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Joanne B. Ciulla

The Search for Ethics in Leadership, Business, and Beyond

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Issues in Business Ethics

Eminent Voices in Business Ethics

Volume 50

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For René

Acknowledgments

Over the years, many people have stimulated my ideas and helped me with my work, among them are the faculty of the Jepson School, where I have done most of my research on leadership ethics. I would especially like to acknowledge my friend and intellectual gadfly, James MacGregor Burns, and my colleague, George (Al) Goethals. Al kept me from misusing and abusing literature from social psychology. I have also benefited from over 20 years of extraordinary conversations and paper swapping with my good friend, the late Robert C. (Bob) Solomon.

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Introduction

Philosophers are a bit like explorers who never really get to where they are going. Instead, they are in it for the journey and the things they discover along the way. Like much of my work, this book is somewhat off the beaten path. I call it the *search* for ethics because the chapters in it are excursions into various ideas, stories, contexts, and aspects of ethics in leadership and business and at work. While the book is philosophical, it is also interdisciplinary. I frequently draw on history to help understand concepts. I like to examine ideas by looking at people and events that lie outside of the usual examples of leaders and cases in business. I do this because history gives us a place to stand and look at ourselves. For example, the story of Nero fiddling while Rome burns helps us understand some aspects of care in leadership (Chap. 3), or the use of cases in Medieval texts illustrates some of the strengths and weaknesses of the case method (Chap. 9).

The book begins my journey with a section on leadership ethics. It merges into the second part on moral imagination, business ethics, and work. I then talk about the vehicles of knowledge that made this exploration of ethics possible – the liberal arts and, most importantly, the humanities. The last part of the book consists of a chapter on resentment, an affliction that plagues many countries today and contributes to polarization and social discord. When leaders cultivate resentment, societies become mean-spirited and potentially dysfunctional. This creates what Plato, in the *Statesman*, said was one of the greatest leadership challenges – how to weave together the meek and the strong and people who do not agree with each other into the fabric of society.

In the introduction to each chapter, I will give background on how and why I wrote about the subject. The chapters in this book trace the evolution of my research, dating back to when I started teaching philosophy at La Salle University in 1975 to the present. In the early days of my career, I was interested in Marx's writings on alienated labor, which led me to explore questions about the meaning of work and ethics in the workplace. I wouldn't say that I was a Marxist, but I appreciated his critique of work and some of the unsavory aspects of capitalism. I suspect that I am not the first business ethics scholar who came to the field via Marx, and probably not the last. As a philosopher, I have always loved ancient philosophy and frequently

draw from it in my research. When I write about the ethics of leaders and work, I find that Aristotle and virtue ethics come in handy, but I do not consider myself a virtue ethicist per se. One of my colleagues calls me an Aristotelian Kantian, which is fairly accurate; however, I tend to think of myself as a philosophical bricoleur. I use whatever ideas are useful for the job at hand, be it from Eastern, Western, analytic, continental, or postmodern philosophy.

When I finished my PhD in 1984, I went to Harvard Business School to do a postdoc in business ethics. At Harvard, I learned about business and wrote teaching notes and cases on business ethics. It was strange to go from working in a philosophy department to a business school. When I told my dissertation advisor that I was going to Harvard, he said, "if you leave philosophy, they'll never let you back in." I never looked back or tried to get back in because I was hooked in interdisciplinary research and writing about practical problems in ethics. Furthermore, by the mid-1980s, business schools seemed to be where the action was – more and more students were studying business and getting MBAs.

After 2 years at Harvard, I went on to teach at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. During that time, my work focused on workplace ethics, and I began doing research for my book on the meaning of work, *The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work* (Times Books, 2000). Years later, I returned to the topic of meaningful work and wrote the paper in Chap. 13 on meaningful work and the moral conditions of work. During my time at Wharton, I also became interested in the role of imagination in teaching ethics and solving ethical problems. Hence, Chaps. 7 and 8 are on moral imagination.

In 1991, my research took a different direction. I went to the University of Richmond as one of the four faculty who designed the Jepson School of Leadership Studies. The Jepson School is a degree-granting liberal arts school that focuses on the study of leadership. Chapter 14 describes how my colleagues and I thought about the study of leadership and designed the school and its curriculum around the liberal arts. One of my colleagues was the influential leadership scholar and Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, James MacGregor Burns. Burns and I debated and corresponded on leadership and ethics for many years. Chapter 5 describes some of the discussions we had via that old-fashioned medium of paper letters. I was excited about doing research on ethics and leadership because back then, there was hardly any work on the subject in the contemporary leadership literature. To me, it seemed like such an obviously important subject that it needed to have its own field. Since 1991, I have engaged in various projects that encouraged other scholars to contribute to the field of leadership ethics. My own research focuses on mapping out the field by laying down a philosophical foundation for it. This included isolating some of the key ethical challenges that are distinctive to people in leadership roles, whether in businesses, governments, communities, NGOs, or social movements.

The first and longest chapter of this book gives an overview of these key issues in leadership ethics. In other chapters, I use historical studies to critique leadership theories and examine ethical questions about leaders and leadership. The study of Nelson Mandela, in Chap. 4, illustrates some of the problems with the theory of authentic leadership. Chapter 6 examines the relationship between public and pri-

vate morality by looking at how adultery affected the leadership of nine US presidents. I also use a thought experiment about a leader kicking a dog to examine how people perceive the virtues of leaders in Chap. 2.

In many ways, leadership ethics is an umbrella for all areas of professional ethics. In business, medicine, law, and other fields, practitioners face the same challenge: how to be effective and at what they do while also being ethical. This can be especially difficult in business. You will see that my work on leadership ethics and business ethics tends to blend together in Part II of the book. This is especially true in Chap. 10 on how the values of business leaders affect organizations and in Chap. 12 on the ethics of empowerment. In Chap. 11, I critically examine how to teach business ethics, while in Chap. 9, I explore the sometimes amusing history of casuistry for insights into the use of cases to teach ethics in various periods of history.

After 25 years at the Jepson School, I find myself back in a business school, where I direct a research institute on ethics and leadership and teach business ethics. I have never felt completely at home in business schools, but I think I should be in one. First, because many business schools continue to resist the idea of requiring students to take business ethics courses that are taught by faculty who are educated in that area. Second, I think applied ethics ought to be taught to the people who will be applying them. And, third, business is the largest major in most universities today, which means students often take fewer classes in other liberal arts, especially the humanities. You will notice that in several chapters, especially Chap. 11, I am critical of business education in and I reiterate the importance of the humanities for teaching and learning about ethics. Chapter 15 compares and contrasts the humanities with the social sciences to explain why we cannot really understand topics like leadership, which are about human nature and relationships, without the humanities. Bringing the humanities into business school education is especially relevant today because so many students study business and then end up in leadership positions that have an influence on the well-being of others in business and society. The humanities are fundamental to learning about ethics. They help students develop moral imagination, empathy, and critical thinking. They also give them perspective on where they are in the broader context of history and humanity. The prospect of leaders, in business and elsewhere, who have not benefited from studying ethics or the humanities is troubling. Yet, we also know that like all education, students do not always learn what we teach them.

In the last chapter of this book, I attempt to understand resentment and the French concept of *ressentiment* as emotions that populist leaders use to cultivate followers and sustain power over them. This insidious emotion polarizes society and compels some to slavishly follow leaders, even when those leaders are unethical or promote policies that are against followers' self-interests and the well-being of society and democracy. I look at this dark and destructive kind of leadership through the eyes of Max Schiller, who had seen it all before in 1920s' Germany, and Friedrich Nietzsche, who warns us of what can happen in a post-truth world where leaders value ideology over truth.

The book ends with a brief afterword in which I reflect on my adventures in the fields of business ethics and leadership ethics.

Contents

About the Author

Joanne B. Ciulla is Professor of Leadership Ethics and Director of the Institute for Ethical Leadership at Rutgers University Business School. Prior to joining the faculty at Rutgers, she was a Founding Faculty Member of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies (University of Richmond), where she held the Coston Family Chair in Leadership and Ethics. Her other academic appointments include LaSalle University, Harvard Business School, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and the UNESCO Chair in Leadership Studies at the United Nations International Leadership Academy. She also has had visiting appointments at Nyenrode Business University, the University of Melbourne, the University of Fort Hare, and Oxford University.

A BA, MA, and PhD in Philosophy, she has published numerous books and articles about leadership ethics and business ethics. She is best known as a pioneer in the field of leadership ethics. Ciulla has received several awards for her scholarship, including Lifetime Achievement Awards from the Society for Business Ethics, the International Leadership Association, and the Eminent Scholar Award from the Network of Leadership Scholars at the Academy of Management. She was also given the Distinguished Educator Award from the University of Richmond and Outstanding Faculty Award from the State Council of Higher Education of Virginia, and she was a Fulbright Specialist.

Ciulla has served both as President of the International Society of Business, Economics, and Ethics and the Society for Business Ethics. She sits on the editorial boards of *The Leadership Quarterly, Leadership,* and *Business Ethics Quarterly* and edits the New Horizons in Leadership Studies series (Edward Elgar). She has worked with a variety of universities, businesses, nonprofits, and government organizations all over the world. She lives in Manhattan with her husband, René Kanters.

Part I
The Ethical Challenges of Leadership

Chapter 1
Ethics and Effectiveness: The Nature of Good Leadership

Abstract and Background In 1995, I published "Leadership Ethics, Mapping the Territory" in the *Business Ethics Quarterly* (5.1, 7–28). The article critically examined the literature in leadership studies and then laid out some of the key problems and parameters for a field of leadership ethics. I imagined a field of study that was analogous to other areas of applied ethics, such as business or medical ethics. The literature in leadership ethics would be multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, and draw from work in philosophy, the sciences, social sciences, and all of the humanities. It would take into account and be integrated with other areas of research in leadership studies.

One of the key objectives in leadership studies is to understand what makes a leader effective. The role of leader is unique in that a leader's competence or incompetence potentially benefits or harms others. From an ethical point of view, being an ethical, incompetent, leader can be just as bad as being a competent, unethical leader. Hence, I have argued that the overarching challenge of leadership, and the framework for leadership ethics, is understanding and navigating the relationship between ethics and effectiveness. This framework also offers a clear and simple way of describing and assessing good leaders – a good leader is both ethical and effective. This chapter is the longest in the book because it elaborates on the ethical challenges that make it difficult for leaders to be ethical and effective. It places these challenges in the context of the leadership literature, and it talks about everything from the personal challenges of self-interest and power, to the problem related to dirty hands and moral luck.

Keywords Leadership ethics · Definition of leadership · Hitler problem · Moral luck · Moral standards · Altruism · Bathsheba Syndrome · Virtue · Transforming leadership · Plato

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Introduction

The moral triumphs and failures of leaders carry a greater weight and volume than those of most other people (Ciulla 2003b). In leadership, we see morality and immorality magnified, which is why the study of ethics is fundamental to the study of leadership. The study of ethics concentrates on the nature of right and wrong and good and evil, and as discussed in the next section, is interchangeable with the word morality. Ethics and morality examine the relationships of people with each other and with other living things. It explores questions related to what we should do and what we should be like as individuals, as members of a group or society, and in the different roles that we play in life. The role of a leader entails a distinctive type of human relationship. Some hallmarks of this relationship are power and/or influence, vision, obligation, and responsibility. By understanding the ethics of this relationship, we gain a better understanding of leadership because some of the central issues in ethics are also the central issues of leadership. They include personal challenges such as self-knowledge, self-interest, and self-discipline, and moral obligations related to justice, duty, competence, and the greatest good.

The challenges of leadership are not new, which is why we find some of the most perceptive work on leadership and ethics in ancient texts. History is filled with wisdom and case studies on the morality of leaders and leadership. Ancient scholars from the East and West offer insights that enable us to understand leadership and formulate contemporary research questions in new ways. History, philosophy, and the humanities in general provide perspective and reveal certain patterns of leadership behavior and themes about leadership and morality that have existed over time. Perhaps the most important benefit of the humanities approach to leadership studies is that it does not allow us to study leader effectiveness without looking at the ethics of what leaders do and how and why they do it. In short, the humanities approach never allows us to forget that the very nature of leadership is inextricably tied to the human condition, which includes the values, needs, and aspirations of human beings who live and work together.

The study of ethics and the history of ideas help us understand two overarching and overlapping questions that drive most leadership research. They are: What is leadership? And what is good leadership? The first is about what leadership is, or a descriptive question. The second is about what leadership ought to be, or a normative question. These two questions are sometimes confused in the literature. Progress in leadership studies rests on the ability of scholars to integrate the answers to these questions. In this chapter, I discuss the implications of these two questions for our understanding of leadership. I begin the chapter by looking at how the ethics and effectiveness question plays out in contemporary work on leadership ethics, and I discuss some of the ethical issues distinctive to leadership. Then I show some of the insights gleaned from the ancient literature and how they complement and provide context for contemporary research. In the end, I suggest some directions for research on ethics in the context of leadership studies.

Ethikos and Morale

Before I get started, a short note on the words ethics and moral is in order. Some people like to make a distinction between these two concepts. The problem with it is that everyone seems to distinguish the concepts in a different way. Like most philosophers, I use the terms interchangeably. As a practical matter, courses on moral philosophy cover the same material as courses on ethics. There is a long history of using these terms as synonyms of each other, regardless of their roots in different languages. In De Fato (II.i) Cicero substituted the Latin word morale for Aristotle's use of the Greek word ethikos. We see the two terms defining each other in the Oxford English Dictionary. The word moral is defined as "of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil in relation to the actions, volitions, or character of human beings; ethical," and "concerned with virtue and vice or rules of conduct, ethical praise or blame, habits of life, custom and manners" (Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1991, p. 1114). Similarly, it defines ethics as "of or pertaining to morality" and "the science of morals, the moral principles by which a person is guided" (Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1991, p. 534). Perhaps the most compelling evidence for why these terms are not significantly different is that people rarely define the difference between them in the same way. They often tend to define the two terms in ways that best suit their argument or research agenda.

The Normative Aspects of Definitions

Leadership scholars often concern themselves with the problem of defining leadership. Some believe that if they could only agree on a common definition of leadership, they would be better able to understand it. This does not make sense because scholars in history, biology, and other subjects do not all agree on the definition of their subject and, even if they did, it would not help them to understand it better. Furthermore, scholars do not determine the meaning of a word for the general public. Would it make sense to have an academic definition that did not agree with the way ordinary people understood the word? Social scientists sometimes limit the definition of a term so that they can use it in a study. Generally, the way people in a culture use a word and think about it determines the meaning of a word (Wittgenstein 1968). The denotation of the word leadership stays basically the same in English. Even though people apply the term differently, all English-speaking leadership scholars know what the word means. Yet the meaning of leadership is also a social construction – slight variations in it tell us about the values, practices, and paradigms of leadership in a certain place and at a certain time.

Rost (1991) is among those who think that there has been little progress in leadership studies. He believed that there would be no progress in leadership studies

until scholars agree on a common definition of leadership. He collected 221 definitions of leadership, ranging from the 1920s to the 1990s. All of these definitions generally say the same thing – leadership is about a person or persons somehow moving other people to do something. Where the definitions differ is in how leaders motivate their followers, their relationship to followers, who has a say in the goals of the group or organization, and what abilities the leader needs to have to get things done. I chose definitions that were representative of definitions from other sources from the same era. Even today, one can find a strong family resemblance in the ways various leadership scholars define leadership.

Consider the following definitions (all from American sources) and think about the history of the time and the prominent leaders of that era. What were they like? What were their followers like? What events and values shaped the ideas behind these definitions?

1920s: [Leadership is] the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation (Moore 1927, p. 124).
1930s: Leadership is a process in which the activities of many are organized to move in a specific direction by one (Bogardus 1934, p. 5).
1940s: Leadership is the result of an ability to persuade or direct men, apart from the prestige or power that comes from office or external circumstance (Reuter 1941, p. 133).
1950s: [Leadership is what leaders do in groups.] The leader's authority is spontaneously accorded him by his fellow group members (Gibb 1954, p. 882).
1960s: [Leadership is] acts by a person which influence other persons in a shared direction (Seeman 1960, p. 127).
1970s: Leadership is defined in terms of discretionary influence. Discretionary influence refers to those leader behaviors under control of the leader, which he may vary from individual to individual (Osborne and Hunt 1975, p. 28).
1980s: Regardless of the complexities involved in the study of leadership, its meaning is relatively simple. Leadership means to inspire others to undertake some form of purposeful action as determined by the leader (Sarkesian 1981, p. 243).
1990s: Leadership is an influence relationship between leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes (Rost 1991, p. 102).
2000s: Leadership is shaped by its contextual factors and it occurs when anyone or anything brings forth direction, alignment, and/or commitment. (Drath et al. 2008; Hunt and Dodge 2000; Kort 2008; Leiden and Antonakis 2009; Uhl-Bien 2006).

Notice that in the 1920s, leaders "impressed" their will on those led. In the 1940s, they "persuaded" followers; in the 1960s, they "influenced" them; whereas in the 1990s, leaders and followers influenced each other. By the 2000s leadership is a relationship that occurs in a context. Observe how all of these definitions say something about the nature of the leader–follower relationship. The difference between these definitions, rests on normative questions: How should leaders treat followers? And how should followers treat leaders? Who decides what goals to pursue? What is and what ought to be the nature of their relationship to each other? The definition

debate demonstrates the extent to which the very concept of leadership is a social, historical, and normative construction.

The Hitler Problem

Some scholars would argue that bullies and tyrants are not leaders, which takes us to what I have called "the Hitler problem" (Ciulla 1995). The Hitler problem is based on how you answer the question, Was Hitler a leader? According to the morally unattractive definitions, he was a leader, perhaps even a great leader, albeit an immoral one. Heifetz (1994) argues that, under the "great man" and trait theories of leadership, you can put Hitler, Lincoln, and Gandhi in the same category because the underlying idea of the theory is that leadership is a person or group's influence over the course of history. However, when your concept of leadership includes ethical considerations, Hitler was not a leader at all. He was a bully or tyrant – or simply the head of Germany.

We see how ingrained ethical ideas are in the concept of a leader when scholars differentiate between leaders and "real leaders" or "true leaders." Burns (1978) and Bass (1997) suggest that many leaders – transactional ones – are competent in that they promote exchanges among subordinates in their pursuit of collective outcomes, but that only transformational leaders are leaders in a strong moral sense. Extending this distinction, Bass attempts to separate leaders who fit the description of a transformational leader but are not ethical, from ethical leaders by distinguishing between transformational and pseudotransformational leaders or authentic transformational leaders (Bass and Steidlmeier 1999). Brown et al. (2005) make this distinction between common leadership and ethical leadership explicit in their concept of ethical leadership: "the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relations, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making" (p. 120). Using Bennis and Nanus's (1985) characterization of leadership – "Managers are people who do things right and leaders are people who do right things" (p. 21) – one could argue that Hitler was neither unethical nor a leader. (Maybe he was a manager?) Bennis and Nanus are among those scholars who sometimes slip into using the term leader to mean a morally good leader. However, what appears to be behind this in Bennis and Nanus's comment is the idea that leaders are or should be morally a head above everyone else.

This normative strand exists throughout the leadership literature, most noticeably in the popular literature. Writers will say leaders are participatory, supportive, and so forth, when what they really mean is that leaders should have these qualities. Yet it may not even be clear that we really want leaders with these qualities. As former presidential spokesman David Gergen (2002) pointed out, leadership scholars all preach and teach that participatory, empowering leadership is best. A president like George W. Bush, however, exercised a top- down style of leadership. Few leadership scholars would prescribe such leadership in their work. Nonetheless,

President Bush scored some of the highest ratings for exercising leadership in recent history despite the fact that he also had some of the lowest approval ratings for his actions as a leader (Gergen 2002). A number of studies help explain this based on the context of Bush's leadership in post-9/11 America. For example, Pillai found that charismatic leadership is not only about personal characteristics but is also something that emerges in leaders during a crisis (Pillai 1996). When people feel a loss of control, they look for decisive leaders. In the case of Bush, they may have found his autocratic leadership style comforting. As the crisis subsided later in his presidency, Bush's ratings hit rock bottom. Another explanation for this disparity between what leadership scholars preach and what people want reflects conflicting cultural values. The American ethos of rugged individualism may also help explain Bush's ratings. On one hand, Americans admire leaders who take bold, decisive, and autocratic action, but on the other hand, they do not want to work for them (Ruscio 2004).

Philosopher Eva Kort (2008) offers a solution to the Hitler problem that goes beyond semantics. She notes that group actions, not relationships, reveal the features that identify what she calls "leadership proper" or "real" leadership from cases of "purported" leadership. Real leadership is ethical and competent leadership. Purported leadership is basically someone in a leadership role, telling people what to do. Kort uses a simple example to illustrate the normative and technical aspects of leadership. A concertmaster holds a formal leadership position. If he or she conducts the orchestra with instructions that the musicians know are bad, they will follow him because of his position. In this case, Kort says the concertmaster is merely a purported leader, not a leader proper. She writes: "It is only when the concertmaster does lead–participate in the plural action in (generally) the right sort of way–that the concertmaster is the leader in the proper sense" (Kort 2008, p. 422). Notice how Kort's definition includes unavoidable judgments. Leaders are people whom we choose to follow because they seem competent and, where relevant, ethical. For Kort, leaders are those whose ideas are voluntarily endorsed and acted on by others in various situations. This is a useful way to understand how ethics and effectiveness are woven together in the concept of leadership. For Kort, the answer to the Hitler problem depends on whether followers freely choose to follow him because they endorse his ethics and think he is competent. This speaks directly to his leadership, but it still does not account for cases where followers are unethical, or morally mistaken, or when they misjudge the competence of their leaders. As philosopher Jacqueline Boaks argues, ethics is so embedded in the idea of leadership that it has to be grounded in some sense of the good. She argues that this grounding would involve "knowledge of what is needed for the flourishing of both followers and leaders" (Boaks 2015). In doing so the word leader would not simply refer to a person or role but as Boaks says, a kind of Aristotelian master virtue that one would attribute to a person. This would resolve the Hitler problem because people who do not promote human flourishing would not possess the virtue that defines them as leaders, but it does not define away the fact that there still are bad leaders.

Hence, the ultimate question about leadership is not, "What is the definition of leadership?" We are not confused about what leaders are, but we would like to know what they should be like. The point of studying leadership is to answer the question, "What is good leadership?" The use of the word good here has two senses: morally good leadership and technically good leadership (i.e., effective at getting the job at-hand done). The problem with this view is that when we look at history and the leaders around us, we find some leaders who meet both criteria, some who meet one, and some who do not meet either. History confuses the matter further because historians do not write about the leader who was very ethical but did not do anything of significance. They rarely write about a general who was a great human being but never won a battle. Most historians write about leaders who were winners or who change history for better or for worse.

Agency and Moral Luck

Historians concern themselves with what leaders do and the consequences of their actions. Biographers are interested in both the actions and the character of leaders. Both must grapple with questions of causation and the agency. Which outcomes are the direct result of a leader's actions and which outcomes come about for other reasons or by chance? Some of our judgments about leaders rest on what philosophers call, moral luck (Nagel 1979). Moral luck is when we attribute praise or blame to a person for an outcome that was not under their control. In Immanuel Kant's (1783/1993) ethics there is no such thing as moral luck because the morality of an act is based on the agent's intent to do her duty, not on how it turns out. This is because we may try to do what is morally right but things outside of our control may result in disastrous consequences. So, for Kant, an act is ethical if it is done with the intent to do one's duty regardless of the outcome, and unethical if it is not based on the intent of doing one's duty and even if it results in a morally good outcome.

In the case of leaders, we cannot ignore consequences because they can have a profound impact on the well-being of others. Some leaders may behave recklessly or in self- serving ways but because of good fortune, they appear to have done morally good things. For example, if a president decided to carpet bomb a terrorist stronghold without regard for innocent civilians and by a twist of fate all of the civilians happened to be of town that day, then the act may appear to be a good one (especially if the public did not know that the leader take into consideration his or her duty to protect innocent civilians). As Bernard Williams (1982) notes there are two kinds of moral luck. The first is intrinsic to an action – based on how well a person thinks through a decision and whether his or her inferences are sound and turn out to be right. Careful plans may fail, and risky ones may succeed. The second, kind of moral luck is extrinsic to a decision. Things like bad weather, accidents, terrorists, malfunctioning machines, etc., may sabotage the best-laid plans or make the worst plans work.

Meindl et al. (1985) found that people tend to think that leaders have more control over outcomes then than they actually do. This coincides with one of the most ethically distinctive aspects of being a leader. Leaders are supposed to take responsibility for an organization, group, etc. As a result of this they are held responsible for things that they did not do or even know about in their organizations. Anything that goes wrong in an organization is their fault and anything that goes right is to their credit. Because the notion of moral agency is sometimes indirect for leaders, especially those operating in complex organizations or systems, luck can play a significant role our assessment of leaders and their leadership. Some leaders are ethical but unlucky, whereas others are not as ethical but very lucky. Most really difficult moral decisions made by leaders are risky because they have imperfect or incomplete information and lack control over all of the variables that will affect outcomes. Leaders who fail at something are worthy of forgiveness when they act with deliberate care and for the right moral reasons, even though followers do not always forgive them or have confidence in their leadership. Americans did not blame President Jimmy Carter for the botched attempt to free the hostages in Iran, but his bad luck in this case was one more thing that shook their faith in his leadership. The irony of moral luck is that leaders who are reckless and do not base their actions on sound moral and practical arguments are usually condemned when they fail and celebrated as heroes when they succeed. The reckless, lucky leader does not demonstrate moral or technical competency, yet because of the outcome, he or she often gets credit for having both.

The Relationship Between Ethics and Effectiveness

History often defines successful leaders in terms of their ability to bring about change for better or worse. As a result, for some people, the great leaders in history include everyone from Gandhi to Hitler. Whereas these so-called "great" leaders usually bring about change or are successful at doing something, the ethical questions waiting in the wings are always these; Was the change itself morally good? How did the leader go about bringing change? And what were the leader's intentions? A full analysis of the ethics and effectiveness of any action requires one to ask: Was it the right thing to do? Was it done the right way? Was it done for the right reason? One needs to ask these questions to assess whether leaders who are great in the sense of changing history, are also good leaders.

What many scholars mean when they talk about a good leader is that he or she is an ethical and an effective leader (Ciulla 1995). Whereas, this may seem like stating the obvious, the problem we face is that we do not always find ethics and effectiveness in the same leader. Some leaders are highly ethical but not very effective. Others are very effective at giving their constituents what they want but not very ethical. For example, some of President Donald Trump's strongest supporters are

Evangelical Christians. Despite the fact that Trump regularly lies to the public and has had adulterous relationships with other women, they support him because he will appoint conservative judges and other policies that they care about. They are willing to give him a pass on his ethics as long as he delivers on what they want. In politics, the old saying "He may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he's our son-of-a-bitch," captures the willingness to trade between ethics for effectiveness. This distinction between ethics and effectiveness is not always a crisp one. Sometimes being ethical is being effective and sometimes being effective is being ethical. In other words, ethics is effectiveness in certain instances. There are times when simply being regarded as ethical and trustworthy makes a leader effective and other times when being highly effective makes a leader ethical, but as philosopher Onora O'Neill notes, trustworthiness not only requires people to be honest and competent, it also requires them to be reliable (O'Neill 2013). Given the limited power and resources of the secretary-general of the United Nations, it would be very difficult for someone in this position to be effective in the job if he or she did not behave ethically. The same is true for organizations. In the famous Tylenol case, Johnson & Johnson actually increased sales of Tylenol by pulling Tylenol bottles off their shelves after someone poisoned some of them. The leaders at Johnson & Johnson were effective because they appeared to act ethically.

The criteria that we use to judge the effectiveness of a leader are also not morally neutral. For a while, Wall Street and the business press lionized Al Dunlap ("Chainsaw Al") as a great business leader. Their admiration was based on his ability to downsize a company and raise the price of its stock. Dunlap apparently knew little about the nuts and bolts of running a business. When he failed to deliver profits at his company, Sunbeam, he tried to cover up his losses and was fired. In this case and in many business cases, the criteria for effectiveness are practically and morally limited. It takes more skill to raise a company's stock price by keeping people employed than it does to raise it by firing them. Also, one of the most striking aspects of professional ethics is that often what seems right in the short run is not right in the long run or what seems right for a group or organization is not right when placed in a broader context. For example, Mafia families may have very strong internal ethical systems, but they are highly unethical in any larger context of society.

There are also cases when the sheer competence of a leader has a moral impact. For instance, there were numerous examples of heroism in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. The most inspiring and frequently cited were the altruistic acts of rescue workers. Yet consider the case of Alan S. Weil, whose law firm Sidley, Austin, Brown, & Wood occupied five floors of the World Trade Center. Immediately after watching the Trade Center towers fall to the ground and checking to see if his employees got out safely, Weil got on the phone and within 3 h had rented four floors of another building for his employees. By the end of the day, he had arranged for an immediate delivery of 800 desks and 300 computers. The next day, the firm was open for business with desks for almost

every employee (Schwartz 2001). We do not know if Mr. Weil's motives were altruistic or avaricious, but his focus on doing his job allowed the firm to fulfill its obligations to all of its stakeholders, from clients to employees. Is this an example of good (meaning ethical and effective) leadership?

On the flip side of the ethics effectiveness continuum are situations where it is difficult to tell whether a leader is unethical, incompetent, or stupid. As Price (2000, 2005) has argued, the moral failures of leaders are not always intentional. Sometimes moral failures are cognitive and sometimes they are normative. Leaders may get their facts wrong and think that they are acting ethically when, in fact, they are not. For example, in 2000, South African president Thabo Mbeki issued a statement saying that it was not clear that HIV caused AIDS. He thought the pharmaceutical industry was just trying to scare people so that it could increase its profits (Garrett 2000). Coming from the leader of a country where about one in five people tests positive for HIV, this was a shocking statement. His stance caused outrage among public health experts and other citizens. It was irresponsible and certainly undercut the efforts to stop the AIDS epidemic. Mbeki understood the scientific literature but chose to put political and philosophical reasons ahead of scientific knowledge. (He later backed away from this position.) When leaders do things like this, we want to know if they are unethical, misinformed, incompetent, or just stupid. Mbeki's actions seemed unethical, but he may have thought he was taking an ethical stand. His narrow mindset about this issue made him recklessly disregard his more pressing obligations to stop the AIDS epidemic (Moldoveanu and Langer 2002).

In some situations, leaders act with moral intentions, but because they are incompetent, they create unethical outcomes. Take, for instance, the unfortunate case of the Swiss charity Christian Solidarity International. Its goal was to free an estimated 200,000 Dinka children who were enslaved in Sudan. The charity paid between $35 and $75 a head to free enslaved children. The unintended consequence of the charity's actions was that it actually encouraged enslavement by creating a market for it. The price of slaves and the demand for them went up. Also, some cunning Sudanese found that it paid to pretend that they were slaves so that they could make money by being liberated. This deception made it difficult for the charity to identify those who really needed help from those who were faking it. Here the charity's intent and the means it used to achieve its goals were not unethical in relation to alleviating suffering in the short run; however, in the long run, the charity inadvertently created more suffering. This case illustrates the relationship between ethics and effectiveness. The charity:

1. Did the right thing – they intended to free children from slavery— but they ended up increasing the market for child slaves
2. They did it the wrong way – taking part in the buying and selling of a human being is unethical.
3. Yet, they did it for the right reason – slavery is immoral because it violates the dignity and human rights of children.

In *The Prince* (1532/1988), Niccolò Machiavelli grappled with the problems that leaders have being ethical and effective. He realized that there are situations where

leaders could not be both ethical and effective. Sometimes they need to do the wrong thing for the right reason or do the right thing the wrong way. Machiavelli says, "If a ruler who wants always to act honorably is surrounded by many unscrupulous men his downfall is inevitable" (Machiavelli 1988, p. 54). Sometimes we regard a leader who acts honorably when dealing with dishonorable people as naïve or incompetent. Machiavelli says that leaders must learn how "not to be good" because there are cases where behaving ethically confers harm on both leaders and followers. We usually dismiss "the ends justifying the means" as a justification for immoral behavior. Nevertheless, leaders frequently face situations where this justification, while morally questionable, characterizes their best course of action. Herein lies the problem: In what kinds of cases do the ends justify the means? For example, does improving the stock price or the bottom line justify cutting employees' wages or downsizing? Sometimes yes, when there is a moral and practical justification for such measures. Moreover, when does the desire to reach a particular end become an excuse for actions that are expedient and generally unethical? How does a leader resist becoming a kind of feckless utilitarian who is willing to do whatever it takes to get the job done? A leader does not have to be a prince in Machiavelli's time to face these questions.

Echoing Machiavelli, philosopher Michael Walzer (1973) agrees that no leader leads innocently. Leaders often find themselves facing what he calls the "dirty hands problem." The job of most leaders is inherently utilitarian in that they have to look after the greatest good for the whole of their group, organization, country, etc. Yet, we tend to judge the moral character of leaders in terms of their virtues and commitment to moral principles. At some point, most leaders confront tensions between ethical principles and the obligations that they have to their followers or organizations. When a leader's moral obligation to prevent harm to followers or their organization can only be filled by doing something unethical, he or she faces a real moral dilemma. Most of the time we face moral problems, which are problems for which we can find satisfactory moral solutions. Moral dilemmas are a distinctive and less common type of moral problem where there is no morally satisfactory solution. No matter what choice you make in a dilemma, you do something wrong. For example, if terrorists take a hostage and threaten to kill him if the President does not release other dangerous terrorists from prison – any choice the president makes leaves him with dirty hands because either the hostage dies or the terrorists are free to commit acts of violence and kill more people.

It is ironic that we select, hire, or elect leaders to make these difficult decisions and get their hands dirty and then we often reproach them for it when they do. The President would be condemned for the loss of the hostage's life or the subsequent attack by the freed terrorists. While we cannot expect moral purity from leaders (or anyone for that matter), we hope that when leaders have to do wrong to do right, their conscience makes them feel dirty. Leading is a morally dangerous occupation because leaders have to fight the temptation to become comfortable with the moral compromises that they sometimes have to make to be effective at doing their job.

Deontological and Teleological Theories

The ethics-and-effectiveness question parallels the perspectives of deontological and teleological theories in ethics. As we saw in the earlier discussion of moral luck, from the deontological point of view, reasons are the morally relevant aspects of an act. As long as the leader acts according to his or her duty or on moral principles, then the leader acts ethically, regardless of the consequences. From a teleological perspective, what really matters is that the leader's actions result in bringing about something morally good or "the greatest good." Deontological theories locate the ethics of an action in the moral intent of the leader and his or her moral justification for the action, whereas teleological theories locate the ethics of the action in its results. We need both deontological and teleological theories to account for the ethics of leaders. Just as a good leader has to be ethical and effective, he or she also has to act according to duty and with some notion of the greatest good in mind.

In modernity, we often separate the inner person from the outer person and a person from his or her actions. The utilitarian John Stuart Mill (1987) saw this split between the ethics of the person and the ethics of his or her actions clearly. He said the intentions or reasons for an act tell us something about the morality of the person, but the ends of an act tell us about the morality of the action. This solution does not really solve the ethics-and effectiveness problem. It simply reinforces the split between the personal morality of a leader and what he or she does as a leader. Ancient Greek theories of ethics based on virtue do not have this problem. In virtue theories, you basically are what you do.

Going back to an earlier example, Mr. Weil may have worked quickly to keep his law firm going because he was so greedy that he did not want to lose a day of billings, but in doing so, he also produced the greatest good for various stakeholders. We may not like his personal reasons for acting, but in this particular case, the various stakeholders may not care because they also benefited. If the various stakeholders knew that Weil had selfish intentions, they would, as Mill said, think less of him but not less of his actions. This is often the case with business. When a business runs a campaign to raise money for the homeless, it may be doing it to sell more of its goods and improve its public image. Yet it would seem a bit harsh to say that the business should not have the charity drive and deny needed funds for the homeless. One might argue that it is sometimes very unethical to demand perfect moral intentions. Nonetheless, personally unethical leaders who do good things for their constituents are still problematic. Even though they provide for the greatest good, their people can never really trust them.

Moral Standards

People often say that leaders should be held to "a higher moral standard," but does that make sense? If true, would it then be acceptable for everyone else to live by lower moral standards? The curious thing about morality is that if you set the moral

standards for leaders too high, requiring something close to moral perfection, then few people will be qualified to be leaders or will want to be leaders. For example, how many of us could live up to the standard of having never lied, said an unkind word, or reneged on a promise? Ironically, when we set moral standards for leaders too high, we become even more dissatisfied with our leaders because few are able to live up to our expectations. We set moral standards for leaders too low, however, when we reduce them to nothing more than following the law or, worse, simply not being as unethical as their predecessors. A business leader may follow all laws and yet be highly immoral in the way he or she runs a business. Laws are supposed to be either morally neutral or moral minimums about what is right. They do not and cannot capture the scope and complexity of morality. For example, an elected official may be law abiding and, unlike his or her predecessor, live by "strong family values." The official may also have little concern for the disadvantaged. Not caring about the poor and the sick is not against the law, but is such a leader ethical? So where does this leave us? On one hand, it is admirable to aspire to high moral standards, but on the other hand, if the standards are unreachable, then people give up trying to reach them (Ciulla 1994, pp. 167–183). If the standards are too high, we may become more disillusioned with our leaders for failing to reach them. We might also end up with a shortage of competent people who are willing to take on leadership positions because we expect too much from them ethically. Some highly qualified people stay out of politics because they do not want their private lives aired in public. If the standards are too low, we become cynical about our leaders because we have lost faith in their ability to rise above the moral minimum.

History is littered with leaders who did not think they were subject to the same moral standards of honesty, propriety, and so forth, as the rest of society. One explanation for this is so obvious that it has become a cliché – power corrupts. Winter's (2002) and McClelland's (1975) works on how power motives and on socialized and personalized charisma offer psychological accounts of this kind of leader behavior. Maccoby (2000) and a host of others have talked about narcissistic leaders who, on the bright side, are exceptional and, on the dark side, consider themselves exceptions to the rules.

Hollander's (1964) work on social exchange demonstrates how emerging leaders who are loyal to and competent at attaining group goals gain "idiosyncrasy credits" that allow them to deviate from the groups' norms to suit common goals. As Price (2000) has argued, given the fact that we often grant leaders permission to deviate or be an exception to the rules, it is not difficult to see why leaders sometimes make themselves exceptions to moral constraints. This is why I think we should not hold leaders to higher moral standards than ourselves. If anything, we have to make sure that we hold them to the same standards as the rest of society. What we should expect and hope for is that our leaders will fail less than most people at meeting ethical standards, while pursuing and achieving the goals of their constituents. The really interesting question for leadership development, organizational, and political theory is "What can we do to keep leaders from the moral failures that stem from being in a leadership role?" Too many heroic models of leadership characterize the leader as a saint or "father-knows- best" archetype who exemplifies all the right values and traits.

Altruism

Some leadership scholars use altruism as the moral standard for ethical leadership. In their book Ethical Dimensions of Leadership, Kanungo and Mendonca wrote (1996), "Our thesis is that organizational leaders are truly effective only when they are motivated by a concern for others, when their actions are invariably guided primarily by the criteria of the benefit to others even if it results in some cost to oneself" (p. 35). When people talk about altruism, they usually contrast altruism with selfishness, or behavior that benefits oneself at a cost to others (Ozinga 1999). Altruism is a very high personal standard and, as such, is problematic for a number of reasons. Both selfishness and altruism refer to extreme types of motivation and behavior. Locke brings out this extreme side of altruism in a dialogue with Avolio (Avolio and Locke 2002). Locke argued that if altruism is about self-sacrifice, then leaders who want to be truly altruistic will pick a job that they do not like or value, expect no rewards or pleasure from their job or achievements, and give themselves over totally to serving the wants of others. He then asked, "Would anyone want to be a leader under such circumstances?" (Avolio and Locke 2002, pp. 169–171). One might also ask, "Would we even want such a person as a leader?" Whereas I do not agree with Locke's argument that leaders should act according to their self-interest, he does articulate the practical problem of using altruism as a standard of moral behavior for leaders. Avolio's argument against Locke is based on equally extreme cases. He draws on his work at West Point, where a central moral principle in the military is the willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice for the good of the group. Avolio also used Mother Teresa as one of his examples. In these cases, self-sacrifice may be less about the ethics of leaders in general and more about the jobs of military leaders and missionaries. The Locke and Avolio debate pits the extreme aspects of altruism against its heroic side. Here, as in the extensive philosophic literature on self-interest and altruism, the debate spins round and round and does not get us very far. Ethics is about the relationship of individuals to others, so in a sense both sides are right and wrong.

Altruism is a motive for acting, but it is not in and of itself a normative principle (Nagel 1970). Requiring leaders to act altruistically is not only a tall order, but it does not guarantee that the leader or his or her actions will be moral. For example, stealing from the rich to give to the poor, or Robinhoodism, is morally problematic (Ciulla 2003a). A terrorist leader who becomes a suicide bomber might have purely altruistic intentions, but the means that he uses to carry out his mission – killing innocent people – is not considered ethical even if his cause is a just one. One might also argue, as one does against suicide, that it is unethical for a person to sacrifice his or her life for any reason because of the impact that it has on loved ones. Great leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and Gandhi behaved altruistically, but what made their leadership ethical was the means that they used to achieve their ends and the morality of their causes. We have a particular respect for leaders who are martyred for a cause, but the morality of King and Gandhi goes beyond their motives.

Achieving their objectives for social justice while empowering and disciplining followers to use nonviolent resistance is morally good leadership.

People also describe altruism as a way of assessing an act or behavior, regardless of the agent's intention. For example, Worchel et al. (1988) defined altruism as acts that "render help to another person" (p. 394). If altruism is nothing more than helping people, then it is a more manageable standard, but simply helping people is not necessarily ethical. It depends on how you help them and what you help them do. It is true that people often help each other without making great sacrifices. If altruism is only helping people, then we have radically redefined the concept by eliminating the self-sacrificing requirement. Mendonca (2001) offered a further modification of altruism in what he called "mutual altruism." Mutual altruism boils down to utilitarianism and enlightened self-interest. If we follow this line of thought, we should also add other moral principles, such as the golden rule, to this category of altruism.

It is interesting to note that Confucius explicitly called the golden rule altruism. When asked by Tzu-Kung what the guiding principle of life is, Confucius answered, "It is the word altruism (shu). Do not do unto others what you do not want them to do to you" (Confucius, trans. 1963, p. 44). The golden rule crops up as a fundamental moral principle in most major cultures because it demonstrates how to transform self-interest into concern for the interests of others. In other words, it provides the bridge between altruism and self-interest (others and the self) and allows for enlightened self-interest. This highlights another reason why altruism is not a useful standard for the moral behavior of leaders. The minute we start to modify altruism, it not only loses its initial meaning, but it starts to sound like a wide variety of other ethical terms, which makes it very confusing. The one practical thing we know about leaders is that they usually lose the confidence and trust of their followers when leaders' actions are perceived to serve their own interests rather than the interests of their followers or organizations.

Why Being a Leader Is Not in an Ethical Person's Self-Interest

Plato believed that leadership required a person to sacrifice his or her immediate self- interests, but this did not amount to altruism. In Book II of the Republic, Plato (trans. 1992) wrote:

> In a city of good men, if it came into being, the citizens would fight in order not to rule. There it would be clear that anyone who is really a true ruler doesn't by nature seek his own advantage but that of his subjects. And everyone, knowing this, would rather be benefited by others than take the trouble to benefit them. (p. 347d)

Rather than requiring altruistic motives, Plato was referring to the stress, hard work, and the sometimes-thankless task of being a morally good leader. He implied that if you are a just person, leadership will take a toll on you and your life. The only reason a just person will take on a leadership role is out of fear of punishment. He

stated further, "Now the greatest punishment, if one isn't willing to rule, is to be ruled by someone worse than oneself. And I think it is fear of this that makes decent people rule when they do" (Plato, trans. 1992, p. 347c). Plato's comment sheds light on why we sometimes feel more comfortable with people who are reluctant to lead than with those who are eager to do so. Today, as in the past, we worry that people who are too eager to lead want the power and position for themselves or that they do not fully understand the enormous responsibilities of leadership. Plato also tells us that whereas leadership is not in the just person's immediate self-interest, it is in their long-term interest. He argued that it is in our best interest to be just, because just people are happier and lead better lives than do unjust people (Plato, trans. 1992, p. 353e).

Whereas we admire self-sacrifice, morality sometimes calls upon leaders to do things that are against their self-interest. This is less about altruism than it is about the nature of both morality and leadership. We want leaders to put the interests of followers first, but most leaders do not pay a price for doing that on a daily basis, nor do most circumstances require them to calculate their interests in relation to the interests of their followers. The practice of leadership is to guide and look after the goals, missions, and aspirations of groups, organizations, countries, or causes. When leaders do this, they are doing their job; when they do not do this, they are not doing their job. Ample research demonstrates that self-interested people who are unwilling to put the interests of others first are often not successful as leaders (Avolio and Locke 2002, pp. 186–188).

Looking after the interests of others is as much about what leaders do in their role as leaders as it is about the moral quality of leadership. Implicit in the idea of leadership effectiveness is the notion that leaders do their job. When a mayor does not look after the interests of a city, she is not only ineffective, she is unethical for not keeping the promise that she made when sworn in as mayor. When she does look after the interests of the city, it is not because she is altruistic, but because she is doing her job. In this way, altruism is built into how we describe what leaders do. Whereas altruism is not the best concept for characterizing the ethics of leadership, scholars' interest in altruism reflects a desire to capture, either implicitly or explicitly, the ethics-and-effectiveness notion of good leadership.

Transforming Leadership

In the leadership literature, transforming or transformational leadership has become almost synonymous with ethical leadership. Transformational leadership is often contrasted with transactional leadership. There is a parallel between these two theories and the altruism/self-interest dichotomy. Burns's (1978) theory of transforming leadership is compelling because it rests on a set of moral assumptions about the relationship between leaders and followers. Burns's theory is clearly a prescriptive one about the nature of morally good leadership. Drawing from Abraham Maslow's work on needs, Milton Rokeach's research on values development, and research on

moral development from Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget, Erik Erickson, and Alfred Adler, Burns argued that leaders have to operate at higher need and value levels than those of followers, which may entail transcending their self-interests. A leader's role is to exploit tension and conflict within people's value systems and play the role of raising people's consciousness (Burns 1978).

On Burns's account, transforming leaders have very strong values. They do not water down their values and moral ideals by consensus, but rather they elevate people by using conflict to engage followers and help them reassess their own values and needs. This is an area where Burns's view of ethics is very different from advocates of participatory leadership such as Rost. Burns wrote, "Despite his [Rost's] intense and impressive concern about the role of values, ethics, and morality in transforming leadership, he underestimates the crucial importance of these variables." Burns goes on to say, "Rost leans toward, or at least is tempted by, consensus procedures and goals that I believe erode such leadership" (Burns 1991, p. xii).

The moral questions that drive Burns's (1978) theory of transforming leadership come from his work as a biographer and historian. When biographers or historians study a leader, they struggle with the question of how to judge or keep from judging their subject. Throughout his book, Burns uses examples of a number of incidents where questionable means, such as lying and deception, are used to achieve honorable ends or where the private life of a politician is morally questionable. If you analyze the numerous historical examples in Burns' book, you find that two pressing moral questions shape his leadership theory. The first is the morality of means and ends (and this also includes the moral use of power). The second is the tension between the public and private morality of a leader. His theory of transforming leadership is an attempt to characterize good leadership by accounting for both of these questions.

Burns's distinction between transforming and transactional leadership and modal and end values offers a way to think about the question, "What is a good leader?" in terms of the leader–follower relationship and the means and ends of his or her actions. Transactional leadership rests on the values found in the means or process of leadership. He calls these modal values. These include responsibility, fairness, honesty, and promise keeping. Transactional leadership helps leaders and followers reach their own goals by supplying lower-level wants and needs so that they can move up to higher needs. Transforming leadership is concerned with end values, such as liberty, justice, and equality. Transforming leaders raise their followers up through various stages of morality and need, and they turn their followers into leaders.

As a historian, Burns was very concerned with the ends of actions and the changes that leaders initiate. Consider, for example, Burns's (1978) two answers to the Hitler question. In the first part of the book, he stated quite simply that "Hitler, once he gained power and crushed all opposition, was no longer a leader – he was a tyrant" (pp. 2–3). A tyrant is similar to Kort's (2008) idea of a purported leader. Later in the book, Burns offered three criteria for judging how Hitler would fare before "the bar of history." He stated that Hitler would probably argue that he was a transforming leader who spoke for the true values of the German people and

elevated them to a higher destiny. First, he would be tested by modal values of honor and integrity or the extent to which he advanced or thwarted the standards of good conduct in mankind. Second, he would be judged by the end values of equality and justice. Last, he would be judged on the impact that he had on the people that he touched (Burns 1978). According to Burns, Hitler would fail all three tests. Burns did not consider Hitler a true leader or a transforming leader because of the means that he used, the ends that he achieved, and the impact he had as a moral agent on his followers during the process of his leadership. By looking at leadership as a process that is judged by a set of values, Burns's (1978) theory of good leadership is difficult to pigeonhole into one ethical theory. The most attractive part of Burns's theory is the idea that a leader elevates his or her followers and makes them leaders. Near the end of his book, he reintroduces this idea with an anecdote about why President Johnson did not run in 1968, stating, "Perhaps he did not comprehend that the people he had led – as a result in part of the impact of his leadership – had created their own fresh leadership, which was now outrunning his" (Burns, 1978, p. 424). All of the people that Johnson helped, the sick, the Blacks, and the poor, now had their own leadership. Burns (1978) noted, "Leadership begat leadership and hardly recognized its offspring. Followers had become leaders" (p. 424).

Burns's and other scholars' use of the word "value" to talk about ethics is problematic because it encompasses so many different kinds of things – economic values, organizational values, personal values, and moral values. Values do not necessarily tie people together the way moral concepts like duty and utility do, because most people subscribe to the view that "I have my values and you have yours." Having values does not mean that a person acts on them. To make values about something that people do rather than just have, Rokeach (1973) offered a very awkward discussion of the "ought" character of values. "A person phenomenologically experiences 'oughtness' to be objectively required by society in somewhat the same way that he perceives an incomplete circle as objectively requiring closure" (p. 9). Whereas Burns provides a provocative moral account of leadership, it would be stronger and clearer if he used the richer and more dynamic concepts found in moral philosophy. This is not philosophic snobbery, but a plea for conceptual clarity and completeness. The implications of concepts such as virtue, duty, rights, and the greatest good have been worked out for hundreds of years and offer helpful tools for dissecting the moral dynamics of leadership and the relationship between leaders and followers.

Transformational Leadership

Burns's (1978) theory has inspired a number of studies on transformational leadership. For example, Bass's (1985) early work on transformational leadership focused on the impact of leaders on their followers. In sharp contrast to Burns, Bass's transformational leaders did not have to appeal to the higher-order needs and values of their followers. He was more concerned with the psychological relationship between

transformational leaders and their followers. Bass originally believed that there could be both good and evil transformational leaders, so he was willing to call Hitler a transformational leader. Bass later made an admirable effort to offer a richer account of ethics. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) argued that only morally good leaders are authentic transformational leaders; the rest, like Hitler, are pseudotransformational. Bass and Steidlmeier described pseudotransformational leaders as people who seek power and position at the expense of their followers' achievements. The source of their moral shortcomings lies in the fact that they are selfish and pursue their own interests at the expense of their followers. Whereas Bass and Steidlmeier still depend on altruism as a moral concept, they also look at authentic transformational leadership in terms of other ethical concepts such as virtue and commitment to the greatest good.

Bass (1985) believed that charismatic leadership is a necessary ingredient of transformational leadership. The research on charismatic leadership opens up a wide range of ethical questions because of the powerful emotional and moral impact that charismatic leaders have on followers (House et al. 1991). Charismatic leadership can be the best and the worst kinds of leadership, depending on whether you look at a Gandhi or a Charles Manson (Lindholm 1990). Bass and Steidlmeier's (1999) runs parallel to research by Howell and Avolio (1992) on charismatic leadership. Howell and Avolio studied charismatic leaders and concluded that unethical charismatic leaders are manipulators who pursue their personal agendas. They argued that only leaders who act on socialized, rather than personalized, bases of power are transformational.

Critics of Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Theories

There is plenty of empirical research that demonstrates the effectiveness of transformational leaders. Scholars are almost rhapsodic in the ways in which they describe their findings, and with good reason. These findings show that ethics and effectiveness go hand in hand. Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993) stated: "Charismatic leaders … increase followers' self-worth through emphasizing the relationships between efforts and important values. A general sense of self- worth increases general self-efficacy; a sense of moral correctness is a source of strength and confidence. Having complete faith in the moral correctness of one's convictions gives one the strength and confidence to behave accordingly" (p. 582).

The problem with this research is that it raises many, if not more, questions about the ethics. What are the important values? Are the values themselves ethical? What does moral correctness mean? Is what followers believe to be moral correctness really morally correct? Critics question the ethics of the very idea of transformational leadership. Keeley (1998) argued that transformational leadership is well and good as long as you assume that everyone will eventually come around to the values and goals of the leader. Drawing on Madison's concern for factions in Federalist No. 10, Keeley (1998) wondered, "What is the likely status of people who would prefer their own goals and visions?" (p. 123). What if followers are confident that the leader's moral convictions are wrong? Keeley observed that the leadership and management literature has not been kind to nonconformists. He noted that Mao was one of Burns's transforming heroes and Mao certainly did not tolerate dissidents.

Whereas Burns's theory tolerated conflict, conflict is only part of the process of reaching agreement on values. Is it ethical for a leader to require everyone to agree on all values?

Price (2000) discussed another problem with the moral view of transformational leadership articulated by Burns (1978) and Bass and Steidlmeier (1999). The leaders they described are subject to making all sorts of moral mistakes, even when they are authentic, altruistic, and committed to common values. The fact that a leader possesses these traits does not necessarily yield moral behavior or good moral decisions. Price further argued that leaders and followers should be judged by adherence to morality, not adherence to their organizations' or society's values. "Leaders must be willing to sacrifice their other-regarding values when generally applicable moral requirements make legitimate demands that they do so" (Price 2003, p. 80). Sometimes being a charismatic and transformational leader in an organization, in the sense described by some theorists, does not mean that you are ethical when judged against moral concepts that apply in larger contexts.

Solomon (1998) took aim at the focus on charisma in leadership studies. He stated charisma is the shorthand for certain rare leaders. As a concept it is without ethical value and without much explanatory value. Charisma is not a distinctive quality of personality or character, and according to Solomon, it is not an essential part of leadership. For example, Solomon (1998) stated, "Charisma is not a single quality, nor is it a single emotion or set of emotions. It is a generalized way of pointing to and emptily explaining an emotional relationship that is too readily characterized as fascination" (p. 95). He then went on to argue that research on trust offers more insight into the leader–follower relationship than research into charisma. Solomon specifically talked about the importance of exploring the emotional process of how people give their trust to others.

Knocking Leaders Off Their Pedestals

Keeley's (1998), Price's (2000), and Solomon's (1998) criticisms about transformational and charismatic leadership theories raise two larger questions. First, scholars might be missing something about leadership when they study only exceptional types of leaders. Second, by limiting their study in this way, they fail to take into account the fact that even exceptional leaders get things wrong. Morality is a struggle for everyone, and it contains particular hazards for leaders. As Kant (1785/1983) observed,

> From such warped wood as is man made, nothing straight can be fashioned. Man is an animal that, if he lives among other members of his species, has need of a master, for he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to his equals. He requires a master who will break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will, whereby everyone can be free…. He finds the master among the human species, but even he is an animal who requires a master. (p. 34)

The master for Kant (1785/1983) is morality. No individual or leader has the key to morality, and hence, everyone is responsible for defining and enforcing morality. We need to understand the ethical challenges faced by imperfect humans who take on the responsibilities of leadership, so that we can develop morally better leaders, followers, institutions, and organizations. At issue is not simply what ethical and effective leaders do, but what leaders have to confront and, in some cases, overcome to be ethical and effective. Some of these questions are psychological in nature, and others are concerned with moral reasoning.

Like many leadership scholars, Plato constructed his theory of the ideal leader – the philosopher king who is wise and virtuous. Through firsthand experience, Plato realized the shortcomings of his philosopher king model of leadership. Plato learned about leadership through three disastrous trips to the city-state of Syracuse. Plato visited Syracuse the first time at the invitation of the tyrant Dionysius I, but he soon became disgusted by the decadent and luxurious lifestyle of Dionysius's court. Plato returned to Athens convinced that existing forms of government at home and abroad were corrupt and unstable. He then decided to set up the Academy, where he taught for 40 years and wrote the Republic. In the Republic, Plato argued that the perfect state could come about only by rationally exploiting the highest qualities in people (although this sounds a bit like a transformational leadership, it is not). Plato firmly believed that the philosopher king could be developed through education. Hence, we might regard Plato's Academy as a leadership school.

About 24 years after his first visit, Dionysius's brother-in-law, Dion, invited Plato back to Syracuse. By this time, Dionysius I was dead. Dion had read the Republic and wanted Plato to come and test his theory about leadership education on Dionysius's very promising son Dionysius II. This was an offer that Plato could not refuse, although he had serious reservations about accepting it. Nonetheless, Plato went to Syracuse. The trip was a disaster. Plato's friend Dion was exiled because of court intrigues. Years later, Plato returned to Syracuse a third time, but the visit was no better than the first two. In Epistle VII, Plato (trans. 1971a) reported that these visits changed his view of leadership:

> The more I advanced in years, the harder it appeared to me to administer the government correctly. For one thing, nothing could be done without friends and loyal companions, and such men were not easy to find ready at hand.
>
> Neither could such men be created afresh with any facility. The result was that I, who had at first been full of eagerness for a public career, as I gazed upon the whirlpool of public life and saw the incessant movement of shifting currents, at last felt dizzy. (p. 1575)

Plato seemed to have lost faith in his conviction that leaders could be perfected. He realized that leaders shared the same human weaknesses of their followers, but he also saw how important trust was in leadership. In the Republic, Plato had entertained a pastoral image of the leader as a shepherd to his flock. But in a later work, Statesman, he observed that leaders are not at all like shepherds. Shepherds are obviously quite different from their flocks, whereas human leaders are not much different from their followers (Plato, trans. 1971b). He noted that people are not sheep – some are cooperative, and some are very stubborn. Plato's revised view of leadership was that leaders were really like weavers. Their main task was to weave

together different kinds of people – the meek and the self-controlled, the brave and the impetuous – into the fabric of society (Plato, trans. 1971b).

Plato's ideas on leadership progressed from a profound belief that it is possible for some people to be wise and benevolent philosopher kings to a more modest belief that the real challenge of leadership is working successfully with people who do not always like each other, do not always like the leader, and do not necessarily want to live together. These are some of the key challenges faced by leaders today all over the world. Leadership is more like being a shepherd to a flock of cats or like pushing a wheelbarrow full of frogs (O'Toole 1995).

Whereas Plato's image of the philosopher king in the Republic is idealistic, the Statesman and the early books of the Republic lay out some of the fundamental ethical issues of leadership; namely, moral imperfection and power. Near the end of the Statesman, Plato contended that we cannot always depend on leaders to be good and that is why we need rule of law (Plato, trans. 1971b). Good laws, rules, and regulations protect us from unethical leaders and serve to help leaders be ethical (similar to James Madison's concern for checks on leaders).

Plato, like many of the ancients, realized that the greatest ethical challenge for humans in leadership roles stems from the temptations of power. In Book II of the Republic, he provided a thought-provoking experiment about power and accountability. Glaucon, the protagonist in the dialogue, argued that the only reason people are just is because they lack the power to be unjust. He then told the story of the "Ring of Gyges" (Plato, trans. 1992). A young shepherd from Lydia found a ring and discovered that when he turned the ring on his finger, it made him invisible. The shepherd then used the ring to seduce the king's wife, attack the king, and take over the kingdom. Plato asks us to consider what we would do if we had power without accountability. One of our main concerns about leaders is that they will abuse their power because they are accountable to fewer people. In this respect, the "Ring of Gyges" is literally and figuratively a story about transparency. The power that leaders have to do things also entails the power to hide what they do.

Power carries with it a temptation to do evil and an obligation to do good. Philosophers often refer to a point made by Kant (1785/1993, p. 32) as "ought implies can," meaning you have a moral obligation to act when you are able to act effectively (similar to the free will/determinism question mentioned earlier – more power, more free will). It means that the more power, resources, and ability you have to do good, the more you have a moral obligation to do so. The notion of helpfulness, discussed earlier in conjunction with altruism, is derived from this notion of power and obligation. It is about the moral obligation to help when you can help.

The Bathsheba Syndrome

The moral foible that people fear most in their leaders is personal immorality accompanied by abuse of power. Usually, it is the most successful leaders who suffer the worst ethical failures. Ludwig and Longenecker (1993) called the moral

failure of successful leaders the "Bathsheba syndrome," based on the biblical story of King David and Bathsheba. Ancient texts such as the Bible provide us with wonderful case studies on the moral pitfalls of leaders. King David is portrayed as a successful leader in the Bible. We first meet him as a young shepherd in the story of David and Goliath. This story offers an interesting leadership lesson. In it, God selects the small shepherd David over his brother, a strong soldier, because David "has a good heart." Then as God's hand-picked leader, David goes on to become a great leader, until we come to the story of David and Bathsheba (2 Samuel 11–12).

The story begins with David taking an evening stroll around his palace. From his vantage point on the palace roof, he sees the beautiful Bathsheba bathing. He asks his servants to bring Bathsheba to him. The king beds Bathsheba and she gets pregnant. Bathsheba's husband, Uriah, is one of David's best generals. King David tries to cover up his immoral behavior by calling Uriah home. When Uriah arrives, David attempts to get him drunk so that he will sleep with Bathsheba. Uriah refuses to cooperate, because he said it would be unfair to enjoy such pleasures while his men are on the front. (This is a wonderful sidebar about the moral obligations of leaders to followers.) David then escalates his attempt to cover things up by ordering Uriah to the front of a battle where he gets killed. In the end, the prophet Nathan blows the whistle on David and God punishes David.

The Bathsheba story has repeated itself again and again in history. Scandals ranging from Watergate to the President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky affair to Enron all follow the general pattern of this story (Winter 2002, gives an interesting psychological account of the Clinton case). First, we see what happens when successful leaders lose sight of what their jobs are. David should have been focusing on running the war, not watching Bathsheba bathe. He was literally and figuratively looking in the wrong place. This is why we worry about men leaders who are womanizers getting distracted from their jobs. Second, because power leads to privileged access, leaders have more opportunities to indulge themselves and, hence, need more willpower to resist indulging themselves. David could have Bathsheba brought to him by his servants with no questions asked. Third, successful leaders sometimes develop an inflated belief in their ability to control outcomes. David became involved in escalating cover-ups.

The most striking thing about leaders who get themselves in these situations is that the cover-ups are usually worse than the crime. In David's case, adultery was not as bad as murder. Also, it is during the cover-up that leaders abuse their power as leaders the most. In Clinton's case, a majority of Americans found his lying to the public far more immoral than his adultery. Last, leaders learn that their power falls short of the ring of Gyges. It will not keep their actions invisible forever. Whistleblowers such as Nathan in King David's case or Sharon Watkins in the Enron case call their bluff and demand that their leaders be held to the same moral standards as everyone else. When this happens, in Bible stories and everywhere else, all hell breaks loose. The impact of a leader's moral lapses causes great harm to their constituents.

Read as a leadership case study, the story of David and Bathsheba is about pride and the moral fragility of people when they hold leadership positions. It is also a

cautionary tale about success and the lengths to which people will go to keep from losing it. What is most interesting about the Bathsheba syndrome is that it is difficult to predict which leaders will fall prey to it, because people get it after they have become successful. One can never tell how even the most virtuous person will respond to situations in various contexts and circumstances (Doris 2005). If we are to gain a better understanding of ethics and leadership, we need to examine how leaders resist falling for the ethical temptations that come with power.

Self-Discipline and Virtue

The moral challenges of power and the nature of the leader's job explain why self-knowledge and self-control are, and have been for centuries, the most important factors in leadership development. Ancient writers, such as Lao tzu, Confucius, Buddha, Plato, and Aristotle, all emphasized good habits, self-knowledge, and self-control in their writing. Eastern philosophers, such as Lao tzu, Confucius, and Buddha, not only talked about virtues but also about the challenges of self-discipline and controlling the ego. Lao tzu warned against egotism when he stated, "He who stands on tiptoe is not steady" (Lao Tzu, trans. 1963, p. 152). He also tells us, "The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by people" (Lao tzu, trans. 1963, p. 148). Confucius (trans. 1963) focused on the importance of duty and self-control. He stated, "If a man (the ruler) can for one day master himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will return to humanity. To practice humanity depends on oneself" (p. 38). He tied a leader's self-mastery and effectiveness together when he wrote, "If a ruler sets himself right, he will be followed without his command. If he does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed" (Confucius, trans. 1963, p. 38).

In the "First Sermon," the Buddha described how people's uncontrolled thirst for things contributes to their own suffering and the suffering of others. Not unlike psychologists today, he realized that getting one's desires under control is the best way to end personal and social misery. This is a particular challenge for leaders because they often have the means to indulge their material and personal desires. Compassion is the most important virtue in Buddhist ethics because it keeps desires and vices in check. The Dalai Lama (1999) concisely summed up the moral dynamics of compassion in this way:

> When we bring up our children to have knowledge without compassion, their attitude towards others is likely to be a mixture of envy of those in positions above them, aggressive competitiveness towards their peers, and scorn for these less fortunate. This leads to a propensity toward greed, presumption, excess, and very quickly to loss of happiness. (p. 181)

Virtues are a fundamental part of the landscape of moral philosophy and provide a useful way of thinking about leadership development. What is important about virtues are their dynamics (e.g., how they interact with other virtues and vices) and their contribution to self-knowledge and self-control. The properties of a virtue are

very different from the properties of other moral concepts such as values. Virtues are qualities that you have only if you practice them. Values are things that are important to people. Some values are subjective preferences – such as chocolate rather than vanilla ice cream – and others are moral values, like honesty. I may value honesty but not always tell the truth. I cannot possess the virtue of honesty without telling the truth. As Aristotle mentioned, virtues are good habits that we learn from society and our leaders. Aristotle wrote quite a bit about leaders as moral role models, and much of what he said complements observations in research on transformational leadership. He noted, "Legislators make citizens good by forming habits in them" (Aristotle, trans. 1984). Whereas virtues come naturally to those who practice them, they are not mindless habits. People must practice them fully conscious of knowing that what they are doing is morally right.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the Greek notion of virtue (areté), which is also translated as excellence, is that it does not separate an individual's ethics from his or her occupational competence. Both Plato and Aristotle constantly used examples of doctors, musicians, coaches, rulers, and so forth to talk about the relationship between moral and technical or professional excellence. Aristotle (trans. 1984) wrote,

> Every excellence brings to good the thing to which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well. …Therefore, if this is true in every case, the excellence of man also will be the state which makes man good and which makes him do his work well. (p. 1747)

Excellence is tied to function. The function of a knife is to cut. An excellent knife cuts well. The function of humans, according to Aristotle, is to reason. To be morally virtuous, you must reason well, because reason tells you how to practice and when to practice a virtue. If you reason well, you will know how to practice moral and professional virtues. In other words, reason is the key to practicing moral virtues and the virtues related to one's various occupations in life. Hence, the morally virtuous leader will also be a competent leader because he or she will do what is required in the job the right way. Virtue ethics does not differentiate between the morality of the leader and the morality of his or her leadership. An incompetent leader, like the head of the Swiss charity that tried to free the enslaved children, lacks moral virtue, regardless of his or her good intentions.

Conclusion

The more we explore how ethics and effectiveness are inextricably intertwined, the better we will understand the nature of good leadership. The philosophic study of ethics provides a critical perspective from which we can examine the assumptions behind leadership and leadership theories. It offers another level of analysis that should be integrated into the growing body of empirical research in the field. The ethics of leadership has to be examined along a variety of dimensions:

1. The ethics of a leader as a person, which includes things like self-knowledge, discipline, intentions, and so forth;
2. The ethics of the leader–follower relationship (i.e., how they treat each other);
3. The ethics of the process of leadership (i.e., respecting followers command and control, participatory);
4. The ethics of what the leader does or does not do.

These dimensions give us a picture of the ethics of what a leader does and how he or she does it. But even after an interdependent analysis of these dimensions, the picture is not complete. We then have to take one more step and look at all of these interdependent dimensions in larger contexts and time frames. For example, the ethics of organizational leadership would have to be examined in the context of the community, and so forth. One of the most striking distinctions between effective leadership and ethical and effective leadership is often the time frame of decisions. Ethics is about the impact of behavior and actions in the long and the short run. Leaders can be effective in the short run but unethical and ultimately ineffective in the long run. For example, we have all seen the problem of defining good business leadership based simply on the quarterly profits that a firm makes. Long-term ideas of effectiveness, such as sustainability, tend to be normative.

A richer understanding of the moral challenges that are distinctive to leaders and leadership is particularly important for leadership development. Whereas case studies of ethical leadership are inspiring and case studies of evil leaders are cautionary, we need a practical understanding of why it is morally difficult to be a good leader and a good follower. Leaders do not have to be power-hungry psychopaths to do unethical things, nor do they have to be altruistic saints to do ethical things. Most leaders are neither charismatic nor transformational leaders. They are ordinary men and women in business, government, nonprofits, and communities who sometimes make volitional, emotional, moral, and cognitive mistakes. More work needs to be done on ordinary leaders and followers and how they can help each other be ethical and make better moral decisions.

Aristotle (trans. 1984) said that happiness is the end towards which we aim in life. The Greek word that Aristotle uses for happiness is eudaimonia. It means happiness, not in terms of pleasure or contentment, but as flourishing. A happy life is one in which we flourish as human beings, both in terms of our material and personal development and our moral development. The concept of eudaimonia gives us two umbrella questions that can be used to assess the overall ethics and effectiveness of leadership. Does a leader or a particular kind of leadership contribute to and/or allow people to flourish in terms of their lives as a whole? Does a leader or a particular kind of leadership interfere with the ability of other groups of people or other living things to flourish? Leaders do not always have to transform people for them to flourish. Their greater responsibility is to create the social and material conditions under which people can and do flourish (Ciulla 2000). Change is part of leadership, but so is sustainability. Ethical leadership entails the ability of leaders to

sustain fundamental notions of morality such as care and respect for persons, justice, and honesty, in changing organizational, social, and global contexts. Moreover, it requires people who have the competence, knowledge, and will to determine and do the right thing, the right way, and for the right reasons. The humanities offer one source of insight into the nature of right and wrong.

Lastly, leadership scholars have just begun to scratch the surface of other disciplines. History, philosophy, anthropology, literature, and religion all promise to expand our understanding of leaders and leadership (Ciulla 2008a, b). Ancient writers such as Plato, Aristotle, Lao tzu, and Confucius not only tell us about leadership, they also capture our imaginations. What makes a classic a classic is that its message carries themes and values that are meaningful to people from different cultures and different periods of history. They offer well-grounded ideas about who we are, what we should be like, and how we should live. These ideas offer us a perspective on current empirical research on leadership and help generate new ideas for research. To really understand leadership in terms of ethics and effectiveness, each one of us needs to put our ear to the ground of history and listen carefully to the saga of human hopes, desires, and aspirations, and the follies, disappointments, and triumphs of those who led and those who followed them. As Confucius once said, "A man who reviews the old as to find out the new is qualified to teach others" (trans. 1963, p. 23)

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Chapter 2
Habits and Virtues: Does It Matter If a Leader Kicks a Dog?

Abstract and Background This article came about because of a story that I heard many years ago, when I was giving some ethics seminars at J.P. Morgan. What I found interesting about the story, which is in this article, is how one comment or gesture can change our perception of a person's moral character. Granted, making judgements based on such things may not always be fair, but they are frequently correct. I later turned this story into a case and used it in class to prepare students to talk about virtue ethics. One day when I was teaching the case, I asked the students what they would think if they looked out the window and saw the Dean of the business school kick a dog as she walked down the street. Some students wondered if the Dean was in the habit of kicking dogs. Others speculated about whether her treatment of dogs indicated something about how she treated people. In short, they began asking Aristotelian questions about the Dean's virtue, and how her lack of virtue in this one incident, might translate into her behavior as a leader.

Later, a friend asked me to write an article for a special issue on leadership in an Italian journal on philosophy and psychology. There is an extensive literature in leadership studies and social psychology on how followers perceive leaders and the qualities they attribute to them. Since followers or subordinates tend to closely observe their leaders, almost anything leaders do may be regarded as significant. Hence, I thought it would be interesting to take the dog kicking thought experiment and explore it using the literature on virtue ethics and attribution theory. I then realized that the dog kicking case was also about the context of an action and the statements we use to describe the character and inclinations of people, based on their behavior. So, I brought in some literature from anthropology on context and literature from philosophy on dispositional statements. By applying these fields of study to the problem, the paper attempts to show why we should be wary of leaders who kick dogs.

Keywords Leadership · Ethics · Moral behavior · Attribution · Leader perception · Virtue · Integrity · Dispositional properties · Habits · Implicit theories of leadership

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Introduction

Followers watch their leaders. They consciously or unconsciously notice how leaders act in formal, informal, public, and private settings and they use this information to draw inferences about leaders' virtues, vices, habits, and future behavior. One reason they do this is because this personal knowledge helps compensate for the real or perceived power imbalance between leaders and followers.[1] There are times when people observe what a leader does in the blink of an eye that influence their opinion of a leader almost as much or even more than his or her entire *résumé*. This leads one to wonder: Is one instance or one small gesture a fair and reasonable way to make a moral assessment of a leader? We might ask this question about the behavior of anyone, but it takes on a special significance in the case of leaders because of the ways they are scrutinized and perceived by followers.[1]

In this chapter, I look at why a seemingly minor act of a leader can influence our perceptions of his or her moral character, even in the face of other positive information. For example, would you hire a successful, well-qualified person to be a CEO or vote for a politician who you discovered had kicked a dog? What would you think of a leader who kicked a dog? Is dog kicking even relevant to leadership? For a dog lover, it would matter, even if he only kicked a dog once. For others, it would not matter if he kicked a dog once, but it might if a leader did it all the time. There are also those who would consider dog kicking completely irrelevant to a leader's moral character and ability to lead. One simple reason for condemning the behavior is that most people think leaders should be role models, yet does being a role model require moral perfection in every aspect of life or does it only require that that a leader serve as a model in areas relevant to his or her role as a leader?[2]

This hypothetical may seem like a trivial thought experiment, but it isn't. In 2014, Desmond Hague, the CEO of a food and beverage company called Centerplate, was fired after getting caught on camera kicking a dog in an elevator.[3] Nonetheless, the point of my question and this chapter is to tease out some philosophical insights into an important practical question. What does a small gesture or off-handed behavior tell us about the moral character of a leader? This question lies at the heart of judgments we make when hiring people for leadership roles and deciding which candidate to vote for in an election. It touches on the relationship between a leader's public and private morality, her everyday behavior, and behavior that is part of her job. I refer to these minor gestures,

[1] See M. HOGG, D. VAN KNIPPENBERG, Social Identity and Leadership Processes in Groups, in: M.P. ZANNA (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. XXXV, 2003, pp. 1–52.

[2] See T.L. PRICE, Why Leaders Need not be Moral Saints, in: J.B. CIULLA (ed.), Ethics, The Heart of Leadership, ABC Clio LLC, Santa Barbara (CA) 2014, III ed., pp. 129–150.

[3] B. Marotte, "Centerplate CEO Steps Down After Dog Abuse Incident in Vancouver, The Globe and Mail, September 2, 1014. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/us-business/centerplate-ceo-steps-down-after-dog-abuse-incident-in-vancouver/article20297029/ accessed January 14, 2019.

which people sense are morally significant, as "morality in the miniature." Morality in the miniature consists of the little things people do that we perceive as indicators of the virtues that they actually possess.[4]

I will begin with a short review of the relevant literature from leadership studies and social psychology about how we make attributions about a person's character and how those attributions are related to our prototypes of what a leader should be like. I then discuss the role of virtues and habits in ethics as a means of showing why judgments about a leader's character that are based on incidents of morality in the miniature such as kicking a dog, while subject to error, can offer insights into a leader's moral character.

Leadership Ethics in Leadership Studies

Most of the literature in leadership studies looks at leadership along two main axes. The first axis includes things like behaviors, traits and styles, and the second consists of the historical, organizational, and cultural context of the leader. Studies of leadership usually aim at understanding good leadership, which I have argued means leadership that is both effective and ethical.[5] Hence, on the one hand, if one regards ethics and effectiveness as two very separate criteria, the question of dog kicking is irrelevant if the kicker possesses the traits, knowledge, and skills to be an effective leader. On the other hand, if one sees ethics as intertwined with leader effectiveness, then dog kicking may be significant. Researchers have yet to discover a universal set of traits that leaders make leaders effective in all contexts,[6] nonetheless, most leadership theories have normative aspects to them.[7]

For instance, some leaders have traits that are effective in a business context but not in a political one. Leadership scholars and practitioners have long enjoyed clustering traits and behaviors into ideal types of leadership, most of which make normative assumptions about leaders. A disproportionate amount of the leadership literature consists of research on transformational leadership,[8] transforming

[4] See J.B. CIULLA, Leadership and Morality in the Miniature, in: A.J.G. SISON (ed.), The Handbook on Virtue Ethics in Business and Management, Springer, New York, 1917, 941–949.

[5] See J.B. CIULLA, Ethics and Effectiveness: The Nature of Good Leadership, in: D.V. DAY, J. AN- TONAKIS (eds.), The Nature of Leadership, Sage, Thousand Oaks (CA) 2011, II ed., pp. 508–540.

[6] See B.M. BASS, Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research and Managerial Applications, Free Press, New York 1990, III ed.

[7] See J.B. CIULLA, Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory, in: "The Business Ethics Quarterly," vol. V, n.1, 1995, pp. 5–24.

[8] See B.M. BASS, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations, Free Press, New York 1985.

leadership,[9] servant leadership,[10] authentic leadership,[11] and a construct with a somewhat misleading name called "ethical leadership."[12]

The attraction of enumerating the traits or behaviors of leaders under the umbrella of a theory is that you can measure them. Hence, the most discussed theories are the ones that have questionnaires, such as transformational, authentic, and ethical leadership. All three of these theories have implicit or explicit normative assumptions. Transformational leadership assumes that the leader inspires followers.[13] In James MacGregor Burn's theory of transforming leadership, leaders and followers engage each other a dialogue about values and through this process leaders and followers become morally better. Bernard M. Bass begs the question of ethics by asserting that only ethical leaders are *real* transformational leaders, whereas he calls the unethical leaders *pseudo-transformational*.[14]

From a philosophical perspective the "ethical leadership" construct developed by Michael E. Brown, Linda K. Treviño, and David A. Harrison tests a somewhat peculiar grab bag of things. Some of the questions are about managerial behaviors, such as the leader "listens to what employees have to say," while others are personal moral assessments such as "conducts his/her personal life in an ethical manner," and others look like virtues i.e., "makes fair and balanced decisions."[15] Respondents of survey studies such as this one, have their own take on the ethical ideas in them but they do not usually have the latitude to express their own implicit theory of ethics. Another limitation of these survey studies is they often filter out attributions that are uniquely part of how people construct their idea of a leader.

[9] See J.M. BURNS, Leadership, Harper & Row, New York 1978.

[10] See R.K. GREENLEAF, Servant Leadership: A Journey Into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness, Paulist Press, Ramsey (NJ) 1977.

[11] See F. LUTHANS, B. J. AVOLIO, Authentic Leadership Development, in: K.S. CAMERON, J.E. DUTTON, R.E. QUINN (eds.), Positive Organizational Scholarship, Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco 2003, pp. 241–261.

[12] See M.E. BROWN, L.K. TREVIÑO, D.A. HARRISON, Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning Perspective for Construct Development and Testing, in: "Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes," vol. XCVII, n. 2, 2005, pp. 117–134.

[13] B.M. BASS, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations, cit.

[14] B.M. BASS, P. STEIDLMEIER, Ethics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behavior, in: "Leadership Quarterly," vol. X, n. 2, 1999, pp. 181–217. And see Terry Price's critique of it, T.L. PRICE, The Ethics of Authentic Transformational Leadership, in: "Leadership Quarterly," vol. XIV, n. 1, 2003, pp. 67–81.

[15] M.E. BROWN, L.K. TREVIÑO, D.A. HARRISON, Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning Perspective for Construct Development and Testing, cit., p. 138.

Agency and Implicit Theories of Leadership

We interpret the behavior of people around us daily. In doing so, we also make inferences about their intentions, motivations, traits, and values. People exercise agency when they intentionally do something. Albert Bandura says: "An intention is a representation of a future course of action to be performed. It is not simply an expectation or prediction of future actions but a proactive commitment to bring them about."[16] We contrast agency with accidental acts such as tripping over a stone and knocking someone over. In such cases, there is no intent, and from a moral point of view, we usually do not assign blame in the same way. The woman did not intend to knock the man over, so we would consider her blameless or perhaps negligent for not watching where she was going. Yet, between accidental behavior and intentional behavior is a third domain and this is what we sometimes call "absent minded behavior." The leader kicks the dog out of the way and carries on with his business, apparently without thinking about it. This is the domain of morality in the miniature what I want to explore in this paper. Acts that the agent hardly appears to think about that may have moral import.[17]

It includes cases where a leader does not intentionally do something bad, but fact that he does it has significance to the followers, not because he had bad intentions but *because* he did it without thinking. Moral agency has an inhibitive form that consists of the power to refrain from acting inhumanely and a proactive form that we express in humane behavior.[18] The leader who kicks a dog may raise concerns about his ability to control him or herself.

Leadership scholars and social psychologists have done extensive research on implicit theories of leadership and the role of attribution in leadership. Attributions are ways of inferring the reasons and causes of actions. According to social identity theory, people base their attributions of leaders on their personal prototype of what a leader ought to be like.[19] Meindl et al. argue that attributions concerning leaders are so strong that they call them "the romance of leadership" because people tend to assume that leaders have more power and control over things than they actually do.[20] Meindl et al. believe that the romance and mystery of leadership may be what sustains followers and moves them to work with leaders toward a common goal; however, it also creates prototypes of leaders that are unrealistic. If this is true, then all kinds of seemingly trivial behavior may have relevance concerning the behavior

[16] A. BANDURA, Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective, in: "Annual Review Psychology," vol. LII, 2001, pp. 1–26, here p. 6.

[17] I limit my discussion here to acts that we perceive to be bad or immorality in the miniature and save my discussion of such good acts for another time.

[18] See A. BANDURA, Moral Disengagement in the Perpetuation of Inhumanities, in: "Personality and Social Psychology Review," vol. III, n. 3, 1999, pp. 193–209.

[19] See M. HOGG, D. VAN KNIPPENBERG, Social Identity and Leadership Processes in Groups, cit.

[20] See J.R. MEINDL, S.B. EHRLICH, J.M. DUKERICH, The Romance of Leadership, in: "Administrative Science Quarterly," vol. XXX, n. 1, 1985, pp. 78–102.

of leaders that they may not have for others. The romance of leadership research illustrates an ethically distinctive aspect of being a leader. Unlike people who are not in leadership roles, we hold leaders responsible for things that they did not know about, did not do, and are unable to control. This is not because people really believe that leaders have agency over everything that goes on. Yet, we still give leaders credit for all of the good things that happen under their watch and blame them for the bad, regardless of whether they had anything to do with it. Moral concepts such as responsibility, are embedded in many, or perhaps most, prototypes of leaders. Ideally, leaders are the ones who give direction and take responsibility for what happens in a group, organization, or society.

To *take* responsibility means to accept the role of someone who gets praised, blamed, and has a duty to clean up problems. *Taking* responsibility is different from *being* responsible in the sense that an agent may not be personally responsible for doing something or even ordering that something be done. This does not mean that leaders always take responsibility, yet this expectation is clear to anyone who has noticed how bad leaders look when they fail to do so. For example, when Americans tried to sign up for health insurance and the government computers crashed, President Obama told the public that he was responsible for the failure. It would have been ridiculous for the President to say, "It's not my fault. I did not program the computers."

Attribution Errors

As mentioned earlier, we also watch leaders to gain insights into how they will behave in the future. People look for invariances or regularities in human behavior because this helps give order to their world. As Fritz Heider points out, one problem with doing so is that we tend to "overestimate the unity of personality" and look at people in the context of the role that they play.[21] Another related problem is one of faulty inductive logic. Sometimes people make unwarranted generalizations about a person from only one or a few observations. The fact that a man once kicked a dog once does not logically warrant the conclusion that he will always kick dogs or always kicks dogs.

When we do not possess knowledge about why the man kicked the dog, we may also discount the behavior because we do not feel we have enough information to make a harsh judgment about the man's character and intent. Hence, we dismiss the act because maybe the man was distracted, under stress, or did not mean to do it. This is called the discounting principle in which the "role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other possible causes are present."[22] While we

[21] See F. HEIDER, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, John Wiley & Sons, New York 1958, p. 55.

[22] See H.H. KELLEY, Attribution in Social Interaction, in: E.E. JONES, D.E. KANOUSE, H.H. KELLY, S.VALINS, B. WEINER, Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior, General Learning Press, Morristown (NJ), 1972, pp. 1–26, here p. 8.

sometimes make mistakes when we discount bad behavior, we also make mistakes when we fail to consider a person's background knowledge. Terry Price argues that leaders make two types of cognitive moral mistakes.[23] The first is about the content of morality, meaning that the leader cannot see why it is wrong to kick a dog. The second kind is about the scope of morality, meaning that the leader does not place dogs in the category of things that are morally considerable. Understanding that the leader in effect "does not know any better" may be helpful, but it still does not make some behaviors morally excusable.

This leads us to another type of attribution error. Sometimes people do not take into account the context of the behavior and the actor.[24] The leader may have kicked the dog because there were rabid dogs in the area. We also have to consider the cultural context of the agent. Sociologists Marcel Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu both use the term *habitus* to depict how the environment interacts with and shapes behavior. As Mauss notes, people's habits and the meaning of behavior "vary between societies, educations, proprieties and fashions, and prestige."[25] Bourdieu says that individual behavior is a "structural variant of all other group or class habitus."[26] Maybe the leader is from a place where dogs are considered vermin and dog kicking is so normal that no one even notices it.

While people err in failing to take into account the cultural context that affects a per- son's behavior, they may also make the mistake of assuming that other people react the way that they do or act on the same interests or values that they have.[27] This may influence both positive and negative attributions. Hence, the dog lover may think that everyone should have the same respect and concern for dogs that she does. For her, the act of dog kicking as extremely immoral. Whereas a cat lover, who hates dogs, may approve of the leader's behavior – given the chance, she would have kicked the dog too.

Other factors may also influence attributions such as proximity to the event.[28] The person who sees the man kick the dog up close may react differently from the person who simply hears about it or watches it on the news. An empathetic witness to the event may feel distress because he hears the dog's cries and sees its discomfort. This may elicit a feeling of physical disgust, which has been shown to increase

[23] See T.L. PRICE, Explaining Ethical Failures of Leadership, in: J.B. CIULLA (ed.), Ethics, The Heart of Leadership, Praeger, Westport (CT) 2004, II edition, pp. 129–146.

[24] See H.H. KELLEY, Attribution in Social Interaction, cit., p. 18.

[25] See M. MAUSS, Techniques of the Body (1935), in: M. MAUSS, Sociology and Psychology. Essays, translated by B. BREWSTER, Routledge and Kegan, London 1979, pp. 95–123, here p. 101.

[26] P. BOURDIEU, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1972), translated by R. NICE, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p. 86.

[27] See H.H. KELLEY, Attribution in Social Interaction, cit.

[28] See F. HEIDER, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, cit.

the severity of a person's moral judgment.[29] These are just a few factors related to how we interpret and misinterpret the behavior of others and make false attributions about their character. Because people tend to carry strong assumptions about what leaders should be like and how they should behave, they tend to be hyper-sensitive to what leaders do. Now we will examine whether making moral judgments about a leader's incident of morality in the miniature are warranted.

Virtue and *Virtuosi*

The most obvious place to start looking at the moral significance of kicking a dog is in virtue ethics. Aristotle says that moral goodness is the result of habit or *hexis*. He does not regard *hexis* as mechanical activity in the way that a behaviorist like B.F. Skinner might think of it.[30] Consider the opening of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: "Excellence of character results from habituation [*ethos*] – which is in fact the source of the name that it acquired [*êthikê*], the word for character-trait [*êthos*] being a slight variation of that for habituation [*ethos*]."[31] However, in Aristotle's and Plato's ethics, you cannot become virtuous through habit alone. In the *Republic*, Plato tells us that a person who becomes good "through habit and not by philosophy" is destined to make bad decisions."[32] Virtue is not the result of conditioning nor does it include the repetition of a particular behavior – e.g., a courageous person is not always courageous in the same way. It takes knowledge and, one might argue, imagination. Thornton C. Lockwood argues that Aristotle's idea of ethical character (*ethos*) or virtue (*aretê*) captures the notion of a *virtuoso* who is responsive in an excellent fashion to what reason perceives in particular and changing circumstances to be virtuous.[33]

The idea of a virtuous person as a moral *virtuoso* has some provocative implications for our discussion of morality in the miniature. The definition of the word "*virtuoso*" consists of the key elements that mirror Aristotle's idea of virtue. First, it means a learned person who has a special technical skill. Second, is often related to someone with good taste and third, such a person is sometimes a dabbler in a variety

[29] See S. SCHNALL, J. HAIDT, G.L. CLORE, A.H. JORDAN, Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment, in: "Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin," vol. XXXIV, n. 8, 2008, pp. 1096–1109.

[30] See B.F. SKINNER, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1971.

[31] ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by D. ROSS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, II.1 1103a 14–18. See T.C. LOCKWOOD, Habituation, Habit, and Character in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, in: T. SPARROW, A. HUTCHINSON (eds.) A History of Habit. From Aristotle to Bourdieu, Lexington Books, Lanham (MD) 2013, pp. 19–36, here p. 19.

[32] ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by D. ROSS, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, II.1 1103a 14–18. See T.C. LOCKWOOD, Habituation, Habit, and Character in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, in: T. SPARROW, A. HUTCHINSON (eds.) A History of Habit. From Aristotle to Bourdieu, Lexington Books, Lanham (MD) 2013, pp. 19–36, here p. 19.

[33] See T.C. LOCKWOOD, Habituation, Habit, and Character in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, cit., p. 20.

of arts.[34] A *virtuoso* has technical skill and knowledge found in (*phronesis*). The attraction to fine things or taste reminds us of what Aristotle's says about being motivated by the love of "the fine," which are activities that give us pleasure because they are good.[35] Aristotle's ethics assumes that virtues should be practiced regularly. A *virtuoso* violinist should be able to play any piece of music well. If she played a simple piece of music badly, we might wonder if she was really a *virtuoso*. If a virtuous person is a *virtuoso* who should play well all the time, what do we say about her when she behaves badly in a minor incident?

Aristotle also says that there is a unity of virtues. You cannot practice and have some virtues without having others. Based on Aristotle's account in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, such a person should know "the right rule" for practicing a virtue and virtues in a variety of situations.[36] For example, courage is facing danger for the right reason. We cannot know what the right reason and hence practice courage without knowing about justice, fairness, and the good life in general.[37] Aristotle's virtue ethics show us why it is reasonable to question the moral character of the leader who kicks a dog. If virtues are supposed to be habits that are intertwined with each other, then it makes sense. Here we see a tension between a unified concept of morality and the potential attribution error of overestimating the unity of personality that was mentioned earlier.

Habits

We tend to assume regularities in human behavior. While this can be problematic, it is not always wrong to do so. Habits have always been a difficult part of ethics because they complicate the meaning of an action. Immanuel Kant thought habits undercut the idea of goodwill, which he saw as the foundation of morality. For Kant, the very idea of ethics rests on following moral laws, especially in cases where we choose respect for the law over what we are inclined to do. Friedrich Nietzsche thought that short-term habits were okay, but he disliked "enduring habits" because they prevented humanity from improving itself though what he called, "self-overcoming."[38] The negative interpretations of habits are based on their connotation

[34] See the entry virtuoso, in: OED Online, January 2019, Oxford University Press, http://www.oed.com.newman.richmond.edu:2048/view/Entry/223848?redirectedFrom=virtuoso#eid

[35] John Stuart Mill echoes this point in What Utilitarianism is when he notes the importance of cultivating the "capacity for nobler feelings" and a preference for the happiness of a Socrates over the happiness of a swine. See J.S. MILL, Utilitarianism (1861), in: J.S. MILL, J. BENTHAM, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, edited by A. RYAN, Penguin Classics, New York 1987, p. 281.

[36] ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, cit., 1144b27-29.

[37] See R. SORABJI, Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue, in: "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society," vol. LXXIV, 1973–1974, pp. 107–129, here pp. 114–115.

[38] F. NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885), in: W. KAUFMAN (ed.), The Portable Nietzsche, Vintage, New York 1968, pp. 103–440.

as mechanistic and repetitive behavior. The positive views on habit tend to follow Aristotle's lead and incorporate free will, reason and intentionality into them.

William James recognized the tension between determinism and voluntary behavior but regarded habit as central to the pragmatist framework. He said that habit serves as "happy harmonizer" of different elements of human experience., G.[39] In a similar light, John Dewey argued that habits are a way for people to link past, present, and future events. He said, "The view that habits are formed by sheer repetition puts the cart before the horse."[40] Repetition is the result of a habit, not its cause. Habits are formed by knowledge, socialization, and reason, which we then streamline into behavior. Kicking dogs may be a bad habit, but since habits are not mindless, the agent is still accountable for what happened before he began to repeatedly exercise the behavior.

In some ways, David Hume's account of habit captures the concern people feel when they witness acts of immorality or morality in the miniature. Hume says that moral judgments are about custom or habit, and they vary across time and culture. On Hume's view, it is reasonable to assume that if a person kicks a dog once, he will do it again or maybe do other similarly bad things. Hume writes: "the supposition, *that the future resembles the past*, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is deriv'd entirely from habit, by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of objects, to which we have become accustom'd."[41] While we may read situations incorrectly when we make snap judgments about a leader based on some small act, Hume tells us we may do so because we have seen causal connections between things like dog kicking and other bad behaviors. According to Hume, it makes sense to be concerned about a leader who kicks a dog; however, in the same light, Hume admits that this opinion can be changed by evidence to the contrary. As Hume famously said: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."[42] When we witness any small unsavory gesture of a leader, it may elicit a feeling of discomfort in part, Hume argues, because it is associated with something else we have seen or some other causal connection between such behaviors in the past. Hume notes that the passion or feeling we might have is not unreasonable, unless we discover that it is "accompanied by a false judgment."[43] In that case it is the judgment not the feeling we have about the act that is unreasonable.

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[39] W. JAMES, What Pragmatism Means (1907), in: W. JAMES, Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth, edited by A.J. AYER, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1978, pp. 27–44, here p. 39.

[40] J. DEWEY, Logic. The Theory of Inquiry (1938), in: JOHN DEWEY, The Later Works, 1925–1953, vol. XII, edited by J.A. BOYDSTON, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale (IL) 1980, here p. 39.

[41] D. HUME, Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), edited by L.A. SELBY-BIGGE, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1968, p. 134.

[42] Ibid. 415.

[43] Ibid. 416.

Integrity and Morality

One bone of contention about virtue ethics is based on the attribution errors of assuming that virtues are unwavering character traits and that behavior depends more on a leader's character than the context of it.[44] Critics argue that people cannot rely on virtues to resist behaving badly when others around them are. Even Machiavelli offers this "nice guys finish last" argument about leaders: "If a ruler who wants always to act honorably is surrounded by many unscrupulous men his downfall is inevitable."[45]

Robert C. Solomon uses emotions to explain the relationship between virtue as a personal quality and a behavior that is influenced by context. He says emotions are part of virtues and since emotions are reactive to other people and situations, it is foolish to deny that virtues depend on the environment and yet that does not mean they are totally determined by it.[46] In contrast to Solomon, Gilbert Harman argues that moral philosophers sometimes commit the fundamental attribution error of assuming that certain behaviors are indicative of moral traits. He calls this "misguided folk morality" and his argument privileges the empirical research of psychologists over the moral theories of philosophers.[47]

Assuming that human beings are more consistent than they are, is a psychological question. Experience and numerous experiments have demonstrated that character is not necessarily a stable part of human behavior. However, I do not think that these experiments imply that to avoid attribution errors people should change the moral ideals inherent in their prototypes of leaders. One reason why the philosophers discussed here are interested in habits is because the idea of consistency is fundamental to the idea of what it means to be ethical. Also, consistency is especially important in leadership for building trust giving people a sense of security. So, when we see a leader kick a dog, it is not unreasonable to wonder if that behavior is consistent with or indicative of other behaviors, just as we wonder about the *virtuoso* who cannot play a simple piece of music.

People often talk about a leader's integrity, sometimes as if it is a psychological quality and sometimes as if it is a moral quality. The description of moral integrity has as many definitions as there are writers in the leadership literature. Leadership scholars often define integrity as a cluster of moral concepts that usually include honesty and they often use integrity to refer to all aspects of a leader's ethics. The descriptive meaning of the word "integrity" is wholeness,

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[44] See R.L. WALKER, P.J. IVANHOE, Working Virtue, Oxford University Press 2007.

[45] N. MACHIAVELLI, The Prince (1513), edited by Q. SKINNER, R. PRICE, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, p. 54.

[46] R.C. SOLOMON, Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business, in: "Business Ethics Quarterly," vol. XIII, n. 1, 2003, pp. 43–62.

[47] See G. HARMAN, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error, in: "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society," vol. XCIX, 1999, pp. 315–331.

and that wholeness is the umbrella over all aspects of morality or as Aristotle says, "the rule." When a person has a virtue, it is a *hexis* because we do not expect moral qualities to be selectively exercised or exercised in isolation from other virtues. As David Baum notes, integrity refers to a personal completeness that describes a person's unbroken or uncorrupted character.[48] While integrity is central to how we think of a person's moral character, it is also central to how we think about their immoral character. Hence, our other intuition about the leader kicking a dog is that the incident may represent a tear in the fabric of the leader's morality. The alternative to this view of integrity is the assumption that people can easily compartmentalize their moral behavior. On this view, unsavory behavior in a leader's private life or outside of the leader's actual work is irrelevant to his or her job as a leader. While this may be true in some cases, we also see cases where followers stop discounting this kind of bad behavior because they have enough evidence to see how a leader's bad private behavior or dog kicking affects how they lead.

Dispositional Properties

We have been discussing how we might make sense of the dog kicking incident form the perspective of leadership studies, psychology, and moral philosophy. Philosophy provides other insights into the problem, based on how we formulate our ideas in language. In the *Concept of Mind*, Gilbert Ryle offers a way to think about attribution based on the statements we make about the "dispositional properties" of people and things. He says dispositional statements: "Apply to, or are satisfied by, the actions, reactions and state of the object; they are inference-tickets, which license us to predict, retrodict, explain and modify these actions reactions and states."[49]

Following the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ryle believes that language has an elasticity of significance.[50] When we make the dispositional statement that someone is a dog kicker, we are not saying that the person is currently kicking a dog, has repeatedly kicked dogs in the past, or will kick dogs in the future; nor are we reporting on observed or unobserved behavior. Dispositional statements do not narrate incidents but "if they are true, they are satisfied by narrated incidents."[51]

So, an observer may see a leader kick a dog and make the statement "the leader is a dog kicker." This statement is not true or false but rather a provisional statement about the leader. The meaning of the statement depends on whether it fits

[48] See D.C. BAUMAN, Leadership and the Three Faces of Integrity, in: "The Leadership Quarterly," vol. XXIV, n. 3, 2013, pp. 414–426.

[49] G. RYLE, Concept of Mind (1949), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2000, p. 124.

[50] See L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations, edited by G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, R. RHEES, Blackwell, Oxford 1953.

[51] Ibid. p. 125.

with other narratives of events in which we are able to see a family resemblance to dog kicking. For instance, dog kicking might at some point become meaningful in the narrative of other behaviors such as humiliating low-level subordinates. Ryle's analysis of statements about dispositional properties gives us a way of understanding how we might think about the act of dog kicking. We may infer from the leader kicking the dog a tentative set of dispositional properties, ranging from cruelty, to distain for subordinates, to impatience, etc., and then watch to see if these qualities manifest themselves in a person's behavior as a leader. This is analogous to Hume's point about judgments. We may make a wrong judgment based on the facts, but our thinking about how we feel at the time is sound. It is neither illogical nor false to say that someone who kicks a dog once is a dog kicker. Dispositional statements have the potential to refer to acts of morality in the miniature that may or may not at some point be either relevant to or even constitutive of a person's morality as a whole.

No More Dogs! A Real Case

At this point the reader is probably weary of hearing about a leader kicking a dog, so let us look at a real example that illustrates the way people have used an observation of morality in the miniature to gain insight into a person's morality. Several years ago, the manager of a large Wall Street bank told me a story of the time that they tried to hire a "superstar" broker away from a competitor to lead a new division of his company. The management team had met with the broker many times over a period of months to convince him to join their firm. After a number of interviews, long lunches, and conversations with the broker, he agreed to join the bank. On the way out of the office after the final interview, the broker turned to the receptionist and said "honey, get me a taxi and move it, I'm in a hurry."[52]

The receptionist blushed and was embarrassed by being addressed in such a rude fashion. The interviewers witnessed his behavior and were quite surprised by it. The man had not behaved that way before and they assumed that he should know better. After the incident, they began to feel uneasy about him. Despite his stellar track record as a broker, his academic credentials, and the fact that they thought he would make a lot of money for the bank, something about him did not seem right. The question on their minds was a question about his virtue: "Is he in the habit of behaving this way?" They not only wondered about how he treated women and subordinates, but they started to wonder how he did other things. Was this a tear in the fabric of his character? The incident compelled them to take a closer look into the broker's background. After further investigation they discovered that there were indeed problems that were unrelated to how he treated women or subordinates, but about how

[52] J.B. CIULLA, Sleazy or Stupid?, in: J.B. CIULLA (ed.), The Ethics of Leadership, Thompson Wadsworth, Belmont (CA) 2003, p. 63.

the broker did business. The managers decided not to hire him because they worried that he had "risky habits."

This case illustrates how morality in the miniature can offer potential clues into a person's character. While being rude to a woman is more serious than being rude to a dog, the behavior indicated an inconsistency from their previous observations about his behavior and fit in their organization. One might object that perhaps lapses like the broker's, can be a one-off and it would be unfair to judge him by it. Yet, the case illustrates that by viewing actions as morality in the miniature, they did not condemn the man based on one act or how they felt about his behavior. Rather, the broker's behavior led them to question his character in general. Some organizations take the idea characterized by morality in the miniature seriously. They look for insights into job candidates' character by taking them out to lunch and observing how they treat the server. The assumption being that if they are rude to the waitress, then they might be rude to subordinates.

Conclusion: Why the Little Things Matter

The case about the broker is exemplified by the saying, "where there is smoke, there is fire." I am not willing to make such a strong claim about the leader who kicks a dog. Instead what I have attempted to show in this paper is that where there is smoke, it makes sense to keep an eye out for fire. Leadership scholars have shown us that people have prototypes of leaders that influence their attributions of them. Psychologists have demonstrated how people make attribution errors about the character of leaders, such as ignoring the context of the behavior or overestimating the unity of personality. We also know that prototypes of leaders usually entail moral theories or moral norms. As we have seen, the anchor of many moral theories is that a person's moral character re- quires some sort of consistency and coherency such as in Aristotle's idea of a unified and intertwined set of virtues. The fact that people have free will and behave inconsistently does not mean that we should remove the expectation of moral coherence from our assumptions about morality or from the moral ideals inherent in our prototypes of leaders.[53]

By regarding a virtue as something that a person practices all the time and is related to other virtues, we set a high standard, especially for leaders who have the power to do great good or harm to others. While such assumptions about virtue may be wrong from a psychological point of view, they are not necessarily wrong from a philosophical one. The character of a leader is on display in a variety of behaviors from the small gesture to intentional action. The big and small

[53] Ethical realists and other philosophers have rejected the naturalistic fallacy that one "should not derive an ought from an is." I think that this is a mistake, because sometimes there are cases when we want people, especially leaders to aspire to ideal moral standards not standards based on how people act. See, G.E. MOORE, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cam.

acts help us hold leaders to a high standard of morality. We should pay attention to acts of morality in the miniature because such acts serve as red flags that alert us to potential problems.

Like the rest of us, leaders are morally imperfect. Yet unlike the rest of us, the consequences of their moral imperfections can potentially do immediate or long-term harm to many people. This is why leaders should be watched (especially by citizens in a democracy) and why the off-handed things leaders do may matter. I am not arguing that we should obsess over everything that a leader does, but rather that it is reasonable to pay attention to the acts that seem inconsistent with what you know about the leader, or behavior that could be indicative of other problems.

Lastly, we live in an era when we know more about our leaders than ever before. The 24-h news organizations watch and dissect everything that high-level leaders say and do. Some find it difficult to sort through what is relevant and what is not relevant to a leader's moral character, especially in politics. When faced with too much information, it becomes all too easy to say that the little things do not matter, as long as the economy is booming, or the company makes a profit. Nonetheless, history has shown us that this is not always true. While kicking a dog may not bear any relationship to a person's moral character, in the case of leaders, the stakes are sometimes too high to simply ignore it.

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Chapter 3
Did Nero Fiddle While Rome Burned? Why "Being There" Is Essential to Leadership

Abstract and Background History fascinates me because it is frequently stranger than fiction. It's also an epic drama that keeps recycling the same cast of characters to different places and times. Certain aspects of human relationships, such as the relationship between leaders and followers, do not change much. The description of Nero "fiddling" while Rome burned is not just a peculiar story about a leader. It is a story that became an expression we use to describe leaders who are inattentive or uncaring. I got to wondering what is was about this story that made it into a shorthand for a type of leader behavior. Moreover, what could this story tell us about the moral expectations that followers have of their leaders in times of crisis? So, I began researching the Nero story and how the expression came to us through history. I then looked at contemporary cases where, like Nero, leaders were in the wrong place and/or doing the wrong thing in a time of crisis. Through the story of Nero, this paper illustrates how the physical location of a leader in a crisis affects followers' perceptions about whether the leader cares about them.

Keywords Leaders · Location · Crisis · Care · Duty · Propriety · Presidential leadership · Nero · Putin · Shakespeare · Flatland

Introduction

> The first and greatest imperative of command is to be present in person. – John Keegan[1]

Jerry Kosinski's novel *Being There*, is a parable about a childlike gardener named Chance, who has led a sheltered life in his master's household and experiences life through television. When Chance's master dies, he ventures out into the real world

Ciulla, Joanne B. "Why 'Being There' is Essential to Leadership." *Leadership and the Humanities*. Vol. 3, in *Leadership at the Crossroads*. Ed. Ciulla, Joanne B. Ciulla Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008, 132–148.

[1] John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987), 329.

J. B. Ciulla, *The Search for Ethics in Leadership, Business, and Beyond*,
Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_3

with his remote control in hand and gets hit by a car. Chance ends up living in the house of the car's owner, Benjamin Rand, a wealthy Washington power broker who is dying. Chance responds to everyone around him in terms of either TV shows or gardening. He helps Rand come to grips with his own death, and later helps Rand's wife cope with the loss of her husband. The politicians he meets are so impressed with his homespun wisdom, that they want him to run for office. Chance does not set out to influence anyone and he does not seem aware of the fact that he does. Yet, by simply *being there* – a gardener among people who, like his plants, need care – he makes a difference. The story offers a useful lesson for leaders. A leader's job and moral obligation is to tend to or care for his or her followers. One way that leaders do this is by being present especially in times of crisis or national disaster. When things go wrong, people expect their leaders to be in the right place, at the right time, and doing the right things.

One of the first things Americans hear on the TV or radio news each day is where the president is or will be and what he will be doing. In England, you can tell when the queen is staying in her castle if her flag is flying over it. People like to know where their leaders are, and that information is readily available to the public. In an era of video conferencing and satellite feeds, leaders can be seen and heard anywhere, at any time in the virtual world. Nonetheless, the presence of a leader on TV is sometimes not good enough. There are times when it is crucial for leaders to physically be in the right place, at the right time, and doing the right sort of thing. This is especially the case when there is a disaster or crisis. Leaders who fail to understand the importance of "being there" in a crisis often face public condemnation. When something bad happens, people want to know where their leaders are and what they are doing. This is about more than symbolic gestures or a sense of timing. Leaders have a moral obligation *to be there* for us because it is their job and it is part of what the job of leader means to followers. This chapter examines how place and time are embedded in what it means to be a leader and the moral expectations of leadership.[2]

On Method

The idea that leaders need to be at the right place at the right time is not particularly profound. It is almost a cliché. While from a commonsense point of view, the statement "leaders who are not in the right place at the right time risk condemnation" seems true, a leadership scholar from the social sciences would ask, "What evidence do we have that this is indeed the case?" A social psychologist might create an experiment that tests how people react when a leader is or is not present in various scenarios, whereas a political scientist may collect data from polls and news articles

[2] Joanne B. Ciulla, "The State of Leadership Ethics and the Work that Lies Before Us," Business Ethics: A European Review 14, no. 4 (2005): 323–335.

on public reactions to leaders who did not show up at important events. Social scientists can tell us whether the statement is true and under what conditions it is true, but they do not tend to focus on questions such as "What does this expectation mean?" "Where did it come from in human history?" In leadership studies, the social sciences have gone a long way to describe and explain leadership, but they only scratch the surface of understanding; to dig deeper, we must turn to the humanities.[3]

The goal of this chapter is to explore why followers expect leaders to be at a certain place at a certain time. My aim is to understand what this means in relation to how we think about leadership. To do this, I will draw from history, the classics, literature, and philosophy. One might call my approach hermeneutic. Hermeneutics is the art of interpreting texts and language. Theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey characterize "hermeneutics" as a theory of knowledge for scholars who study "culture, rituals, images, examples of the useful arts – in short, for such products as are the result of man's deliberate ingenuity rather than of nature's blind working."[4] The idea of leaders and leadership clearly falls into this category. As the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer notes, the hermeneutic approach allows one "to discover the meaning of a part in the context of the whole.[5] In what is called "the hermeneutic circle," a scholar goes back and forth between interpretations of meaning that are explicit and implicit in the phenomenon under investigation.

In this chapter we will begin by looking at the container for "being there," which are the normative aspects of time and space in general, and in a particular piece of literature. We go on to examine a historical vignette about the Roman Emperor of Nero and what it has come to mean to us in the present. Then, we consider a contemporary case involving the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and apply philosopher Martin Heidegger's work on time and care to pull together our analysis of why being there at the right time is morally important for leaders.

Some General Observations on the History and Meaning of Time

Time marks the space between birth and death in which we live our lives. In the past, events were the measure of time. For example, in Madagascar, one-half hour was measured by the time it took to cook rice. The time it took to fry a locust mea-

[3] As C. P. Snow noted in his famous 1959 Rede lecture, there are "two cultures" of scholars, the humanities and the sciences. He said the sciences provide us with descriptions and explanations, but we need the humanities for understanding. C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2.

[4] Roy Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 1.

[5] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, second ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1990), 190.

sured a moment. In Chile, it took one Ave Maria to cook an egg and an earthquake could last two credos.[6] In the early days of Christianity, the Catholic Church gave a moral sense to time because it said that time belonged to God. Sloth was not, as people think today, the sin of not working. It was the sin of not caring. Sloth was considered a sin because God, having given us the gift of time, wanted us to pay attention to what we do in it and to enthusiastically attend to the things that we do in the time we have.[7]

Agrarian societies chart time by natural events, and in many cultures, people still primarily use religious events to mark the passing of time. Today, time measures events rather than events measuring time. We regard clocks and calendars as objective and rational ways to decide when to do things and when to go places. Even the kind of watch that a person wears portrays time differently. Traditional analog clocks allow you to see where you have been, where you are, and where you are going. The digital clock literally and figuratively depicts modernity – you only see time in the present. Clocks and calendars give us two different imperatives for action. The first imperative is based on objective measures of time: "It is June 4th hence, according to my schedule, I must go to New Orleans and be there by noon." The second is based on events that create a feeling of obligation such as, "New Orleans has been hit by a flood and people are suffering. I have an obligation to go there as soon as possible."

Even our objective concept of time is a bit of a fiction. It used to be true that a watch measured every event and synchronized watches worn by different people would agree on the time interval between two events. However, when Albert Einstein noticed that the speed of light appeared the same to every observer, no matter how fast they were moving, scientists abandoned the idea that there was a unique absolute time. Instead, according to relativity theory, observers would have different measures of time as recorded by the clock that they carried. Different observers wearing different watches would not necessarily agree.[8] This is a more personal notion of time, relative to the space that is occupied by the observer who measures it. Time then is more than the numbers used to measure it. While clocks and calendars tell us when events take place, events still define time and place for us. Most people do not remember the date when John F. Kennedy was killed or when the Challenger crashed, but they usually remember where they were and what they were doing. Events tend to mark our memories more than calendars and clocks.

[6] E. P. Thompson, "Time Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present, no. 38 (1967).

[7] Joanne B. Ciulla, The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work (New York: Crown Business Books, 2000).

[8] Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam Books, 1988).

Where You Are, What You Know, and Who You Are

We cannot treat space and time as separate containers or environments of human experience because they usually bleed together. Where we are, influences our moral outlook on the world. Edwin Abbott illustrates this point in his novel *Flatland.* Abbott creates a fantasy about spatiality to critique the arrogance and narrow-mindedness of colonial and Victorian morality of his day.[9] The book explores the complexities of imagining spatial and moral dimensions. In the story, a character named "A Square" sets out on a journey and discovers the epistemic limitations of living in his two-dimensional world of Flatland. Along the way, he meets up with the Sphere from Spaceland, who patiently helps A Square recognize a third dimension. Once A Square begins to see in three dimensions, he wants to continue in the "divine" search of knowledge about more dimensions, but Sphere arrogantly dismisses the possibility of more than three dimensions. Eventually, A Square returns to Flatland. This part of the story is similar to Plato's allegory of the cave. When a person breaks free from looking at shadows on the cave wall and climbs out of the cave, he too sees reality in three dimensions. Like Plato's cave man,[10] A Square will never be at home again in the two-dimensional reality and the morality of Flatland. By being somewhere else, he becomes someone else. He is a square who no longer fits in with the other squares.

Flatland raises an interesting question about physical reality and our moral perceptions of the world. Does watching the two-dimensional pictures of war, floods, and famine on the news have the same moral impact as being there? How does being there enhance a leader's capacity to empathize and meet the moral expectations of his or her followers? For our purposes, how does being there at the right time alter or perhaps, make a leader? For example, on 9/11 the physical presence of the former New York Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani at the site of the disaster played an enormous role in the public's perception of him as a leader, regardless of the quality of what he did at that time or before it. In other words, in times of crisis, being there in body, heart, and mind may be as important, or more important, than what a leader actually does at the time.

Did Nero Fiddle While Rome Burned?

The significance of *where* you are, when you are there, and what you are doing is contingent on *who* you are. The meaning of a leader occupying a certain place at a certain time is unique. For example, we all know the story of Nero playing his fiddle while Rome burned. There is nothing wrong with Nero playing the fiddle on the

[9] Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions (New York: Dover Publications, 1992 [1884]).

[10] Plato, Republic, trans. G. M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1992).

roof of his palace; however, there is something that is not only wrong but also immoral about Nero playing the fiddle on his roof at the time in which Rome burns below. It is this point that connects space and time to the implications of Nero's identity as the leader of Rome. If Nero were an ordinary citizen who lived alone, his behavior in that place, at that time, would be considered odd, but not necessarily immoral. The fact that Nero is a leader makes his location at that time morally relevant, because there is a sense in which we expect him to be somewhere else in Rome attending to the disaster. In this case, Nero is physically looking down on Rome, but it does not appear that his heart and mind are on the fire.

The story of Nero playing his fiddle has come down to us through the ages. It is repeated in various forms by a number of ancient historians and then it shows up (as do so many things from the past) in William Shakespeare's work as well as in the work of a number of modern writers. Today we sometimes use the phrase as shorthand to describe a leader who is self-centered, inattentive, and irresponsible, who fails to look after something that is important – "She is like Nero who played the fiddle while Rome burned." To fully understand the significance of this story for our understanding of leadership, we must first ask, is it true that Nero played the violin while Rome burned? Curiously, for our purposes the truth of the story is not that important. The more interesting question is: Why have people from Nero's own time up until now kept repeating this story?

In AD 64 there was a huge fire in Rome. It lasted 6 days and wiped out large portions of the city. One of the more reliable accounts of the fire comes from the Roman historian Gaius Cornelius Tacitus (AD 56–120). Tacitus reports that Nero was not in Rome when the fire started. The emperor was at his summer home in Antium and did not return to the city until the fire got close to one of his houses in town. When Nero finally arrived in Rome, Tacitus tells us:

> But as a relief for the evicted and fugitive people, he opened up the Plain of Mars and the Monuments of Agrippa, in fact even his own gardens, and he set up improvised buildings to receive the destitute multitude; and comestibles were sailed up from Ostia and nearby municipalities, and the price of grain was reduced to three sesterces. All of which, though popular, proved unavailing, because a rumor spread that at the very time of the City's blaze that he had actually mounted his domestic stage and sung of the extirpation of Troy, assimilating present calamities to olden disasters.[11]

If this rumor really was going around Rome, be it true or false, it is one that speaks volumes about how Nero was perceived as a leader. (Imagine President George W. Bush ordering disaster relief after Hurricane Katrina and then getting up on his home stage and singing a song that compared the disaster to the destruction of Troy!)

Ancient historians were known to present gossip as fact and embellish his tory to make the story more interesting. Tacitus was no admirer of Nero, but his account seems more measured than other historians (and he was a near contemporary of Nero's). For example, the historian Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus (AD 69–140) claims that Nero set the fire to plunder and destroy ancient monuments and the

[11] Tacitus, The Annals, trans. A. J. Woodman (Indianapolis IN: Hackett Publishing, 2004), 15.39, 323.

houses of the rich and powerful in the city. According to Suetonius, "Pretending to be disgusted by the drab old buildings and narrow, winding streets of Rome, he [Nero] brazenly set fire to the city."[12] Suetonius then writes:

> Nero watched the conflagration from the tower of Maecenas, enraptured by what he called "the beauty of the flames"; then put on his tragedian's costume and sang "The Sack of Ilium"[13] from beginning to end. He offered to remove corpses and rubble free of charge, but allowed nobody to search among the ruins, even of his own mansion; he wanted to collect as much loot and spoils as possible himself. Then he opened a Fire Relief Fund and insisted on contributions, which bled the provincials white and practically beggared all private citizens.[14]

This is a far more sinister account of the event. One in which Nero does, as the saying goes, "fiddle while Rome burns." Later writers followed Suetonius's story line, only some had Nero singing a different song or playing a different instrument, while others, such as Cassius Dio (AD 150–235), had him "singing and watching the fire from the roof of his palace."[15]

Despite any exaggeration or poetic license, we know that Nero was an immoral and somewhat bizarre person in his private and public life. He killed his mother and kicked his pregnant wife to death after she complained about him coming home late from the races. Nero perfected the idea of bread and circuses, giving handouts and violent public entertainment to keep the masses happy. Fiddling while Rome burned, was nothing compared to the fact that he later blamed the fire on the Christians. After the fire, Nero rounded up the Christians and had them brutally tortured and killed, often as public entertainment. Among those killed, were the Saints Peter and Paul. It is all too easy to caricaturize a leader like Nero, but as the classicist Edward Champlin suggests, the real Nero may not have been as bad as his monster-like image in history.[16]

Citharas and Fiddling

Nero was known to be a brutal man and a vain artist. He was a serious musician who liked to compete in music contests and longed for artistic recognition. The story of him fiddling while Rome burned seems to speak to the public perception of him as uncaring, self-centered, and disjointed from the people. One thing we can be certain of is that he did not play the fiddle because it had not yet been invented. According to classicist Mary Gyles, Nero probably played the cithara (a stringed instrument

[12] Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, trans. Robert Graves and Michael Grant (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 236.

[13] This is a lost epic from Greek literature about the sack of Troy.

[14] Suetonius, 1997, 237.

[15] Cassius Dio, Roman History, trans. Earnest Gray, Loeb Classical Library Edition, Vol. VIIII (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), sec. 16, 113.

[16] Edward Champlin, Nero (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 9.

resembling a lyre) because he had coins and statues made of himself as a cithara player.[17] So the interesting question is, why do we say that Nero played the fiddle? Here is where we can see how the study of language offers insight into the origin of certain ideas. According to Gyles, the Latin word "fides" means string, and the Roman writer Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–143 BC) uses fides and the diminutive "fidicula" to refer to a stringed instrument, which in his day, would be a lyre or a cithara. She traces the term to the AD 500 s and finds that "fidicula" is used in English and Continental Germanic to refer to musical instruments such as the harp, lyre, and rotta. Gyles says that by the fourteenth century, the word evolved into the word "fiddle" and applied to the violin when it was invented a century later. So, what does all this have to do with Nero and leadership? The story of Nero playing the fiddle lay somewhat dormant in literature until it re-emerged in the seventeenth century in Shakespeare's *Henry VI* where Shakespeare has Henry proclaim:

> Plataginet, I will: and like thee, Nero,
> Play on the lute, beholding the towns burn.[18]

Gyles argues that it is significant that Nero shows up in this play as a musician; however, that in *The Taming of the Shrew,* Shakespeare makes it clear that he thinks a lute is the same thing as a fiddle.[19] She then points to a number of authors who follow Shakespeare and repeat the story that Nero fiddled while Rome burned. Because of the Nero story, the verb "fiddled" enters the English language with two very different meanings. Consider the definition from Samuel Johnson's dictionary, written between 1745 and 1755:

> 1. To fiddle, from the noun.
> To trifle, to shift the hands often, and to do nothing like a fellow that plays upon a fiddle. Good cooks cannot abide what they justly call fiddling work, where abundance of time is spent and little done?[20]

One rarely associates playing an instrument with "doing nothing," yet if we go back to the Nero story, we see that both the story and the word for playing the instrument in the story (albeit the wrong instrument) take on a meaning that includes a moral condemnation of Nero, who was doing something trivial and unhelpful at the wrong time and in the wrong place. In modern English, "to fiddle" is an even harsher term

[17] Mary F. Gyles, "Nero Fiddled While Rome Burned," The Classical Journal42, no. 4 (1947): 11–217.

[18] William Shakespeare, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1994), Henry VI, Pt. I Act I, Scene 4, 6.

[19] Gyles, "Nero Fiddled While Rome Burned," 215.

[20] Samuel Johnson, *Dictionary of the English Language,* Vol. I (New York: AMS Press, 1967).

that can mean to cheat or swindle,[21] to make frivolous movements, and to waste time.[22]

The intent of this, somewhat off the beaten path, account of Nero and fiddling while Rome burns is to show how sayings can be graphic summaries of what people, over a long period of time, have thought and felt about how leaders should not behave. We expect leaders to attend to the problems of their followers. In times of crisis, people condemn leaders who are not there and/or do something at the time of the crisis that the public perceives as pleasant or enjoyable to the leader. When leaders behave this way, the public thinks they are fiddling around. In our next examples, we see that the perception of fiddling around need not involve playing an instrument.

A Case of Not Being There

Russian President Vladimir Putin offers a striking instance of a leader who failed to understand the importance of "being there" when he stayed on at his vacation dacha instead of returning to his office in Moscow or going to the port at the Barents Sea after the Russian nuclear submarine *Kursk* sank in August of 2000. Consider some of the reactions to Putin's behavior at home and in the world press.[23] "Particularly irksome," declared a Moscow daily, was that "he has not interrupted his vacation … if only for an hour, to support the seamen in distress." Igor Chernyak wondered about Putin's ability to empathize.

> How come that in the past five days, Putin, who once spent a night aboard a sub marine and knows what being underwater means, has not found time to address the families of the Kursk's seamen? Why does he think he can remain silent these days, with all of Russia keyed up, its heart going out to the people aboard the hapless sub?

In democratic societies, the public is supposed to hold their leaders accountable for where they are in times of crisis. For example, the British paper the *Independent* editorialized (August 18): "No democratic politician can afford to remain on holiday in a crisis." Oslo's *Dagbladet* observed: "every other democratically elected head of state would have gotten as near the site [of the accident] as humanly possible." Michael Backhaus argued in the tabloid *B.Z.* of Berlin (August 18):

> The czars and their Soviet successors simply did not have to take care of public concerns. In their majority, the Russians still want a strong man, a kind of czar, at the lead. But they want someone who takes care of the people and who is with them in times of misery. Putin's

[21] It is worth noting here that in the 1530s, wandering minstrels had fallen into disrepute and by the seventeenth century were considered idlers and people who spread social unrest. This too contributed to the meaning of the expression "fiddling around," according to Gyles, "Nero Fiddled While Rome Burned," 215.

[22] The Complete Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 585.

[23] All press quotes in this section, unless otherwise stated are from Federation of American Scientists. Available at http://www.fas.org/news/russia/2000/russia-000818-sub_comment.htm

> heartless silence and the serious shortcomings during the rescue mission could destroy his reputation as the savior of the Russian motherland.

An editorial in the Italian *La Stampa* (August 18) notes:

> According to the Russians, today Putin should be at the Barents Sea …following the rescue operations. Yesterday's public surveys, conducted for "Echo of Moscow" radio, heated up its switchboards: Most of the radio listeners wanted Putin to immediately interrupt his vacation, (adding) "Clinton does it all the time."

Putin replied to these criticisms and acknowledged his mistake in an inter- view with Voice of America:

> The only thing which could have been changed in my conduct as head of state, it could be possible to halt my working meetings, to suspend them at the place of my vacation in Sochi, the Black Sea, I could go back to the capital, to Moscow. But, again, it would have been a P-R (public relations) activity since in any city of the country, or all over the world, I'm always linked to the military, I have communication means, I can discuss any problems on the table.[24]

Putin thought that going to his office or to the site of the submarine was simply a matter of public relations. In other words, he says he cared, in the sense of paying attention, but failed to *show* care. The cause of outrage was the public perception that he chose to stay on vacation rather than be where the public thought that he should be. Hence, he appeared to be fiddling around when he should have been doing his job as leader. Note that Putin, like Nero, did seem to attend to the problem at hand. The key issue for followers was that they believed that their leaders were not paying attention and were doing something enjoyable while others suffered. Such leaders appear self-interested, callous, and indifferent to the plight of their followers.

Putin's case is particularly revealing when it comes to the difference between caring and showing care. On the one hand, he is a product of his personal background as head of intelligence and as someone who grew up in an undemocratic culture. So on the one hand, perhaps he did not know that leaders were supposed to stop vacationing and go to their office in Moscow or to the site of a disaster.[25] On the other hand, this does not get at the question of whether Putin really cared about the right things at that time. Some believed that Putin was more concerned with showing that Russia did not need help than caring about the 118 men who were trapped in the submarine. The other rumor going around was that there was something he wanted to hide on the submarine.

There are many other cases of leaders who failed to be in the right place at the right time. Coincidentally, a year later, we see another example of this involving a submarine. In February 2001, when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori found out that the U.S. submarine *Greeneville* sank a Japanese fishing boat called the *Ehime Maru's,* he actually called his office and asked his secretary whether it was

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[24] Voice of America. Available at http://www.fas.org/news/russia/2000/russia-000909.htm

[25] Terry L. Price, *Understanding Ethical Failures* in *Leadership* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

all right for him to continue playing golf. Apparently, she said yes, because he went on to play for two more hours.[26] He was widely condemned by the public and the press. (Mori's political career was already on thin ice at the time.) His response to criticisms of his behavior was more clueless than Putin's. He said: "Why is this an issue of emergency management? It is an accident isn't it? I think I exercised my leadership."[27] In an editorial, Japanese writer Shin'ya Fujiwara criticized Mori's behavior and the failure of the captain of the *Greeneville* to apologize to the Japanese families. Fujiwara aptly sums up the expectations that people have for leaders to be there. He/writes, "both men have shown this capacity to go missing when they are needed, leaving us alone again in our grief and frustration."[28]

Being there in a time of crisis is central to leadership in all contexts. As John Keegan notes in the opening quote of this chapter, a leader's presence is central to military leadership for practical as well as moral reasons. Business leaders have also been condemned when they fail to show up in times of crisis. One notable example of this is the failure of Exxon CEO Lawrence G. Rawl to visit the site where the *Exxon Valdez* broke up in Alaska, causing one of the worst oil spills in history. It took him about a week to finally get there. In the meantime, the public got the impression that Exxon did not care or take responsibility for the environmental disaster. Rawl later said that his biggest mistake during the crisis was not going to the site of the disaster immediately after it occurred.[29]

Care and Being There

Let us turn now to what "care" means and how it is related to being there. "Care" has two different but interrelated meanings. It can mean anxiety or concern and is often used as a noun as in "She has many cares" or "She has no cares." The verb form of "care" often means solicitous, paying attention *to,* taking responsibility *for,* or even worrying *about* someone or something, as in "I care about or for her." The two different meanings come together in "I must care for her especially when she has so many cares." The word "care" comes from the Latin word "cura," which is also the root of the word "cure." In *Being and Time* philosopher Martin Heidegger traces the origins of the role of care in life to the fable of Care (Cura) by the Roman

[26] Stephanie Strom, "Sub Incident Erodes Trust in Japan Chief and the U.S.," *TheNew York Times,* February 18, 2001, N7.

[27] Howard W. French, "A Sorry Mess: Taking Measure of Suffering," *The New York Times,* March 4, 2001, WK 16.

[28] Shin'ya Fujiwara, "In Japan, Waiting for the Captain to Appear," *The New York Times,* February 14, 2001, A17.

[29] Bruce Harrison and Tom Prugh, "Assessing the Damage: Practitioner Perspectives on the Valdez," *Public Relations Journal 45,* no. 10 (1989): 40.

writer Gaius Julius Hyginus (64 BC-AD 17).[30] The fable ties the idea of caring to the origins and maintenance of humanity. It goes like this:

Once when "care" [Cura] was crossing a river, she thoughtfully picked up some mud and began to shape it. While she was thinking about what she had made, Jupiter came by. Care asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. Care wanted to name the human after herself, but Jupiter insisted that his name should be given to the human instead. While Care and Jupiter were arguing, Earth (Tellus) arose and said that the human being should be named after her, since she had given her own body. Finally, all three disputants accepted Saturn as judge. Saturn decided that Jupiter, who gave spirit to the human, would take back its soul after death; and since Earth had offered her body to the human, she should receive it back after death. But, said Saturn, "Since Care fashioned the first human being, let her have and hold it as long as it lives.[31]

The myth demonstrates how care literally and figuratively makes us what we are and sustains us as human beings. Heidegger ties the idea of care (Sorge) to what it means to be or to exist. He uses the word "Da-sein," to mean "being there." Heidegger says we not only exist in time, but we exist first and foremost as beings with the capacity to be concerned about our own being or self-identity. We are self-reflective in that we make sense of our ability to make sense of the world. Humans do not exist by themselves. They exist in the midst of a world of other people and things. For Heidegger, care is the uniquely human way of being in this world. It is the experience of care that unifies the self and makes a person into an authentic human being. While Heidegger is looking at the broader philosophic question of "being there," it is instructive to use his observations to think about why care is fundamental to what we are as humans and how we understand our common morality.[32] This last point is most important for the issue at hand concerning leaders. The "being" of a leader has some unique aspects to it. Since leaders cannot exist without followers, they exist in the context of followers. What sets them apart in that context is that their role carries the expectation and obligation to care. Failure to place a value on being there at a particular time is, like the vice of sloth, a failure to care.

The Ethics of Care

One of the oldest and ubiquitous moral principles is the golden rule: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you" or "do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you." It assumes a common ability to empathize, and it encompasses expansive notions of space and time. The "others" in the rule are just

[30] Hyginus, *Fabularum Liber* (New York: Garland, 1976 [1535]).

[31] In an edited form the quote is from: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996), 184.

[32] See Robert C. Solomon, *From Rationalism to Existentialism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

like you and me, no matter where they are or what time it is. The rule implies that people are the same based on their wants and needs. The golden rule gives us guidance on how to treat people, yet it still does not quite capture what it means to care. Perhaps that is what makes it such a useful principle. Care requires attention, solicitude, and active involvement. Unlike the golden rule, which is objective and egalitarian, care entails having certain dispositions and feelings, and it is highly subjective and selective.

In the twentieth century, feminist scholars began to formulate an ethic of care.[33] One impetus for this was psychologist Carol Gilligan's surprising discovery that girls progressed up Lawrence Kohlberg's scale of moral development more slowly than boys. Gilligan went on to conduct her own study of moral development of girls and found that women and girls thought about ethical problems in "a different voice" than men.[34] Rather than reasoning from moral principles, females were more concerned with relationships and contexts. One might argue that if a leader thinks about morality in this "female" way, he or she would be more likely to sense why being in the right place, at the right time, is important for his or her relationship to followers. It is the same disposition that leads mothers and fathers to physically comfort their screaming babies, even when the babies are not hurt or in danger. According to psychologist Erik Erikson, the human inclination to care is rooted in the impulse to "caress" someone who in his helplessness emits signals of despair.[35] The ethics of care is often contrasted with the ethics of justice. Philosopher Virginia Held describes an ethic of justice as one that focuses on fairness, equality, individual rights, and abstract principles, as well as the consistent application of them. An ethic of care is about cultivating caring relations, attentiveness, responsiveness to need, and narrative nuance (which includes time and place). She says, "Whereas justice protects equality and freedom, care fosters social bonds and cooperation."[36]

The basic ideas behind the ethics of care, such as the role of emotions, empathy, and sympathy, have been discussed by many thinkers in the history of philosophy and are not considered feminine or masculine, but merely other aspects of ethics.[37] For example, Søren Kierkegaard introduced the notion of care as a means of counteracting the excessive objectivity of philosophy in the early twentieth century.[38]

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[33] See Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Martha C. Nussbaum, *Sex and Social Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[34] Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

[35] Erik H. Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed: A Review* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982).

[36] Virginia Held, *The Ethics of Care* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 15.

[37] See, for example, Bishop Joseph Butler, Five Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel; and A Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950 [1726]); and David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983).

[38] Søren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus; or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est; and A Sermon, trans. Thomas Henry Croxall (Paulo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958) Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1966).

The Roman philosopher Seneca (who, by the way, was Nero's tutor) observed that behaving rationally is only part of morality. He said humans were given reason so that they can achieve the good. They were given the capacity to care so that they can perfect the good.[39] The dichotomy between those cold, hard, objective, moral principles based on reason and justice, and moral feelings such as empathy is extremely important when we consider the ethics of leadership. Followers want and expect leaders to have moral principles and moral feelings. Not all leaders have both, but this does not necessarily mean that they are immoral or that they cannot learn or at least compensate for missing the feelings related to care.

Conclusion: Duty and Propriety

Looking back on the Putin example, notice that he says that he was monitoring the situation with sophisticated communications while at his vacation dacha. There was nothing that he could practically do to help raise the submarine. He appears to have been directing the action from afar. Putin may well have been behaving like a responsible and rational leader, who was perceived to be in the wrong place at that time. The public controversy over Putin centered on what his absence at the Barents Sea port said about his feelings; however, there is another equally if not more important issue in the case. Putin not only appeared to lack the right feelings that would motivate him to be there, but he lacked the knowledge that he had a duty to be there. Staying at his dasha made him seem slothful – as if he did not care about how or where he did his work or as if he was not giving the disaster the appropriate kind of attention. Care is about more than concern for others; it is also about concern for what one does in the role that defines what one is. While we want leaders who have feelings of care for other human beings, there is much to recommend in a leader with a strong sense of duty. First, a leader like Putin does not need to have a tender heart to know when and where he should be in times of crisis. Care is largely about feelings, but it can also be framed in terms of attention to one's duty. Second, the duties of leadership can be taught in ways that moral feeling cannot. Leaders learn from their mistakes when they have a duty to be on the site of a disaster. Putin did. In later disasters, such as the massacre of school children in Beslan by Chechan rebels in 2004, he promptly arrived on the scene. Even if showing up is nothing more than public relations, it still means something to followers. It means the leader is "on the job" and paying attention to their plight. A leader's presence can give followers confidence in the leader, and this confidence can serve as a source of comfort.

It may be unrealistic to expect all leaders to have finely honed feelings of care, and not all of them do. This is rather like expecting all leaders to have charisma.

[39] Seneca, *Seneca ad Lucilium Epistulae. Vol. 3 of Epistulae Morales,* trans. Richard M. Gummere (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953).

I would argue that either care for one's duty or the care that comes from feelings is morally sufficient, albeit not as emotionally satisfying to followers. The duty to be with followers in a crisis is also captured by the concept of "propriety" or what is considered proper behavior for a leader. Confucius understood the importance of propriety and ceremony for leaders as a means of showing both respect and humility.[40] Ancient Greek and Chinese writers talked about propriety in terms of the virtue reverence. According to philosopher and classicist Paul Woodruff, the ancients considered reverence the most important virtue for leaders. It was the virtue that made leaders act as if they were a part of a larger whole and kept leaders from acting like gods.[41] As noted earlier, leaders simply cannot exist without followers, even though some think they can.

We have been exploring how being there and care are essential elements of the moral obligations of leadership. Being in a certain place at a certain time is the context and existential aspect of leadership. The best leaders care because of how they feel *and* because of their sense of duty, but either motivation may be sufficient for filling their moral obligations and doing their job. A leader's duties are determined by how to do his or her job the right way. As I have argued elsewhere, the ethics of leaders is inextricably tied to and embedded in the skills, knowledge, and competencies of leadership.[42] Leaders can and often do learn their duties and proper behavior on the job. Duty and propriety offer guidance for leaders about where they should be at certain times, regardless of how the leader feels.

Physical presence affects the way that people perceive the world. Visiting the location of a disaster after it has occurred is different from watching it on a TV. Being at the site of a disaster may cultivate sentiments of care in leaders who do not have them or, at a minimum, help leaders understand why they should be there. When leaders "fiddle while Rome bums," stay on vacation while sailors die, or play golf while families grieve, they fail to understand that these things do not happen to their followers without happening to them. This is why it is so important for presidents to visit wounded soldiers and attend the funerals of those who have fallen in war. Leaders need to experience the feelings of followers up close because they are players in the same tragedy. Since the time of Nero and perhaps before then, people have condemned leaders who fail to understand this point and "fiddle while Rome burns."

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[40] See Confucius, "Selections from the Analects," ed. and trans. Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[41] Paul Woodruff, *Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue* (New York: Oxford Uni versity Press, 2001).

[42] Joanne B. Ciulla, "Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory," *The Business Ethics Quarterly* 5, no. 1(1995): 5–28. Also see, Joanne B. Ciulla, "Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness," in *The Nature of Leadership,* ed. J. Antonakis, A. T. Cianciolo, and R. J. Sternberg (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 302–327.

Chapter 4
Searching for Mandela: The Saint as a Sinner Who Keeps on Trying

Abstract and Background I first visited South Africa in 2000, when I was working with the United Nations International Leadership Academy. After that, I traveled to South Africa on many other occasions. For 6 years, I sat on the board of The Desmond Tutu Peace Foundation. During that time, I had the opportunity to meet Archbishop Tutu and a number of people who were involved the anti-apartheid movement and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In 2009, I was invited to be a visiting professor at the University of Fort Hare's Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa. Fort Hare is the oldest black University in South Africa. It is Nelson Mandela's alma mater and home to the African National Congress (ANC) archive.

Over the 3 years that I visited Fort Hare, I perused the ANC archive and read a variety of biographies about Mandela. I had never intended to write anything on him, because there were already plenty of books by Mandela's friends, journalists, and other academics. When Donna Ladkin and Chellie Spiller asked me to contribute an article for their handbook on authentic leadership, I wasn't sure what to write about. While thinking about a topic, I noticed that a few articles on authentic leadership asserted that Mandela was an authentic leader. This gave me pause, because the more I had read about him, the more he seemed to be an enigma. So, I decided to use my research from Fort Hare to answer the question: Was Mandela *really* an authentic leader? This paper seeks to answer that question, while also taking a critical look at the theory of authentic leadership.

Keywords Mandela · Authentic leadership · Biography · Anti-apartheid movement · Presentation of self · Heidegger · Sartre · Fort Hare · de Klerk · Robben Island

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Introduction

We all create ourselves through our thoughts, beliefs, values and actions, but an iconic leader like Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela is different. There are two Mandelas – Mandela the man and Mandela the movement or the 'saint" who represents a set of ideals, moral values and aspirations of black and colored people in South Africa and around the world. The two identities overlap, yet they are not quite the same. Is Mandela an authentic leader? If you do not do much research on him, Mandela certainly appears to meet all of the qualifications of an authentic leader. Yet, the more research one does on Mandela the more difficult it is to find out who he really is. It also raises questions about the application of authentic leadership to leaders like him and the theory itself.

In her 1986 biography of Mandela, Mary Benson begins with the question "How is it that a man imprisoned for more than twenty-three years – who has not been allowed to be quoted by the South African media – has become the embodiment of the struggle for liberation in that country and the vital symbol of a new society?"[1] I will argue that, in addition to his natural gifts and intelligence, he is both a master of impression management and a willing pawn of history. His main source of power and influence is moral because of the sacrifices that he made and the morality of the fight for human rights and dignity for black and colored South Africans. The leadership of Mandela, as an icon, is existential in that his power stems from being Mandela.

Normative constructs of leadership, such as authentic leadership, attempt to account for good leadership, which I have argued boils down to what constitutes ethical and effective leadership.[2] Researchers who use these constructs often claim great leaders as exemplars of their theory. Mandela certainly seems to fit the way many researchers describe authentic leadership and, for that matter, most normative conceptualizations of leadership, such as transformational leadership, servant leadership and "ethical leadership."[3] Nonetheless, the case of Mandela does more to bolster and refine these theories than the theories do to help us understand Mandela and his leadership.[4] On the surface, when we consider Mandela's story, he appears to be a paragon of authentic leadership, yet when we look closer we see that he does not quite fit the bill.

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[1] Mary Benson (1986), Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement, New York: W.W. Norton, p. 13.

[2] Joanne B. Ciulla (2011), "Ethics and effectiveness: the nature of good leadership," in John Antonakis and David Day (eds.), The Nature of Leadership, 2nd edn., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 508–40.

[3] M.E. Brown, L.K. Treviño and D. Harrison (2005), "Ethical leadership: a social learning perspective for construct development and testing," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, **97**, 117–34.

[4] C.D. Cooper, T.A. Scandura and C.A. Schriesheim (2005), "Looking forward but learning from the past: potential challenges to developing authentic leadership theory and authentic leaders," Leadership Quarterly, **16**, 475–93.

The Search Begins

I became interested in Mandela in 2000 when I was doing some work in Cape Town for the United Nations International Leadership Academy. During that time, I was invited to attend a reunion of the African National Congress (ANC) on Robben Island. The organizers of the event closed the island off to tourists and presented a series of seminars by former political prisoners and their jailers. It was very exciting to meet some of the people whom Mandela talked about in his 1994 auto- biography *Long Walk to Freedom*.[5] The prison guards described what it was like to have this group of intellectual revolutionaries in their care. In most prisons, a warden worries about drugs, violence and weapons. On Robben Island, the warden's greatest concerns were the words that came from the lips of the political prisoners and the tips of their pens. The South African government kept a lid on the anti-apartheid movement by banning activists from talking and writing to each other both inside and outside of prison.

Former President F.W. de Klerk was also at the reunion. At one point, de Klerk asked a former prisoner about a large photo in the courtyard of the prison that depicted Mandela and other political prisoners seated in one row sewing, while in another row there were prisoners breaking rocks. The guide told him that the prison staged the shot for aid workers who had come to check up on the treatment of political prisoners. About 11 years later, I had an opportunity to interview de Klerk. I reminded him of that incident and asked him what he was thinking when he heard this explanation. There was an uncomfortable pause and then de Klerk said it was such a pity that a person like Mandela was put in a place like that.[6] This was a strange remark from a leader who was responsible for the deaths of so many anti-apartheid leaders during his time in politics.

Mandela was not on the island that day, and I was a bit surprised that the other former inmates and jailers did not talk as much about him as I had expected after reading his autobiography. Perhaps this is simply because the writer of an autobiography takes center stage and the story reflects the author's perspective on himself, selective memory, and the story he or she wants to tell. Some of the obvious limitations of his autobiography made me even more curious about Mandela, but I did not do any further research on him until 2009, when I became a visiting professor at Mandela's alma mater, the University of Fort Hare.

The University of Fort Hare is the oldest black university in South Africa and the cradle of the anti-apartheid movement. Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Govan Mbeki are just a few of its distinguished graduates. The university houses the ANC archive, which contains some of Mandela's papers. Among the documents that I studied were the proofs of Mandela's autobiography, which was co-written by Richard Stengel, managing editor of *Time Magazine*. The proofs had Mandela's

[5] Nelson Mandela (1994), Long Walk to Freedom, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

[6] Joanne B. Ciulla interview with F.W. de Klerk at the University of Richmond on February 22, 2011. Full interview accessed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7D0TgVQicg

handwritten comments in the margins.[7] It was clear from these notes and from Mandela's descriptions of writing the memoir that Mandela and others had meticulously crafted Mandela's story. A few months after this, I participated in a documentary called *The Magic of Mandela* that aired on Dutch television.[8] Most of the documentary consisted of interviews with people about what it was like to meet Mandela. While I had never met Mandela, he really did seem to have a magical effect on others. Many spoke in hushed terms of their awe of him and commented on the power of his smile. The more I heard about Mandela, the more I wanted to know what he was really like.

Authenticity in Leadership Studies

Researchers describe authentic leadership in a variety of ways,[9] but most definitions are somewhat similar. Some describe it along the lines of Bruce Avolio's and Fred Luthans's definition – "a process that draws from both positive psychological capacities and a highly developed organizational context, which results in both greater self-awareness and self-regulated positive behaviors on the part of leaders and associates, fostering positive self-development."[10] This definition later added explicit moral elements such as: "a pattern of leader behavior that draws upon and promotes both positive psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate, to foster greater self-awareness, an internalized moral perspective, balanced processing of information, and relational transparency on the part of leaders working with followers, fostering positive self-development."[11] Authentic leadership is basically about how a leader's self-knowledge contributes to making him or her an effective and a moral leader. There is an inherent circularity in the notion of morality in this definition. Morality seems to be both the result of being authentic and a quality of authenticity.

The Authentic Leadership Questionnaire (ALQ) measures self- awareness, balanced processing, internalized moral perspective, and relational transparency.[12] So,

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[7] University of Fort Hare, University Library, ANC Archives, Office of the ANC President, Nelson Mandela, Papers Series XV, draft manuscripts of Long Walk to Freedom, Box 421.

[8] The Magic of Mandela, Vara Network, Dutch Television, the Netherlands, December 23, 2011, http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/programmas/8024-de-magie-van-mandela

[9] W.L. Gardner, C.C. Cogliser, K.M. Davis and M.P. Dickens (2011), "Authentic leadership: a review of the literature and research agenda," Leadership Quarterly, **22**, 1120–45.

[10] F. Luthans and B.J. Avolio (2003), "Authentic leadership development," in K.S. Cameron, J.E. Dutton and R.E. Quinn (eds.), Positive Organizational Scholarship, San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, p. 243.

[11] F.O. Walumbwa, B.J. Avolio, W.L. Gardner, T.S. Wernsing and S.J. Peterson (2008), "Authentic leadership: development and validation of a theory-based measure," Journal of Management, **34** (1), pp. 89–126.

[12] Ibid.

let us see how Mandela appears to stack up against these criteria. Self-awareness entails an understanding of one's strengths and weaknesses, how one finds meaning, and how one learns about the self from others.[13] When we turn to a leader like Mandela, who worked for a moral cause and wrote several books about his experiences, one would be hard pressed to say that he does not appear to have self-awareness. Moreover, being in jail for 27 years certainly gives a man time to think. In a letter to his wife Winnie, who was in Kroonstad prison at the time, Mandela writes: "Incidentally, you may find that the cell is an ideal place to learn to know yourself, to search realistically and regularly the process of your own mind and feelings."[14] It is also easy to find evidence that Mandela engaged in balanced processing because of the lawyerly reasoning evident in his written and spoken words.[15] If you read Mandela's speeches, you see that they are more logical and precise than they are rhetorical – Mandela was no Winston Churchill.

There are numerous instances where Mandela's actions indicate that he possesses internalized moral perspective, most notably in his refusal to compromise. The South African government offered to release Mandela from jail seven times between 1975 and 1985. All of the offers placed various restrictions on Mandela – most banned his participation in political activities. Mandela refused every one of them, which resulted in his being imprisoned for as many as 16 years longer than he had to be. In January of 1985, President P.W. Botha offered Mandela his freedom if Mandela would unconditionally promise to reject violence as a political instrument. He turned down Botha's offer and wrote a fiery speech from prison that his daughter Zindzi delivered at a rally in Soweto. In the speech that she read, Mandela declared his loyalty to the ANC and the people and said that, until Botha got rid of apartheid, no one else including Mandela could be free. Both Mandela's decision and his statement of it reflect the kind of altruism, concern for the greater good, and loyalty to the organization and followers that raise leaders from the ordinary to the mythical. In the speech he said: "I cherish my own freedom dearly, but I care more for your freedom."[16] We see examples of self-sacrifice and concern for the greatest good throughout Mandela's life. In a CNN interview on his 90th birthday, he was asked if he regretted not spending more time with his family. Mandela answered no, because what he was doing was for the greater good of society.[17]

Mandela's refusal to compromise is an aspect of his extraordinary self-control. Many of his friends and biographers comment that Mandela had a bad temper.

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[13] M.H. Kernis and B.M. Goldman (2006), "A multi-component conceptualization of authenticity: theory and research," in M.P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 38, San Diego, CA: Academic Press, pp. 283–357.

[14] Nelson R. Mandela (2010), Conversations with Myself, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, p. 211.

[15] For texts of his speeches see Nelson Mandela (1993), Nelson Mandela Speaks, New York: Pathfinder Press.

[16] Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 455.

[17] Robyn Curnow (2008), Mandela Talks with CNN, July 18, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Chbp5naeywI&feature=related

Mandela himself says that his time in prison taught him self-control and made him more mature. In 1976, an interviewer asked fellow prisoner Ahmed Kathrada to assess the morale of Mandela and some of the other political prisoners. He replied:

> In many ways, like all of us Nelson has been changing over the years. I think that the basic change in Nelson is that as he has been living through prison his anger and hatred of the system has been increasing, but the manifestations of that anger have become less visible to a person. They are more subdued, more tempered. They've become more cold and analytical in focusing on the evils of the system.[18]

But then, in the next sentence, Kathrada goes on to say, "His morale has been such that he has been one of the men that has inspired all who came into contact with him."[19] It would seem that Mandela was able to put a positive mask over his hatred and anger. In his memoirs, Kathrada writes, "It is virtually impossible to know his inner emotions; by and large he remains inscrutable."[20] So, whether Mandela exercised the fourth and most fundamental aspect of authentic leadership, relational transparency (that is, presenting himself as he really is and not acting)[21] is, as we will see, difficult to tell. Who Mandela is and what makes him what he is raise some philosophic questions about identity and being.

Authenticity in Heidegger and Sartre

Articles in the authentic leadership literature often cite but rarely discuss the ways that existentialist philosophers Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre characterize authenticity.[22] Both philosophers make a sharp distinction between metaphysics, an area of inquiry that looks at primary causes and offers causal explanations of reality, and ontology, which is about descriptions of reality. The distinction between these two areas of study is relevant to the claims that one can make about authentic leaders. There is a difference between making a metaphysical claim that the characteristics of an authentic leader are reasons for or *cause* leaders to be good (that is, ethical and effective) and the ontological claim that these characteristics describe certain types of good leaders. Leadership researchers seem to want to do both when they do studies that attempt to show correlation or causal connection between authentic leadership and leader effectiveness.

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[18] Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr. (1991), Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 141.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ahmed Kathrada (2004), Memoirs, Cape Town, South Africa: Zebra Press.

[21] Kernis and Goldman, "A multi-component conceptualization."

[22] For example, Kernis and Goldman, "A multi-component conceptualization," offer an extensive discussion of the philosophic background on authenticity. It is admirable that they do this; however, there are a number of mistakes and misunderstandings of the philosophic literature in it, which is unfortunate, because these mistakes are frequently repeated in articles that cite Kernis and Goldman. Alas, this is one of the pitfalls of interdisciplinary research!

Both Heidegger and Sartre believe that humans create themselves. Heidegger takes a historical approach to what he calls Dasein (or being as a person). Life is a project that has a narrative unity between the past, present and future. Heidegger uses the term "authentic existence" to mean the projects that people do to create themselves in light of their place in the context of time. Heidegger claims that his idea of authenticity is a morally neutral ontological description – about being in the world at a particular time (hence the title of his book *Being and Time*).[23] Heidegger frames authenticity in terms of resoluteness. He says:

> The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been – that possibility that Dasein [being] may choose its hero – is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness. … Resoluteness implies handing itself down by anticipation to the "there" of the moment of vision; and this handing down we call "fate."[24]

Since Heidegger believes life projects are done in history they are also done as a part of various groups. Hence, we not only "be in time"; we "be with others" or "be in the world." So, here the primary question in the context of history, is not about "Who shall I become?" but "Who shall we become?"[25] Heidegger's notion of being also rests on the idea of care. By care he means attentiveness or attention to the world. While we usually think of "care" as a moral term, Heidegger uses it in a non-moral sense. For him, care is the foundation of being, because we can only "be" if we are attentive to "residing" or dwelling in the world.[26] In this sense of being, Mandela is indeed authentic, particularly because there is ample evidence of his strong sense of himself as a player in history and someone who is attentive to what he must be in the context of others. Whether he is faking how he acts is irrelevant. What matters is his sense of himself in time and among others. On this view, what Mandela is does not require that he shows what he really thinks or feels in any context.

Sartre's notion of authenticity is normative, but in a peculiar way, because he does not believe in moral norms. He says that a person earns authenticity under "the call of conscience."[27] In other words, authentic people do not behave morally because society says so or because they are supposed to. They are moral because they use their freedom to choose a moral act to be their own choice and their own project. His notion of authenticity is based on freedom and the constant necessity of choice that it entails. It is a very individualistic concept. Freedom and choice force us to carry the full burden of responsibility for everything we do.

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[23] Martin Heidegger (1962), Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, p. 62.

[24] Ibid., p. 438.

[25] Ibid., p. 436.

[26] Many scholars do not like to refer to Heidegger's work because he was a member of the Nazi party and there seem to be some references that support Hitler in Being and Time. I address his work here in response to the literature that references it.

[27] Jean-Paul Sartre (2001), Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, translated by Hazel Barnes, New York: Citadel, p. 222.

We become social beings by what Sartre calls "the look of another." Once this happens, a person loses some of his or her autonomy and freedom and becomes part of another person's project. (In *No Exit,* he shows us why hell is other people).[28] Sartre writes that "man is always separated from what he is by all the breadth of the being which he is not" and "Man is a being of distances."[29] In other words, nothingness surrounds us on all sides – hence the title of his book *Being and Nothingness*. A number of articles on authentic leadership claim Heidegger's notion of authenticity, but Sartre actually captures the psychological aspects of most authentic leadership constructs. The story that Mandela creates is best described by Heidegger's historical notion of self. However, by the choices Mandela makes and the way that others see him or Sartre's "look of another," he seems to lose some control of his own story.

A Historiography of Mandela Biographies

Mandela has a great story and, in a culture where history is to a large extent based on oral tradition, stories often change as people tell them. Once Mandela became famous and was released from prison, fellow prisoners and prison warders wrote books or gave interviews about him. Mandela discredited some of the warders' stories. James Gregory, a warder from Robben Island, wrote a popular book called *Goodbye Bafana* that many say exaggerated his friendship with Mandela.[30] According to Mandela, he did not know Gregory well at all and did not have a favorable view of the warders there.[31] In a handwritten note on his day calendar, he wrote: "Religion is in our blood. But you have to be in a S.A. prison where, as in Robben Island, all warders were white and prisoners Black, Coloureds, Indians – to see how man can be cruel to others."[32]

It is striking how many of the major biographies of Mandela are by his friends. The journalist Mary Benson, who wrote one of the first biographies in 1985, knew Mandela well.[33] Fatima Meer, whose husband went to law school with Mandela, was also a good friend of Winnie and Nelson Mandela.[34] Her authorized biography

[28] Jean-Paul Sartre (1958), No Exit, translated by Paul Bowles, New York: Samuel French.

[29] Ibid., p. 17.

[30] James Gregory (1995), Goodbye Bafana: Nelson Mandela, My Prisoner, My Friend, London: BCA.

[31] See Anthony Sampson (1999), Mandela: The Authorized Biography, New York: Vintage Books, p. 217.

[32] From a 1998 diary dated March 15, 1998, Nelson Mandela Digital Archive, Folder 10, Image 5, http://archive.nelsonmandela.org/#!asset-viewer:q.1069448327201967200=10893284659214125890&l.id=VwQ_iQTaA4hFgZZm395lpZXc7vzupmE&l.min-loaded=15&l.expanded-id=vwM_iQTaA4hFgZZm395l-Z8ewRCZYik

[33] Benson, Nelson Mandela.

[34] Fatima Meer (1988), Higher than Hope: The Authorized Biography of Nelson Mandela, New York: Harper & Row.

of Mandela largely draws on interviews with Winnie. Winnie Mandela dictated her own autobiography to Anne Benjamin in the book *Part of My Soul Went with Him*, but it focuses on Winnie's difficulties after Mandela went to prison and offers surprisingly little perspective on Mandela as a person.[35] While the biographies by Mandela's wife and friends provide a wealth of detail on both what he did and what he was like, they sometimes seem influenced by their connection to him and the movement that he represented. Also, many of the earlier biographies draw from each other's work and interviews with each other. Fellow prisoners Mac Maharaj and Ahmad Kathrada wrote an "authorized portrait" of Mandela.[36] Similarly, the journalist Anthony Sampson wrote an authorized biography of Mandela. Sampson too had been a friend of Mandela's since the 1950s. Sampson makes reference to British journalist Martin Meredith's comprehensive unauthorized biography of Mandela. Meredith did not know Mandela personally, but he interviewed Mandela and many of his friends for his book.

Presidential scholars and biographers know that you need to wait awhile before you can fully assess a leader. Recent biographers, such as the British journalist David James Smith, are somewhat more objective. Smith said his goal was to rescue the saint Mandela and create a fresh portrait.[37] Tom Lodge, a South African political scientist, also offers a critical look at Mandela.[38] His take on Mandela differs from others in that Lodge does not think that Mandela changed much from the person he was as a child, whereas many biographers portray Mandela as a changed man after his stay in prison. The most recent authorized biography was published in 2012 by Richard Stengel, who met Mandela in 1992 and co-authored Mandela's autobiography.[39] After that, they became good friends. Mandela introduced Stengel to his wife and later became a godfather to Stengel's sons. In some of the more recent books we begin to see more perspective on Mandela and better background research.

Mandela kept excellent records, made copies of letters, and wrote quite a bit on his own. The archives are filled with his papers and bits and pieces of everything else. For example, at Fort Hare, I read a poem on a piece of toilet paper that was written by an ANC leader while in prison on Robben Island. Mandela started but never finished a second autobiography. He published some fragments of it, as well as letters and interviews with friends in *Conversations with Myself*.[40]

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[35] Winnie Mandela (1985), Part of My Soul Went with Him, New York: W.W. Norton.

[36] Mac Maharaj and Ahmed Kathrada (eds.) (2006), Mandela: The Authorized Portrait, Kansas City, MO: McMeel Publishing.

[37] David James Smith (2010), Young Mandela: The Revolutionary Years, New York: Little, Brown.

[38] Tom Lodge (2006), Mandela: A Critical Life, New York: Oxford University Press.

[39] Richard Stengel (2012), Mandela: Portrait of an Extraordinary Man, New York: Virgin Publishing.

[40] Mandela, Conversations with Myself.

A Historiography of Mandela's Autobiography

Mandela's memoirs, which formed the basis of his book *The Long Walk to Freedom*, were written to serve a political function. In the auto- biography Mandela tells us that his fellow inmates on Robben Island Ahmed Kathrada (Kathy) and Walter Sisulu suggested that he write his memoirs, and so he started doing so at night. Kathrada explained that "the High Organ" of the ANC on Robben Island, Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba, discussed Mandela's memoirs, but they kept the text a secret from the other political prisoners.[41] Mandela writes: "We created an assembly line to process the manuscript. Each day I passed what I wrote to Kathy, who reviewed the manuscript, and then read it to Walter. Kathy then wrote comments in the margins."[42] Sisulu told Mandela to keep out the dark parts of his life, such as his divorce of his first wife, Evelyn. Mandela later told his biographer Richard Stengel that "their view is that you are not telling your life; we want you to be a model around which we are going to build our organization."[43]

After Mandela completed his autobiography, he buried one copy of the manuscript in the prison yard. Mandela and his colleagues each, in their own memoirs, tell the dramatic story of the day that prison laborers dug up the prison yard to build a new wall and discovered the manuscript. Mandela and the others were able to salvage some of it, which is in the Mandela Archive, but most of it was lost.[44] The prison warden figured out who wrote the manuscript and punished Mandela, Sisulu and Kathrada by taking away their study privileges for four years – a very harsh punishment for them.

Another inmate, Mac Maharaj, was able to smuggle a second copy of the 500-page manuscript out of the prison, and he eventually got it to England in 1976. When he got to London, Maharaj had Mandela's manuscript typed, and he gave a copy to Mandela's dear friend and president in exile of the African National Congress (ANC), Oliver Tambo. In 2011, Maharaj reflected on the importance of Mandela's prison memoir to the BBC. Maharaj describes how, in Sartre's terms, Mandela became a part of the "life project" of the ANC:

> We were living in a society where the history of our struggle was not covered anywhere – not even in academia. Everything in history was the history about the white man. So that in itself was an exciting exercise to put down on paper the life of one man who was so central [to the struggle], and whose autobiography was really a political autobiography.[45]

In his autobiography, Mandela says that, after the manuscript finally got to Tambo, it disappeared, and he never found out what Tambo did with it. According to the Nelson Mandela Archive, Mandela's memoir was supposed to be published in

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[41] Ibid., p. 180.

[42] Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 415.

[43] Mandela, Conversations with Myself, p. 65.

[44] You can read the salvaged pages of Mandela's manuscript in the ANC archive.

[45] Karen Allen (2011), "How a secret manuscript became a global bestseller," BBC News Magazine, 1 November, www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15422179

1978 to celebrate his 60th birthday and bring world attention to the anti-apartheid struggle, but the ANC decided not to publish it. All Mandela says about it is: "For one reason or another, it was never published."[46] It seems peculiar that, after everything that Mandela and his friends went through to write it and get it out of the country, he would not know what Tambo did with it. Furthermore, why did the people involved with the manuscript never discuss the reasons why it was not published in their own descriptions of writing and smuggling the book to London?[47] Anthony Sampson offers one answer in his biography of Mandela. He says that Yusuf Dadoo and Joe Slovo, and other communists in exile, read the manuscript and did not like it because it did not give enough credit to the communists' role in the struggle.[48]

One of the most difficult aspects of the anti-apartheid movement was keeping the various factions together. There were Marxists, nationalists, and Indian groups, many of whom, in the spirit of Gandhi, were pacifists. The ANC also had a military branch that Mandela chaired, called the MK (*Umkhonto we Sizwe* or 'spear of the Nation"). Mandela was neither a Marxist nor a pacifist. He was against violence, but he realized that it might be necessary against a government that used violence against them. There were often tensions between the Marxists and the ANC. In a handwritten document called "Marxism and Ingqindi [a Zulu word for feast]" that was confiscated from Mandela in prison, Mandela and his ANC colleagues were quite insistent that the two groups work together. He tactfully emphasized why overthrowing apartheid should be their primary objective and that overthrowing capitalism could come later.[49] Perhaps this is why the Marxists did not like the idea of having Mandela as the sole symbol of the movement.

Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders realized that making Mandela into the symbol of the movement was the clearest and most powerful way to get their message to the world – and it worked. As one observer said of Tambo's efforts, "He willed that Mandela should be a giant."[50] Mike Terry, the executive secretary of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, remembers that Maharaj came up with the idea to use Mandela's 60th birthday to gain world attention for the movement.[51] The

[46] Maharaj and Kathrada, Mandela, p. 181.

[47] I went through biographies of Tambo, Maharaj and others and could not find the answer. I also wrote to Mandela's long-time archivist, Verne Harris, and he did not know. Harris told me about Kim Worthington, who had interviewed Maharaj and was writing an article about Mandela's autobiography. Worthington speculates that some factions in the movement were not eager to have Mandela or anyone as their face, since the ANC thought of itself as an egalitarian participatory organization. These comments were via email and are part of her research for her article "The many authors of Nelson Mandela's autobiography Long Walk to Freedom" (unpublished manuscript, 2012).

[48] Sampson, Mandela, p. 236.

[49] Nelson Mandela (date unknown), "Marxism and Ingqindi," ANC Archive: Office of the ANC President, Nelson Mandela Box 129, number 60, University of Fort Hare.

[50] Sampson, Mandela, p. 383.

[51] Interview with Mike Terry (date unknown), African National Congress website, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=45

International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa did publish a book on Mandela's 60th birthday called *The Struggle Is My Life*, which was an edited collection of Mandela's speeches, writings, letters and photos. It also contained the prison memoirs of Maharaj and Michael Dingake but not Mandela's memoir. One can only speculate on why Mandela never talks about why his manuscript did not get published. Was it anger, wounded pride, or politics?

Mandela the Man of History

Two themes stand out about Mandela. The first is that he sees himself as a man of history, and the second is that he sees himself as an actor playing various roles. (For a timeline of his life, see the Appendix). Boas Shamir and Galit Eilam describe authentic leadership in terms of roles: "the role of the leader is a central component of their self-concept, they have achieved a high level of self-resolution or self-concept clarity, their goals are self-concordant, and their behavior is self-expressive."[52] Shamir and Eilam argue that followers decide if leaders are authentic and legitimate by how believable their life stories are. They call life stories "narratives of origin" that are analogous to the providence of a painting; the story establishes whether a person is fit to lead. Followers look at "authenticity markers," which might be traits or experiences in a leader's story that justify his or her claim to lead the group. They maintain that, the more a leader's story presents the leader as similar in background, values, and other characteristics to the group, the more he or she is accepted as representative of that group. Mandela certainly has a story filled with authenticity markers that justify his claim to lead. His father was a chief and, by heredity, Mandela too would become a chief. However, his primary claim to leadership came from his willingness to sacrifice 27 years of his life in prison for the struggle against apartheid. Yet, while his story encompasses common group values related to the cause, it is also built around his historical and personal exceptionalism – he is not like everyone else.

In prison, Mandela wrote about his past and the influence that it and his ancestors had on him and his worldview. Mandela was born in Mvezo in the Transkei in 1918. His parents were Gadla Henry Mphakanyiswa and Fanny Nosekeni of the Madiba clan. Mandela's father had four wives, and Mandela was the oldest son of his father's third wife. The meaning of Mandela's many names fashion and reflect his identity. His Xhosa names, Rolihlahla and Dalibhunga, are strikingly prescient. "Rolihlahla" is a colloquial term for a "troublemaker," and it literally means "pulling the branch of a tree." At the age of 16 he received the name Dalibhunga when he was circumcised and initiated to manhood. It is a traditional name that describes Mandela's role in the clan. It means "creator or founder of the Bhunga [legislative council]" or

[52] B. Shamir and G. Eilam (2005), ""What is your story?" A life-stories approach to authentic leadership development," Leadership Quarterly, **16**, 399.

"convener of the dialogue." On the first day of school Mandela's teacher gave him the name Nelson. The most proper name for Mandela and the one that he prefers, is his clan name Madiba. It dates back to Mandela's ancestor, an eighteenth-century Thembu chief who ruled the Transkei. People also refer to Mandela as Khulu, or great one, and the affectionate Tata, or father, as in father to the people.[53]

When Mandela tells the story of his origins, he frames the past in a way that explains what he is or aspires to be. He portrays his father, Henry, as a proud and wealthy nobleman who did not accept white rule. Henry Mandela was a chief or headman. His role, and traditionally his son's role, was advisor to the king. Mandela tells us that, about a year after he was born, his father was summoned to court by a white magistrate to answer a tribesman's complaint about an ox. Henry refused to go because he said he was not guided by the king of England but by Thembu custom. The magistrate took this as insubordination and stripped Henry of his title, most of his herd and his land.[54] After that, Mandela's father became impoverished and embittered. This tale is of a man who unjustly lost his wealth and status because he defied white rule.

The story was handed down to Mandela verbally (Mandela's father and mother were illiterate), and it appears in almost all biographies of him. It is a defining moment in Mandela's life and his personal and public identity. Biographer David James Smith tracked down the court documents of the incident concerning Mandela's father. According to court records, there was no mention of Henry's insubordination. The records said that a native constable, Amos Dinga, had been sent to investigate a number of charges against Henry Mandela. Henry was called in because he was charged with abusing his powers as a headman and a series of other corrupt practices. These practices had to do with selling land that he oversaw but did not belong to him. Henry was summoned and he appeared in court. After a long hearing that included a substantial amount of evidence supporting the cases against him, he was found guilty and dismissed from his post. During the trial, Henry was allowed to cross-examine witnesses, but he did not call any witnesses to support his side of the case.[55]

Mandela's response to this version of the story reflects the significance of the story to him. He told Smith, "For me a wrong was done and they needed to justify it so they created the paperwork to do it."[56] Smith thinks that this is unlikely, given the thorough records that the colonial courts kept and the effort it would take to invent all of the detailed cases brought against Henry Mandela by his own people. Smith also notes that it was not uncommon at the time for blacks to go to a white court and seek justice against their own leaders.

Henry died when Mandela was nine, and Mandela was sent to live in the Great Place with the paramount chief Jongintaba, who was the regent for the child king of

[53] Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/names

[54] Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 6.

[55] Smith, Young Mandela, pp. 28–9.

[56] Ibid., p. 30.

the Thembu people. Mandela writes about the awe he felt at the luxury of the palace and of Jongintaba, who drove a large Ford and dressed in elegant suits. He also loved hearing the stories that the court elders told about the Xhosa kings who ruled before the white men came and the democratic form of debate that they used to rule.

Mandela the Adventurer

Jongintaba sent Mandela to school and eventually to the University of Fort Hare. Another significant and prescient story in Mandela's auto- biography and biographies about him describes how Mandela got expelled from the university. The University of Fort Hare was the incubator for black leaders and intellectuals. Going there was a great privilege, and the faculty often told students they were destined to become leaders. Mandela got involved in student government and was nominated to run for the Student Representative Council (SRC). He writes, "I did not know at the time that the events surrounding a student election would change the course of my life."[57] At a meeting prior to the election, the students decided that they needed to do something to improve the food at the university, however, to do so, they would have to increase the powers of the SRC. The group unanimously decided to exert pressure on the administration for additional powers by boycotting the election. Most of the students took part in the boycott, but some still voted, and Mandela and the others were elected. Mandela and his colleagues objected that this was not a fair election and refused to take office. The principal, Dr. Kerr, accepted their refusal and said he would hold another election. They held another election with the same result. This time the others took office, but Mandela still refused. He went to the principal, and Kerr told him that he had to either take office or be expelled. Mandela tellingly writes that he was uncertain about his decision, but "I had taken a stand and I did not want to appear to be a fraud in the eyes of my fellow students." He then adds: "at the moment I needed to compromise, I simply could not do so. Something inside me would not let me."[58] Mandela goes on to say that he resented the power that Kerr had over his fate.

When Jongintaba learned that Mandela had been expelled, he was furious and ordered Mandela back to school. Mandela decided to wait a bit and, during that time, Jongintaba determined that, since he was getting on in years, it was time for him to pick out a wife for Mandela and for his own son Justice. Neither of the young men wanted to get married, so they ran away from home and got jobs in a goldmine near Johannesburg. Like many parts of Mandela's story, how they ran away from home is one of the great adventure stories in his life.

Mandela's description of when he went underground after founding the militant MK in 1961 is also told as a dramatic adventure, filled with disguises and close

[57] Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 44.

[58] Ibid., p. 45.

calls. At the time, Mandela had become head of the National Action Council, which would organize mass demonstrations. The council decided that the names of all of its members would be secret, except for Mandela, who would have to go underground. It made Mandela the public face of the ANC in hiding. According to Fatima Meer, "Nelson accepted the responsibility unhesitatingly. He had reached a point in his life where he was prepared to make any sacrifice to end apartheid."[59] She also points out that he agreed to his new role without discussing with his family the implications that it would have for their well-being.

Mandela's strategy was to keep the government engaged while hiding himself. There were sightings of him all over the country. Sometimes he would unexpectedly pop up at a meeting or in a township, or people would recognize him through his disguise. Stories about his escapades were told throughout the country, and people took to calling him the Black Pimpernel.[60] The stories about Mandela followed the classic form of the little guy outsmarting the giant. They embarrassed the government and heartened blacks. Meer notes: "The black public was thrilled at the adventure that Mandela had created."[61]

Mandela the Movement

Mandela made great personal sacrifices, yet he also seems to have taken some pleasure from playing various roles, especially when they pleased the crowd. That is why it is difficult to assess the extent to which he is a man who presents himself as he really is. As Irving Goffman notes, "When an individual plays a part, he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them."[62] At one extreme, the performers may sincerely believe that their act and the impression they give is reality, while at the other end of the spectrum they may be cynical manipulators. The authentic leader would obviously be at the sincere end, but Goffman's work raises important questions. If you sincerely believe in the role or impression, then in what sense are you actually *playing* a role? Is there a difference between the role and the real self? Is the role of Mandela the movement really Mandela the man? Mandela's physical appearance played an important part in his leadership persona. He presented an impressive picture to the world – handsome, athletic, and, at 6 feet 4 inches, he towered over most black South Africans. Mandela also enjoyed performing. At Fort Hare he played John Wilkes Booth in a play about

[59] Meer, Higher than Hope, p. 163.

[60] They call Mandela the Black Pimpernel after the novel The Scarlet Pimpernel by Baroness Emmuska Orczy. This novel is set during the French Revolution and is about the mysterious leader of a clandestine group of British men who go around rescuing French revolutionaries from execution. The leader gets the name because he signs his letters with a small red flower.

[61] Meer, Higher than Hope, p. 163.

[62] Irving Goffman (1959), The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Anchor Books, p. 17.

Lincoln, and on Robben Island he starred as King Creon in *Antigone*. In addition to acting, as a college student he enjoyed ballroom dancing. However, it was not until he left his first job as a night watchman in a goldmine and moved to Johannesburg that he was first cast in the role of his lifetime.

While working at the goldmine, Mandela got in trouble because he bragged to others about running away from home and outsmarting Chief Jongintaba. Jongintaba got wind of this and had Mandela fired from the mine. Jongintaba ordered Mandela to come home, but Mandela convinced Jongintaba that he needed to stay in the city so that he could pursue a law degree. Mandela's cousin took him to meet the successful black real estate agent Walter Sisulu, who was also an ANC member and a communist. Mandela's excellent English and commanding presence impressed Sisulu the moment he met him. Sisulu said Mandela "was someone who would go far and should be encouraged. He was the kind of young man we needed to develop our organization [meaning the Communist Party and the ANC]."[63] Sisulu became Mandela's mentor. He got Mandela engaged in politics and found him a job as a clerk in a Jewish law firm. Sisulu cast Mandela into the role of an ANC leader and later ended up spending 26 years in prison with him.

One oddity about Mandela and biographies of Mandela is the amount of attention that Mandela and other writers give to his clothing. For Mandela, dressing well and dressing right for the occasion are important aspects of how he sees and presents himself to the world. He tells us early on in his autobiography that when he moved to Jongintaba's palace, he was impressed by Jongintaba's suits and one of his favorite chores was ironing the chief's suits. Mandela's sister told biographer Mary Benson: "The Chief bought him clothes and he became a human being."[64] It appears that there was some connection in Mandela's mind between dressing like a white man and being the equal of one. Mandela also comments on other people's clothing (for example, Jongintaba's suits and Sisulu's double-breasted suit) as markers of their status.

When Mandela finished his degree at Fort Hare via correspondence school, he borrowed money from Sisulu to buy a suit to wear at graduation. He was one of the few blacks to have his suits made by a tailor, even when he did not have the money to pay for them. Alfred Kahn often made Mandela's suits and most of them were gifts. In one account, an observer points out that Mandela was wearing his favorite double-breasted suit; in another story we are told that Mandela was wearing a black and white checked suit.[65] As Smith and others observe, Mandela was somewhat vain, especially about his appearance.[66] Richard Stengel describes him as very meticulous about his dress: "I have seen him remove a shoe during an interview to reverse a sock that he notices is inside out."[67]

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[63] Smith, Young Mandela, p. 54.

[64] Ibid., p. 32.

[65] Ibid., p. 96.

[66] Ibid., p. 101.

[67] Stengel, Mandela, p. 1.

In the major events of his life, Mandela dresses the part. The well-tailored suits are a staple of his political career. When Mandela was underground, he described wearing a variety of disguises. On 21 May 1961, Mandela gave the first television interview of his career, looking very much like a revolutionary leader. The interview was held in a secret location because Mandela was in hiding at the time. He has a well- trimmed mustache and beard and a jacket that looks like a military one. His appearance fits with his role and his message in the interview, which was about the ANC's new policy on military tactics.[68]

Perhaps the most famous costume that Mandela wore is the jersey and hat of the Springbok rugby team at the 1995 World Cup. Rugby had always been a white sport in South Africa, and black South Africans usually rooted against the Springbok team. By wearing his support of the team, Mandela was able to bring black and white sports fans together. This story was immortalized in the movie *Invictus*. When Mandela retired, he took to wearing colorful Indonesian-style shirts that were formal but comfortable and represented the multi-colored nation. One can now buy his trademark shirt in tourist shops under the name "Madiba shirts."

Controlling his appearance was personally and publicly important to Mandela. When he was imprisoned in solitary confinement prior to the Rivonia trial, he was forced to enter the courtroom in prison garb. Mandela writes, "I was disgusted to have to appear in court wearing my prison clothes of khaki shorts and flimsy sandals. I took pains to smile at the gallery when I walked into the courtroom, and seeing our supporters was the best medicine I could have had."[69] Among the first things Mandela lobbied for on Robben Island were long trousers for the black prisoners. It took him three years to get them.

During the Rivonia trial, where Mandela would be sentenced to life in prison, he caused a stir when he appeared in the courtroom every day wearing a tribal costume called a kaross, which was made from leopard's skin (some accounts said it was made from the skins of jackals). The kaross went across one shoulder and left the other one bare. Mandela explained that he was "literally carrying on my back the history, culture, and heritage of my people."[70] Mandela's kaross electrified observers in the gallery and outside of the courtroom. Maharaj and Kathrada tell us that cheering people lined the streets and as the police van carried Mandela away from the courthouse. They write, "The Black Pimpernel may no longer be at large, but he was the hero of the people."[71]

In her biography of Mandela, Elleke Boehmer sums up the many roles played by Mandela. She notices that all of the biographies of him repeatedly strike the same keynote: his chameleon-like talent for donning different guises; his theatrical flair for costume and gesture; his shrewd awareness of the power of his own image.

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[68] Interview with Brian Widlake from ITN, 21 May 1961, www.youtube.com/watch?v=fPofm50MHW8&feature=related

[69] Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 307.

[70] Sampson, Mandela, p. 167.

[71] Maharaj and Kathrada, Mandela, p. 110.

Across his career he played such various roles as counselor, lawyer, showman, guerrilla leader, and statesman, and allowed himself profligately to be photographed in these guises. As was seen, he delighted in acting the *shape-shifter*, assuming a range of contrasting masks and mien, and convincing others of their authenticity.[72]

Mandela the Man

So, who is Nelson Mandela? Leaders of the struggle, friends, the press and history made Mandela the movement. Mandela's autobiography constructs a picture of him as the wise mediator and a democratic and participatory leader. It is easy to forget that inside and outside of prison the factions of the struggle were not united, and some of them resented having Mandela as the face of the movement. When F.W. de Klerk freed Mandela, the world celebrated, yet that did not mean it was easy going for Mandela. He was the great symbol, but there were other strong leaders on the ground, such as the young union leader Cyril Ramaphosa, who worried that after 27 years in jail Mandela was out of touch. Ramaphosa would then wait to become the president of South Africa until 2018.

Martin Meredith writes that, despite the well-deserved heroic image of Mandela, Mandela is an enigmatic person who emerged from prison accustomed to concealing his emotions behind a mask. Even those near him felt as though they did not know him very well. Many biographers describe him as being very charming but also an autocratic leader. He was feared as much as he was honored. Mandela was a man of the people who later in life loved spending time with celebrities and the wealthy. A report for the Minister of Justice described Mandela as manipulative, while at the same time having almost all of the textbook qualities of an authentic leader.[73] One of the most candid descriptions of Mandela comes from Richard Stengel. He writes that Mandela is a man of many contradictions and a "power charmer." Mandela is more charming, kinder and more attentive to people he does not know than to people he knows. According to Stengel, he can be warm with strangers and cold with his family and friends. He notes that Mandela has a strong desire to be liked and admired and he hates to disappoint people. "He wants you to come away from meeting him thinking that he is everything you had ever hoped for."[74] When he meets strangers, they get what Stengel calls, "the full Mandela." One of Mandela's cabinet ministers commented that he thought Mandela had achieved "a *total politicization of being*."[75]

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[72] Elleke Boehmer (2008), Nelson Mandela: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 123.

[73] In February 1981, the Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetsee, requested a psychological profile of Mandela. Sampson says it was remarkably accurate and the traits that they use to describe him fit characterizations of authentic leadership well, except for the one about Mandela being manipulative. See Sampson, Mandela, pp. 290–91.

[74] Stengel, Mandela, p. 1.

[75] Boehmer, Nelson Mandela, p. 128.

Tom Lodge makes similar observations about Mandela. He says that Mandela's political actions were calculated and scripted performances that were designed to meet or change public expectations. According to Lodge, Mandela's elite background, striking appearance, and confidence about his historical "destiny as a leader" shape him and the opinion of others around him. Lodge writes:

For Mandela, politics has always been primarily about enacting stories, about making narratives, primarily about exemplary conduct, and only secondarily about ideological vision, more about means than ends. In the South Africa of the early apartheid era, Mandela was one of the first media politicians, 'showboy,' as one of his contemporaries nicknamed him, embodying a glamour and a style that projected *visually* a brave new African world of modernity and freedom.[76]

It is clear from Mandela's books, interviews, and biographies that he understood that he had become a symbol. When he became president, he told Sampson, "rather than being an asset, I am more of a decoration."[77] This self-deprecating comment belies the fact that Mandela the man knew the power of Mandela the movement and the moral capital that came with it. Mandela's leadership rested heavily on the fact that he *is* Mandela. This existential kind of leadership is not without precedent in South Africa. For example, the journalist Max du Preez describes an encounter between Paul Kruger and the great King Moshesh in 1840.[78] Kruger had asked Moshesh to meet with him, but Moshesh did not show up for a long time. When he finally arrived, Kruger wanted to know why it took him so long to come and Moshesh answered, "I am Moshesh." Du Preez goes on to say that decades later other brave African leaders like Moshesh would look their adversaries in the eye and say, "I am Biko" or "I am Mandela." What they mean, according to du Preez, is "I am an African, the soil under your feet belonged to my people long before there was a Europe or an Asia or an America. I represent a civilization as old as humanity."[79]

Later in his life, Mandela tells several of his biographers and interviewers that he wants them to portray him as he really is. He complains about being portrayed as a "saint." Mandela uses the phrase "A saint is a sinner who keeps on trying" several times in his own writing and in letters to Winnie and friends.[80] Mandela started to write a second autobiography, perhaps to set the record straight, but he never finished it. One wonders if we would have gotten the "real" Mandela in this autobiography. *Long Walk to Freedom* weaves Mandela's story into the story of a new South Africa. In his second autobiography, he seems to have shed his role as teacher and moral exemplar. He notes that an autobiography is not only about a person's life but

[76] Lodge, Mandela, p. 211.

[77] Sampson, Mandela, p. 566.

[78] The event described here happened before Paul Kruger became the fifth president of the South African Boer Republics, the ZAR (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek).

[79] Max du Preez (2010), Pale Native: Memories of a Renegade Reporter, Cape Town: Zebra Press, p. 4.

[80] There are several examples of his use of this phrase in Mandela, Conversations with Myself. See his letter to Winnie on p. 211.

a blueprint for how others should live their lives; however, that is not what Mandela wants to do. He tells us:

> This book has no such pretensions as it has nothing to leave behind. As a young man I combined all the weaknesses, errors, and indiscretions of a country boy, whose range of vision and experience was influenced mainly by events in the area in which I grew up and the colleges to which I was sent. I relied on arrogance in order to hide my weaknesses. As an adult my comrades raised me and other fellow prisoners with some significant exceptions, from obscurity to either a bogey or enigma, although the aura of being one of the world's longest serving prisoners never totally evaporated.
>
> One issue that deeply worried me in prison was the false image that I unwittingly projected to the outside world; of being regarded as a saint. I never was one, even on the basis of an earthly definition of a saint as a sinner who keeps on trying.[81]

It is difficult to know what to make of Mandela's comments. This does not appear to be the statement of an authentic leader who had engaged in relational transparency with his followers. Yet, it may well be a profound statement of self-knowledge. Perhaps Mandela's comments are the ruminations of a man who does not feel that he has lived up to the roles that he played as hero and moral exemplar. It might also be Mandela the politician, personifying the trait that he has said he admires – humility – because humility draws people to a leader. History has documented, and will document, why Nelson Mandela was, on many counts, an extraordinary leader. Nevertheless, whether Mandela was an authentic leader, and whether Mandela knows himself and presents himself to the world as he really is, we may never know.

So, what do we learn about authentic leadership from a case that is about searching for the real Nelson Mandela? First, a construct of authenticity that centers on self-knowledge is too simplistic to explain complex leaders like Mandela. Leadership scholars would benefit from carefully reading the more nuanced philosophic accounts of authenticity in writers such as Sartre and Heidegger. Mandela is not the great "man" who strides upon the stage of history and changes it because he is true to himself and transparent in his relationships with others. Sartre helps us understand Mandela as a man who gives up some of his freedom and autonomy to become a part of the project of the anti-apartheid movement. According to Heidegger's view, Mandela is attentive to what he is in the context of others, but whether he acts as he really is or fakes it, is irrelevant to what he actually does. Second, if leadership researchers want to use historical figures as examples of authentic leadership, they need to first research the historiography of their biographies and autobiographies. Research methodology is just as important in history as it is in the social sciences. And finally, the assumption that morality is a quality of an authentic leader and the result of being an authentic leader is circular and too simplistic to stand up to real examples in history. Mandela is not a moral leader because he is authentic, nor is he an authentic leader because he is moral.

This chapter suggests the following hypothesis concerning the rarified group of leaders who sacrifice their lives, or a good portion of their lives, for the human rights of their people – leaders like Nelson Mandela, Mohandas Gandhi and Aung San Suu

[81] Ibid., pp. 409–10.

Kyi. Perhaps the more iconic such leaders become over time, the more difficult it is for them to be authentic (in the sense of many authentic leadership constructs). At some point, followers expect them to play a role that is bigger than they are, and they cannot refuse to play it. After such leaders play these roles for a while, they and the rest of the world forget or no longer know who they really are. Hence, it may be that, during Mandela's long walk to freedom, Mandela the man got lost in Mandela the movement, but it may well be that he found himself before his journey ended and his memory faded.

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Appendix: Timeline[82]

1918 July 18, Rolihlahla Dalibhunga Mandela born in Mvezo in the Transkei to Gadla Henry Mphakanyiswa and Fanny Nosekeni of the Madiba clan.
1927 Mandela's father dies, and he goes to live in the Great Palace with Chief Jongintaba.
1937 Goes to Healdtown Wesleyan College in Fort Beaufort.
1939 Attends the University of Fort Hare and becomes friends with Oliver Tambo.
1940 Is expelled from Fort Hare.
1941 Runs away from home to Johannesburg to avoid an arranged marriage, and meets Walter Sisulu
1943 Graduates via correspondence courses with a BA from the University of Fort Hare and enrolls for an LLB at Wits University.
1944 Co-founds the African Youth League and marries Evelyn Ntoko Mase, a nurse; has three children, one of whom dies.
1952 Arrested and sent to jail for nine months for violating the Suppression of Communism Act; elected as an ANC deputy president; opens the first black law firm in Johannesburg with Oliver Tambo.
1956 Arrested with 155 others; on trial for treason. All acquitted in 1961.
1958 Divorces Evelyn and marries Nomzamo Winnie Mandela; has two children.
1961 Goes underground, and the militant arm of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or Spear of the Nation, is formed.

[82] The timeline is adapted from the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/timeline.[/notetxt]

1962 In January, he sneaks out of the country and travels all over Africa to gain support for the ANC and get military training in Morocco, Ethiopia and 12 other African states and meets Julius Nyerere and Haile Selassie.
1963 Hides out posing as a gardener at Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia and works with the MK.
1964 Charged with sabotage in the Rivonia trial and sentenced to life in prison on Robben Island along with Sisulu and Govan Mbeki.
1982 Mandela, Sisulu, Kathrada and Mhlaba are moved to Pollsmoor Prison, where they share a cell.
1984 Rejects offer to be released to the custody of his nephew K.D. Matanzima, president of the independent state of Transkei.
1985 Rejects P.W. Botha's offer to release him if he renounces violence.
1988 Is moved to Victor Verster Prison, where he lives alone in a nice house.
1990 The ANC is unbanned and Mandela is released. He is elected president of the ANC.
1993 Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize with F.W. de Klerk. 1
1994 Elected president of South Africa.
1996 Divorces Winnie
1998 Marries Graça Machel
2013 Mandela dies

Chapter 5
Conversations and Correspondence with Burns on the Ethics of Transforming Leadership

Abstract and Background This short chapter was written from letters and conversations with my colleague and friend, James MacGregor Burns. Burns is a Pulitzer Prize winning historian and one of the most influential leadership scholars. He is best known for his theory of transforming leadership that later evolved into theories about transformational leadership. The reason why Burns's work is so powerful, is because it was one of the first, and still few, studies that is truly interdisciplinary. His theory of transforming leadership is based on the history of real leaders, political theories, and work in psychology. Burns and I were kindred spirits when it came to interdisciplinary research, but we also enjoyed arguing about the theoretical and substantive differences we had about leaders and leadership. When Burns passed away in 2014, I had the opportunity to look over our correspondence and write this article about some of our discussions for an issue of *Leadership and the Humanities* that honored his work.

Keywords Leadership · Ethics · Burns · Transforming leadership · Transformational leadership · Ethics · Normative definitions · Philosophical ethics · Modal values · End values · Ciulla

Introduction

As I stood in the Williamstown College cemetery listening to the short eulogies for James MacGregor Burns, I reflected on our conversations and letters about leadership over the years. Burns and I were the first two faculty hired by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies. If the university had not hired Burns before me, I might not have ended up at Jepson. I arrived on campus in 1991 and, with three other faculty members and the school's two deans, we designed all aspects of the school from the admission policies to the curriculum. Burns was not involved in this process. His job as Senior Fellow was to visit periodically and discuss our research with us.

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As a novice in leadership studies I immediately began reading the major books and members to discuss their work. When Burns visited the school, he would have lunch with each of the faculty. These were truly great lunches. Since my area of research is ethics, our conversations centered around two issues: Burns's account of ethics based on modal values and end values and the public and private morality of leaders. Over the next 23 years, until his death in 2014, Burns and I discussed and corresponded on these subjects. We agreed about many things in general, yet often saw the details quite differently. We never changed each other's minds but that did not deter either of us from continuing to argue about various aspects of ethics and leadership. In this article, I will describe some of our discussions that took place in person and by mail.

Language Problems

The first thing that struck me in the leadership literature was the overarching concern that leadership scholars had about the definition of leadership. This concern was particularly evident in Joseph Rost's book, *Leadership for the Twenty-First Century* (1991). As most of the literature consisted of empirical studies, which required simple definitions, this was understandable. However, the focus on finding a definition of leadership went beyond the practical considerations of doing empirical social science studies. Some scholars seemed to believe that if we could only define leadership once and for all, we would actually understand it. As a philosopher, this did not make sense to me. We can stipulate the definition of a leader for the purpose of a study or an argument; however, the actual meaning of a word evolves through usage and experience, not because a scholar or group of scholars decide by caveat the meaning at a meeting or in a journal article or book. What leadership is for the scholar has to fit with the way ordinary people understand the term and the phenomenon. If it does not, then leadership scholars will find themselves talking to each other in their own private language. As I saw it, the definition problem stemmed from the fact that the words 'leader' and 'leadership' carried quite a bit of normative baggage. When most people define the term 'leader,' they describe what a leader is and what a leader ought to be. The difference in definitions is really a difference in what people think leaders should be. When I sent Burns the paper with this analysis of the definition problem (Ciulla 1995), he replied:

> I was impressed by your relaxed and reasonable approach to defining leadership. Perhaps someday we will have become so successful in leadership theory we can then work out a satisfactory definition![1]

This was vintage Burns, he had a charming way of stonewalling an idea. Burns then went on to talk about defining other terms:

[1] James MacGregor Burns, Letter to Joanne Ciulla, March 12, 1995.

> I do think, though, that we can and should define specific terms more clearly. We (writers on leadership) variously use the terms ethics, values, moral dimensions, moral virtue, and end- goals, substantive values (justice, equality, etc.), and others. I tend to use the term 'end-values,' but it may not be quite right. But at least we should, I suggest, sharply discriminate in our definition (and concept) between norms of behavior or codes of conduct on the one hand, and the palpable, substantial collective goals of justice and the like, or equality, on the other.[2]

Again, the problem of language emerged, mainly because of our different disciplinary approaches. As the subject matter of philosophy, ethics consists of what these terms mean, philosophers rarely offer simple definitions of them. One problem in leadership studies is getting people from different disciplines to understand each other. In the preface to my collection Ethics, *The Heart of Leadership* (Ciulla 1998), Burns complained that the contributors to the book did not make a distinction between ethical and moral leadership. As I pointed out to him on several occasions, that seems to be a distinction without a difference. The two words tend to define each other or eventually collapse into each other. I also noted that almost every writer who makes this distinction defines the difference in a different way – often to suit what he or she wants to say.

Ethics and Transforming and Transformational Leadership

Whereas Burns and I agreed on the centrality of ethics to leadership and the need to account for the ethics of the leadership process as well as the ethics of the ends of leadership, we continued to disagree about how to talk about it. The moral questions that drive Burns's theory of transforming leadership emerge from his work as a biographer and a historian. When biographers or historians study a leader, they struggle with how to judge or keep from judging their subject. If you analyze the numerous historical examples in Burns's book *Leadership* (1978), you find two pressing moral issues shape his leader- ship theory. The first is the morality of means and ends (this also includes the moral use of power), and the second is the personal morality of a leader. His theory of transforming leadership attempts to characterize good leadership by accounting for both of these.

Burns's distinction between transforming and transactional leadership and modal and end-values offers a way to think about the question, 'What is a good leader?'. Transactional leadership rests on what Burns calls the ethics of means or modal values, which are things like responsibility, fairness, honesty, and promise keeping. His modal values are simply moral principles, some of which philosophers might identify as duties or virtues. Burns's modal values are about how the leader treats followers. They say a lot about the ethics of the leader. So, while transactional leadership is not as lofty as transforming leadership, it is still the meat and potatoes of leadership.

[2] Ibid.

Burns rightly emphasizes the fact that transactional leadership requires a set of moral agreements to work. He tells us that transforming leaders and followers elevate each through various stages of morality and need.[3] He calls his criteria for judging the results of this process 'end-values.' These include liberty, justice, and equality. For Burns, both leaders and followers have moral agency in the leadership process. Scholars often overlook this aspect of Burns's theory in part because they confuse transforming leadership with the much larger and more dominant literature on transformational leadership. Bernard Bass's original theory of transformational leadership does not emphasize the influence of followers on leaders. His work focuses on the psychology of transformational and transactional leadership based on measurements of individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and idealized influence (see Bass 1985). His early theory of transformational leadership was 'value free,' but there remained the assumption that transformational leaders were good in the moral and practical sense of the word.

Burns and I were equally confused over why Bass's transforming leader would be ethical. In response to my criticisms concerning ethics of transformational leaders, Bass had modified his theory to account for ethical and unethical leaders, which he called transformational (ethical) and pseudo-transformational (unethical) leaders. Bass emphasized the superiority of transformational leadership over transactional leadership. This is somewhat ironic as Bass's studies were mostly in business settings where transactional leadership would, on a practical level, be just as important as transformational leadership.

In 1998, Burns commented on this:

> There is an implication in Bass that transformational leadership calls for a higher level of morality than transactional. Of course, this is not a new thought for us but he develops it interestingly. Could one argue that the master transactional leader really does not need to worry so much about morality because he or she engages in dealing or brokerage where it is assumed that the participants are operating in terms of self-interest – that it is understood and accepted? Or as the transformational leader has to deal with followers on the basis of trust and perhaps not even exchange – perhaps even the transformational leader is given more lee- way on this basis. Well, as you see, I may just be adding to the confusion![4]

Burns does indeed add to the confusion about his own work, since Burns says that transactional leaders need to operate with modal values, which would, even on his limited account of them, include trust.

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[3] One of the problems with using the values approach to ethics is that it requires a very complicated taxonomy of values. The word value is also problematic because it encompasses so many different kinds of things. The values approach requires arguments for some sort of hierarchy of values that would serve to resolve conflicts of values. In order to make values something that people do rather than just have, Milton Rokeach (1973, p. 9) offers a very awkward discussion of the ought character of values: 'A person phenomenologically experiences "oughtness" to be objectively required by society in somewhat the same way that he perceives an incomplete circle as objectively requiring closure.'

[4] James MacGregor Burns, Letter to Joanne Ciulla, June 12, 1998.

Philosophical Ethics and Burns

In terms of his ethical theory, Burns appears to be a consequentialist, despite his acknowledgment that 'insufficient attention to means can corrupt the ends' (Burns 1978, p. 426). However, because Burns does not really offer a systematic theory of ethics, he is difficult to categorize. Consider, for example, his two answers to the Hitler problem. In the first part of his book, *Leadership* (ibid., p. 3), he says quite simply that once Hitler gained power and crushed all opposition, he was no longer a leader. He was a tyrant. Burns says that Hitler would probably argue that he was a transforming leader who spoke for the true values of the German people and elevated them to a higher destiny. Later in the book, he offers three criteria for judging how Hitler would fare before 'the bar of history.'

First, Hitler would be tested by modal values of honor and integrity or the extent to which he advanced or thwarted the standards of good conduct in mankind. Second, he would be judged by the end values of equality, freedom, and justice. Last, he would be judged on the impact that he had on the well-being of the people that he touched (ibid., p. 426). According to Burns, Hitler would fail all three tests. He does not consider Hitler a leader or a transforming leader, because of the means that he used, the ends that he achieved, and the moral impact of Hitler on his followers.[5]

By looking at leadership as a process and not a set of individual acts, Burns's theory of good leadership is difficult to pigeonhole. Not surprisingly, because he is a historian, his theory seems more useful as a tool for assessing leadership after the fact. Near the end of *Leadership*, Burns offers an anecdote about why President Johnson did not run again for president in 1968. Burns (1978, p. 424) tells us, "Perhaps he did not comprehend that the people he had led – as a part of the impact of his leadership – have created their own fresh leadership, which was now outrunning his." All of the people who Johnson helped – the sick, the blacks, and the poor – now had their own leaders. Burns (ibid.) says, "Leadership begat leadership and hardly recognized its offspring." In his view of transforming leadership there is a kind of 'withering away' of the leader as followers become leaders. Apparently, Johnson did not know that he was transforming people while he was doing it, which raises the question of whether you have to know you are a transforming leader to be one. Nonetheless, Johnson's leadership on civil rights fares well when measured against Burns's end values of liberty, justice, and equality.

Burns's theory of transforming leadership rests on a dynamic relationship between leaders and followers. Nonetheless, his dependency on the idea of values

[5] The third test has an Aristotelian twist to it. The relationship of leaders and followers and the ends of that relationship must rest on eudaimonia or happiness that is understood as human flourishing, or as Aristotle says, 'living well and faring well with being happy' (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book I (1095a19) (trans. W.D. Ross) in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 1730).

offers a somewhat static picture of morality that fails to account for the varieties of moral agency. Burns refers to values as 'priorities' and 'standards' (ibid., p. 9). Ordinary moral language is much richer than the language of values. Burns tries to get values to do the work of other moral terms. He describes his terms in the following ways (ibid., p. 6):

> Ethical Values: traditional 'character tests' such as chastity, sobriety, abstention, kindness to the poor and ten commandment-type rules
> Modal Values: honesty, trustworthiness, reliability, reciprocity and accountability
> End Values: order, liberty, equality, justice, community

If we look at these values, we see Burns refer to virtues or habits of character along with some moral principles and then a specific application of a virtue such as kindness to the poor. Virtues tell us what we should be like and moral principles tell us what we should do. Values describe the overarching picture of what is important, but they are too general and inert to use to describe what actually goes on between people in the process of transforming leadership. Burns later relented and began to use virtues in the way that most philosophers understand the term. When he was researching his book on the Enlightenment, *Fire and Light* (Burns 2013), he wrote:

> I won't respond substantively to you at this point, because I am somewhat distracted into other activities, but I do want to say, as I work on leadership during the Enlightenment, that I constantly see some validity in my approach to moral leadership as embracing virtues, ethics, and values. Working on Washington recently has been quite an eye opener, incidentally, in regards to virtues – as you doubtless know, he copied out a huge long list of behavioral virtues mainly designed to make him look as presentable as possible to his fellow planters, of course you and I are working on a higher level than that![6]

I once asked Burns why he did not include happiness as an end value along with justice, liberty, equality. I pointed out that justice is an end in itself, but I am not sure that liberty and equality are ends in themselves. In a letter, I suggested that maybe Burns should include the Aristotelian notion of happiness (eudaimonia) as an end value because it is good in itself. Eudaimonia means happiness in the sense of human flourishing or well-being, which seemed to fit with what Burns wanted to say about well-being. Burns replied:

> I would not mention this sickly sentimental term except for Jefferson, and before him Furguson, et al in the Scottish Enlightenment, used it – and they really meant it, but we are not sure what they meant by it. Fulfillment, is it personal or collective?[7]

He then went on to say that he was going to see Rollo May that weekend and would ask him about it, which certainly impressed me!

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[6] James MacGregor Burns, Letter to Joanne Ciulla, February 3, 2003.

[7] James MacGregor Burns, Letter to Joanne Ciulla, April 13, 1994.

Burns's Contribution

Despite my philosophic quibbling with Burns about ethics, I think the main reason why his work is so important to leadership studies and leadership ethics rests on the fact that he examined leadership through the lens of democracy, not management. In 2002, his editor at Grove Press asked me to review the manuscript for his book *Transforming Leadership* (2007). I particularly liked the wide variety of historical case studies about leaders in it. The only thing I found lacking was that it did not include a case about a business leader. I asked Burns why. He told me that he had an uncle who worked on Wall Street and when the stock market crashed in 1929, his uncle lost everything and committed suicide. Burns said, after that, he had never had any interest in business. I think one reason Burns did not engage the leadership studies literature in his writing is because so much of it is about management. Most businesses are not democracies, hence the assumptions about leaders and followers are different – that is, leaders are managers and followers are employees. This is why transformational leadership is about what leaders do to followers, whereas transforming leadership is about what leaders and followers do to each other.

I think that leadership scholars, especially the ones in business schools, should re-examine Burns's work in light of their own. It would be interesting to consider what business organizations would be like if they used democratic values such as justice, equality, and liberty to measure the quality of their leaders and leadership. I am not suggesting that businesses become democracies but rather approach leadership as if they were. In the U.S. and in many parts of the world today, we see growing inequality in society and organizations. Some CEOs earn hundreds of times more than the lowest paid worker. In the current precarious economic environment, fear of unemployment sometimes restricts people's liberty to leave a job or express themselves on the job. All of this raises questions about how the actions of leaders in business and government measure up against democratic values such as equality, liberty, and justice. When we look at leadership as Burns did, through the values of democracy, we cannot avoid reflecting on the ethics of leaders and followers because both have the ability and the responsibility to transform each other, their organizations, and society.

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Chapter 6
Dangerous Liaisons: Adultery and the Ethics of Presidential Leadership

Abstract and Background This article addresses a key question in leadership ethics: Does the private morality of a leader affect his or her leadership? This was another issue that James MacGregor Burns and I liked to debate. As a historian and biographer, who was old enough to remember hearing Franklin Roosevelt talk on the radio, Burns did not think that the adulterous affairs of Presidents were relevant to their leadership. His perspective might also have reflected the fact that he was male and from a different generation. Burns noted that many presidents, such as Roosevelt, had affairs, yet still accomplished great things for the country. Granted, he had a point, but I still wasn't sure that adultery did not have some effect on a leader's behavior. Hence, for a book honoring Burns, I decided to take an in-depth look at U.S. presidents from 1901 to 2001 to see if and how, adulterous affairs affected the ethics of their day-to-day leadership.

Writing this paper, required an extensive amount of research because not all biographies of presidents talk about their adulterous affairs. Fortunately, several of the president's paramours published their letters. I was also able to get insights from looking at other references, such as biographies of first ladies, newspapers, and even an article in *People Magazine.* I discovered that these presidents' adulterous relationships affected what they did on the job, mainly through the unethical actions they took to hide their affairs from the public (and sometimes from their wives).

I found that Donald Trump was not the first president to pay his lovers hush money to keep them from ruining their chance of getting elected. The only difference between Trump and a president like Warren Harding on this matter, is that Trump got caught. What Burns and other older historians seem to miss, is the that most of these presidents were lucky. Their affairs were not made public during their presidency. Many of them lived in times where they could have a 'gentleman's agreement' with the press, which sounds rather quaint today when such agreements and gentlemen are scarce.

Keywords Leadership · Ethics · Adultery · Presidents · Public and private morality · Presidential character · Sex · Power · Risky behavior

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Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_6

Introduction

The relationship between the public and private morality of leaders has long vexed biographers, historians, psychologists, and philosophers as well as voters, and any person or group that has had to select a leader or decide whether to follow one. Since the mid-1990s James MacGregor Burns and I have argued about whether private morality, particularly in relation to adultery, affected the leadership of the presidents he studied – for example, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. Burns did not think it affected their leadership. We discussed President Clinton's scandal with Monica Lewinsky at length when it was constantly in the news. I thought that adultery would matter, but I was unsure of how, why, and to what extent. The issue has many layers to it, including some fundamental philosophic questions about the nature of morality. Is morality contextual? Is a person's moral character one or many? How does private morality affect public morality? There are also empirical questions about whether private morality actually affects the ethics of a president's leadership.

This chapter focuses on the real and potential ethical problems that unethical private behavior poses for leaders and their leadership. To explore this question, it examines US presidents from 1901 to 2001 who have committed adultery. I concentrate on adultery because, despite changes in American sexual mores, the public's attitudes about it have remained fairly constant over the years. It seems ironic that the only case in which adultery has led to the impeachment of a president was in an era when the public had more liberal views of sex outside of marriage, but it is not. According to a 2013 Gallup poll, 91% of Americans surveyed think adultery is always wrong.[1] A National Opinion Research Center (NORC) poll shows that this number had actually gone up 10 points since they began their surveys on trends in sexuality in 1973.[2]

Adultery is more common among the US presidents studied in this chapter than it is in the general public. Out of the 17 US presidents who served between 1901 and 2001, seven had documented extramarital affairs, and it is highly likely that two others had affairs before or during their presidencies. The rate of adultery among these presidents is over twice the rate of the general public, which has remained constant at about 20% for men and 10–15% for women.[3] (Needless to say, it is difficult to get reliable data on this.) This chapter looks at the presidents in this 100-year span of history to tease out the tangible ways that adultery affected or could have affected their leadership. This chapter shows that while adulterous relation-

[1] Friedman, Richard A. "Infidelity lurks in your genes." New York Times, May 22, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/infidelity-lurks-in-your-genes.html?src=twr&_r=1 (accessed December 14, 2015).

[2] National Opinion Research Center (NORC) University of Chicago (2013), *Trends in Public Attitudes about Sexual Morality*. http://www.norc.org/PDFs/Trend_Report_Sexuality.pdf (accessed December 14, 2015).

[3] Ibid.

ships do not necessarily interfere with a president's ability to be effective, they often lead to unethical leadership behaviors while in office and pose unnecessary risks to the president and possibly the nation.

Public and Private Morality

Before we begin, we need to sort through some conceptual issues. First, what is the difference between public and private morality for a president – or anyone, for that matter? In a sense, almost all morality is public because it is reflected in how people treat each other and other living things. Yet, we often distinguish between people's moral behavior on the job and their moral behavior outside of work. The fact that presidents live where they work poses a special challenge for separating public and private behavior. The separation of public and private morality begs the question: Is the morality of a person made of a whole cloth or is it a patchwork quilt?

Presidential scholars differ on this point. Rather than referring to public and private morality, James David Barber believes that presidents consist of the outer rational person, which is connected to an inner emotional one. The word *character* comes from the Greek word for engraving. It is something marked on a person that influences how he or she confronts the world. In short, Barber says, "Any real president is one whole man."[4] This view is akin to Aristotle's notion of the unity of virtues in which a person cannot practice one virtue – say, courage – without also exercising other virtues such as judgment and prudence. If character consists of moral habits such as truth-telling, then a person can only have the virtue of honesty if he or she tells the truth at home and at work. Similarly, the concept of integrity means that the morality of a person is made of a whole cloth. Stephen Carter argues that moral people have integrity, meaning they have integrated all the different aspects of their life into a whole.[5] He thinks that a person who practices exemplary public behavior and sordid private behavior is not morally whole in terms of his or her ability to be temperate, honest, respectful, fair, or to keep promises. This is why we often generalize about a person's character from a small incident and assume that "where there's smoke there's fire." When constituents discover that a president cheats on his wife, some imagine that he will do the same to them.[6]

In contrast to Barber, Dennis Thompson sees the ethical character of a president as a patchwork quilt – fragmented and based on the context. He says, "If moral behavior is variable and mixed, we should be prepared to tolerate some vices in our presidents and be more discriminating in the virtues we require of them."[7] So for

[4] Barber, James David. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977, 7.

[5] Carter, Stephen L. Integrity. New York: Harper Perennial, 1996.

[6] Ciulla, Joanne B. "Habits and virtues: does it matter if a leader kicks a dog?" Rivista Internationazionale *d*e Filosophia e Psicologia 5, no. 3 (2014): 332–42.

[7] Thompson, Dennis F. "Constitutional character: virtues and vices in presidential leader- ship." Presidential Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2010): 23–37, p. 24.

him, a president can have different public and private moralities. Thompson argues that the virtues we should care about in a president are constitutional virtues that are specific to public office. These include sensitivity to the basic rights of citizen- ship, a respect for due process, taking responsibility, tolerance of opposition, willingness to justify decisions, and commitment to telling the truth.[8] He tells us that presidents usually have more or less of these and other virtues. In the end Thompson, like Burns and other historians, offers a utilitarian perspective on leadership. He says virtues are not as important as their actions and consequences. This is in line with John Stuart Mill's distinction between agents and actions. He says, "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with worth of the agent."[9] In other words, personally bad people may do good things and personally good people may do bad things.

While Thompson's argument lays out a set of moral obligations based on the US Constitution that are relevant to presidents, it misses the broader issue about what it means to be a leader. According to philosopher Terry Price, being a leader means that a person accepts a set of obligations to followers. Engaging in behavior that most people in American politics know would cause problems if made public shows a disregard for the interests of the public. Taking on such obligations, entails avoiding behavior that, if made public, would hamper their ability to do their job well. This offers another way to ask the question of this chapter: Is adultery against the public interest and, if so, how?[10]

In his study of presidential character, James P. Pfiffner takes a middle ground on whether presidential character is fragmented or whole. When it comes to issues of private morality, like sexual infidelity, he says they are important because they call into question a president's judgment, self-restraint, and commitment to his duties. This sounds a bit like Aristotle's view; however, he also adds a utilitarian twist: "But in judging their behavior in retrospect, we ought to judge their sexual behavior in balance with other important aspects of character and contributions to the country."[11] In other words, philanderers may also do good things; and, in the case of some presidents, they do. Pfiffner weighs a president's ethics against his effectiveness. He also makes a moral distinction between romantic affairs that involve a caring relationship and one-night stands, which are simply about sex. This may be true in regard to the morality of the person; but, as we will see, both sorts of liaisons can be dangerous for a president.

[8] Ibid., paraphrased from p. 25.

[9] Mill, John Stuart. "What utilitarianism is." In Utilitarianism and Other Essays, edited by Alan Ryan. New York: Penguin, 1987, 276–97.

[10] Price, Terry L. "Judgmental privacy and the special obligations of leadership." Leadership and the Humanities 2, no. 5 (2014): 120–29.

[11] Pfiffner, James P. The Character Factor: How We Judge America's Presidents. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004, 90.

The Relationship Between Ethics and Effectiveness

The separation between public and private morality is really about how leaders' morality – public, private, or both – affects their ability to be ethical and effective on the job.[12] This may be why a leader's personal life matters for followers. People carry around implicit ideas about leaders and others that consist of assumptions about what they ought to be like. These vary from person to person but include some common themes in regard to US presidents.[13] Presidents are symbols of a nation, and sordid personal behavior by a president affects the image of the nation. As Thomas Cronin notes, "even though the 'mythic grandeur' of the presidency has been diminished in recent years, the president is still a powerful symbol."[14] In addition to being symbols, presidents also play the role of an architect of national identity.[15] The notion that the president is a moral exemplar and father figure runs through American history.[16]

In some cases, the legacy and symbolism of a president may deter historians from exploring some aspects of a president's private life. For instance, based on letters, George Washington appears to have been in love with his married neighbor, Sally Fairfax. Whether he actually had a physical affair with her we do not know, but the letters appear quite intimate. Many professional historians vehemently dismiss this as "the Sally Fairfax myth," perhaps because it sullies the image of Washington as a founding father.[17]

Revelations of a president committing adultery affect the nation. They elicit public feelings of anger, betrayal, and embarrassment – especially when hammered into the public consciousness by political nemeses and the media. When the sexual infidelity of a president becomes public, the media reaction is emotional. For example, one study of the Clinton scandal found that the press is less careful about checking the credibility of their sources and fact checking when it comes to stories about personal behavior than it is about public behavior.[18]

History has also shown us that sexual improprieties such as adultery do not keep presidents from doing important and good work, as was the case with presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson. If given a choice, most people would probably prefer a personally unethical president to a publicly unethical one. The

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[12] Ciulla, Joanne B. "Ethics and effectiveness." In The Nature of Leadership, edited by J. Antonakis, A.T. Cianciolo, and R.J. Sternberg. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004, 302–27.

[13] Meindl, J.R., Ehrlich, S.B., and Dukerich, J.M. "The romance of leadership." Adminis- trative Science Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1985): 78–102.

[14] Cronin, Thomas E. The State of the Presidency. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1980.

[15] Stuckey, Mary E. and Wabshall, Shannon. "Sex, lies, and presidential leadership: interpretations of the office." Presidential Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2000): 514–33.

[16] Langston, Thomas S. With Reverence and Contempt: How Americans Think About Their President. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

[17] Watson, Robert P. Affairs of State: The Untold History of Presidential Love, Sex, and Scandal, 1789–1900. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.

[18] Retter, James D. Anatomy of a Scandal. Santa Monica, CA: General Publishing Group, 1998.

1884 presidential race between Grover Cleveland and James Blaine illustrates the precedence of public morality over private morality. Voters had to choose between an anti- corruption presidential candidate who was accused of adultery and one who was accused of shady financial dealings with criminals while in office.[19] Cleveland allegedly impregnated a 33-year-old widow, Maria Crofts Halpin. He was not married or president at the time.[20] Cleveland referred to this as his "woman scrape."[21] In the 1884 presidential campaign Cleveland's corrupt opponent James Blaine exploited Cleve- land's woman scrape with the famous attack phrase "Ma, Ma, Where's my pa?" In defense of Cleveland, one of his supporters aptly summed up the public and private morality debate:

> I gather that Mr. Cleveland has shown high character and great capacity in public office but that in private life his conduct has been open to question, while, on the other hand, Mr. Blaine, in public life has been weak and dishonest, while he seems to have been an admirable husband and father. The conclusion that I draw from these facts is that we should elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office, which he is so admirably qualified to fill and remand Mr. Blaine to the private life which he is so eminently fitted to adorn.[22]

Cleveland overcame the scandal because he had a really crooked opponent; he effectively crusaded against corruption while in office; and he never denied or covered up the affair once it was public.[23] The last is a lesson that politicians never seem to learn.

Since the beginning of the American Republic, the infidelities of presidents and presidential candidates have served as powerful weapons of character assassination. Politicians often benefit from convincing the public that personal as well as public moral lapses disqualify their opponents from leadership. Even the British tried to discredit George Washington during the Revolutionary war with a sex scandal called the "Washerwoman Kate Affair." When Washington was fighting at the front, Congressman Benjamin Harrison wrote to him about a washerwoman's pretty daughter that he had procured for Washington's entertainment when he returned to Philadelphia. The letter was intercepted and published in the *Boston Weekly*, which was an anti-war publication, and *Gentlemen's Magazine* in London. The British based some of their propaganda campaigns on Washington's sex life, including claims that he had black, Indian, and white mistresses throughout the colonies.[24]

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[19] Thompson, Denis F. "Constitutional character: virtues and vices in presidential leader- ship." Presidential Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2010): 23–37.

[20] Pafford, John M. The Forgotten Conservative: Rediscovering Grover Cleveland. Washing- ton, DC: Regnery History, 2013, 101–3.

[21] Lachman, Charles. A Secret Life: The Lies and Scandals of President Grover Cleveland. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013, 28.

[22] Howe, M.A. DeWolfe, Portrait of an Independent: Moorfield Story, 1845–1929. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1932, 151.

[23] Jeffers, H. Paul. An Honest President: The Life and Presidencies of Grover Cleveland. New York: HarperCollins, 2000, 107.

[24] Watson, Robert P. Affairs of State: The Untold History of Presidential Love, Sex, and Scandal, 1789–1900. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Whether these stories of Washington are true or not, we do not know. Sometimes the public regards accusations of adultery as nothing more than a political ploy, while at other times the mere accusation of adultery is enough to discredit someone.

Andrew Jackson was the first president accused of adultery by his political opponents. The irony of this is that he was attacked for committing adultery with his wife. Jackson met his wife, Rachel Donelson Robards, when she was estranged from her abusive husband. Divorce laws were vague at the time and women could not divorce their husbands. Jackson convinced Robards to divorce his wife. Robards requested a divorce from the Kentucky legislature, but he never properly concluded the procedure. Jackson and Rachel assumed that the divorce went through and got married.

When Jackson campaigned for president, his marriage became cannon fodder for his opponents such as Henry Clay. This was an era of explosive growth for newspapers, so newspapers were competitive and keen to find ways to broaden their audiences. One editorial writer wrote of Jackson, "Ought a convicted adulteress and her paramour husband to be placed in the highest offices of this free and Christian land?"[25] The owner of the *New York Sun* editorialized, "We do not believe that the American people will knowingly elect to the Presidency a coarse debauchee who would bring his harlots with him to Washington."[26] The campaign also raised legitimate questions about Jackson's bloody past, which included dueling, executing soldiers "for no reason," and the unnecessary slaughter of Indians. Yet these serious allegations were overshadowed by claims that Jackson's mother was a prostitute and that he engaged in "wife theft."

Why Is Adultery Unethical?

We could simply dismiss the public interest in a president's sex life as politics, voyeurism, a cultural phenomenon, something that afflicts the prudish Americans but not the French, or simply the failure to adhere to a religious, social, or legal norm. The *Oxford English Dictionary* offers this simple definition of adultery: "Voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and another who is not his or her spouse, regarded as a violation of the marriage vows and hence as a sin or crime."[27] This definition does not tell us why it is wrong. Since we often talk about a president's character it is useful to see why it is wrong in terms of virtue.

Aristotle tells us that virtues such as justice or courage are always practiced the right way; however, other types of actions, like adultery, can never be practiced correctly. He says, "in the case of adultery, rightness and wrongness do not depend on

[25] Ibid., 180.

[26] Ibid., 135.

[27] Oxford English Dictionary. "Adultery," 2011. http://www.oed.com.newman.richmond.edu:2048/view/Entry/2845?redirectedFrom=adultery#eid (accessed August 12, 2015).

committing it with the right woman at the right time and in the right manner, but the mere fact of committing such action at all is to do wrong."[28] Yet, some philosophers have gone to great lengths to show that there are cases where adultery is not wrong.[29] By looking at two cases where adultery seems acceptable and two where it does not, we get a clearer picture of the moral problems with adultery.

Open Marriage

Adultery may not be wrong in an open marriage where both parties agree to have sex with other people. This eliminates the need for deception, failure to keep the promise of fidelity (because of a new agreement), emotional distress to the spouse, and betrayal of trust. Yet, even in an open marriage, one partner may feel betrayed if their understanding of the agreement concerning an open marriage is violated. Such violations might include falling in love with someone else, having a child with them, or transferring too much of his or her time and affection to another person. The arrangement might also cause problems for the children. These same issues may arise in polygamous marriages and yes, even among the French.

Romance

Married people sometimes fall in love with someone else. Their marriage may be good, but one spouse meets his or her soul mate, or the marriage may be bad for one or both spouses and one of the partners falls in love with someone else.[30] Philosopher Raja Halwani argues that the promise to be a faithful spouse may be a different kind of promise than the promise to pay back a loan. It may be more like a "promise to be a certain kind of person who is faithful, but whether the person turns out that way after marriage is not assured because things can happen that make it difficult to be this person."[31] These cases do not seem unethical if, for example, a wife falls in love with someone else, tells her husband, and leaves the marriage to marry or be with the other person. This happens all the time. However, it still begs the ethical ques-

[28] Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics, Book II (1007a15). Translated by Martin Ostwald. Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1975, 44.

[29] Wasserstrom, Richard. "Is adultery immoral?" In Philosophy and Sex, edited by Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984.

[30] Richard Taylor, "Having love affairs." In Philosophy and Sex, edited by Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984.

[31] Halwani, Raja. "Virtue ethics and adultery." Journal of Social Philosophy 29, no. 3 (1998): 5–18.

tion of whether it is morally justified to break this promise because someone else comes along. Some might argue that these affairs are morally different because the adulterer eventually tells the truth.[32] But does the truth telling at the end make up for the lying and betrayal in the beginning? The problem with this scenario is that married people often fall in love with others but one or both parties either cannot or do not want to get divorced, which leads to the scenario that is most relevant to presidents.

Having Your Cake and Eating It Too

These are the cases where married people fall in love with someone else but still love their spouse and/or do not want to leave the marriage because of the children or for political or economic reasons. In some ways, these cases involve the most ethical violations. The adulterer engages in a high stakes game in which the need for deception and violation of other moral principles escalate because the costs of getting caught are high.

Lust

This concerns the adulterer who wants to stay married and have sex with one or more people without any emotional attachment. We regard cases of love different from cases of pure lust. When people are in love, they usually feel care, respect, friendship, and concern for another person – lust does not induce the same. Lust may violate principles such as respect for persons, or, in Kantian terms, not treating people as ends in themselves. Adultery based on lust violates all of the moral principles mentioned in cases 1–3. Like virtues, vices are usually connected to other vices. Lust is related to *akrasia*, weakness of the will or lacking command over oneself – love can also have this effect. Lust in particular and adultery in general may lead people to engage in other unethical, dangerous, and destructive behaviors.

While these are not meant to be an exhaustive set of the varieties of adultery, it teases out the other unethical behaviors that come with the practice of adultery. These unethical behaviors have a much greater impact on more people when practiced by people in positions of power.

[32] Primoratz, Igor. Ethics and Sex. New York: Routledge, 1999, 82.

Sex and Power

Sex has always been related to power. Some people find power sexy, and powerful people may use and abuse their power to have sex. Psychiatrist Arnold M. Ludwig argues that sex with many partners is a natural part of male leadership. In his provocative book *King of the Mountain*, he compares human leaders to their primate ancestors. Like apes, humans receive advantages from being leaders. These advantages include: more extramarital affairs, more offspring, opportunities for more food, and deference from others.[33] In fairness to apes, when apes become leaders, they also protect the group and share food.[34] In this respect apes seem to look after their constituents better than some of the tyrants, kleptocrats, and other destructive varieties of human leaders.

Ludwig's assessment of leaders unsettles us because it is neither completely true nor completely false. There certainly are leaders who become enamored with power and use it to get whatever they want. In the *Republic* Plato grapples with the argument that people want to be leaders for the power and benefits that come with it. He notes that if you are a just person, being a leader does not necessarily serve your self-interest. If anything, Plato tells us, for ethical people there are disadvantages to being a leader, because ethical leaders would feel obligated to put the needs and interests of their followers before their own.[35] So, according to Plato, virtuous presidents would forgo adulterous affairs in the interest of focusing on their moral obligations to all stakeholders.

We entrust presidents with power and expect them to use it in the interests of the nation, but they sometimes fall prey to elements of what is called "the Bathsheba Syndrome." The biblical story of David and Bathsheba is about how the very successful King David seduced one of his general's wives and, to cover it up, arranged for her husband Uriah to be killed in battle (2 Samuel II). Dean Ludwig and Clinton Longenecker discuss how success and power led to King David's adultery and subsequent abuse of power.[36] It highlights one of the most dangerous aspects of adultery for leaders – the need to hide the affair from a spouse and/or the public. Revelations of adultery are embarrassing, hurtful to the spouse and family, and they threaten a leader's power and reputation. This is why leaders will go to great lengths to cover it up and, in doing so, make inappropriate use of staff and other resources under their control – that is, King David orders Joab, the commander of his army, to lead Uriah to his death at the front. For leaders, the cover-up for adultery is often worse than adultery because the cover-ups are where leaders tend to most abuse

[33] Ludwig, Arnold M. King of the Mountain: The Nature of Political Leadership. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001, 51.

[34] de Waal, Frans. Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

[35] Plato. The Republic. Translated by M.A. Grube. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1992.

[36] Ludwig, Dean and Longenecker, Clinton. "The Bathsheba syndrome: the ethical failure of successful leaders." Journal of Business Ethics 12, no. 4 (1993): 265–73.

their power, subordinates, and public trust. Unlike ordinary people, presidents have influence over a variety of human and other resources. As we will see, some presidents seem to either be reckless or possess an inflated belief in their ability to hide things from the public. Lastly, Ludwig and Longenecker point out that the private immorality of a leader may be a symptom of a leader who has become distracted and has lost strategic focus. Having secret affairs takes time and resources that may detract from their ability to do their jobs well. As we will see in the following cases, adultery and the need to conceal it cause a number of real and potential problems for presidential leadership.

The Dangerous Liaisons

Woodrow Wilson was the first president in this 100-year period of history to have a well-documented affair. Wilson was an intellectual and a moralist who dreamed of creating a more just world and lasting peace through his League of Nations.[37] During the 1912 presidential campaign Theodore Roosevelt's political advisors urged him to exploit Wilson's affair with Mrs. Peck. Roosevelt refused, saying, "You can't convince the American people that a man is a Romeo who looks so much like an apothecary's clerk."[38]

Wilson met his paramour, Mary Allen Hulbert Peck (or Mrs. Peck), before he was president when he went alone on a vacation to Bermuda for his health. The affair is well documented in letters between Wilson and Peck, Wilson and his wife, and in a memoir by Peck.[39] In his biography of Wilson, August Heckscher says that Wilson was like two different men who did not know what the other was thinking. He notes, "Thus he seems never to have felt the need to make a choice between his wife and Mary Peck."[40] Before his first wife, Ellen Wilson, died the Republicans considered discrediting Wilson by bringing up the Peck affair. A Democratic Party representative offered Peck several hundred thousand dollars for her letters, but she refused.[41] Very soon after Wilson's wife Ellen died, Wilson decided to marry Edith Bolling Galt. As biographer John Milton Cooper notes, "Wilson was fortunate to not have a full-fledged diplomatic emergency on his hands in September 1915 because he had to deal with a romantic one, in his courtship of Edith Galt."[42] Fearful that Edith would find out about Peck, Wilson told her about the affair. After he was

[37] Blum, John Morton. Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956.

[38] Berg, Scott. Wilson. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2013, 6.

[39] Hulbert, Mary Allen. The Story of Mrs. Peck: An Autobiography. New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1933.

[40] Heckscher, August. Woodrow Wilson. New York: Charles Scribner, 1991.

[41] Berg, 410.

[42] Cooper, John Milton. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York: Vintage, 2011, 301.

married, Wilson and Edith invited Peck to lunch and offered her monetary help because they were still worried about her selling her letters. Despite the attempted pay-offs, Peck went on to publish their letters after Wilson left office.

Warren G. Harding is considered one of the worst presidents in American history.[43] For a long time, people believed that Harding's wife Florence (nicknamed "the Duchess") destroyed his papers to hide malfeasance that took place during his administration. Fortunately, they were not destroyed.[44] Harding did not have a happy marriage. Some people thought Florence was so domineering that when Harding became ill from eating bad crabmeat and died of a heart attack, rumors spread that his wife had poisoned him.[45]

Harding had two affairs. The first was with Carrie Fulton Phillips, the wife of one of Harding's best friends. Phillips and her husband moved to Germany, and Harding and Phillips exchanged about 240 letters between 1905 and 1924.[46] Phillips was pro-German prior to the war. At the beginning of WWI, the secret service had her under surveillance because they thought she was a German spy. In 1920, the Republican National Committee worried about the affair becoming public and gave Phillips and her husband a trip to Japan, $20,000 in cash, and other monthly payments, to keep them quiet.[47]

Nan Britton, a teenage girl from Harding's hometown, initiated his second affair. When she was 16, Britton developed a crush on Harding, who was 31 years her senior. She posted pictures of Harding in her bedroom, followed him around town, and even befriended Harding's wife to get close to him.[48] They began having an affair in 1917 when she was 21 and Britton had a daughter by him in 1919. Harding never saw or acknowledged the child, but he had secret service agents bring her support payments until his death. He used to refer to Britton as his "niece." Britton later wrote a best-selling book called *The President's Daughter* about her long affair with Harding, which included an account of how the secret service and Harding's staff kept Florence from catching them having sex in a closet off of the Oval Office. Britton later sued the Harding estate on behalf of her daughter for part of the inheritance, but the Harding family did not believe that Britton had a child by

[43] Trani, Eugene P. and Wilson, David L. The Presidency of Warren G. Harding. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1977.

[44] Dean, John W. Warren G. Harding. New York: Times Books, 2004.

[45] Anthony, Carl Sferrazza. Florence Harding: The First Lady, the Jazz Age and America's Most Scandalous President. New York: William Morrow, 1998.

[46] Library of Congress, "Warren G. Harding–Carrie Fulton Phillips Correspondence." https://www.loc.gov/collection/warren-harding-carrie-fulton-phillips-correspondence/about-this-collection (accessed January 12, 2016).

[47] Robenalt, James David and Dean, John W. The Harding Affair: Love and Espionage During the Great War. New York: St. Martin's, 2011.

[48] Brittan, Nan. The President's Daughter. Cleveland, OH: Hypo To Helio Books, 2013.

him. In 2015, a DNA test verified Britton's claim that she did indeed have Harding's child.[49]

Franklin D. Roosevelt had a talent for having affairs – some of which he conducted in plain sight of his wife and the public. His wife Eleanor had a few too. Roosevelt's love affair with Lucy Mercer, Eleanor's social secretary, started around 1916 and it lingered on through his presidency.[50] When Eleanor first discovered the affair, she fell into a deep depression because of the betrayal.[51] Roosevelt wanted to marry Mercer but he did not because divorce would ruin his political career and, as Burns and Dunn note, he was afraid of his mother cutting off her support.[52] Eleanor thought Roosevelt ended the affair, but he kept contact with her even after Mercer married. Roosevelt gave standing instructions to let Mercer's calls go directly to him through the White House switchboard and that they be kept secret. Eleanor was not happy to learn that Mercer was with him when he died in Warm Springs, Georgia. The Roosevelt's marriage became a somewhat open one, and the White House staff said their marital arrangements were sometimes "a nightmare" for them.[53]

Roosevelt's other major affair was with his secretary, Marguerite "Missy" LeHand. According to Alice Kearns Goodwin, "Missy went on to be the most celebrated private secretary in the country." "Everyone loved her" and Missy was in love with the president.[54] Eleanor came to terms with Missy's role as his "work wife," perhaps because Missy came from a different class.[55] She allowed Eleanor to do her work and to know that the president was well cared for during the time that he had polio.

Roosevelt surrounded himself with a number of adoring and intelligent women, some of whom had affairs with him, such as his 6th cousin, Margaret "Daisy" Suckley.[56] As one biographer notes, none of these women wanted anything from him, which may be the reason why he did not have to worry as much about deception and paying them off for their silence.[57] Nonetheless, Roosevelt lived in fear of his political opponents, the press, and his wife discovering his continuing affair with Mercer. He saw what happened to Grover Cleveland and worried that he would not be as lucky.[58]

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[49] Baker, Peter. "DNA said to solve a mystery of Warren Harding's love life." New York Times, August 13, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/dna-is-said-to-solve-a-mystery-of-warren-hardings-love-life.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore- ipad&_r=0 (accessed August 13, 2015).

[50] Burns, James MacGregor and Dunn, Susan. The Three Roosevelts. New York: Grove/ Atlantic, 2007.

[51] Smith, Jean Edward. FDR. New York: Random House, 2007.

[52] Burns and Dunn, 495.

[53] Cawthorne, Nigel. The Sex Lives of Presidents, eBook edition. New York: St. Martin's, 2013.

[54] Goodwin, Alice Kearns. No Ordinary Time. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, 119.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ward, Geoffrey, C. Closest Companion: The Unknown Story of the Intimate Friendship Between Franklin Roosevelt and Margaret Suckley. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012.

[57] Persico, Joseph E. Franklin and Lucy: Mrs. Rutherford and the Other Remarkable Women in Roosevelt's Life. New York: Random House, 2009, 311.

[58] Lash, Joseph. E. Eleanor and Franklin. New York: Norton, 1971.

Dwight D. Eisenhower harbored a similar concern for his political career because of an extramarital affair that he had during WWII. In 1942, Kay Summersby, an English fashion model, became Eisenhower's driver. Eisenhower enthusiastically described Kay in his letters to his wife Mamie, and even told her that the two shared a dog.[59,60] When Eisenhower signed the formal surrender documents, Summersby was standing behind him in the historic picture. She was later either air- brushed out of the historic photo or they used a shot of the same group that was taken from a different angle and only showed the shadow of her head.[61]

When Franklin Roosevelt traveled to Carthage to meet Eisenhower, he was eager to meet Summersby. She drove Roosevelt and Eisenhower around the battlefields of Carthage, and they and their entourage had a picnic. Summersby sat next to Roosevelt at the picnic, and he asked her if she would like to join the Women's Army Corps (WACs). She said she could not because she was not an American citizen. Roosevelt said, "Stranger things have happened" and by presidential order commissioned her as a second lieutenant in the WACs in 1944.[62] After the war, Summersby wrote an adoring memoir about working with Eisenhower, which did not suggest an affair. In it she said the one secret of his success was "his unconquerable honesty."[63] She published a second memoir after Eisenhower died in which she admitted her affair with Eisenhower.[64]

Eisenhower returned from the war a hero. General George Marshall, Mamie, and his political ambitions all encouraged him to break his ties with Summersby. After the war, Eisenhower's deputies helped her land jobs and did their best to keep her away from Eisenhower. The affair also caused Eisenhower political problems. During the 1952 primary campaign, supporters of his opponent, Senator Robert A. Taft, rehashed the story about his secret affair with Summersby, Mamie's drinking problem, and rumors that Eisenhower was Jewish. Truman later quipped, "If those were the worst things Republicans could find to say about Ike, he was a lucky man."[65]

John F. Kennedy was even luckier. There are so many named and nameless women who had affairs or sex with Kennedy that it is difficult to know where to begin. He had dangerous liaisons with a mob boss's girlfriend, Judith Campbell Exner, one of the many who wrote books about it, and an alleged East German spy turned prostitute, Ellen Rometsch. Then there were famous strippers and movie stars such as Blaze Starr and Marilyn Monroe, staffers, interns, prostitutes, and

[59] Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: Soldier and President (The Renowned One-Volume Life). New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 65.

[60] Smith, Jean Edward. Eisenhower in War and Peace. New York: Random House, 2012, 220.

[61] Korda, Michael. Ike: An American Hero. New York: Harper & Row, 2007, 582.

[62] Ibid., 422.

[63] Summersby, Kay. Eisenhower Was My Boss. New York: Prentice Hall, 1948.

[64] Morgan Summersby, Kay. Past Forgetting: My Love Affair with Dwight D. Eisenhower. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977.

[65] Korda, 638.

anonymous women brought in off the street. The recklessness of his almost daily sexual pursuits is breathtaking. After Kennedy was assassinated, the chief White House usher gave Mrs. Kennedy the White House logs, which contained the most detailed record of the parade of women who came into the White House daily. They destroyed the logs, which would normally have been preserved in the presidential library.[66]

Kennedy enlisted the help of staff, secret service men, friends, cabinet members, and other politicians to supply him with women. He once asked his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to find a villa on Lake Como where he could bring a woman on the night before a meeting with the Pope.[67] Tony Sherman, a member of Kennedy's secret service detail, said, "Seventy to eighty percent of the agents thought it was nuts … Some of us were brought up the right way."[68] The behavior of the president adversely affected the people who worked for him by making them uncomfortable, coercing them to lie or procure women, or by corrupting them.

Kennedy regularly went swimming nude with staff secretaries Priscilla Wear and Jill Cowen, who were known around the White House as Fiddle and Faddle and he got a young intern drunk and seduced her. The FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, was on to Kennedy's affair with the alleged spy Rometsch, but Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General, convinced Hoover to stop a Senate investigation of his brother and Rometsch. Hoover also kept his spies busy tracking Kennedy's exploits, and they developed a detailed file on him. Hoover used his knowledge about Kennedy and the next three presidents to advance and protect his own career. Kennedy sometimes discussed sensitive matters with his paramours. He talked to Marilyn Monroe about Cuba, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and his desire to put Teamster leader Jimmy Hoffa in jail.[69] We know this because the FBI bugged Monroe's house.

The endless stream of women that Kennedy sneaked into the White House did not go through security checks, which could have been dangerous. "Kennedy's apparent lack of concern about the public disclosure of his philandering seems incomprehensible."[70] It may have stemmed from years of having his family, and later his Attorney General brother, clean up after him.[71] Kennedy and the nation were lucky – his behavior posed a potential threat to the country and possibly the world.[72] Historian Thomas C. Reeves sums up Kennedy's administration this way:

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[66] Hersh, Seymour M. The Dark Side of Camelot. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1997.

[67] Reeves, Richard. President Kennedy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

[68] Hersh, 10–11.

[69] Summers, Anthony. Goddess: The Secret Lives of Marilyn Monroe. New York: Open Road Media, 2013.

[70] Giglio, James N. The Presidency of John F. Kennedy. second edition. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006, 290.

[71] Some biographers believe that Kennedy was married to Durie Malcolm, a Palm Beach socialite in 1947, but that when Kennedy's father found out he got angry and had all records of the marriage expunged from the courthouse. He also got a priest to annul the marriage.

[72] Reeves, Thomas C. A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy. New York: Free Press, 1991, 419.

"During his 1000 days, Kennedy arrogantly and irresponsibly violated his covenant with the people."[73]

Lyndon Baines Johnson may have been a beneficiary of Kennedy's wild sex life. Hoover lived on the same street as Johnson in Washington and the two were friends. Hoover supplied Johnson with intelligence on Kennedy's womanizing. Some speculate that Johnson used the Hoover files to get himself picked as Kennedy's vice president.[74] The ethos of the Kennedy White House may have rubbed off on Johnson. Johnson once said, "I had more women by accident than Kennedy had on purpose."[75] Johnson's affairs started before he was in the White House. The smart, witty, and beautiful Alice Glass was Johnson's paramour when he was in Congress. Alice was the mistress and then wife of wealthy publisher Charles Marsh, who was a mentor to Johnson. Biographer Robert Caro says this was the only episode in Johnson's life that ran counter to his political ambitions: "In that era a divorced man could be effectively barred from public office."[76] Even after she married, Johnson kept going to Alice Glass's house in Virginia, and sometimes he brought his wife, Lady Bird, who probably knew about the affair.[77] The affair lasted until 1967, when Glass broke up with Johnson because she could no longer support his war in Vietnam.[78]

Johnson had overlapping affairs. In addition to his affair with Glass, Johnson had an affair with the actress turned Congresswomen Helen Gahagan Douglas from about 1945 to 1949.[79] During that time, Johnson also started a long-time affair with Madeleine Brown, a young assistant in an advertising firm in Dallas, which lasted from about 1948 to 1967. Brown had a son named Steven with Johnson.[80] Johnson made her enter into a sham marriage because Hoover found out about the affair and the child. Hoover eventually used this knowledge to force Johnson to extend his service as Director of the FBI beyond the mandatory retirement age.[81] Sex and power were joined in Johnson's mind. "Part of him wanted power for the glory of helping others" and "another part of him wanted power to satisfy rawer instincts, including his desire for random, un- limited sex and the thrill of dominating others."[82] Johnson not only had a need for other women, but also a need to show off

[73] Ibid., 421.

[74] Hersh, 129.

[75] Dallek, Robert. Lone Star Rising, Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908–1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 189.

[76] Caro, Robert A. The Means of Ascent: The Years of Lyndon Johnson (Book 2). New York: Knopf, 1990, 25.

[77] Ibid., 58.

[78] Cawthorne, location 3261.

[79] Caro, Robert. Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson III. New York: Knopf, 2002.

[80] Russell, Jan Jarboe. Lady Bird: A Biography of Mrs. Johnson. New York: Scribner, 1999, 166.

[81] Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1999.

[82] Russell, 128.

about it, sometimes in front of his wife.[83] Johnson hired beautiful secretaries and, as one biographer noted, he used the White House secretaries as his personal harem. He fondled secretaries and staffers and had sex in the Oval Office and on Air Force One.[84] When a correspondent asked Lady Bird what she thought about the revelations concerning Roosevelt's affair with Lucy Mercer, she said the affair was "like a fly on the wedding cake."[85]

Richard M. Nixon also had to deal with Hoover's knowledge of his mysterious affair with Marianna Liu. They first met when Nixon was a lawyer in 1958 in Hong Kong at a club called Opium Den, where Liu was a hostess.[86] Nixon's scheduler reported that Nixon saw Liu often between 1964 and 1967. In 1967, when Nixon decided to run for president, the FBI became concerned about Liu because Nixon had received a security briefing about China. They investigated Liu for possible involvement with the Chinese Communist Party. FBI reports shows that Nixon gave Liu a bottle of Chanel No. 5 after their first encounter. Liu said she had many dates with Nixon in Hong Kong and that he cared for her.[87] The CIA also put Nixon and Liu under surveillance, and the Hong Kong intelligence service took pictures of them together in his hotel bedroom. The *New York Times* reported that the FBI under Hoover was investigating an alleged "affair" between Nixon and Liu, a suspected spy.[88] A recent article in the London *Sunday Times* reported that MI6 had also spied on and taken pictures of Nixon and Liu.[89]

White House logs show that Liu visited Nixon in the White House three times. The *Enquirer* tabloid ran a story on the romance between Nixon and Liu, and Nixon helped Liu sue the tabloid. Liu lost the suit, in part because what it had reported was true. She and Nixon denied that the affair was physical and that he had helped get her into the country. Nixon also "denied any knowledge of her being a suspected Red agent."[90]

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[83] Ibid., 205.

[84] Cawthorne, location 3287.

[85] Russell, 22.

[86] Stone, Roger and Colapietro, Mike. Nixon's Secrets: The Rise, Fall, and Untold Truth about the President, Watergate, and the Pardon. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2014, 214–15.

[87] Summers, Anthony, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon. New York: Penguin, 2001.

[88] Crewdson, John M. "F.B.I. investigated Hong Kong woman friend of Nixon in 60's to determine if she was a foreign agent." New York Times, June 22, 1976. http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimesindex/docview/122936481/fulltextPDF/3ED2C9CAE07E42FBPQ/10?accountid=14731 (accessed September 16, 2015).

[89] Harnden, Toby, "MI6 took spy snaps of Nixon and Chinese 'mistress.'" Sunday Times, January 11, 2015. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Americas/article1505619.ece (accessed September 9, 2015).

[90] "Nixon said to be helping woman in libel suit." New York Times, September 17, 1976. http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimesindex/docview/122886541/2220BA57CCFC44CBPQ/9?accountid=14731 (accessed September 16, 2015).

Curiously, in 1969 Liu moved into a house down the street from Nixon's home in Whittier, California. She was admitted into the United States with the guarantee of a job as a housekeeper.[91] It was later discovered that the dates on her immigration papers had been altered, and Liu repeatedly refused to open up her immigration file for reporters. Hoover kept a file on Nixon's relationship with Liu. Nixon hated Hoover and planned to fire him. However, at the meeting that Nixon called to fire Hoover, Hoover threatened to reveal what he knew about Liu.

Nixon later said that he could not fire Hoover because he would "pull down the temple."[92]

George H.W. Bush is almost as difficult to imagine having an affair as Wilson and Nixon. In fairness, this case has the least amount of solid evidence; but it still demonstrates the potential impact of even the charge of adultery on a president or presidential candidate. Jennifer Fitzgerald was Bush's secretary during his last year with the Republican National Committee. When Bush became Ambassador to China, she went with him to run his office there. Fitzgerald was savvy and sophisticated. The staff in Bush's office reported being jealous of her "special access to her boss."[93] Barbara Bush, the president's wife, was away from China for a year, and during that period Bush and Fitzgerald traveled and spent much of their leisure time together.

Fitzgerald later worked on Bush's campaign as the gatekeeper – other staffers found her cold and efficient and wondered what kind of hold she had over him. In an interview, Fitzgerald said: "Everyone keeps painting me as the old ogre … I really don't worry about it. All these bizarre things simply aren't true."[94] During his first campaign, advisors grew concerned about "the Jennifer problem," which arose in 1987 in the wake of the Gary Hart scandal.[95] On October 19, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 43 points on rumors that the *Washington Post* was going to publish stories about Bush's extramarital affair.[96] Michael Sneed of the *Chicago Sun-Times* wrote, "several major newspapers were sifting when it came to reported dalliances of Mr. Boring."[97] The British press covered the story and the satirical magazine *Spy* ran a serious investigative story on the Bush/Fitzgerald affair. Its cover headline read: "1000 Reasons Not to Vote for George Bush, No. 1 He Cheats on His Wife."[98] According to biographers Webster Griffin Tarply and Anton Chaitkin,

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[91] Wilkins, Barbara. "Marianna Liu admits she knew Nixon in Hong Kong, but says there was no spying and no romance." People 6, no. 14 (October 4, 1976).

[92] Kessler, Ronald. The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI. New York: St. Martin's 2003, 184.

[93] Parmet, Herbert S. George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997, 179.

[94] Ibid., 241.

[95] Tarpley, Webster Griffin and Chaitkin, Anton. George Bush: The Unauthorized Biogra- phy. Joshua Tree, CA: Progressive Press, 2004, 335.

[96] Ibid., 495.

[97] Ibid., 494.

[98] Spy magazine, July/August 1992.

Bush's friends from Skull and Bones (his old Yale club) helped suppress the affair in the American press.[99]

When Bush ran against Clinton, discussion of the Fitzgerald affair emerged again.[100] In 1992, a CNN reporter asked Bush if he had had an affair and he replied, "I am not going to take sleazy questions like that from CNN. No, it's a lie." Barbara Bush addressed the stories with humor: "George Bush sleeps with two girls: Millie [their dog] and me."[101] Others disagreed. The wife of Bush's good friend C. Boyden Gray said, "Jennifer was a fact of life in George's life … No one knew that better than my husband who worked for George Bush for 12 years."[102] With a little help from his friends and advisors, Bush remained unscathed by "the Jennifer problem."

William Jefferson Clinton: The One Who Got Caught

In some ways, Bill Clinton's adulteries sum up all of the lessons, risks, and fears of the philandering presidents who came before him. He had unrelenting political foes who were determined to use his affairs to destroy him – and he got caught. Compared to some of his predecessors, Clinton's affairs seem almost tame, but his punishment was not. Clinton's affair with Gennifer Flowers became public in 1992 when he ran for president. At first, Clinton denied the affair, but then he went on television with his wife and confessed to "marital wrongdoing."[103] Unlike Cleveland, he did not admit it outright, but he appeared to say enough to satisfy the public and Clinton went on to get elected.

Clinton was a known womanizer and the White House had a number of "minders" who made sure that attractive young women were not left alone with the president. After his election in 1992, Clinton's political adversaries saw the woman issue as his Achilles heel, and conservative fundraisers such as Richard Mellon Scaife, as well as members of a Republican Congress, sought to use this issue to discredit and possibly impeach Clinton.[104] In 1994, Paula Jones brought a sexual harassment lawsuit against Clinton that argued there had been a pattern of sexual harassment when he was Governor of Arkansas. The suit was dismissed for lacking legal merit.[105]

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[99] Tarpley and Chaitkin, 355.

[100] Ibid., 503.

[101] Green, George Robert. The Presidency of George H.W. Bush. second edition. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 229.

[102] Kelly, Kitty. Times Online. http://tca-referencedesk.blogspot.com/2004/04/jennifer-fitzgerald-described-as-george.html (accessed Oct. 5, 2015).

[103] Heath, Jim. "Clinton on Flowers '92." 60 Minutes, January 26, 1992. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwXE52e9JFg (accessed January 12, 2016).

[104] Lewis, Neil A. "Almost $two million spent in magazine's anti-Clinton project." New York Times, April 15, 1998. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/15/us/almost-2-million-spent-in-magazine-s-anti-clinton-project-but-on-what.html (accessed September 18, 2015).

[105] "Clinton welcomes Jones decision: appeal likely." CNN, April 2, 2011. http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/04/02/clinton.jones.reax/ (accessed September 18, 2015).

The name "Monica Lewinsky" came up during the deposition for the Jones lawsuit, which was part of a wide-ranging investigation of the Clintons by independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr. Lewinsky had become an intern in the White House in July of 1995. Starting in March of that year she had six trysts with the president in the president's study, hallway, and, like Nan Britton and Warren Harding, in rooms off of the Oval Office. During that deposition, Clinton said that he did not have sex with Lewinsky, and he said to the public:

But I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single time – never. These allegations are false. And I need to go back to work for the American people.[106] His denial was based on what constituted sex because he had only received oral sex from her. This lie accounts for the loss of public support and constituted the first ground of his impeachment – perjury.

The secret service agents and other staffers knew that something was going on between Clinton and Lewinsky. In April of 1996 staffers who wanted to get Lewinsky away from the president transferred her to the Pentagon. Clinton did not have physical contact with her but the two did have occasional phone sex and exchanged small gifts. In 1997 she had two more encounters with him, but later that year Clinton broke it off with her right before the Supreme Court decided to let the Paula Jones case proceed. After that, Lewinsky kept calling Clinton's secretary, Betty Currie, because she wanted another job in the White House. Clinton wanted to move her far away, so he asked Bill Richardson, Ambassador to the United Nations, to get her a job in New York but Lewinsky was not interested.[107]

Then on December 17, 1997, Clinton called Lewinsky to tell her that she was going to be subpoenaed in the Jones case. The subpoena asked that Lewinsky bring any gifts that she had received from the president with her. The president told her to do so. Later either Currie called Lewinsky or Lewinsky called Currie (this is still not clear), and Lewinsky gave almost all of her gifts to Currie. This incident is significant because Jones's lawyers wanted to show that Clinton punished women who would not have sex with him and rewarded those who did. Lewinsky then asked Clinton's friend, Vernon Jordan, to find her a job. Jordan helped her with an affidavit that supported Clinton in the Jones case. Lewinsky signed the affidavit in January of 1998 and the next day Jordan got her a job at Revlon. The gift giving and the job became the basis for the obstruction of justice charge.[108]

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[106] Miller Center. "Response to the Lewinsky allegations," January 26, 1998. http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3930 (accessed September 18, 2015).

[107] Takiff, Michael. A Complicated Man: The Life of Bill Clinton as Told by Those Who Know Him. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.

[108] The above account is taken from Starr, Kenneth W. The Starr Report: The Findings of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr on President Clinton and the Lewinsky Report. New York: Public Affairs Reports, 1998.

According to the Government Accounting Office, the investigation of Clinton by independent counsel, Starr, cost taxpayers over $40 million. In his analysis of the case, Richard Posner sums up a key way in which adultery affects presidential leadership: "The serious breaches of public morality were Clinton's violations of federal criminal law, which were felonious, numerous, and non-technical." Yet, Posner also seems to beg the broader question of public and private morality when he goes on to say: "How far they should be considered serious breaches of *public* morality depends on one's conception of the Presidency."[109] Congress impeached Clinton for his efforts to hide his adultery, not for committing adultery. As writer Michael Isikoff sums up the Lewinsky affair, "the sheer energy needed to conceal the problem was staggering;" and policy advisor George Stephanopoulos lamented that the affair seemed to undercut what the White House staff had hoped to accomplish.[110]

The Risks and Unethical Effects

After looking at these nine presidents, we see that their private unethical behavior is causally connected to various types of unethical public behavior. While it is possible to compartmentalize behavior, these cases show how, in the case of presidents, unethical private behavior includes a willingness to engage in unethical public behavior. The cases here shed doubt on the idea that moral character is a patchwork based on context, since a person's life is a quilt and the pieces are connected. As we have seen, the public behavior resulting from adultery includes: exploitation by political opponents, pay-offs by political parties, pay-offs by the president, blackmail, use of influence to obtain jobs, threats to national security, misuse of the secret service, misuse of the White House staff and other agencies, time, energy, distraction and threat to the president's initiatives and agenda, law breaking, abuse of public money, and impeachment. Throughout US history, politicians have used adultery to smear the reputation of their political opponents. We also notice that the electorate will forgive or at least overlook adultery prior to a president's election, if he tells the truth about it. A candidate's adultery can also elicit unethical behavior by political parties. In the cases of Harding and Wilson, parties were willing to misuse their funds to keep the candidate's paramours quiet.

The need for secrecy opens candidates up to blackmail or the need for hush money. Wilson offered financial aid to Mrs. Peck to keep her from publishing his letters. Kennedy's father and his brother Bobby paid a number of women for their silence. The prostitute and suspected spy, Ellen Rometsch, was deported to East Germany and given a generous stipend by the Kennedys. The only blackmailer in these cases is J. Edgar Hoover, who used his knowledge of Johnson's and Nixon's

[109] Posner, Richard A. An Affair of State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 9.

[110] Isikoff, Michael, Uncovering Clinton: A Reporter's Story. New York: Crown Publishing, 1999, 330.

affairs to secure his own job. Johnson also may have used Hoover's information on Kennedy to become his running mate. There does not seem to be any evidence of blackmail by foreign nationals, but in the case of Harding, Kennedy, and Nixon there were concerns that the president's lovers were foreign agents.

There may be a moral difference between genuine romances and pure lust. The moral difference here regards the character of the person; but the potential ethical problems for a President may be the same, and in some ways worse. Romantic friendships entail a more ethical relation- ship in terms of respect for the other as an equal, but in the case of a president they can also be dangerous if the president shares sensitive information with them. Roosevelt had affairs and/or close friendships with several accomplished women, such as Dorothy Schiff, the owner and publisher of the *New York Post*. There must have been some sensitive material in his letters to Daisy Suckley because he asked her to destroy them. The other risk of affairs is that their paramours will write tell-all books or publish their letters, as did a number of the women in this study. Such books do harm in that they cause pain and embarrassment to the president's wife and family. They may also tarnish the office of the president and undermine the public trust and respect for those who hold it.

Out of the nine presidents studied here, six of them had affairs with women who worked for them. Affairs with staff can lead to problems, starting with the obvious one of sexual harassment and relationships affected by disparities of power. In this study, only Kennedy and Johnson appear to have engaged in outright sexual harassment. While one might argue that the social norms were different in those days, it is doubtful that the harmful effects of this behavior on the women harassed were much different than they are today. Furthermore, affairs in the office lead to concerns about favoritism, poor judgment, and conflicts of interest. In the well-documented case of Kennedy, numerous staff members and other associates reported feeling uncomfortable about his sexual escapades and the roles that they were expected to play to hide and facilitate them. When leaders ask subordinates to do unethical things, they harm them too.

In terms of leadership ethics, the most problematic area is the impact of the affair on a president's management and use of his staff, the secret service, government agencies, and administration officials. Harding had the secret service deliver payments to his mistress. Roosevelt, Kennedy, Nixon, and Clinton used staffers to attend to the various problems caused by their adultery. Kennedy and Nixon may have both used other government agencies to help with their women problems. Kennedy asked a Secretary of State to arrange a place for his tryst. Engaging coworkers in these kinds of activities creates a stressful environment that is distracting to the work that they do. Eisenhower, Nixon, and Clinton all used their political connections to find jobs for their paramours. Clinton directly or indirectly arranged for Bill Richardson, US Ambassador to the United Nations, to offer Lewinsky a

job.[111] These are personal uses of power that were given to the president to serve the public interest, not to hide or facilitate his affairs.

Another ethical consideration in these cases concerns whether the affair occurred before or after someone becomes president. Affairs that take place before a president takes office may not affect the ethics of a president's leadership, except when they are a campaign issue or become a political issue that follows him into office. Affairs that a president initiates when he is in office are different. They may signal recklessness and an intentional disregard for his duties to the office and to the American people, or a lack of self-control, a dangerous sense of entitlement, and/or abuse of power. As we have seen in the story of David and Bathsheba, some leaders come to believe that they are smarter than everyone else and capable of keeping unethical behavior such as adultery secret.

This leads to a final point, which gets at the difficulty of assessing the relationship between the public and private moral behavior of a president or any leader. Burns always maintained that adultery did not affect the leadership of presidents such as Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson. In a way, this is true for the following reasons. First, they lacked unrelenting political opponents like Henry Clay and Newt Gingrich who were willing to exploit inside knowledge of a president's affairs for political assassination. Second, there were no 24-h news channels, and the press took a more hands-off approach to presidents' personal lives. Third, and most important, they did not get caught – the public did not know. It is not until Clinton that we see the harm that adultery can do to the president, the presidency, the country, and the people who work with him. His adultery tells us about his private morality; what he did to cover it up tells us about his public morality and unethical aspects of his leadership. There remains the thorny question that Burns might ask: If a president has an adulterous affair (or many of them) and the public never finds out, does it matter? It depends on what disciplinary lens you use to look at leadership. As a political scientist and historian, Burns would say if presidential leadership is about engagement in conflict and historical change, then what does it matter if Johnson or Roosevelt had mistresses or harassed their staff? Civil rights legislation, the war on poverty, and the New Deal were far more important and had a greater impact on people's lives than problems in the office. However, leadership is a process and a complex moral relationship between people based on trust, obligation, commitment, emotion, and a shared vision of the good.[112] When we look at these nine presidents' behavior from the perspective of their relationships with the people with whom they worked and their moral responsibilities to the public, we see tangible ways in which adultery leads to unethical public behavior. When presidents ask those around them to become complicit in various acts of subterfuge to facilitate or to hide adultery, they do not lead ethically. Machiavelli said leaders have to learn how to not be good, but he meant in regard to things like fighting wars, getting and

[111] Posner, 19.

[112] Ciulla, Joanne B. Ethics, the Heart of Leadership. 2nd edition. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2004, xv.

holding on to power, and generally their work as leaders.[113] Presidential politics is sometimes a dirty business, but it is part of the president's job and the job of the people who serve presidents. One doubts that the people in any administration signed on to lie to the president's wife or sneak women into or out of the Oval Office. As much as we may want presidents to be morally perfect human beings – they are not. Ever since the time of George Washington, presidents have known that if they are caught having an adulterous affair, they risk losing public and political support. Barring any radical change in the way the public regards adultery in its presidents, one can see why pursuing dangerous liaisons while in the White House is reckless and profoundly stupid in the context of the moral responsibilities of leader- ship. Private immorality becomes public immorality when the need to keep it secret leads to unethical behavior on the part of leaders and followers. The fact that, except for Clinton's impeachment, nothing really bad has come from these presidents' adultery speaks more to the context in which they served and moral luck than anything else. This would be my final argument to Burns; but, knowing him as I do, I doubt that he would have bought it.

Acknowledgements A special thanks to my colleagues George (Al) R. Goethals, Kevin Cherry, and Richard Dagger for their insightful comments and suggestions.

[113] Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Translated by Hill Thompson. New York: The Limited Editions Club, 1954.

Part II
Business Ethics and Work

Chapter 7
Business Ethics as Moral Imagination

Abstract and Background This chapter is from the first article that I wrote on moral imagination in the late 1980s. I originally wrote it as a commentary on a Ruffin Lecture at the Darden School of the University of Virginia. It is probably one of the earliest articles on the subject in business ethics, because it was published prior to Mark Johnson's book, *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics* (1994) and Patricia Werhane's *Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making* (1999). To write it, I mostly drew mostly from literature in philosophy. After teaching business ethics in business schools, I became interested in ways to stimulate my students' imaginations that went beyond the usual use of case studies. I stumbled on to psychologist Bruno Bettelheim's book on fairy tales, *The Uses of Enchantment*, which was really about the development of ethics in children. His discussion of fairy tales offered an enjoyable way to examine role of imagination in ethics. I later wrote several other articles that developed my views on moral imagination, including the one in the next chapter.

Keywords Business ethics · Moral imagination · Moral language · Fairy tales · Moral dilemmas · Bettelheim · Antigone

Introduction

Business ethics would be a dull subject if ethics came in two off the rack colors, black and white. Most of us aren't lucky enough to have such simple ethical tastes. We're stuck with designer ethics, the decorator variety of moral puzzles that come in gray or spectacularly mixed tones of competing claims and conflicting duties. Gray is the color that thoughtful people often see when they initially confront an ethical problem. And gray problems seldom surrender to lily white solutions. Sometimes we aren't quite sure we did the morally right thing. So, business ethics embraces much more than simply cultivating the ability to "Just say no" or "Just say

Ciulla, Joanne B. "Business Ethics as Moral Imagination," in *Business Ethics: The State of the Art*. Ed. R. Edward Freeman, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 212–220.

J. B. Ciulla, *The Search for Ethics in Leadership, Business, and Beyond*,
Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_7

yes" to clear-cut alternatives. It includes the discovering, anticipating, encountering, and constructing moral problems (some of which are real moral dilemmas), and then creating of viable solutions to them.

This requires what Ezra Bowen calls cultural or civic literacy and ethical literacy, or the ability to use moral language effectively.[1] But it's not what literacy is but what literacy does that is important. By opening up other possible worlds of business and morality, literacy stimulates imagination and gives us a new way of seeing. We can use it to assess and reapply traditions, and moral language can be woven into contexts and situations in new ways that actually transform them. Business ethics shouldn't just add a chapter to the book of business education it should re-write it. We can do more than just heighten moral awareness or produce obedient employees we can develop moral imagination in our students. By exploring the moral grays of business life, students must be inspired to use their creativity and technical know-how to produce workable multicolored solutions.

Ethical behavior can be seen to encompass prescriptive and creative functions. The prescriptive side says, "Do no harm" or "Thou shalt not" or "You ought to always do X" (i.e., always tell the truth) or "Promote the good." It is explicit and seeks to put certain limits on human behavior. The creative involves inventing ways to live up to moral prescriptions, given the practical constraints of the world. A student once asked me, "Does acting ethically mean that if I work in the loan department of a bank and a poor person can't make his mortgage payment, I shouldn't foreclose on it because it would put him out on the street? You can't run a bank that way." Some people would just do their job and foreclose on the mortgage, others would try to come up with creative financing, and a few would invent a system for humanely dealing with such problems. Educators should ask themselves, "Which response do we want our graduates to have?" Moral commitment comes in many hues, some of which demand that we go out of our way to make the world better. This takes imagination, vision, maturity, and technical know-how. While teaching business ethics to undergraduates generally requires more emphasis on the prescriptive side of ethics, teaching it to adults requires greater emphasis on the creative side. The study of ethics should lead them to think about new possibilities for business. In this respect a course in business ethics overlaps with courses on leadership and innovation.

The Superiority of the Real World

As essayist C. K. Chesterton points out in his essay on ethics and imagination, the businessman prides himself on pragmatism not idealism. When the businessman rebukes the idealism of his office-boy, it is commonly in some such speech as this:

[1] Ezra Bowen, "Literacy Ethics and Profits (The Centrality of Language)," Ruffin Lectures, 1988.

"Ah, yes, when one is young, one has these ideals in the abstract and these castles in the air; but in middle age they all break up like clouds, and one comes down to a belief in practical politics, to using the machinery one has and getting on with the world as it is."[2]

One of the first things you hear upon entering a business school is references to something called the "real world." This "real world" consists of concrete, contingent things, current business practices, rules of the market, black-letter laws, and statistics. It dictates what you can and can't do. Some students enter business school infatuated with this world. They want to live in it and don't want it to change in any fundamental way. It smacks of certainty and promise and appeals to those who pride themselves on having their feet planted squarely on the ground. Neither immoral nor amoral, the real world does not preclude morality it just has a hard time making it fit in.[3] Because of this reverence for the "real world," the most damning indictment of business ethics is that it's not practical. Here one needs to look critically at a variety of business assumptions concerning economics and consumer behavior. As Chesterton goes on to point out in his essay, he never gave up his childlike ideals, but he did give up his childlike faith in practical politics. You can't teach ethics to business students without first forcing them to confront their childlike faith in things like the rules of the market. This may sound a bit harsh, but as anyone who has taught business students knows, if you don't come to class armed with some pretty good reasons and counter examples to show why the market alone is not a sufficient force for punishing and regulating the behavior of people, you will have a pretty hard time getting them to appreciate what Kant has to say. I'm not saying that students have to reject everything that they have learned on the contrary. Rather they have to dampen their enthusiasm for the certainty of these presuppositions. One has to learn to think critically before one can think creatively.

[2] C. K. Chesterton, "The Ethics of Elfland," *Collected Works,* Vol. I (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 249.

[3] Business schools still suffer from the legacy of positivism, which stipulated that facts are subject to truth conditions while values are not. Hence, facts are objective things that happen in the real world and values are subjective actions guiding things. By cleaning up language for science, the fact/ value distinction muddied the waters for ethics. We were left with the problem of building a bridge between distinct categories fact/value and theory/ practice. It's no surprise that with the emergence of applied ethics there is a renewed interest in ethical realism and virtue theory. Both of these approaches offer an integrated picture of facts and values, which allows us to study what people and institutions do, because values are embedded in practices and traditions. For business ethics this theoretical approach makes the study of ethics inseparable from the study of business practice.

Moral Language

Business students have a basic understanding of right and wrong and general agreement on the merits of honesty. They possess the right moral concepts or linguistic tools but have not mastered them in the environment of business and the culture of particular organizations. If we take the view that thought is embodied in language and language is embedded in a shared form of life, then it makes perfect sense to say that experience can enrich our concept of, say, "honesty," while the concept itself remains the same.[4] On this theory of language, understanding is not reduced to definition, but expanded by experience.

The use of moral concepts by individual speakers over time is grounded in an increasingly diversified capacity for participation in a variety of social practices.[5] It takes time to understand the practices of a new culture or community. Hence, someone who is competent at solving ethical problems in his or her personal life is not necessarily good at solving ethical problems in corporate life. Ethical and cultural literacy are life-long projects. Mastery of moral language not only reveals new possible worlds but allows us to create them.

Fairy Tales and Real-Life Stories

Imagination does not have to lead to fantasy, but fantasy can stir imagination. Case studies are about real situations, but they can nonetheless be taught in a way that challenges students to come up with creative solutions. The only limitation is that the solutions be workable. Imaginative problem solving operates between two broad and expandable assumptions. The first is a critical one: just because business is a certain way does not mean that it necessarily has to be that way. I don't know how many times I have heard managers re buke me, like Chesterton's office boy, with what they consider a prudent rule of business, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." This phrase is symbolic of both competitive and moral mediocrity the idea that we only confront problems when we are forced to. Hence, we only worry about making better cars after the Japanese do, and we only worry about our accounting practices after we are convicted of fraud.

The second assumption, borrowed from Kant, is a practical one. It rests on the old adage "ought implies can," or you are only morally obliged to do that which is possible for you to do (or you are free to do). This assumption needs to be critically explored and constantly expanded. Students often think that taking a moral or

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[4] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* 3rd ed. trans. G. E. M. Anscomb (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pts. 1820 and 241.

[5] Sabina Lovibond, *Realism and Imagination in Ethics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 32.

socially responsible stand requires either individual or corporate martyrdom i.e., you lost your job or your market share. They feel powerless and sometimes prefer to mortgage their ethics until they are the CEO of a company because they think that only those at the top can effectively take a moral stand. However, the really creative part of business ethics is discovering ways to do what is morally right and socially responsible without ruining your career and company. Sometimes such creativity requires being like the cartoon mouse who outsmarts the cat.

Perhaps it wouldn't be a bad idea for people to go back and read fairy tales. In his book, *The Uses of Enchantment,* Bruno Bettelheim says that the main message of fairy tales is that the struggle against severe difficulties is a fundamental part of life, but "if one does not shy away, but steadfastly meets unexpected and often unjust hardships, one masters the obstacles and emerges victorious." He stresses the fact that fairy tales impress because they are not about everyday life. They "leave to the child's fantasizing whether and how to apply to himself what the story reveals about life and human nature."[6]

Fairy tales teach children an inspiring lesson – they can use their wits to resolve insurmountable problems. Take, for example, "The Genie and the Bottle." In it, a poor fisherman casts his net three times and brings up a dead jackass, a pitcher full of sand and mud, potsherds and broken glass. On the fourth try, he brings up a cop per jar. When he opens it, a giant genie pops out of it. The genie threatens to kill the fisherman and the fisherman begs for mercy. Then, using his wits, the fisherman taunts the genie by doubting the ability of such a large genie to fit into such a small jar. The genie goes back into the jar to prove the fisherman wrong. The fisherman closes the lid, casts the jar into the ocean and lives happily ever after.[7]

Now this may not be the best case for your business ethics class. Getting students to talk about literature that doesn't refer directly to business can be an uphill battle. Yet, just as most adults remember their fairy tales, students tend to remember the unreal literary cases long after they have forgotten the real ones.[8] I've found that some of the stories my students tell about their work experiences pack the same punch as "The Genie and the Bottle."

In a class on international business ethics, an Indian student explained that, before enrolling at Wharton, he had worked for a steel company in India. His company bid on and won the contract for a $20 million project in Venezuela (the first of its kind for an Indian steelmaker). However, the transaction could not proceed until the Indian government approved the deal. When the government official met with the student the official indicated that all would go well if a $2000 bribe were paid. The student halted his story there and the rest of the class then discussed what they would have done in this predicament. A majority of students felt the bribe request posed an insurmountable barrier to closing the deal. They saw two incompatible

[6] Bruno Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment* (New York: Vintage, 1983), p. 8.

[7] Ibid., p. 28.

[8] See Robert Coles, "Storyteller Ethics," *Harvard Business Review* (April May 1987).

possibilities either you paid the bribe and got the contract, or you didn't pay the bribe and lost the contract. Arguments for paying the bribe rested on commonality of bribes in various parts of the world, the size of the transaction, its benefits to India, and the relatively small size of the agent's request.

As the discussion heated up, some students got frustrated and said, "Ethics is one thing, but this is the real world." They then asked the Indian student if he had gotten the contract and he said, "Yes." Satisfaction fell over the room. Order had been restored to their real world. Morality hadn't interfered with business. The class, half of which consisted of foreign students, assumed that the bribe was paid. But then the Indian student said, "Now, let me tell you what I did. That day, I just happened to have my Walkman in my pocket. I switched it on and put it on the table. Then I said to the government official, I'm sorry, but I forgot to tell you that we tape all of our official conversations with government officials and send them to the appropriate supervisors." Like the quick-witted fisherman, the Indian had tricked the evil genie back into his bottle. He avoided doing evil and won the contract. Unlike his classmates, he saw more than two ways to solve the problem. Most important, morality entered the real world and altered it. The student's behavior, based on rejection of bribery as wrong, offered a novel solution to a common and serious problem. At this point, a clever moralist might raise the questions, "Is it right to lie to a briber? Is blackmailing a briber like breaking a promise to a terrorist? Do two wrongs make a right?" But for a businessperson this story might prompt thinking about how a company can protect itself in such situations perhaps taping transactions is a good policy. Sometimes the act of an individual opens up a new repertoire of action for others in like circumstances.

According to Bettelheim, some stories demonstrate why self-interest must be integrated into a broader notion of the good in order for people to effectively cope with reality. For example, the Brothers Grimm story, "The Queen Bee," tells the tale of a king's three sons. The two smart sons go off to seek adventure and lead a wild and self-centered existence. Simpleton, the youngest and least intelligent son, sets out to find his brothers and bring them home. The three brothers finally meet up and travel through the world. When they come to an anthill, the two older ones want to destroy it just to enjoy the ants' terror. But Simpleton will not allow it later, he also for bids his brothers to kill a group of ducks or set fire to a tree in order to get honey from a bee's nest. Finally, the trio comes to a castle where a little gray man tells the oldest brother that if he doesn't perform three tasks in a day, he'll be turned into stone. The first and second brothers fail at the three tasks. Then Simpleton is put to the test. The tasks gathering 1000 pearls hidden in the moss in the forest, fetching from the lake a key that opens the bedchamber of the king's daughters, and selecting the youngest and most lovable princess from a room full of identical sleeping sisters are impossible. Simpleton sits down despondently and cries. At that point the animals that he saved come and help him. The ants find the pearls, the ducks volunteer to find the key, and the Queen Bee settles on the lips of the youngest princess.

The spell is broken, Simpleton's brothers are brought back to life, and Simpleton marries the Princess and gains a kingdom.[9]

"The Queen Bee" might well be the child's version of stakeholder analysis. It highlights the interdependence and reciprocal relation ships between individuals and groups. Most important, it shows that, contrary to some economic assumptions, decisions based on self- interests, and not the interests of others, may not be the most profitable way to meet the challenges of life.

Our view of what is possible in the business world comes from personal experience and the media. We are bombarded with reports of unethical behavior. These reports create both outrage and cynicism. It is, however, interesting to note how the business community responds to morally responsible behavior that bucks conventional wisdom. Think for a moment about the impression that Johnson and Johnson made when it recalled Tylenol because someone had put poison in some of the bottles. It took morally responsible action at a high cost for something that wasn't the company's fault. Johnson and Johnson was later rewarded by the market for its responsible behavior. This story offered the business community a new paradigm for responding to a problem. It was a real life story of what we had hoped to be true in fairy tales. Doing the morally right thing may be difficult and costly, but in the end, you win back the king dom. People have always needed to believe that ethical behavior will bring about some good even if the good is simply self-respect and peace of mind.

Moral Dilemmas

There are, however, a variety of moral conflicts that don't seem to bring about the good. Moral dilemmas are situations in which two equally important obligations conflict. You morally ought to do A and morally ought to do B, but you can't do both because B is just not doing A, or some contingent feature of the world prevents you from doing both. Tragedy and drama sometimes focus on such conflicts. Often cited is the conflict in Sophocles' play *Antigone*. Antigone wants to bury her brother, but Creon won't let her because her brother was a traitor and his burial could stir up unrest in the city. Her obligation to the State conflicts with her obligations to her family and the gods. Antigone is in a fix. She's damned if she buries her brother and damned if she doesn't. With real moral dilemmas we never feel quite happy with our decision. Some students mistakenly believe that all moral conflicts are unsolvable and draw the conclusion that there are no answers to ethical problems, only opinions.

Many philosophers have denied that bona fide ethical dilemmas exist (lest they be put out of business). Kant, Ross, and Hare offer levels of analysis and hierarchies of duties that serve as tiebreakers in what at first glance, appear to be moral conflicts

[9] Bettelheim, *Enchantment,* pp. 7677.

but turn out to be sloppy or inadequate descriptions and analysis. Hare, for example, approvingly quotes a message posted on a sign outside of a Yorkshire Church. It said, "If you have conflicting duties, one of them isn't your duty."[10]

Bernard Williams argues that moral conflicts are more like conflicts of desire than conflicts of belief about facts. If, for example, you believe that Camden is in Pennsylvania, and you believe that Camden is in New Jersey, unless there is something to explain how both of these beliefs can be true, you must give up one belief in favor of the other. So, by accepting belief B, it is logically necessary for you to reject belief A. Williams says that we respond much differently to conflicting desires. For example, the desire of a man to be a loyal husband may conflict with his desire to have an affair with another woman. When it comes to strong conflicting desires, we usually try to imagine ways to satisfy both. Often this isn't possible. Yet, choosing to act on one desire does not logically eliminate the second desire in the same way that choosing one fact necessarily eliminates another. The husband may choose to act on his desire to remain loyal to his wife, but still desire to have an affair with the other woman. Williams says, in this kind of case, a person may believe that he "acted for the best" but the case is not closed as it is in a factual dispute. What is left, or the "remainder" of the conflict, Williams calls, "regret," or the "What if?" question.[11]

While I wouldn't draw a relativist conclusion from Williams's argument, I think he has put his finger on an extremely important point of moral psychology. We feel different when we reject a moral claim than we do when we reject a factual one. In serious moral conflicts, our desire, like the desire of the married man, is to satisfy both. Ambivalent feelings about a particular moral decision do not necessarily mean that it is a bad one. Regret is the emotion we try to minimize when we construct solutions to moral problems. We do this by imagining how we will feel about different possible outcomes. In serious dilemmas, both outcomes may appear equally attractive or unattractive, just as conflicting moral obligations may carry equal weight. The hallmark of this peculiar species of moral problem, the true dilemma, is that regret is built into the problem.

Conclusion

Philosophers throughout the ages have offered tiebreakers or means for resolving conflicts. Their insights offer a window on the rich complexity of moral reasoning. Snappy case studies and engaging stories are a key part of teaching business ethics, but equally important are the powerful ways of seeing provided by the legacy of

[10] R. M. Hare, *Moral Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 26.

[11] Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers, 195672 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 16686.

moral philosophy. People who think morality is black and white and believe that all we have to do is teach values in our schools may not like the idea of imaginative ethics. As I have tried to show, it isn't theories or values alone that will change business, but rather the critical perspective and creative actions of our students. Companies that want ethical employees but business as usual are bound to be disappointed.

Chapter 8
Moral Imagination and Truth

Abstract and Background Several years after I wrote the article in the last chapter, "Business Ethics as Moral Imagination," I published another article that was commentary on Patricia Werhane's Ruffin Lecture on moral imagination. In this chapter, I focus on the part of that paper where I develop some of my own views on moral imagination by drawing on Iris Murdoch's work. Murdoch is both a philosopher and a novelist. I became interested in her after reading her novel, *The Sea, The Sea*. It's a great story that keeps the reader wondering about whether the protagonist's perceptions of the woman he desires are true. I was pleased to then discover that Murdoch had also written an excellent analysis of moral imagination and art in her book, *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*. After reading this book, it seemed to me that her novel was a clever extended example of what Murdoch, the philosopher, had to say about imagination, art, and our perceptions of truth.

Keywords Moral imagination · Fiction · Fantasy · Perspective · Perception · Murdoch · Empathy · Memory · Werhane

Introduction

> Life is translation and we are all lost in it. (Clifford Geertz)[1]

I once told a colleague that I was going to add 'the development of moral imagination' to my business ethics course objectives. She cringed and said, "What, imagination is the last thing that you need in an ethics course!" She was unfamiliar with the term and worried that moral imagination meant people could act any way that they wanted, regardless of moral principles. Mark Johnson's definition of moral imagination might have put her at ease. He defines it as "an ability to imaginatively dis-

Adapted from: Joanne B. Ciulla, Fantasy, Wishful Thinking, and Truth, *Business Ethics Quarterly*, Special Issue: Ruffin Series: New Approaches to Business Ethics, 1998: 99–107.

[1] Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

J. B. Ciulla, *The Search for Ethics in Leadership, Business, and Beyond*,
Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_8

cern various possibilities for acting in a given situation and to envision the potential help and harm that are likely to result from a given action."[2] Pat Werhane argues that sometimes when people behave unethically, it's because they are unable to get out of their schema, meaning, when they are locked into one reality, they lose perspective and the ability to behave ethically or take moral action. She says, moral amnesia occurs when people fail to learn from past mistakes that might help them in future situations.[3]

In this chapter, I will draw on Iris Murdoch's work to discuss what makes moral imagination moral and distinguishes it from fantasy and wishful thinking. Some of the best insights into the relationship between fantasy and moral imagination come from the arts. As a philosopher and novelist, Murdock is well suited to talk about art and imagination. Murdoch says, "Kant both celebrates the imagination and fears it. He fears the disintegration of moral judgment into aesthetic judgment." However, according to Murdoch, this fear in unfounded because she believes that there is morally good and bad imagining in art and in life.[4]

The Sea, The Sea

Murdoch's point is well illustrated in her novel *The Sea, the Sea*.[5] It's the story of a famous director named Charles Arrowby who retires from the theater and moves to a small village by the sea. Arrowby lives alone and tells the reader that he has only had one love in his life, Hartley, and she left him when he went away to London to study theater. As fate would have it, he discovers that Hartley lives with her husband in his village. Arrowby sees Hartley and despite the fact that she is old and dowdy, the sight and memory of her rekindles his love. Hartley is curious about Arrowby because he is famous, but she shows little interest in having a relationship with him. Arrowby goes to Hartley's house and meets her husband, who appears to be an unrefined blue-collar worker. As the novel goes on, Arrowby spies on Hartley. From the information he collects about her, he concludes that she is unhappily married to a brutish, possessive man.

Murdoch toys with the reader throughout the first part of the novel. She gives us just enough facts so as to wonder whether Hartley is really a beaten down wife, stuck in an unhappy marriage and afraid to leave, or a content married woman with no romantic interest in Arrowby. Arrowby is convinced that he has a moral obligation to save Hartley. He wants to take her away and give her all the things that she has missed in life, so he kidnaps her and locks her up in his house. He figures that if

[2] Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) p. 202.

[3] Patricia H. Werhane, Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethics Decision-Making in Management, Business Ethics Quarterly, Special Issue: Ruffin Series: New Approaches to Business Ethics, 1998: 75–98.

[4] Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York: Penguin Press, 1993), p. 315.

[5] Iris Murdoch, The Sea, The Sea (London: Penguin Books, 1978).

he gets Hartley safely away from her husband, she will begin to think clearly. During her captivity, Hartley begs to be set free. During her captivity, Hartley tells Arrowby that her husband is a decorated war hero and she makes him sound like a good person. Arrowby makes no progress in getting her to realize her love for him and agree to leave her husband. He finally releases her, and she goes back to her husband.

After Hartley and her husband move to Australia. Arrowby visits her neighbor and reads a postcard that Hartley sent, describing how happy they are with their new life. By the end of Murdoch's novel, it still isn't clear whether Hartley is happy or complacent. We never know whether she is suffering an extreme case of battered wife syndrome or if she is really happy with her life. Murdoch crafts a thin line between moral imagination and moral fantasy. The morality of Arrowby's actions rest heavily on whether he got the story of Hartley right or whether he is imagining her story based on what he wishes were true.

Imagining How and That, Empathy, and Memory

There are creative and prescriptive elements in moral imagination. The creative function of moral imagination concerns imagining how to solve a moral problem or fill a moral obligation. The prescriptive element of moral imagination is imagining that, which encompasses the ability to perceive that there is a real or potential problem that violates some moral principle or principles. Often when we use our moral imaginations to imagine that something is wrong, but sometimes the line between moral and factual assumptions about a situation is either hazy or indistinguishable. In Murdoch's novel, is Arrowby trying to creatively fill a real moral obligation to Hartley? or Did his obsession with her lead him to create a story about her that included a moral obligation that required an imaginative plan to save her? If the first scenario is true, then Arrowby's fantasy concerned how he might best fill his moral obligation to save Hartley. If the second scenario is true, then we might say that Arrowby had a fantasy that Hartley's life was a certain way and that story entailed a false moral obligation to save Hartley.

It's not surprising that Murdoch makes Arrowby an artist, because Murdoch sees close ties between imagination in ethics and imagination in art. However, she notes that in art and in life, there is a difference between an egoistic moral fantasy and liberated truth seeking. In *The Sea the Sea*, Arrowby's behavior is creative, but he fails to see the truth. He is unable to correctly size up the situation or imagine that X is the case. The creative way in which he seeks to address the problem (imagining how) by kidnaping Hartley, might be morally acceptable, if indeed Hartley was under the spell of an abusive husband and needed to be saved. Then, she would be grateful to him for forcefully taking her away. One could easily imagine making the same mistake with a friend who becomes a follower of a cult like religious group. If the friend is a sincere believer who made a rational choice, then kidnaping her and attempting to deprogram her is a violation of her personal right to follow her beliefs.

It is tempting to say that Arrowby's imagination fails in terms of empathy. If anything, Arrowby does a tremendous amount of empathizing with Hartley, but he gets her story wrong. He thinks that if he were Hartley and trapped in an unhappy marriage, he too would want to be rescued by someone who loved him. Empathy and moral imagination are both about getting the story right (seeing that), otherwise we are putting ourselves in the wrong person's shoes. Here Werhane's insights on empathy are very helpful. As she rightly points out, empathy allows us to understand someone without agreeing with their feelings. Perhaps Arrowby fails this test of empathy because he only empathizes with the story of a Hartley who needs saving, not a Hartley who loves her husband. Arrowby can't imagine how Hartley would choose to love a man like her husband over himself. Empathy requires distance from oneself and the other person. It's about understanding "Hannibal the Cannibal," while at the same time, declining his dinner invitation.

Arrowby's egoism prevents him from being self-critical. He seeks information about Hartley, yet he translates what he finds through his own desires and fantasies. Murdoch says, the egoist has a narrow moral world, whereas the better person has a larger and more complex one. Moral people are not necessarily more creative, instead they possess a larger picture of life, which allows them to see right and wrong clearly and with less doubt.[6] Arrowby's perspective is narrow and hence, he imagines the wrong story. For Murdoch, morality is determined more by the scope or size of a person's world view than his or her imagination. She says, "obsessed egoists destroy the space and air around them, whereas unselfish people enlarge the world."[7] People and artists are imaginative. Yet, what separates good people and good art is the ability to act and create in ways that manifest truths that a wide range of people recognize.

As Werhane points out, memory is another avenue for obtaining the truth necessary for moral imagination. Memory facilitates moral learning by allowing us to draw analogies between past triumphs and mistakes, and current ethical problems. In art, memory stimulates imagination. Poet Stephen Spender argues that poets have a highly developed sense of memory that allows them to retain experiences and their pristine significance from earlier in life. For example, Dante built The Divine Comedy around his memory of meeting with Beatrice when he was nine.[8] Poets use their memories for creative purposes. Memories contain a variety of feelings and images that can be reconfigured again and again. What we don't know in Murdoch's novel, is if Arrowby's memory of Hartley is accurate.

[6] Murdoch, 1993, p.325.

[7] Ibid., 347.

[8] Stephen Spender, "The Making of a Poem," in The Partisan Review, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1946.

Developing Moral Imagination

The behavior of fictitious characters like Arrowby and real people in all walks of life, challenge us to reflect on how people develop moral imagination. I have defined moral imagination as the capacity to have a broad moral world view. Let us return for a moment to the idea of imagining that and imagining how. The concept of imagining that is analogous to Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of seeing as or seeing that. According to Wittgenstein, seeing that is seeing an aspect of something. Seeing an aspect of something is akin to having an image. The concept of imagining that is like the concept of seeing as, or seeing that, or seeing an aspect of something. Hence, one element of moral imagination is the ability to see the ethical aspects of a situation. Seeing and imagining are subject to our will and they require knowledge and memory.[9] Just as some people are tone deaf or color blind, some people lack the capacity to imagine or see the ethical aspects of a situation or problem. People who are color blind or tone deaf can still appreciate art and music, even if they can't sing or identify colors. Similarly, there might be people who appreciate morality, but are unable to act according to its precepts. There are also people who are morally deaf and blind, and incapable of even appreciating morality.

Another way to think about seeing or imagining that is that some people don't know how to see a moral problem. Unlike the tone deaf and color-blind person, they do not lack the physical capacities to hear notes and see colors, they lack information on how to see or hear something. This deficiency is analogous to the ability to see a duck or a rabbit in the same picture. Some people can only see the duck, however, when we show them how to see the rabbit, they are then able to see the rabbit. Business ethics teachers attempt to help students see morally right and wrong actions in business. This is ethics appreciation. Classes in art and music appreciation don't aspire to make people into artists and musicians. However, courses such as business ethics, aspire to make students practitioners of ethics in business. The challenge is to get students to see right and wrong and then want to find creative ways to do so. Tapping into students' emotions is one way to nourish the moral will.

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz characterizes moral imagination as the ability of people to share emotions across cultures. Geertz analyzes a Western anthropologist's description of a Balinese ritual in which the concubines of a Rajah throw themselves into the Rajah's funeral pyre. He wonders how it is that "peoples' creations can be so utterly their own and so deeply a part of us."[10] While the ceremony itself is barbaric to the Western mind, the Westerner can also be moved by the art and drama of it. Geertz describes moral imagination as a conglomeration of morality, emotion and art. It is not necessarily based on intelligence, but on the willingness of a person to broaden his or her world to include others.

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[9] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 3rd edition tr. E.M. Anscombe, (New York: Macmillan Publishing, Inc., 1968) pp. 213e–214e.

[10] Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 54.

Murdoch sees an important difference between morality and art. She says, "As moral agents we are not called upon to be original geniuses, but to be good persons.'"[11] There are no moral geniuses when it comes to imaging that. Nonetheless, in everyday life, there are those who seem to be moral geniuses when it comes to imagining how. In business, they are the innovators whose actions expand the moral worlds of other business people by turning existing logic upside down and making new things possible. The moral innovators in business open up possible worlds for people who know there are problems but cannot imagine what to do about them.

The element that connects imagining how with imagining that is the desire to seek truth and a passion to do what is morally right. Perhaps the most important and the most difficult part of teaching ethics is cultivating moral feelings. Mary Warnock observes that, "Children cannot be taught to feel deeply, but they can be taught to look and listen in such a way that the imaginative emotion follows." She goes on to say, "imagination helps us to see the familiar at a different level, and sporadically, we may also use it to render our experience unfamiliar and mysterious.'"[12] If Warnock is right about rendering our experience unfamiliar, then the best way to develop moral imagination in organizations and in business students is to broaden their world by sometimes taking them away from it through stories. In his essay on teaching books by Jane Austin, literary critic Lionell Trilling tells us that by reading about people in other times or other cultures, that are written by authors who possess moral imagination "We undertake an activity which humanism holds to be precious, in that it redeems the individual from moral torpor."[13] What distinguishes great enduring literature from mediocre literature, and moral imagination from fantasy in business, is the strand of truth that ties creativity to that which is known to be true by others.

[11] Murdoch, 1993, p. 310.

[12] Mary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 206–7.

[13] Lionel Trilling, The Last Decade (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 212.

Chapter 9
Casuistry and the Case for Business Ethics

Abstract and Background I started doing research on casuistry in the mid-1980s, when I was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard Business School. Despite the fact that I have written and used many cases in my courses, I have never been sold on the use of cases as the only means of teaching business ethics. My colleague at Harvard, Kenneth Goodpaster, suggested that I look into casuistry. I did some poking around but then dropped the subject. A few years later, I was invited to give a Ruffin Lecture at the Darden School and I used that opportunity to delve into casuistry. By then, I had the benefit of Albert Jonson and Stephen Toulmin's book, *The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning* (1988). Casuistry fit with my interest in history and the role of imagination in ethics. Studying it helped me understand what it was that bothered me about the case method. My research for this paper took me from Plato's commentary on the sophists, to the Jesuits, the English Casuists, the early advice column writers in magazines, the "scruple shops" at Oxford, and the 18th century texts used to teach about ethics and business at Yale.

This chapter shows why cases are indispensable for teaching business ethics. However, the history of casuistry also demonstrates the shortcomings of using cases without actually teaching about ethical concepts. Case courses may lead to a kind of relativism, in which the message of the class is that ethics is nothing more than doing what seems right in a particular situation. That is why casuistry was discredited in the past and is still a danger today, especially when the business ethics teacher does not have any formal training in ethics.

Keywords Casuistry · Business ethics · Case method · Sophists · Cicero · Jonsen · Toulmin · Penitential manuals · Christianity · Cases of conscience

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Introduction

If you put your ear to the ground of history and listen closely, you will hear a variety of ongoing conversations about the moral problems of everyday life. Sometimes strange and sometimes familiar, these discussions take place at the crossroads of the humanities. Philosophers, theologians, historians, poets, and playwrights each, in their own way contribute to the dialogue. Today, real-life ethical problems sell newspapers and glue people to TV soap operas. As the stuff of gossip, moral problems titillate. As the foundation of comedy and tragedy, they move us to laughter and tears reminding us that we are not simply spectators but participants in the human condition. Against the backdrop of this long-standing fascination with morality, it is odd to think that a subject such as business ethics is new.

History offers good news and bad news about business ethics. The good news is that we are not orphans but part of a family of scholars who systematically discussed cases about the moral problems of doing business. The bad news is that our ancestors, the Sophists and the casuists, were considered the quacks and horse thieves of moral philosophy. They were so disliked as a group that the words "casuistry" and "sophistry" became pejoratives that described a specious form of hair-splitting argumentation. In the court of history, the Sophists were charged with false advertising and dangerous practices. The casuists, known for their case approach to ethics, were indicted for recklessly disregarding moral principles and pandering to the interests of the rich and powerful.

The dubious reputation of our ancestors may in part explain why some people scoff and others giggle when they hear that we teach business ethics. Unfortunately, we can't choose our relatives. We can, however, try to understand where they went wrong. After a brief examination.

of the Sophists' problems, this essay will focus on casuistry, which is generally defined as the tradition of using of cases to discuss practical ethical dilemmas (sometimes called "cases of conscience").

The growth of interest in all areas of applied ethics has set the stage for an examination of casuistry, including two excellent books published on the subject: *The Abuse of Casuistry,* by Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, and *Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe,* edited by Edmund Leites.[1] Since this essay offers only some snapshots of the history of casuistry, I refer you to these books for greater detail. In my quick survey, I'm not interested in engaging in exegetic arguments about particular historical texts; instead, I offer a sampling of this rich history and of the provocative questions that it raises for those of us who teach business

[1] Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, *The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Edmund Leites, ed., *Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1988).

ethics today. Hence, I take as my guide the old casuist adage "Where the masters disagree, the disciples are free."

The Problem with Sophists

You get a good sense of the Sophist's public image from the opening of Plato's dialogue the "Protagoras." Socrates and his friends knock on the door of the house where the Sophist Protagoras is staying. The porter opens the door, looks at them, and says, "Ha, Sophists!" and slams the door in their faces.[2] Protagoras later tells us: "Personally I hold that the Sophist's art is an ancient one, but that those who put their hand to it in former times, fearing the odium which it brings, adopted a disguise and worked under cover."[3] He says that some used poetry, religion, music, or physical training "as a screen to escape malice." There were several reasons why the Sophists were disliked. For starters, their name was presumptuous, it meant wise man. But the key reason was the fact that Sophists were usually foreigners whose ideas were seen as a threat to the traditional order. The most interesting criticism of the Sophists for our purpose, how ever, centers on the intent and methodology of their instruction.

The decline of polytheism in the fifth century led to a kind of superstition, found in the writings of Aristophanes, Sophocles, and Plato, that suggested that there is some higher authority or law. These factors, combined with the emergence of a democratic city state, led to a new set of assumptions about morality. Prior to the fifth century, education was handed down through families of aristocrats, and moral virtue was considered an inherited quality.[4] The myth in the "Protagoras"tells us that the gods gave all men a sense of justice.[5] The notion that all people could have moral knowledge led to the belief that virtue could be taught.

The Sophists weren't just teaching ethics, they were teaching professional ethics. Their mission was to teach people how to be successful political leaders. This included the teaching of political virtue *(aretê),* which encompassed both moral and technical excellence. For example, Protagoras says that in addition to teaching virtue, he teaches young men how to manage their personal affairs, household affairs, and state affairs "so as to become a real power in the city, both as a speaker and a

[2] Plato, *Protagoras,* in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato,* ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 314de. All references to Plato are from this edition.

[3] Ibid., 316d-317b.

[4] Werner Jaeger, *Paideia,* vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 287. See also George Grote, *A History of Greece,* vol. 3 (London: John Murray, 1869).

[5] Plato, *Protagoras,* 349e.

man of action."[6] Unlike philosophical or religious ethics, political and business ethics rest on the assumption that people will have the technical competence to sustain themselves in their professions. Inherent in both these areas of knowledge is the potential for conflict between the demands of morality and the demands of winning an election or staying in business. In other words, you have to be a politician before you can be an ethical politician. For the Sophists the conflict between moral and practical excellence centered on rhetoric.

As intellectual descendants of Homer and Hesiod, the Sophists harnessed the force of the poetic tradition and used it as a tool for molding public opinion. They taught their students how to lay out both sides of a public issue so that each side appeared to be of equal value. Students were required to memorize cases and arguments. Lessons in rhetoric emphasized the timeliness of action, the mood of the audience, and the "opportune moment" for introducing a particular point. The Sophists also showed students how to use maxims and definitions to make their point. While the Sophists did not have a particular ideology, they did attempt to assign a coherent set of meanings to the evaluative vocabulary as a means of giving guidance for how to live well.

Socrates was accused of being a Sophist, even though he never formally had students. Plato's dialogues show us how Socrates cross examined and refuted interlocutors in hopes of.

encouraging and admonishing them into a better understanding of concepts such as courage and piety. In the early dialogues, Socrates demonstrates why the Sophists' definitions are inadequate. The difference between the Sophists' rhetorical method and the Socratic method rests more on the pedagogical goal; the techniques are similar. Rhetoric aimed at analyzing an argument and moving an audience; Socratic method aimed at exploring concepts and bringing forth self-knowledge. The problem with rhetoric was not that it was evil but that it could be misused to make the weaker argument appear to be the stronger. Philosophy purged itself of rhetoric out of the fear that the form and aesthetics of language would overpower the substance of truth.

When Socrates raised the question "Can virtue be taught?" he was not casting doubt but instead asking "How can virtue be taught?" and "Who [meaning what sort of person] should teach it?" These questions are analogous to issues in the current debate over business ethics. Can the subject be adequately taught by any skilled case method teacher? Should the teacher have some broader understanding of moral concepts? Underlying these two questions is the question of intent in teaching business ethics. Is it to solve moral problems in business, or is it to gain a greater understanding of morality in order to solve moral problems in business?

Plato's intellectual disdain for the Sophists is based on their agnosticism and their disregard for universal principles.[7] They were interested in the good of particu-

[6] Ibid., 318e-319.

[7] There were also cultural and personal reasons why Plato disliked the Sophists, but here I focus only on what he tells us in the text of his dialogues.

lar actions, not the nature of "the good." For example, in *Double Arguments* the great rhetorician Gorgias uses rhetorical techniques to show that nothing general can be said about ethics each case and each situation must be judged anew.[8] The Sophists were ethical relativists who had an anti-intellectual attitude towards theoretical or scientific knowledge. As Protagoras says, "Man is the measure of.

all things; which are, that they are, and of things which are not that they are not." Plato's dispute with the Sophists rests on the conflict between absolutism and relativism that reap pears throughout the history of Western thought. He envisioned ethics as scientific or universal knowledge, while the Sophists saw ethics only in terms of experience or practical knowledge. For Plato morality needed to be pinned down to some larger order of things. In recent years, some critics have expressed a similar concern over business ethics. They worry that ethics in business is somehow dis connected with traditional values.

A question often raised today is: Don't people learn about traditional values when they are children? If they haven't learned them by college, why bother? Aren't business students too old to learn ethics? Aristotle says no. Unlike Plato, who thought ethics was a science *(episteme),* Aristotle tells us that ethics is a form of practical knowledge *(phronesis),* which can be learned only through experience. Hence, in *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle says that you shouldn't even bother trying to teach ethics and politics to young people; he asserts that this sort of education is useful *only* when one has had sufficient experience in life to appreciate it fully.[9]

For the Greeks the moral character of the teacher was as important as his skill. Teaching ethics for pay had a suspicious ring to it. In the "Protagoras"and the "Sophist" Plato uses commercial imagery to talk about the Sophist. He refers to the Sophist as a "hired hunter of young rich men," "a sort of merchant of learning as nourishment for the soul," and a "retail dealer" in knowledge.[10] Socrates warns us to be careful that the Sophist, "in commending his wares, does not deceive you like the wholesaler and retailer who deal in food for the body."[11] Well into modern times, people frowned upon the idea of paying teachers because they feared that education would then change to please the whims of the students. Since the Sophists usually taught men from wealthy families, there was a potential for conflict. This issue reemerged in the seventeenth-century debate over the Jesuit casuists, who were accused of being apologists for their rich patrons. Recently, the idea of paid ethics consultants and expert ethics witnesses has raised the eyebrows of skeptics. If any

[8] See Mario Untersteiner, *The Sophists,* trans. Kathleen Freeman (Ox ford: Basil Blackwell, 1954).

[9] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics,* ed. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), bk. 2, 1103all-a37.

[10] Plato, *Sophist,* 331c-e.

[11] Plato, *Protagoras,* 313c-d.

thing, the issue of pay reminds us that throughout history people have demanded pure, disinterested intentions in those who aspire to teach virtue.[12]

Why the Sophists Weren't Casuists

The word "sophistry" is sometimes used interchangeably with "casuistry." However, the debate over the Sophists had a somewhat different set of concerns than those behind the debate that emerges over casuistry. Casuistry has historically appeared in tandem with some ethico-legal or purely legal absolutism. In its most positive sense, casuistry corrected the excesses of overly rigid laws by bridging the gap between abstract principles and particular cases. This sort of legalism was not present in ancient Greek culture. There was no distinction between externally imposed moral principles and individual moral character. Thus, there was no real need for casuistry to fill the gap.

The second reason why the ancient world had no need for casuistry was that the notion of conscience was not developed until the time of the Stoics. While there were hints of conscience in the writings of Heraclitus, Hesiod, and Homer, there was generally no strong sense of self-condemnation. Prior to the fifth century B.C., the poets (notably Homer) provided moral instruction. The heroes of the *Illiad* and the *Odyssey* did not develop moral imperatives but in stead showed people what they should be. The heroes embodied the virtues in spite of the fact that they were often manipulated by the gods, who were not regarded by the Greeks as the ultimate moral authorities.

Lastly, the Sophists emerged to meet the needs of a changing society with no system of moral principles. Polytheism was in decline, and the old ethical qualities were superseded by intellectual qualities. Democracy made achievement and success something that any male citizen could obtain. Traditional morality based on virtues gave the Greeks a clear sense of what they should be, but, in this new and chaotic environment, they needed guidance in what they should do. Hence, unlike the casuists, the Sophists were trying to create standard procedures and definitions to bring order to the competitive world of politics. The common criticism of both, however, was that they were relativists and morally lax.

[12] Jacques Le Goff points out that in the Middle Ages the argument against paying teachers was similar to the argument against usury: one should not pay teachers because that would be like selling knowledge, and knowledge belongs to God. In the case of usury, the same prohibition was made against selling time. See Jacques Le Goff, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages,* trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 29.

The Roots of Casuistry

Casuistry is the art of reasoning from cases. The word itself is derived from the Latin *casus,* meaning "case." In grammar a "case" is the falling away or declension of a noun. By analogy, the term "casuistry" implies a kind of deflection or falling away from a law or principle. Casuistry serves the dual purpose of applying principles to cases and using cases to help us understand and sometimes alter principles. It is morality in detail. Parents are casuists when they ex plain to their children why certain acts are good and bad. Children learn the meaning of words such as "good" and "fair" not by definition but by observing a number of situations in which those terms are applied. If the ascetic moralist is like a mathematician, the casuist is like a medicine man,[13] the former is interested in knowledge and judgment, whereas the latter is concerned with understanding and diagnosis. Casuists have been accused of too much contact with the world, ascetics too little.

Jonsen and Toulmin trace the roots of casuistry to Aristotle's assertion that moral knowledge is *phronesis,* not *episteme.* We gain moral knowledge through experience, but, unlike science or geometry, moral knowledge is not certain, nor is it universal. Jonsen and Toulmin see the beginnings of case analysis in the third book of *Nicomachean Ethics,* where Aristotle outlines how to appraise the morality of an action. He asks (1) "Who did it?" (2) "What was done?" (3) "In what context was it done?" (4) "Using what instrument?" (5) "To what end?" and (6) "In what manner?"[14]

Classical rhetoric also played an important part in the development of casuistry, according to Jonsen and Toulmin. For example, in Cicero's *De Officiis,* written in 44 B.C., we see rhetorical methods being used to discuss cases related to business. Cicero tells the reader that his intention is not just to raise questions but to resolve the them completely. Some of Cicero's cases pop up in other texts over hundreds of years. The following is one such case:

> Suppose an honest man sells a house because of some defects that he is aware of, but others do not suspect. Suppose the house is unsanitary but is considered healthy; suppose no one knows that vermin can be seen in all the bedrooms, that the house is built of poor timber and quite dilapidated. The question is, if the seller does not tell these facts to a buyer and sells the house for much more than he thought he could get for it, did he act without justice and without honor?[15]

After raising the question, Cicero looks at both sides of the case. Using natural law, definitions, and recognized duties, Cicero points out that concealment is different from keeping silent. In a similar case that would be relevant in any business ethics class today, Cicero tells the story of a merchant who arrives with a grain shipment

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[13] This analogy is suggested in Jonsen and Toulmin, *Abuse of Casuistry,* pp. 42–6.

[14] Ibid., p. 71.

[15] Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Officiis,* trans. Harry G. Edinger (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Library of Living Arts, 1974), bk. 3, 54.

at the gates of the famine-stricken city of Rhodes. The merchant knows that other shipments are 1 day behind him, but the citizens of the city do not. The question is, "Should the merchant conceal this fact from the buyers and charge a higher price?"[16] In the discussion of this case Cicero pits self-interest against natural law and again dis cusses the buyer's right to know.

The Potential Immorality of Law

The most important characteristic of casuistry is the fact that it emerges as a means of discussing ethics in times when there is an overreliance on the law or when there exists a kind of legal or ethical absolutism. At its best, casuistry corrects the excesses of the law. This feature is one reason people are interested in business ethics today. For a longtime, we believed that laws and regulations were sufficient to effect ethical behavior in business. Any good corporate lawyer can ensure that a company adheres to the letter of the law. But we have seen many cases in which businesses act legally but unethically.

Extreme dependence on laws to regulate behavior is called nomism. Nomism is a tendency, found in some religions, to try to control personal and social life by making law the supreme norm. When a religion or a society degenerates into a mere formalism of conduct, it ceases to have moral conviction and ethical purpose. The founders of Judaism aimed to make.

life conform to law and they wanted obedience to the commandments to be both a necessity and a custom. However, they also realized the danger of overdependence on the law. Hence, they softened their legalism by emphasizing sincerity of the soul. Following the letter of the law was not sufficient; the heart had to be inclined to the spirit of the law. In the covenant to be made with Israel, the Bible says that "the Law would be written in the hearts of the people."[17] We see this idea resurface in Kant, who also saw that what made an action moral was not just adherence to duty but a good will.

The rabbis who wrote the Talmud with the intention of immortalizing the law were skilled casuists. Some, like the fifteenth-century scholar Jacob Pollack, were notorious for taking the law literally. Pollack developed a method called "spicing" the law, which used ingenious disputations to circumvent the meaning of its language.[18] Under the reformed Judaism of the eighteenth century, this sort of procedure became irrelevant, because the law was regarded as an ideal that was subject to interpretation.

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[16] Ibid., bk. 3, 50.

[17] Jer. 31.33.

[18] Robert Mark Wenley, "Casuistry," in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* vol. 3, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner, 1929), p. 243. See also his *Modem Thought and the Crisis in Belief* (New York: Macmillan, 1909).

Occupational Sins in the Middle Ages

In Christianity, casuistry developed as a means for helping priests judge sinners. Texts of cases, called penitential manuals, started to circulate around the third century. These texts analyzed cases using the precepts of Roman law. The Pelagian controversy of the fifth century over free will and the all-knowing nature of God increased the need for casuistry to mediate between morality and religion. Since priests were like judges, their main function was *subsumptio* (i.e., placing a particular case under a general rule.). However, before a judge could do this there had to be *constructio,* which involved finding the identifying marks of a case.

Penitential manuals proliferated in the thirteenth century, after the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 decreed that everyone had to go to confession once a year. The Scholastics turned the old legal casuistry of the Church into moral casuistry. Interest shifted from punishing souls to reforming them and understanding the individual and his or her trade became an important part of the priest's task. The first confessors' manuals were also printed in local (or "vulgar") languages. The "best-sellers" were those texts that had the greatest number of questions about trade. These manuals were bought up by wealthy merchants who sought the Church's opinion on questions such as "Is it legitimate to work in the fields or sell at fairs on Sunday?" According to the historian Jacques Le Goff, three themes emerged from these manuals: **(1)** Every Christian is essentially defined in relation to his profession: vocation and salvation. (2) All labor deserves compensation: vocation and money. (3) Every profession based on labor is justified: vocation and labor.[19]

Until the 1600s, ordinary Christians thought of sin in terms of the seven deadly sins: gluttony, lust, pride, envy, avarice, anger, and sloth – not the rules of the Ten Commandments. One reason ·for the sins' greater popularity is that seven things are easier to remember than ten. They also had the advantage of being easy to portray symbolically to an illiterate public.[20] You can draw a great picture of gluttony, but how do you draw "Thou shalt not kill?" (It is interesting to think about the relationship between a graphic view of morality based on types and an auricular or literary view of morality based on instructions.)

Confessors' manuals advised priests to watch out for gluttony in cooks, lust in innkeepers, and greed in lawyers. Sins were also related to the sinner's place in the hierarchy. There were academic sins, judges' sins, peasants' sins, and mechanics' sins. As the middle class grew, new categories had to be created. In his book *The Birth of Purgatory* Le Goff argues that the concept of purgatory became popular in the late thirteenth century because the Church needed a correlative place in the afterlife for the middle class. On earth they stood between the powerful and the

[19] Le Goff, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, p. 118.

[20] John Bossy, "Moral Arithmetic: Seven Sins in to Ten Commandments," in Leites, ed., *Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe,* p. 220.

poor, the clergy and the laity.[21] By the end of the twelfth century the Church was changing its views on wage labor and the professions. Powerful guilds were established, and the Church was on a cathedral-building spree. In one famous incident, a group of prostitutes approached the Bishop of Paris and offered to donate a window to Notre Dame Cathedral. Unlike a guild donation, their window would not depict a scene from their trade but would honor the Virgin Mary. The embarrassed bishop refused. Nonetheless, a decision on the case was written in one of the first confessional manuals of the period by Thomas of Chobham. It reflects how casuistry can be used to move an activity into a different moral category. Chobham wrote:

> Prostitutes must be counted among the mercenaries. They hire out their bodies and supply labor.... Whence this principle of secular justice: she does evil in being a prostitute, but she does not do evil in receiving the price of her labor, it being admitted that she is a prostitute. Whence the fact that it is possible to repent of practicing prostitution while keeping the profits of prostitution for the purposes of giving alms.
>
> If, however, prostitution is engaged in for pleasure, and the body hired out to experience ecstasy, then one's labor is not being hired and the profit is a shameful as the act.[22]

Here you can see how casuistry might go wrong. In Chobham's rush to add prestige to paid labor, he almost forgets about the problem with prostitution. The result is an argument that would support "Robin Hoodism." You can do anything as long as you give the money to the Church or the poor. Chobham, however, pushes on to consider other problems with the prostitute's trade. He says:

> If the prostitute perfumes and adorns herself so as to attract with false allures and gives the impression of a beauty and seductiveness which she does not possess, the client buying what he sees, which, in this case, is deceptive, the prostitute then commits a sin, and she should not keep the profit it brings her. If the client saw her as she really is he would give her only a pittance, but as she appears beautiful and brilliant to him, he gives a handsome sum. In this case, she should keep only the pittance and return the rest to the client she has deceived, or to the Church, or to the poor.[23]

In the emerging market economy of this time, the Church used cases to inch toward changes in its policies on trade and the professions. For a fascinating discussion of how a variety of cases helped the Church reconceptualized its view of usury, have a look at Benjamin Nelson's book *The Idea of Usury.*[24]

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[21] See Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[22] Le Goff, Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages, p. 66.

[23] Ibid., pp. 66–67.

[24] Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

Hard Times for Casuists

Casuistry came under serious attack in the seventeenth century, most notably in Blaise Pascal's *Provincial Letters* (1656).[25] Pascal served as the hit man for the Jansenists, a group of rigorous Catholics who were violently opposed to the moral laxity of the Jesuit casuists. Jesuits of this period including Escobar y Mendoza, Luis Molina, Thomas Sanchez, and John Azor studied classical rhetoric and used it as a basis for refining their techniques of case analysis.

Pascal's attack on them was so vicious and delightfully written that he turned the word "casuistry" into a derogatory term. His slurs on the casuist Escobar resulted in the word "Escobarderie," which became a synonym in French for duplicity. Pascal's critique of the casuists was not always fair or loyal to the texts.[26] However, there was much to criticize in the Jesuit doctrine of probabilism. The Jesuits took their inspiration from the words of Jesus to the adulterous: "Neither will I condemn thee."[27] They sought a moral minimum, and their goal was to make objective and meaningful judgments by holding a person innocent of sin in cases where there was doubt. Probabilism was meant to address the fact that moral laws are not like scientific laws, so it is reasonable to doubt them in light of concrete examples. If the lawfulness of an action was in doubt, the Jesuits believed that it was reasonable to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty. Another way of deciding which opinion to follow was to choose the position held by the more famous scholar. Pascal interpreted probabilism to mean "When in doubt, do what you want." As Plato was displeased by the Sophists, so Pascal was offended by the casuists' relativism and by their failure to present some broader vision of morality.

Not all of the casuistry that came out of this tradition was bad, however, nor did Pascal's *Provincial Letters* kill off casuistry. By the nineteenth century, the methods developed by the Jesuits for clarifying the circumstances of a case were still being used in new texts. Consider, for example, Jean Gury's analysis of this case, called "Of the Indirect Will":

> Richard, an inn-keeper, happy in having a large patronage, furnishes abundantly wine to the drinkers, incited by the love of lucre, and also by the desire to prevent blasphemous talk, though foreseeing that many of them will get drunk; in his conscience, he is not sinning. He harbors, even cheerfully, men who hold impious or obscene conversations, and he does not reproach them for it, because, says he, he is not responsible for their conduct.[28]

In question l Gury asks, "Does Richard sin gravely in furnishing wine to people who will get drunk, without any better reason than his love for gain?" The answer to this question is yes, if the inn keeper continues to serve wine to someone who is already

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[25] Blaise Pascal, *The Provincial Letters,* trans. A.*J.* Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1982).

[26] For an excellent discussion of this debate, see Jonsen and Toulmin, *Abuse of Casuistry,* chap. 8.

[27] John 8.11.

[28] Paul Bert, trans., *The Doctrine of the Jesuits* (Boston: B. F. Bradbury, 1940), p. 55.

drunk. Here he sustains a slight loss for the sake of preventing a certain sin. Question 2 asks whether the innkeeper sins by not preventing drinkers from committing blasphemy. Generally, no, says the casuist, because charity does not require that we sustain a considerable business loss (by not serving wine) in order to oppose sins. It is morally sufficient that the innkeeper desires to prevent drunkenness and blasphemy.

English Casuistry and Scruple Shops

The attack on Jesuits did not deter the English Protestants from writing their own massive books of casuistry in the late seventeenth century. The best-known English casuists were Bishop Sanderson, Jeremy Taylor, William Ames, William Perkins, and Richard Baxter. In contrast to Roman casuistry's reliance on canon law and the confessional, English casuistry was based on the Scriptures, tradition, and right reason, which made it more accessible to the general public. In the seventeenth century Oxford students would get together every week for "scruple shops," in which they would discuss interesting cases of conscience.[29]

English casuistry also made it into the American educational system. In the eighteenth century, Ames's work was standard reading at Yale, where casuistical instruction was part of the curriculum. Ames's writings were replaced in the nineteenth century by Francis Wayland's book *The Elements of Moral Science,* a best-seller that sold more than sixty thousand copies.[30] The second volume of this book, entitled *Practical Ethics,* was thoroughly casuistical.[31] At Harvard, the required text for young men in the eighteenth century was Richard Baxter's *Christian Directory.*[32] Like other English casuists, Baxter included a section that provided directions for the conscience on buying, selling, borrowing, lending, and usury and that included questions about bribes, contracts, and promises. In contrast to the Jesuits, the English.

casuists gave the benefit of doubt to the law only if more could be said against following it than could be said in favor of it. Notice how the principle works in the following case from Baxter's "Cases and Directions About Trusts and Secrets":

> What if a delinquent intrust me with his estate or person to secure it from penalty? Baxter answers, if the case has already been prosecuted and punishment required by the common good, then you shouldn't take it. However, if you think that your friend will repent and that

[29] Robert Barclay, *The Inner Life of Religious Societies of the Commonwealth* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1876).

[30] Francis Wayland, *The Elements of Moral Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963).

[31] Wenley, "Casuistry," p. 245.

[32] Richard Baxter, *A Christian Directory* (London: Robert White, 1673).

his act will result in what a magistrate (if he knew) might agree is a greater good, then go ahead just don't lie or use other sinful means.[33]

Casuistry Goes Public

English casuistry soon found its way into literature and journalism. The best-known casuistical writer was Daniel Defoe. His novels *Roxana, Moll Flanders,* and *Robinson Crusoe* are chock-full of characters who are blameworthy but nonetheless evoke our sympathy. Defoe liked to write about how people rationalize immoral actions by making their situation the exception to the rule. In his essay "An Enquiry into the occasional Conformity of Dissenters" (1698), Defoe calls the tendency to misuse casuistry "playing Bo Peep with the Almighty."[34] Many of Defoe's story ideas came from the magazine *The Athenian Mercury,* originally called *The Athenian Gazette: or Casuistical Mercury,* which printed readers' questions about moral problems. The magazine's subheading read "resolving all the most nice and curious questions proposed by the ingenious of either sex." First published in 1690, *The Athenian Mercury* was the forerunner of magazines like *The Tatler* and *The Spectator.* John Dunton, its publisher and editor, wanted to "oblige the reader with a true discovery of the 'question project.' " By promising anonymity to his readers, Dunton hoped to elicit the "nice and curious questions" that people were too embarrassed to ask the divines.[35] We see in *The Athenian Mercury* the "Dear Abby" format that flourishes today, particularly in women's magazines.

Many of *The Athenian Mercury's* cases were about courtship and marriage. Some of the most interesting queries were actually re treads of famous cases discussed by casuists such as Jeremy Taylor. In one such case, an alleged reader asked: "Whether a man who has by mistake married his own daughter, coming afterwards to know it, is obliged to acquaint her with it, if he believe the knowledge of it will occasion her death; and how otherwise he ought to demean him self in that condition, having children by her, upon whom the reproach of being so born may bring a great affliction?"[36] Early on, Dunton must have realized this sort of kinky moral problem sold magazines. Today we hear these types of issues discussed on TV talk shows sporting titles like "Cross-Dressers and the Women Who Love Them." Public discussion of private issues always seems to draw a crowd.

The cases from *The Athenian Mercury* were later categorized and republished in five volumes as *The Athenian Oracle.* Editors showed a mixture of respect for morality and pragmatism in their replies to readers' queries. One section of the

[33] Richard Baxter, *Baxter's Works,* vol. 1 (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854), p. 866.

[34] G. A. Starr, *Defoe and Casuistry* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 4.

[35] Gilbert D. McEwen, *The Oracle of the Coffee House* (San Marino, Calif.: The Huntington Library, 1972), p. 3.

[36] The Athenian Oracle, vol. 2., p. 183.

reprint contains cases on business and employment. For example, a shop clerk wrote: "I needed money but didn't know anyone to borrow it from, so I cheated my master. After a time, I made up a greater sum and gave it to him for goods never sold, which will be a clear profit to him. In your opinion, is this a sin before God?"[37] Because you ought to "do unto others," it is a sin, the editors reasoned. They pointed out that the master might have needed the money before it was given back. Nonetheless, they went on to say, "We don't think that you are obliged to mention it to him [the master], for the world is reflective beg for God's pardon and don't do it again."[38]

Philosophy Ascends

With the growth of literacy and the popular press, cases of con science moved from the hallowed regions of religion and philosophy to the streets and coffeehouses. In his book *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England,* William Whewell traces the roots of modern moral philosophy to the English casuists of the seventeenth century, including Taylor and Sanderson.[39] Writing in 1852, Whewell maintained that Taylor's use of cases as illustrations of moral principles was the first step toward a systematic approach to moral ity.[40] During this time, however, philosophy was beginning its Platonic ascent into theory. As a sign of the times, Whewell changed the name of his chair at Cambridge from the Knightsbridge Chair of Casuistical Divinity to Professor of Moral Philosophy.[41]

By the twentieth century, G. E. Moore acknowledged in his *Principia Ethica* that "casuistry forms part of the ideal of ethical science: Ethics cannot be complete without it."[42] However, he washed the philosopher's hands of applied ethics when he asserted that it is not the business of a moral philosopher to give personal advice. Jansen and Toulmin argue that modern philosophy's rejection of case ethics "is a lingering expression of the intellectual dream that, after all, ethics may yet be transformed into a universal theoretical science."[43] I don't think that we should take this to mean that philosophy should give up this quest. The infamous history of sophistry and casuistry tells us that case ethics without some larger picture of moral-

[37] Ibid., p. 155.

[38] Ibid.

[39] William Whewell, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England (London: J. W. Parker, 1852).

[40] William Whewell, *The Elements of Morality,* vol. I (London: J. W. Parker, 1845).

[41] Jonsen and Toulmin, *Abuse of Casuistry,* p. 163.

[42] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 5.

[43] Jonsen and Toulmin, *Abuse of Casuistry,* p. 20.

ity and tradition elicits outrage. Even if the search for scientific ethics is futile, we need to continue it so as to keep the dialogue between theory and practice alive.

In practical terms, business ethics must balance the demands of laws with the demands of particular circumstances. We also need, however, to convey some broader vision of the role that business plays in history and culture. I have been fascinated by the use of the word "greed"in recent discussions of business scandals. Public concern focuses more on an emerging disposition in our culture than on legal malfeasance. We live in a society filled with laws, codes, regulations, and "how to" books. Some are inclined to improve professional ethics by creating more rules and better codes. When President Bush entered office, he appointed a lawyer to draft a new ethics code. The moral problem in government is not that public officials need instructions on how to act, however, but that they have lost sight of what it means to be a public official. They know that a conflict of interest is wrong, but they no longer possess a vision of what their interests should be. We could create more rules, but this approach is not sufficient because eventually it leads to an infinite regress of rules upon rules upon rules.

Modernity has been compared to a digital watch, which unlike an analog watch doesn't indicate where we've been or where we're going; it displays only the present. When we look at history, we see that few of our current moral problems are new. Most are just variations on themes with new actors, props, and stage settings. Hence, it is not enough to teach business ethics by simply reading cases or devising new rules to follow. We need to take our students to the crossroads of the humanities and engage them in the ongoing conversation about morality in everyday life.[44]

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[44] In addition to the works already cited, the following sources have also been consulted: William E. Addis and Thomas Arnold, eds., *A Catholic Dictionary* (London: Kegan Paul & Trench, 1885); Morton W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins* (Mich.: State College Press, 1952); James Broderick, *The Economic Morals of the jesuits* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Jack H. Broome, *Pascal* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965); Jospeh Butler, *The Analogy of Religion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Enrico Castelli, ed., *Tecnica e Casistica* (Rome: Instituto di Studi Filosofici, 1964); Dwight Cathcart, *Doubting Conscience: Donne and the Poetry of Moral Argument* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975); Thomas De Quincey, *Uncollected Writings,* vol. 2, ed. James Hogg (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972); Peter Drucker, "What Is 'Business Ethics'?" *The Public Interest* 63 (Spring 1981); George A. Grote, *A History of Greece,* vol. 8 (London: John Murray, 1869); Richard M. Hare, "Medical Ethics: Can the Moral Philosopher Help?" in Stuart F. Spieker and H. Tristram Engelhardt, eds., *Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its Nature and Significance* (Boston: D. Reidel, 1977); Frank L. Huntley, *Jeremy Taylor and the Great Rebellion* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970); Kenneth E. Kirk, *Conscience and Its Problems: An Introduction to Casuistry* (London: Longmans, Green, 1927); Roger L'Estrange, *The Casuist Uncased* (London: Sign of the Gun, 1680); George Lewis, *Robert Sanderson* (New York: Macmillan, 1924); Edward Leroy Long, Jr., *Conscience and Compromise: An Approach to Protestant Casuistry* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminister Press, 1950); Martin Luther, *Luther's Works,* ed. Walther I. Brandt, vol 45 (Philadelphia, Pa.: Muhlenberg Press, 1962); Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); W. I. Matson, "Kant as Casuist," *The Journal of Philosophy,* vol. 51 (December 1954); Frederick Denison Maurice, *The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry* (London: Macmillan, 1868); Robert James Merrett, *Daniel*

Defoe's Moral and Rhetorical Ideas (Victoria, B.C.: University of Victoria, 1980); Edward Caldwell Moore, *Chris tian Thought Since Kant* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1915); Raymond Mortimer, ed., *The Seven Deadly Sins* (London: Sunday Times Publications, 1962); J. Clark Murray, *A Handbook of Christian Ethics* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1980); Benjamin Nelson, "Conscience, Casuistry, and the Cure of the Souls," unpublished ms., 1950); G. B. Nicolini, *History of the Jesuits: Their Origins, Progress, Doctrines, and Designs* (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854); George R. Noyes, ed., *Collection of Theological Essays from Various Authors* (New York: Walker Fuller, 1866); Chaim Perelman and Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971); Nicolas Perrault, *The Jesuits Morals,* trans. Exerel Tonge (London: John Starkey, 1679); Robert Sanderson, *Lectures on Conscience and Human Law,* ed. Charles Wordsworth (London: James Williamson, 1877); Jerome B. Schneewind, *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Henry Sidgwick, *Outlines of the History of Ethics* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Thomas Slatter, S.J., *Cases of Conscience for English-Speaking Countries,* vol. 1 (New York: Benziger Bros., 1911); Camille Wells Slights, *The Casuistical Tradition in Shakespeare, Donnne, Herbert, and Milton* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); Jeremy Taylor, *Whole Works,* vol. 12 (London: Thomas Davison, 1828); Stephen Toulmin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Eduard Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy,* trans. Sarah Frances Alleyne and Evelyn Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, 1886); *Zeller's Pre-Socratic Philosophy,* trans. Sarah Frances Alleyne (London: Longmans, Green, 1881).

Chapter 10
The Importance of Leadership in Shaping Business Values

Abstract and Background Business ethics cases are usually about business leaders or companies that do bad things. However, there are also stories about admirable business behavior that catch the attention of the public and, hopefully, the imaginations of business students. This chapter mentions two such cases. The first, is about Aaron Feuerstein, owner of a textile factory in Massachusetts called Malden Mills. When Feuerstein's factory burned down, he continued to pay his employees until it was rebuilt. The second case is about when the pharmaceutical company, Merck, that decided to donate a drug that they developed to cure river blindness.

This chapter discusses how the individual values of business leaders matter in organizations. Understanding the values of a leader, organization, or society is a biographical and historical project. Sometimes the values of a company's founder carry through from past to present, and sometimes they don't. The paper applies leadership studies literature to business ethics. It looks at the origins of leaders' virtues and values and how, by enacting values, they embed them in the fabric of an organization.

Keywords Leader's values · Company values · Virtues · Moral silence · CEOs · Roy Vagelos · Leadership theories · Value consistency

Introduction

Few people doubt that leaders play a role as either founders or promoters of values in organizations. So, the more important question is not "Whose values?" but "What values?" Just because a leader has values doesn't mean that they are good ones. Furthermore, the question is not so much about what a leader values, but what a leader actually does to demonstrate his or her values. This paper is about how leaders translate values into action and actions into enduring organizational values. I first examine how we have come to think about the values of business leaders and success. I also reflect on what theories of leadership say about how leaders influence followers. Then I argue that the language of having values is often inadequate for

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understanding individual and organizational ethics. Lastly, I look at the leadership of P. Roy Vagelos of Merck & Company to illustrate the how the values of founders and current leaders shape the values of their own organizations, and how they can shape the values of the industries in which they operate.

Old Assumptions About the Values and Virtues of Business Leaders

Some of our attitudes towards the values of business leaders can be traced to the Protestant work ethic, which included the belief that accumulation of wealth was a sign that one was among God's chosen. One of the Calvinists' favorite Biblical passages was "Seest thou a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings" (Proverbs xxii 29). This equation of business success and salvation seemed to stick even in the secular world. In the eighteenth century, Benjamin Franklin tempered the Protestant work ethic with enlightenment ideals. He believed that business leaders should strive for wealth so that they can use it in a humane way to help society. Franklin thought good character was necessary for success. In his autobiography he listed eleven virtues needed for success in business and in life: temperance, silence, order, resolution, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and humility. Virtues tell us what we should be like and what we have to do to be that way. Values are what we believe to be important or morally worthy. We usually assume that values motivate us to act, but this isn't always the case. Some are satisfied to have a value and not act on it. This is not possible with a virtue. A person may value courage, but never do anything brave or heroic, whereas one cannot possess the virtue of courage unless he or she has done something courageous.

America is somewhat distinct in its history of celebrating the values and character of business leaders. For example, in the nineteenth century, William Makepeace Thayer specialized in biographies of chief executive officers. His books focused on how the values leaders formed early in life contributed to their success. Thayer summed up the moral path to success this way: "Man deviseth his own way, but the Lord directeth his steps." (Huber 1971, p. 53) As the number of business journalists grew in America, some dedicated themselves to lionizing business leaders. The Scottish immigrant Bertie Charles (B.C.) Forbes elevated the moral adulation of business leaders into an enduring art form, imitated by business publications throughout the world. When he started Forbes magazine in 1916, Forbes described it as "a publication that would strive to inject more humanity, more joy, and more satisfaction into business and into life in general." (Forbes, October 1947, p. 10) His goal was to convey Franklin's message that work, virtue, and wealth lead to happiness and social benefit.

The 18th and nineteenth century advocates of the work ethic preached that strong moral character was the key to wealth. By early twentieth century the emphasis on moral character shifted to an emphasis on personality. In Dale Carnegie's 1936 classic *How to Win Friends and Influence People*, psychology, not morality, was the key to success in business. This was true in leadership theory as well. Scholars were more interested in studying the personality traits of leaders than their values. This is in part because through most of the twentieth century many prominent leadership scholars were psychologists.

The mythologies of business leaders remain popular, even though many of them are not great philanthropists or particularly morally virtuous or advocates of enlightened self-interest. (Economist, 30 May 1998) Today business leaders are more likely to be celebrated in the first person than in the third. Consider, for example, the popularity of autobiographies by Al Dunlap, Donald Trump, and Bill Gates, all of whom enjoy touting their own virtues and values to the public.

Books such as *Business as a Calling*, by Michael Novak, draw the traditional Protestant connection between success in business and God's favor. (Novak 1996) Novak, who is a Catholic, argues that successful business people are more religious than other professionals. He cites two studies to back up his view. The first looked at church attendance by elites from the news media, business, politics, labor unions, the military, and religion. It found that groups with the highest proportion of weekly church attendance after religious professionals were the military at 49% and then business at 35%. The second study, of Conference Board survey of senior executives at Fortune 500 companies, reported that 65% of the respondents said they worshipped at churches or synagogues regularly. (Across the Board 1988, pp. 11–12) Novak infers that church going affects business values. However, we need more evidence than church attendance to connect religious values with the values a leader brings to work. After all, for some going to Church is nothing more than going to Church.

Leadership Theories and Values

The legacy of the Protestant work ethic and its attitudes toward business present a paradox. Are business leaders successful because of their virtues? or are they virtuous because they are successful? In the literature of leadership studies both seem to be true, depending on how one defines leadership. Leadership scholars have spent way too much time worrying about the definition of leadership. Some believe that if they could agree on a common definition of leadership, they would be better able to understand it. Joseph Rost gathered together 221 definitions of leadership. After reviewing all of his definitions, one discovers that the definition problem was not

really about definitions per se. All 221 definitions say basically the same thing – leadership is about one person getting other people to do something. Where the definitions differ was in how leaders got other followers to act and how leaders came up with the something that was to be done. For example, one definition from the 1920s said, [Leadership is] "the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation." (Moore 1927, p. 124) Another definition from the 1990s said, "Leadership is an influence relationship between leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes." (Rost 1991, p. 102) We all can think of leaders who fit both of these descriptions. Some use their power to force people to do what they want, others work with their followers to do what everyone agrees is best for them. The difference between these definitions rest on a normative question: "How should leaders treat followers?"

The scholars who worry about constructing the ultimate definition of leadership are asking the wrong question, but inadvertently trying to answer the right one. The ultimate question about leadership is not "What is the definition of leadership?" The whole point of studying leadership is, "What is good leadership?" The use of word *good* here has two senses, morally good and technically good or effective. If a good leader means *good* in both senses, then the two should form a logical conjunction. In other words, in order for the statement, "She is a good leader" to be true, it must be true that she is both effective *and* she is ethical.

The question, "What constitutes a good leader?" lies at the heart of many public debates about leadership today. We want our leaders to be good in both ways. Nonetheless, we are often more likely to say leaders are good if they are effective, but not moral, than if they are moral, but not effective. Leaders face a paradox. They have to stay in business or get reelected in order to be leaders. If they are not minimally effective at doing these things, their morality as leaders is usually irrelevant, because they are no longer leaders. In leadership, effectiveness sometimes must take priority over ethics. What we hope for are leaders who know when ethics should and when ethics shouldn't take a back seat to effectiveness. History tends to dismiss as irrelevant the morally good leaders who are unsuccessful. President Jimmy Carter was a man of great personal integrity, but during his presidency, he was ineffective and generally considered a poor leader. The conflict between ethics and effectiveness and the definition problem are apparent in what I have called, "the Hitler problem." (Ciulla 1995) The answer to the question "Was Hitler a good leader?" is yes, if a leader is defined as someone who is effective and gets the job that they set out to do, done. The answer is no, if the leader gets the job done, but the job itself is immoral, and it is done in an immoral way. In other words, leadership is about more than being effective at getting followers to do things. The quality of leadership also depends on the means and the ends of a leader's actions. The same is true for Robin Hood. While in myth some admire him, he still steals from the rich to give to the poor. His purpose is morally worthy, but the way that he does it is not. Most of us would prefer leaders who do the right thing, the right way for the right reasons.

The way that we assess the impact of a leader's values on an organization also depends on one's theory of leadership. Many still carry with them the "Great Man" theory – leaders are born and not made. Personality traits, not values catapult leaders to greatness. This theory has been articulated in different ways. Thomas Carlyle wrote about the traits of heroes such as Napoleon. Niccolo Machiavelli described the strategic cunning of his "Prince". Friedrich Nietzsche extolled the will to power of his "superman". While the innate qualities of leaders are primary factors in these theories, it is not always clear what makes people want to follow great men. Charismatic leadership is a close relative to the Great Man Theory. Charismatic leaders have powerful personalities. However, the distinguishing feature of charismatic leadership is the emotional relationship that charismatic leaders establish with followers. Charismatic leaders range from a John F. Kennedy, who inspired a generation to try and make the world better, to the cult leader Jim Jones, who lead his followers into suicide. The values of charismatic leaders shape the organization, but in some cases these values do not live on when the charismatic leader is gone.

Other theories of leadership focus on the situation or context of leadership. They emphasize the nature of the task that needs to be done, the external environment, which includes historical, economic, and cultural factors, and the characteristics of followers. Lee Iacocca was the right leader for Chrysler when it went bankrupt, but we don't know if he would be the right leader at some other phase of the firm's history. Ross Perot was good businessman, but many doubted his ability to be effective as a political leader. Situational theories don't explicitly say anything about values, but one might surmise that in some situations a person with particularly strong moral values must emerge as a leader. For example, Nelson Mandela and Václav Havel seemed to have been the right men at the right time. They both offered the powerful kind of moral leadership required for peaceful revolutions in South Africa and the Czech Republic.

A third group of scholars combine trait theories with situational models and focus on the interaction between leaders and followers. The leader's role is to guide the organization along paths that are rewarding to everyone involved. Here values are sure to play an important role, but again it matters what the values are and what they mean to others in the organization. The Ohio studies and the Michigan studies both measured leadership effectiveness in terms of how leaders treated subordinates and how they got the job done. The Ohio Studies looked at leadership effectiveness in terms of "consideration" or the degree to which leaders act in friendly and supportive manner, and "initiating structure" or the way that leaders structure their own role and the role of subordinates in order to obtain group goals. (Fleishman 1953) The Michigan Studies measured leaders on the basis of task orientation and relationship orientation Implicit in these theories and studies is an ethical question (Leikert 1961). Are leaders more effective when they are kind to people, or are leaders more effective when they use certain techniques for structuring and ordering tasks? Is leadership about moral relationships or techniques? – the answer is both about both. (Yukl 1989, p. 96).

Transforming Leadership and Servant Leadership are normative theories of leadership. Both emphasize the relationship of leaders and followers to each other and the importance values in the process of leadership. James MacGregor Burns' theory of transforming leadership rests on a set of moral assumptions about the relationship between leaders and followers.[3] Servant leadership has not gotten as much attention as transformational leadership in the literature, but in recent years interest in it by the business community has grown. Servant leaders lead because they want to serve others. (Greenleaf 1977, p. 23) In both transforming leadership and servant leadership, leaders not only have values, but they help followers develop their own values, which will hopefully overlap or be compatible with those of the organization.

The Problem with Only Having Values

Social scientists like to talk about values because they are descriptors. When a poll asks voters if they prefer better schools or lower taxes, we assume that if the majority pick better schools, it means most respondents value education. Ask people about their values and they will tell you what they think is important. Different types of moral statements and concepts *do* different things. For example, the statement "you ought not to kill" prescribes, "Do not kill" commands, "Killing is wrong" evaluates, and "Killing is wrong because I value life" explains, and "Killing is against my values, which include the value of human life" describes. Values are static concepts. You have to make a lot of assumptions to make a value do something. You have to assume that because people value something they act accordingly, but we know this isn't the case. While values change all the time, having a value does not mean that one has or will do something about it.

Since values themselves do not have agency, the main way that a leader influences the organization is through his or her words and actions. One way to understand a leader's values is through their vision. The CEO who says his or her vision is to double market share by the year 2000 has a goal, not a vision. All businesses want to make profits. Visions must have an implicit or explicit moral component to them. (Nanus 1992) Often the moral component has to do with improving the quality of life, particularly in the case of making a product safer, environmentally friendly, or more affordable to those who need it. A leader's vision should tell us where we want to go, why it's good to go there, and the right way for us to get there.

The only way to understand if a business leader's values have an impact is to look at how his or her values connect with actions. Hypocrisy is the most extreme form of values not meeting up with actions. Hypocrites express strong moral values that they do not hold and then act against them. For example, a company that advertises its commitment to green products while continuing to sell products that don't meet its own espoused green standards is hypocritical. (Bird 1996, p. 4) What is most odd

about some hypocrites is that they are not always complete liars. Some know they should live up to the values they talk about, but simply do not or will not.

Another problem with values and actions is what Frederick B. Bird calls "moral silence".

Moral silence is the opposite of hypocrisy. Morally silent leaders act and speak as if they do not hold certain moral values, when they actually do. The company president who cuts 1000 jobs from the payroll may publicly state that he cut jobs to fill what he considers his most important obligation to protect shareholder value. When in fact he is guilt ridden because he really believes that his greatest moral obligation is to his employees. Leaders sometimes lack the ability or the moral courage to act on their values. Similarly, there are some who have values, but are either too busy, distracted, or lazy to act on those values. Consider the case of a female corporate executive who has strong convictions about giving women opportunities for career advancement but does not go out of her way to take advantage of opportunities to ensure that women in her company have these opportunities.

Often leaders don't realize that the values they hold are in practice contradictory or inconsistent. Once a colleague and I conducted an ethics seminar for the presidents of a large conglomerate. The CEO of the corporation was an enthusiastic participant. During the seminar he expressed his feelings about the importance of honesty and integrity in business. However, as the participants discussed our case studies, it became clear that there were a number of situations in which protecting the company's integrity meant losing business or money. The CEO strongly agreed with these conclusions. However, the others in the seminar pointed out to him that quarterly sales determined the compensation for each business unit. The CEO set profit targets for each business unit and used a formula to determine compensation. When it came to performance, he valued the numbers more than anything else. What the CEO failed to realize was that he was espousing the value of integrity, but in effect saying that employees would be punished if they did not act with integrity (with firing) and punished if they did act with integrity (with reduced compensation). Some thought that if the CEO really valued integrity, he should make some adjustment to the incentive system to take into account business lost for ethical reasons. One brave man wondered out loud if the CEO didn't really value profits over integrity.

Often companies write codes of ethics or mission statements but don't to think through what the values in the statement mean in terms of how they manage their businesses. In 1983 the Harvard Business School wrote a glowing case study of how CEO Jim Beré developed the Borg-Warner code of ethics (Goodpaster 1983). Borg-Warner is a conglomerate of automotive, financial services, and security service businesses. Its code began with the statement, "We believe in the dignity of the individual", and "We believe in the commonwealth of Borg Warner and its people." An elegant framed copy of the code was hung offices and factories of Borg-Warner's various businesses. Their ethics code also said, "we must heed the voice of our natural concern for others" and "grant others the same respect, cooperation, and decency we seek for ourselves" (Murphy 1998, p. 27).

Warner Gear, a division of Borg Warner, manufactured gears for cars and boats. In 1984 it made a text book turn around in labor relations and productivity. After years of losing money and engaging in endless labor disputes, the union and management finally agreed to cooperate. They formed effective quality circles that saved the company millions of dollars in waste and inefficiency. Company profits soared in 1985 (Ciulla 1985, p. 11). However, in July of that year, with no warning to the managers or employees who implemented the turnaround, Borg Warner announced it was shipping part of Warner Gear to Kenfig, Wales to save on labor costs. This meant that the factory would lose 300 jobs. While the business decision may have been warranted, the way that it was implemented did not show decency and respect for those who had worked so hard to make the firm successful. All the energy, good will, and commitment of the employees didn't matter, and neither did the grand values that hung on the wall.

Lastly, there are cases where a business leader acts on values that he has never made any concerted effort to express in words to employees. In 1995, a textile factory in Massachusetts named Malden Mills, burnt down. The next day, the owner, Aaron Feuerstein, announced that he would give out Christmas bonuses and pay his employees full salaries until the factory was repaired. In the midst of massive corporate downsizings of that time this story of kindness captured the public imagination. Feuerstein was a quiet man running a family business. The business itself was known for treating workers fairly, but Feuerstein had never been one to publicly articulate his own values. Given the publicity of his actions after the fire, he was asked by the press to talk about his values. He then explained that his business values came from his Jewish faith and the teachings of the Talmud. Yet for most employees, where he got his values didn't matter as much as what he did with them.

The point of these examples is to show that a leader's values do indeed shape the values of the firm when they are paired with policies and actions that breathe life into them. The way in which founders influence the values of the company is by setting out their mission, what they want to do, and how they want to do it. But most importantly, their actions write the story of the organization's values. The story can be a morally good one or an evil one. Either way, the role of leaders who come after the founder is to tell and add to the story of the company and its values. This includes ethical lessons learned from its mistakes as well as its moral triumphs.

Howard Gardner believes that great leaders are also great story-tellers. He says "leadership is a process in the minds of individuals who live in a culture. Some stories tend to become more predominant in this process, such as stories that provide an adequate and timely sense of identity for individuals" (Gardner 1995, p. 22). The story of the fire at Malden Mills will become part of the company's mythology. It not only conveys a message of moral commitment to employees, but it sets a moral standard for those who will take Feuerstein's place.

Leaders' values matter when they are repeatedly reflected in their actions. However, a leader's values and his or her will to act on them are also shaped by the history and the culture of the organization itself. As I pointed out earlier, we some-

times mythologize business leaders because they are successful or imagine that their lone values are responsible for doing some heroic action. However, as we saw earlier, there can be a gap between having values and acting on them. This gap is often narrowed or widened by the values already present in the story of the organization.

One of the more dramatic illustrations of business leadership and values is the case of P. Roy Vagelos, CEO of Merck & Co., Inc. (Useem 1998, Chapter 1). Prior to becoming CEO, Vagelos was director of Merck Sharp & Dohme's research laboratories. In 1979 a researcher named William Campbell had a hunch that an antiparasite drug he was working on called Ivermectin might work on the parasite that caused river blindness, a disease that threatens the eyesight and lives of 85 million people in 35 developing countries. He asked Vagelos if he could have the resources to pursue his research. Despite the fact that the market for this drug was essentially the poorest people in the world, Vagelos gave Campbell the go ahead. While the decision was Vagelos', it was also reinforced by the Merck's axiom "health precedes wealth".

Campbell's hunch about Ivermectin proved to be right and he developed a drug called "Mectizan", which was approved for use by the government in 1987. By this time Vagelos had become the CEO of Merck. Now that the drug was approved he sought public underwriting to produce Mectizan. Vagelos hired Henry Kissenger to help open doors for Merck. They approached several sources including the U.S. Agency for International Development and the World Health Organization, but they couldn't raise money for the drug. Merck was left with a drug that was only useful to people who couldn't buy it. Vagelos recalled, "We faced the possibility that we had a miraculous drug that would sit on a shelf" (Useem 1998, p. 23). After reviewing the company's options, Vagelos and his directors announced that they would give Mectizan away for free, forever, on October 21, 1987. A decade later the drug give-away cost Merck over $200 million. By 1996 Mectizan had reached 19 million people. In Nigeria alone it saved six million people from blindness.

Few business leaders ever have the opportunity to do what Vagelos did. His values guided his decisions in this case, but so did the values of the founder. George C. Merck, son of the company's American founder said that from the very beginning Merck's founders asserted that medicine was for people not profits. However, he quickly added that they also believed that if their medicine is good for people, profits will follow (Useem 1998, p. 29).

Like many corporate mission statements Merck's says its mission "is to provide society with superior products and services". The statement goes on to assert, "we are in the business of preserving and improving human life". "All of our actions must be measured by our success at achieving this goal." It concludes with, "we expect profits from work that satisfies customer needs and that benefits humanity" (Useem 1998, p. 29). The values in Merck's mission statement are as grand as the ones in Borg Warner's. However, the corporate leaders prior to Vagelos acted on and hence reinforced these values long before Vagelos donated Mectizan. After W.W.II, tuberculosis thrived in Japan. Most Japanese couldn't afford to buy Merck's power-

ful drug, Streptomycin, to fight it. Merck gave away a large supply of the drug to the Japanese public. The Japanese did not forget. In 1983 the Japanese government allowed Merck to purchase 50.02% of Banyu Pharmaceutical. At the time this was the largest foreign investment in a Japanese company. Merck is currently the largest American pharmaceutical company in Japan. The story makes Merck's mission statement come alive. It is the kind of story that employees learn and internalize when they come to work there.

In this case, Vagelos' moral leadership extended beyond his organization into the industry. As Michael Useem points out, at that time, Merck became the benchmark by which the moral behavior of other pharmaceutical companies were judged. Sometimes the moral actions of one CEO or company set the bar higher for others. Useem observes that the message hit home at Glaxo. In comparing Glaxo to Merck, a business writer once called Glaxo "a hollow enterprise lacking purpose and lacking soul" (Useem 1998, p. 31). Merck's values seemed to inspire Glaxo's new CEO Richard Sykes. In 1993 Glaxo invested in developing a drug to combat a form of tuberculosis connected to aids and found mostly among the poor. In 1996 Glaxo donated a potent new product for malaria. Similarly, Dupont is now giving away nylon to filter guinea worms out of drinking water in poor countries and American Cyanamid is donating a larvacide to control them.

A cynic might regard Merck's donation of Streptomycin and Mectizan as nothing more than public relations stunts. But what is most interesting about the actions of Merck's leaders is that while they believed that 'by doing good they would do well', at the time that they acted it was unclear exactly when and how the company would benefit. Neither the Japanese after the war nor the poor people of the world who are threatened by river blindness looked likely to return the favor in the near future. While this wasn't an altruistic act, it was not a purely self-interested one either. Since it was unclear if, when, and how Merck would benefit, it is reasonable to assume that Merck's leaders and the values upon which they acted were authentic. They intentionally acted on their values. Any future benefits required a leap of faith on their part.

Business leaders' values matter to the organization only if they act on them. In business ethics and in life we always hope that doing the right thing, while costly and sometimes painful in the short run, will pay off in the long run.

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Chapter 11
Is Business Ethics Getting Better? Business Ethics and Business History

Abstract and Background It always strikes me as silly, when I read an article about business ethics that begins by saying something like, "because of the global financial crisis, people have started to pay attention to business ethics." This shows either a profound ignorance of history or, perhaps more plausibly, that business and society suffer from an acute case of amnesia, where every scandal seems completely new and unprecedented. Either way, this attitude speaks to the importance of history not only for business ethics but for teaching students about business.

This chapter is based on my 2010 Presidential Address to the Society for Business Ethics. It's somewhat autobiographical, in that it goes back to when I started doing research on business ethics as a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard Business School. I talk about sitting in on Alfred Chandler's business history seminar and my interactions with other talented historians at Harvard Business School in the mid-1980s. I became very intrigued by the history of HBS, especially the early discussions about what business students needed to learn, the role of business in society, and Harvard's experiences with business ethics and business history courses. As I will discuss in Part III of the book, the humanities teach us about ethics and each other. Except for most business ethics classes, humanities content is largely absent from business education. In this chapter, I suggest that if business schools don't want ethics courses, history courses might provide an alternative way of instilling responsible business behavior.

Keywords Ethics · Business history · Business ethics · Ptah-hotep · Leadership · Tulip mania · Speculative bubbles · Harvard Business School · Teaching business ethics · CEO compensation

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Introduction

In the title of this chapter, I ask the question "Is business ethics getting better?" I will not talk about specific aspects of business but the practice of business as a whole. Some scholars have answered this question in terms of recent history. In 1961, Raymond C. Baumhart, who was then a doctoral student at the Harvard Business School, did a study around the question "How Ethical are Businessmen?" He said that his research did not give a definitive answer to the question, but that the executives he surveyed all said that they wanted to improve the ethical business behavior of business people.[1] In 1977, Steven N. Brenner and Earl A. Molander updated and expanded Baumhart's study to see if the ethics of business had changed since the Baumhart study.[2] Their research found that societal expectations of business were changing, and in some areas, business had gotten better and in other areas, it remained the same. In a more recent essay, Ian Maitland suggests that the ethics of business is congruent with business cycles. He argues that business ethics deteriorate during boom times and improve during recessions.[3] A priori, this makes sense since it is human nature to not ask questions about why things are going well and to become introspective when things fall apart. Yet when you look at history writ large, we see that the answer to this question is not so simple.

There are moral problems inherent in business and human nature that make ethics a constant struggle, regardless of the business cycle or system of regulation. History offers us an early warning system about the ethical pitfalls of business and the tragedies that result from the moral failures of business. People have been aware of these problems for a long time. The ancient Greek historian Polybius said that Carthage fell because it had become a place where "nothing that leads to profit is considered disgraceful."[4] Throughout history people have also reminded us of the social benefits of business. As the Enlightenment philosopher Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu notes, "[I]t is almost a general rule, that wherever we find agreeable manners, there commerce flourishes; and wherever there is commerce, there we meet with agreeable manners."[5] In this chapter, I will look at a few of the things that history shows us about the potential moral pitfalls of business as a means of explaining why I believe that history ought to be a part of the way that we teach business ethics in business schools.

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[1] Raymond C. Baumhart, "How Ethical Are Businessmen?." *Harvard Business Review* (July–August 1961): 710, 12, 16, 19, 15676.

[2] Steven N. Brenner and Earl A. Molander, "Is the Ethics of Business Changing?," *Harvard Business Review,* January–February 1977: 5771.

[3] Ian Maitland, "A Theory of the Ethical Business Cycle," *Business Ethics Quarterly* 20(4) (2010): 74950.

[4] Po1ybius, *The Histories,* trans. Robin Waterfield, ed. Brian McGing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 410.

[5] Charles de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws,* trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: The Free Press, 1970), 316.

Modernity is like a digital watch. Unlike an analogue watch, a digital watch does not show where we have been or where we are going. It only displays the present. History provides us with a place to stand and look at the present and future. It offers a perspective on who we are, what we do, and why we do it. What history shows us about organizations and the people who run them is that the basic problems of business ethics are not new, only the cultural and technological contexts of these problems change over time. The reason for this is quite simple. People are the same and hence, the ethical challenges of human activities such as business and have not changed much either.

Business rests on the pursuit of self-interest, but at the same time requires self-control, constraints on self-interest, and as Max Weber shows us, delayed gratification.[6] Adam Smith tried to resolve this paradox with his notion of enlightened self-interest or self-interest that is tied to the interests of others in society.[7] The most ubiquitous moral principle in both the East and the West is the Golden Rule.[8] Both renditions of it "do unto others as you would have others do unto you" and "do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you" help us take the leap from our interests to the interests of others. The remarkable thing is that humanity is at least as successful at making this leap as it is at failing to do so; however, along the way, they struggle. So, let us look at just a few examples of the moral struggles that work, leadership, and business have presented to people throughout history.

Some Ancient Perspectives

It is useful to begin with the writings of Ptah-hotep, who was a sage and vizier to the Egyptian pharaoh Djedkare Isesi of the 5th Dynasty. Written on papyrus, his book, *The Precepts of Ptah-Hotep,* is one of the oldest surviving paper books. It was written somewhere between 2450–2300 BCE.[9] In it, Ptah-hotep talks about a person's responsibilities at work, which include adherence to duty, self-control, and transparency or vigilance against those who want to bribe or make secret deals. He even cautions against falling asleep on the job.

> If you are employed in the larit [storehouse], stand or sit rather than walk about. Lay down rules for yourself from the first: not to absent yourself even when weariness overtakes you. Keep an eye on him who enters announcing that what he asks is secret; what is entrusted to you is above appreciation, and all contrary argument is a matter to be rejected. He is a god who penetrates into a place where no relaxation of the rules is made for the privileged.[10]

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[6] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009).

[7] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Penguin Books, 1970).

[8] Jeffrey Wattles, *The Golden Rule* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[9] The translator Miriam Lichtheim argues that while Ptah-hotep lived between 2450 BCE and 2300 BCE, the actual papyrus was not produced until 2300–2150 BCE.

[10] Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings, Volume 1: The Old and Middle Kingdoms (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 63.

Ptah-hotep also takes note of the problems people face when they acquire wealth. Such people can start to think that they are better than others and forget where they came from.

> If you have become great after having been little, if you have become rich after having been poor, when you are at the head of the city, know how not to take advantage of the fact that you have reached the first rank, harden not your heart because of your elevation; you are only the administrator, the prefect, of the provisions which belong to Ptah. Put not behind you the neighbor who is like you; be unto him as a companion."[11]

Finally, like many sages who follow him, Ptah-hotep warns us about the dangers of wealth and power. Both can make people think they are special and no longer subject to the same rules as everyone else. Some leaders make the tragic mistake of thinking that power exempts them from responsibility, when in fact power usually gives them more responsibility to more people. As Ptah-hotep writes:

> He who is placed in front, at the head of a large number of men, must be without reproach, and in spite of his power, never forget that there are laws…. He has attained to high honor, he must not, as is too often the case, be puffed up by his good fortune, but should consider the new duties which his rank imposes on him.[12]

Early on, people noticed that, in addition to the ethical challenges of having money and power, profit making based on anything other than trade for goods, might be problematic. As Aristotle notes, the amount of property needed for the good life is not unlimited because it is based on what we need. He goes on to say that the art of profit-making and accumulating coin has no boundaries. It is based on insatiable wants.[13] Like other ancients, Aristotle is vehement about his disdain for usury or what he calls, "money breeding money." He writes: "The most hated sort [of money making], and with the greatest reason is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it [to trade products]".[14]

The early Romans also realized that business and the desire to make a profit sometimes lead to dishonest behavior. For example, in Cicero's *De Officiis,* writ ten in 44 BCE, Cicero presents several cases where business people are tempted to deceive, such as this one illustrating the principle of caveat emptor:

> Suppose an honest man sells a house because of some defects that he is aware of but others do not suspect. Suppose the house is unsanitary but is considered healthy; suppose no one knows that vermin can be seen in all the bedrooms, that the house is built of poor timber and quite dilapidated. The question is: if the seller does not tell these facts to a buyer and sells the house for much more than he thought he could get for it; did he act without justice and without honor?[15]

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[11] Ibid., 65.

[12] Ibid., 62.

[13] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics,* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Transla tion,* trans. W. D. Ross, ed. J. Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1996.

[14] Ibid., 1997.

[15] Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Officiis,* trans. Harry G. Edinger (Indianapolis: The Library of Living Arts, 1974), 120.

Like Aristotle, Cicero voiced suspicions about retailers. He says, "Those who buy from merchant and sell again immediately should also be thought of as demeaning themselves. For they would make not profit unless they told sufficient lies, and nothing is as dishonorable as a falsehood."[16] Cicero also notes the potential for business people to exploit the misery of others. He tells the story of a merchant who arrives at the gates of the famine-stricken city of Rhodes with a grain shipment. The merchant knows that other shipments are one day behind him, but the citizens of the city do not. Cicero raises the question, "Should the merchant conceal this fact from the buyers and charge a higher price?"[17] Even in ancient times, people saw that there was something wrong with charging the market price in times of disaster. Clearly, price gouging has been around for a long time, but so has compassionate behavior during disasters. Like Cicero, the contemporary philosopher Henk van Luijk called for a principle of decency in business, which he described this way: "if given the opportunity to improve the general welfare, people need solid reasons *not* to do it."[18]

Work and Wages

Other ethical problems in business revolve around what people deserve to be paid for their work. As Jean Jacques Rousseau observed, "The human race fell from a golden age when they discovered that they could get advantage from the work of others."[19] You do not have to read Karl Marx to understand this problem. Nowadays, this is not a matter of master and slave or serf, but a more sanitized "market view of labor." People get paid according to their market value, regardless of the social value of the work that they do. Furthermore, when unemployment is high, some employers take advantage of their employees by making them work long hours sometimes for less pay. This is considered acceptable when the market determines wages and people fear losing their jobs.

Plato offers us a unique perspective on CEO compensation. He writes: "medicine provides health, and wage earning provides wages; house building provides a house and the wage earning that accompanies it provides a wage."[20] The same is true for leadership. The craft of leadership focuses on producing benefits for others, not just the leader. Plato concludes that like medicine and house building, the "craft" of leading requires different virtues from the craft of earning wages. The market acts

[16] Ibid., 58.

[17] Ibid., 118.

[18] Henk J. L. van Luijk, "Rights and Interests in a Participatory Market Society," *Business Ethics Quarterly* 4(1) (1994): 79–96.

[19] Jean Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on a Subject Proposed by the Academy of Dijon: What Is the Origin of Inequality among Men, and Is It Authorized by Natural Law?" *The Social Contract and Discourses,* trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950).

[20] Plato, *Republic,* trans. G. M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992), 22.

as if the virtues of craft and wage earning are either the same or complementary. Corporations usually try to tie CEO compensation to performance, but as we have seen lately, CEOs can still earn high wages even when their companies do poorly or fail. In Plato's terms, some CEOs are good at making money for themselves, but not good at making money for the other stakeholders inside and outside of the company. The economist Robert Frank calls the belief that there are only a few talented individuals who can run companies and hence, deserve a disproportionate amount of wealth, the basis of a "winner-take-all society."[21] Is this true? Perhaps in some cases, but Rakesh Khurana's study of CEOs found that the highest paid CEOs were the most charismatic, but they did not produce the best earnings for their companies.[22] As Plato might say, they are better at wage earning than they are at leading and looking after the interests of their organizations.

Business has always had the ability to bring out the worst in people. In particular, the acquisitive and competitive aspects of it may tempt or encourage even the most disciplined person or group of people into one or more of the seven deadly sins greed, envy, lust, pride, gluttony, anger and sloth. The first six are usually the basis of business scandals and financial disasters. The seventh, sloth, is the most interesting, because sloth is more than simple laziness, it is the vice of not caring. When businesses are feckless and uncaring, they can harm people and the environment. Business encourages virtues as well as vices. We know that it sparks creativity, generosity, kindness, discipline, and a number of other virtues. Like all activities that affect the lives of others, business is a practice that requires moral effort and fortitude. Certainly, there are many businesses that try "doing well by doing good."

The Night Watch and CSR

One of my favorite paintings is Rembrandt's *The Company of Frans Banning Cocq and Willem van Ruytenburch,* which is better known as *The Night Watch.* In some ways, it is emblematic of the strengths and weaknesses of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). On the surface, it depicts a group of wealthy business people who, along with Captain Cocq and Lieutenant Ruytenburch, are prepared to do their civic duty to defend the city, if necessary. Cocq and the seventeen other people in the picture commissioned the painting in 1642. The curious thing about this very large (about 12 × 14 feet) canvas is that the actual night watch had disbanded years before it was painted, so the heroic group was actually more like a sporting club than a civic watch. Furthermore, Rembrandt's unconventional composition depicts Cocq bathed in light, while others are only in partial view. Some of the merchants were not happy about this because they had each paid their share to be in the picture.

[21] Robert Frank and Phillip J. Cook, *Winner-Take-All Society* (New York: Penguin, 1996).

[22] Rahesh Khurana, Searching for the Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Like the old German expression: "Do good and talk about it," these merchants wanted to be physically and morally recognized. The story of the picture is emblematic of a potential problem with CSR. It is okay for businesses to advertise how they fill their social responsibilities as long as they do not let the "talking about it" misrepresent or supersede the actual "doing good."

On Tulips and Bubbles

Business ethics does not seem to be getting better in regard to the behavior that leads to speculative bubbles and international financial crises. Not long before Rembrandt finished the "Night Watch," Tulip mania raged throughout Europe. Europeans were enamored with the flower, and its bulbs were traded on the market for huge sums of money. For example, at the tulip market's peak in 1637, the Admiral van Enkhuijsen tulip traded for fifteen times the yearly wage of an Amsterdam bricklayer.[23] The bulbs sold by weight and the unit of measure was the azen. Soon people stopped buying and selling actual tulip bulbs and began speculating on future price of an azen of bulbs. Merchants, craftsman, and other ordinary citizens jumped into this futures market. When the bubble burst, both the wealthy and those of modest means were ruined.

In his prescient book the *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds* (1841), Charles MacKay offers a delightful commentary on irrational business behavior. He discusses "tulipomania" and the incident that gave us the term "speculative bubble."[24] The word "bubble" was first used to describe the frenzied speculative investment in the South Sea Company and the subsequent crash of its stocks. In the early 1700s, the company had obtained a monopoly on trade in the South Seas from Spain. The Spanish gave the British an *assiento,* which was a permit that allowed them to sell slaves and other merchandise to Spanish colonies. In a scenario all too familiar today, the company started and/or did not correct rumors about the extraordinary profits they would make. Banks and other investors, ranging from government officials and aristocrats to middle class workers, invested and then lost large sums of money. If the British government had not stepped in and propped up the banks, the British banking system would have failed when the bubble burst. In 1720, British Parliament enacted the "Bubble Act" requiring all new joint stock companies to be incorporated by Act of Parliament or Royal Charter.

[23] Ana Pavord, *The Tulip: The Story of a Flower that Has Made Men Mad* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999).

[24] Charles McKay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2002), 5.

History and Business Ethics

These are just a few examples of what history can tell us about the ethical challenges of engaging in business. Let us now turn to more a recent past and look at the use of history to teach ethics in a business school. When I was at the Harvard Business School (HBS), I had the pleasure of sitting in on a few of Alfred Chandler's seminars on business history. I was just beginning to do research in business ethics, and I was struck by the inextricable relationship between business history and business ethics. At the time, a colleague named Jeffrey Cruikshank was writing a history of the Harvard Business School called, *A Delicate Experiment HBS 1908–1945*. We often talked about his research for the book. It was fascinating because Cuikshank had access to old letters and documents dating back to the school's inception in 1908.[25]

The early intellectual purpose of HBS was as "a school of applied economics, with incidental responsibilities toward law and engineering."[26] One of the questions on the mind of Wallace Donham, the second dean of HBS was: Who is responsible for what in society? The 1920s was an era of industry and technological innovation. Donham was particularly concerned with the impact of technology on business and society. When the British philosopher Lord Alfred North Whitehead joined Harvard's faculty in 1924, Donham used to have Saturday afternoon discussions with him about the human problems of what Whitehead called, "scientific materialism." As Cruikshank observed, Donham believed that society could no longer turn to the legal profession for "wise counselors" in these matters because the law had lost its independent status in the late nineteenth century when it became a servant to industry. Since Donham did not think that religion was likely to be reinstated to its position of moral authority, it fell to the business community to face what Donham saw as the critical social problem: the "control the consequences of scientific development."[27] Donham wanted a business school curriculum that would prepare students to take on the responsibility of managing the moral impact of business and technology on society. The school's first approach to this was to introduce a history course not a business ethics course into the curriculum in 1927. A professor named Norman Gras taught the course. Gras began his class with cases from medieval history and later moved on to more contemporary ones. Gras said that the reason why the course was successful because "history placed business into human culture or recognized human culture in business."[28] But history did not seem to be enough preparation for business students to take on their social responsibilities. Gras wrote

[25] Note that the Wharton School is the oldest business school in the U.S. It was established in 1881.

[26] Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, A Delicate Experiment: The Harvard Business School from 1908–1945. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987), 155.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., 168.

"The history of every profession contains plenty of evidence that it will be practically impossible to get great groups of men acting from pure altruism."[29] His hope for ethical progress was to have corporations internalize ethical standards and set the norms for the rest of society.

In 1928, HBS introduced what was perhaps the first business ethics course in an American business school. They hired a philosopher named Carl F. Taeusch from the University of Iowa to teach a second-year elective in business ethics. I was able to buy an old library copy of the business ethics textbook that Taeusch wrote. It still had the record of borrowers in the back. There did not seem to be much interest in the book since it had only been checked out 24 times in 56 years. HBS students did not like Taeusch's business ethics course, in part because they thought it was too theoretical, so HBS dropped business ethics from the curriculum in 1935.

One observer wrote: "It is the opinion of those who remember Dr. Taeusch's course on ethics that it was unsuccessful because it was perceived as 'Sunday School talk.' Indeed, that effort and another in the mid 1930s appear to have set back the desire to tackle the subject at all."[30] The subject seems to disappear until 1958, when the school approved an elective course called "Business, Society and the Individual." Thirty years later, HBS introduced its first required module "Decision Making and Ethical Values."[31]

Despite business scandals, the Great Depression, and the recent collapse of the banking system (based on a mortgage bubble), some business schools are still reluctant to commit time and resources to business ethics courses, yet they spend lavishly on courses related to finance and accounting. When we look back at recent history, few would argue that financial disasters and business scandals were the result of people having poor quantitative skills. Going back to Plato, we might say that some business schools focus more on teaching students the craft of making money than on the craft of actually running a business or a sustainable business. Some of the business school graduates who drove their companies into the ground lacked perspective and a historical understanding of the ethical traps inherent in business and human nature. Just think about how many well-educated people in the financial industry have fallen for "the madness of crowds."

Conclusion

So, is business ethics getting better? Yes and no. My point is that you cannot answer this question in meaningful way unless you study history. That is why the Baumhart and Brenner/Molander studies are interesting, but not particularly insightful because

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] See Harvard Business School Institutional Memory, 1958 and 1988: http://institutionalmemory.hbs. edu/topic/curriculum_and_courses.html

their horizon is too narrow. Furthermore, as business historian Geoffrey Jones observes, "The loss of history has resulted in the spread of influential theories based on ill-informed understandings of the past."[32] For example, it is accepted wisdom that countries grow and prosper when they are open to foreign investment. But Jones notes that "this is an article of faith rather than proven by the historical evidence of the past."[33] Jones says that business historians have been marginalized or ignored by business schools and business scholars, despite the fact that early business historians have often identified areas that later become hot topics to business researchers such as entrepreneurship and globalization.

What does this mean for business ethics and business education? First, I think we should revisit the HBS approach of teaching ethics through history. Business schools might consider offering students the option of taking business ethics or business history to fill their course requirements. While ethics and history are different subjects, both compel students to think about the big questions concerning business and life. Second, history should be a part of any business ethics course. This is not difficult to do in classes that use case studies. By adding historical context to a case or comparing contemporary cases with similar events in the past, students gain a richer insight into the values and motivations that shape the behavior of people in business. And third, history is a fundamental part of leadership development. Business schools claim to educate leaders, but often they simply train managers. This is because they fail to consider a key element of leadership. Leadership requires a person to have a broad perspective on the world and an understanding of how it works. As Chester Bernard argues in his classic work, *The Functions of the Executive,* business leaders must possess "the art of sensing the whole."[34] History and the study of human values help cultivate this art in students, researchers, and practitioners. Perhaps that is what Carl Taeusch was trying to teach in his unpopular, "too theoretical," "Sunday School," business ethics class.

In closing, I leave you with Taeusch's eloquent statement about the place of philosophy and historical memory in the human enterprise of business:

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[32] Sean Silverthrone, "The Lessons of Business History: A Handbook," Harvard Business School: Working Knowledge, March 17, 2008, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5849.html. In this interview Jones offers an eloquent explanation of the ways in which business history contributes to our understanding of business. Jones, a historian at HBS, also discusses the reasons why many business schools ignore business history. For an excellent source on business history, see his book: Geoffrey G. Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin, *Oxford Handbook of Business History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[33] Silverthrone, "The Lessons of Business History."

[34] Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive: 30th Anniversary Edition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 239.

> The world is in need of two types of men that it does not have in great abundance: those who are experts in technique, who contribute the ninety-five percent of perspiration necessary to carry on well the world's work, and the inspired five percent who are possessed of broad enough vision to see what there is to do. It is the latter who anticipate most of the possibilities and troubles of humanity, and in this group the philosopher should be found. And the philosopher has functioned in the past, and can still contribute his share, by directing human efforts through the channels that a useful memory and a far-reaching imagination alone can discover or construct. And when we in this practical age insist that the philosopher come down from the clouds and the mountaintops, it is not necessary that he lose his sense of direction in the market place.[35]

[35] Carl F. Taeusch, *Professional and Business Ethics* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1926), 3.

Chapter 12
Leadership and the Problem of Bogus Empowerment

Abstract and Background In the late 1990s, empowerment was a popular buzz word, especially in the popular management literature. I was skeptical of the idea because it often appeared to be another way to make the organizations seem democratic, or it was selective empowerment, which meant employees could make decisions, as long as they were the decisions that management wanted. Giving employees power, has ethical connotations. In Kantian terms, it shows respect for their autonomous will and demonstrates a high level of trust that employees will use their knowledge, skill, and judgment to serve the good of the organization. Authentic empowerment gives employees real discretion. Pretending to give employees power, but not actually doing so, is what I call bogus empowerment. For employees, it can be insulting, degrading, demoralizing, and a waste of time. My exploration of empowerment led me to the work of some of the great sociologists of the twentieth century such as C. Wright Mills, David Riesman, and Philip Rieff. Their commentaries on American culture are still relevant today, as a means of understanding the tension between individual freedom and the restrictions that employers place on it at work.

Keywords Empowerment · Ethics · Power · Social values · Niceness · Industrial relations · Sincerity · Honesty · Employee relations · Leadership

Introduction

Empowerment conjures up pictures of inspired and confident people or groups of people who are ready and able to take control of their lives and better their world. The empowered are the neighbors in a community who band together and take action to drive out drug dealers; the longtime welfare mother who gets a job and

Ciulla, Joanne B. "Leadership and the Problem of Bogus Empowerment." *Leadership and Ethics Working Papers*. The Kellogg Leadership Studies Project. Ed. Joanne B. Ciulla. College Park Maryland: University of Maryland Press, 1996.43–67.

J. B. Ciulla, *The Search for Ethics in Leadership, Business, and Beyond*,
Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_12

goes on to start a business; the child who learns to read and to ride a bike. Power is a relationship between people with mutual intentions or purposes.[1]

Empowerment is about giving people the confidence, competence, freedom, and resources to act on their own judgments. Hence, when a person or group of people is empowered, they undergo a change in their relationship to other people who hold power and with whom they share mutual goals. In a community, empowering citizens changes their relationship to each other and to other holders of power such as business and government. In a business, empowering employees changes their relationship to each other, management, and the work process.

You can hardly pick up a popular business book without seeing the words *leadership, empowerment, trust, or commitment* either on the cover or in the text. Gone are the bosses of the industrial era. Since industrialization, organizations have entered a new age where employees are partners and part of the team. Not only are managers supposed to be leaders – all employees are supposed to be leaders in their own way. This is good. It's democratic. It shows respect for persons and it sounds very ethical. So why isn't everyone happy? Why do business leaders worry about trust and loyalty? Why are employees cynical? One reason is that people are not secure in their jobs because of the recession, technology, and competition from the global labor market. The other reason, and focus of this chapter, is that in many organizations promises of empowerment are bogus. The word bogus is a term used to express anger, disappointment, and disgust over hypocrisy, lies, and misrepresentations. This is how people feel when they are told that they are being empowered, but they know that they are not. When leaders promise empowerment, they raise the moral stakes in their relationship to followers. Failure to deliver can lead to even greater cynicism about leadership, alienation, and abdication of moral responsibility by employees and/or citizens.

When you empower others, you do at least one of the following: You help them recognize the power that they already have, you recover power that they once had and lost, or you give them power that they never had before. In his study of grassroots empowerment, Richard Couto says there are two main kinds of empowerment. The first kind he calls psycho-political empowerment. It increases people's self-esteem and results in a change in the distribution of resources and/ or the actions of others. In other words, empowerment entails the confidence, desire and, most important, the ability of people to bring about real change. This is probably what most people think of when they think of empowerment. Couto calls the second form of empowerment psycho-symbolic empowerment. It raises people's self-esteem or ability to cope with what is basically an unchanged set of circumstances.[2] More often than not, leaders promise or appear to promise the first kind of empowerment but actually deliver the second.

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[1] James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 13.

[2] Richard Couto, "Grassroots Policies of Empowerment" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1992), 13.

In this chapter, I argue that authentic empowerment entails a distinct set of moral understandings and commitments between leaders and followers, all based on honesty. I begin by looking at the cultural values behind the idea of empowerment, particularly as it applies in the workplace. My primary focus is on business organizations, but much of what I have to say about the moral aspects of empowerment applies to leaders and followers in community, nonprofit, and political contexts as well. I briefly outline how the idea of empowerment has evolved in management theory and practice. Critical analysis of this history and the ways in which empowerment is manipulative and unauthentic, will then help establish some of the moral aspects of empowerment and their implications for leadership.

The Social Values Behind Empowerment

The idea of empowerment has its charm. U.S. citizens treasure democracy and its accompanying values of liberty and equality. If democracy were the only goal of empowerment, U.S. citizens would have the most democratic workplaces in the world, but they don't. As Thomas Wren points out, ever since U.S. independence, there has been a conflict between the values of equality and authority.[3] This tension is clearly evident in all organizational life. However, there are other values in our culture that shape the leadership and values of the workplace. Philosopher Charles Taylor identifies three values of the modern age that he says cause personal anxiety and social malaise. They are individualism, instrumental reason (which causes disenchantment with the world), and freedom (which people seem to be losing because of individualism and instrumentalism).[4] Ideally empowerment is what makes humans triumph over the anxiety they have over these values and provides the antidotes to the social malaise.

In the workplace are constant tensions among individualism, freedom, and instrumental value and/or economic efficiency (I count these as two aspects of the same value). In a society where people value individualism and freedom, the challenge of leadership in organizations is the challenge of leading cats, not sheep.[5] This means leaders have to use more powerful means of control than they would in a culture where people live in accepted hierarchies. For example, Americans were smitten with Japanese management in the late 1970s because it was effective and seemed so democratic. What they failed to realize was that the Japanese could afford to be democratic because the social controls imposed by hierarchy and com-

[3] J. Thomas Wren, "Historical Background of Values in Leadership," *Kellogg Working Papers* (University of Maryland, 1996).

[4] Charles Taylor, The *Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 2–9.

[5] James O'Toole, *Leading Change* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994).

munity were internalized in workers, hence requiring less overt control by managers. U.S. business leaders face the challenge of maintaining control without overtly chipping away at individualism and democratic ideals. This is why the language of empowerment is so attractive.

Economic efficiency and instrumentalism are the most powerful and divisive values in the workplace. They trump all other values, and our current faith in the market makes it difficult to sustain plausibly any other ethical values in an organization. The market is a nasty, ruthless boss. Instrumentalism or the value of getting the job done is more important than the means and people used to get it done. Business leadership is effective if it gets results. Leaders and their organizations are successful if they make the most amount of money or do the most amount of work in the least amount of time. Not only are the ends more important than the means, there is little if any room for things that have intrinsic but non-instrumental value in business. The greatest of all impediments to empowerment in business, and increasingly in all areas of life, is economic efficiency. It acts on rules that refuse to take into account special circumstances.

In addition to the values of instrumentalism, individualism, and freedom, I add a fourth social value that I call "niceness." It might sound strange to say that U.S. culture values niceness at a time when there seems to be little civility. Niceness is not civility. Historian Norbert Elias traces the origin of civility to the sixteenth-century Dutch philosopher Erasmus. His book, *De Civilitate Morum Puerilium or On Civility in Children,* chronicles the proper behavior of people in society, with a special emphasis on outward physical behavior. In short, it is an etiquette book about properly blowing one's nose, eating at the table, and relieving oneself. Published in 130 editions and translated into English, French, Czech, and German, Erasmus's book established the concept of civility as behavior that was considerate of other people in a society.[6] Immanuel Kant later points out that civility is not morality (because it doesn't require a good will), but the similitude of morality – an outward decency.[7] Civility is the behavior that citizens should have toward their fellow citizens. It includes an obligation of citizens to be polite and respectful of the private rights of others. Whereas the concept of civility develops as a form of outward consideration for others (e.g., not picking your nose in public), niceness is used as a means of gaining the favor and trust of others by showing a willingness to serve. Niceness fits the description of courtly behavior from which we get the term *courtesy.* The following selection from the *Zeldler Universal Lexicon of 1736* captures the basic elements of commercial niceness:

> The courts of great lords are a theater where everyone wants to make his fortune. This can only be done by winning favor with the prince and the most important people of his court. One therefore takes all conceivable pains to make oneself agreeable to them. Nothing does

[6] Norbert Elias, *The History of Manners* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 53–55.

[7] Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, translated by Ted Tumphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 31–32.

> this better than making the other believe that we are ready to serve him to the utmost capacity under all conditions. Nevertheless, we are not always in a position to do this, and may not want to, often for good reasons. Courtesy serves as a substitute for all this. By it we give the other so much reassurance, through our outward show, that he has a favorable anticipation of our readiness to serve him. This wins us the other's trust, from which an affection for us develops imperceptibly, as a result of which he becomes eager to do good to us.[8]

There are other distinctive facets of niceness that are embedded in the observations of social critics since the mid-twentieth century. The first element of niceness is the belief that social harmony means lack of conflict. *In An American Dilemma*, Gunnar Myrdal explains one facet of niceness. He argues that U.S. social scientists derived their idea of social harmony from liberalism based on the Enlightenment ideal of *communum bonum* or common good. Radical liberals wanted to reformulate corrupt institutions into places where natural laws could function. The radical liberal, who could be a communist, socialist, or anarchist, wanted to dismantle power structures of privilege, property, sand authority. In the utopia of the radical liberal, the concept of empowerment would not be useful. People would not need to be given power or made to feel powerful, because the restraints that institutions had on their lives would in theory be removed. However, the dominant view in the social sciences (and certainly among those who were management theorists) was conservative liberalism. The conservative liberal takes society as it is and, under the influence of economics, adopts the idea of social harmony as stable equilibrium.[9] The social scientists studied empirically observable situations and terms such as balance, harmony, equilibrium, function, and social process. They pretended that these terms gave a "do-nothing" valuation of a situation, but these words carry a veiled set of value judgments. Myrdal notes:

> When we speak of a social situation being in harmony, or having equilibrium, or its forces organized, accommodated, or adjusted to each other, there is almost inevitable implication that some sort of ideal has been attained, whether in terms of "individual happiness" or "the common welfare."[10]

Traditionally, management theorists have tacitly accepted the valuations behind these terms. Empowerment, like harmony, is assumed to be a good that brings about individual happiness. Social harmony in an organization meant accommodating and adjusting people. Conflict or disharmony was a sign of failed leadership. Niceness comes out of this one-dimensional picture of stable equilibrium and harmony. If no one complains and yells at work, then there is social harmony. Furthermore, the "do-nothing" value-free stance of social scientists is in part responsible for some of the manipulative theories and practices in management.

David Riesman captured another root of niceness in his 1950 description of the emerging U.S. character. In *The Lonely Crowd,* Riesman described inner-directed

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[8] Elias, 9.

[9] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 1046–47.

[10] Ibid., 1055.

people who can cope with society because they are directed by internal, general goals implanted in them by their elders. Riesman observed that these people are becoming far and few between. Inner-directed people have less need for empowerment because they have what they need built-in. The more prevalent character type identified by Riesman is the other-directed person. These people are shallower, friendlier, and more uncertain of themselves.[11] Other-directed people take more of their clues on values and goals from the outside: They want to be liked and have a strong need to belong.

In his book, Riesman describes a society dominated by other-directed people, in which manipulative skill overshadows craft skill and expense accounts overshadow bank accounts. Business is supposed to be fun and managers are supposed to be glad-handers who joke with staff and charm their bosses and clients. Most importantly, Riesman notes the trend that continues today of rewarding highly skilled people with management positions and power over other people. Hence the skilled engineer who gets promoted has to become a skilled glad-hander. The growth of the service industry shaped this character type into the model leader-manager and employee. To be successful in a service, one has to be friendly, likable, and nice. Since Riesman's day, bank accounts mattered more and expense accounts are smaller. What remains the same is the powerful value of the glad-hander. Our society may be less civil, and perhaps because of it niceness has been commercialized into the courtly norm of friendly bosses, bankers, and waiters all intent on gaining favor with customers and superiors to facilitate a smooth transaction.

As practiced in business, niceness consists of not getting into disputes and behaving in a commercially friendly fashion. Because people don't seem to behave this way naturally, we need the help of the therapist to attain niceness. In *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, Philip Rieff says that truth has become a highly personal matter he calls "psychic truth."[12] He thinks that *therapeutic effectiveness* has replaced the value of truth in our culture. Truths that make people feel better and help them adjust and fit in are far more desirable than truths that rock the boat. If our culture places more importance on psychic truths than on real truths, and if some "truths" or therapeutic fictions are effective because they make people happier, then leaders only have an obligation to make people *feel* empowered. They do not have to give them actual power.

It is obvious why niceness, based on therapeutic lies and conflict-free environments and a kind of bland friendliness that we experience when we go the store or a bank, is one of the values that lurk behind the history of empowerment in business for an obvious reason. Leaders often prefer the "nice" kind of empowerment to the kind that leads to chaos and loss of control. It is a form of politeness in which lead-

[11] David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950), 14–21.

[12] Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 137. A similar point is made in Robert Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), ch. 2.

ers pretend that followers have a choice. It is "would you take the time to do this?" rather than "do this," but the meaning is the same. As I have said, there is empowerment and bogus empowerment. I describe bogus empowerment as the use of therapeutic fictions to make people feel better about themselves, eliminate conflict, and satisfy their desire to belong (niceness), so that they will freely choose to work toward the goals of the organization (control of individualism), and be productive (instrumentalism). Leaders who offer bogus empowerment are insincere and disrespectful of others. They believe that they can trick followers into believing they have been given power when in fact they have none.

Empowerment and the Organization Man

The sociologist C. Wright Mills offers one of the earliest and clearest articulations of bogus empowerment: "The moral problem of social control in America today is less the explicit domination of men than their manipulation into self-coordinated and altogether cheerful subordinates."[13] Mills believed that management's real goal was to "conquer the problem of alienation within the bounds of work alienation."[14] By this he meant that the problems of the workplace had to be defined and solved in terms of the values and goals of the workplace itself. By controlling the meanings and the terms under which alienation was conquered and satisfaction found, employers could maintain control without alienating workers. William H. Whyte echoed Mills's concern about psychological manipulation in *The Organization Man*, only Whyte zeroed in on people's need to belong. The workplace of the late 1950s is both radically different from and strikingly similar to today's workplace. Whyte criticized the social ethic that makes morally legitimate the pressure of society against the individual. The social ethic rationalizes the organization's demand for loyalty and gives employees who offer themselves wholeheartedly a sense of dedication and satisfaction. The social ethic includes a belief that the group is a source of creativity. A sense of belonging is the ultimate need of the individual, and social science can create ways to achieve this sense of belonging.[15]

Whyte feared that psychologists and social engineers would strip people of their creativity and identity. He attacked the use of personality tests to weed out people who don't fit in. He also challenged the notion that organizations should be free from conflict. The critique of the workplace in Whyte's book is similar to the critiques that liberals have of communitarianism. Community-oriented life looks good, but it is ultimately oppressive and authoritarian. In the fifties social critics worried about the conformity of people to institutions and the values of suburban life. Today

[13] C. Wright Mills, "Crawling to the Top," *New York Times Book Review,* December 9, 1956.

[14] C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), 232–37.

[15] William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956), 6–7.

we worry about lack of consensus about values, political polarization, and the breakdown of urban and suburban communities. Organizations often want to build teams and emphasize the value of group work. No one seems worried about loss of creativity and submission of individual identity to group identity. Managers care more about the problem of the individual who is not a team player and most management theorists believe that groups and teams are the foundation of all that is good and productive.

Whyte says, "The most misguided attempt at false collectivization is the attempt to see the group as a creative vehicle."[16] Contrary to popular management thinking today, Whyte does not believe that people think or create groups. Groups, he says, just give order to the administration of work. Whyte describes an experiment done at the National Training Lab on leaderless groups. Theoretically, when the group "jelled," the leader would fade into the background, to be consulted for his expertise only. These groups resulted in chaos, but as Whyte puts it, the trainers hoped that the resulting "feeling draining" of the group would be a valuable catharsis and a prelude to agreement.[17] According to Whyte, the individual has to enter into the process somewhere. If everyone wants to do what the group wants to do, and nothing gets done, then the individual has to play a role in the process. However, Whyte wonders if we should openly bring individuals into the process or "bootleg," it in an expression of group sentiment. Basically, he sees the leaderless group as intellectual hypocrisy. The power and authority of groups simply mask the real power and authority of leaders.

It is useful to compare Whyte's observations to those of later studies such as James Surowiecki's book *The Wisdom of Crowds*. Surowiecki argues that crowds can make better decisions than individuals under the right conditions.[18] The conditions require that the individuals in the crowd are independent of each other, have diverse opinions, are not located in a centralized place, and have some method of aggregating opinions. As described, the crowd avoids the problems that White sees with groups in organizations. The same is true of the kind of crowdsourcing that is the backbone of creative endeavors such as Wikipedia. Technology has found a way around Whyte's problem with groups by empowering everyone individually, which has allowed groups of unrelated strangers engage in creative endeavors. This sort of empowerment does not always translate to the workplace where there is usually still a desire to control employees and behavior of individuals and groups.

In his book, Whyte also urges people to cheat on all psychological tests given during job interviews and at the workplace. He pits the individual against the organization and what he sees as the social scientist's coercive idea of belongingness. Another famous illustration of the struggle against the organization is in Sloan Wilson's novel, *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit*, published a year before Whyte's

[16] Ibid., 51.

[17] Ibid., 54.

[18] James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds* (New York: Anchor Books, 2005).

book. In the novel, a personnel manager asks the main character, Tom Rath, to write an autobiography in which the last line reads, "The most significant thing about me is …" Revolted by the exercise, Rath debates whether to say what the company wants to hear (the therapeutic lie) or write about his most significant memory, concerning a woman he met during the war. Caught between truth and fiction, Rath holds on to his dignity by stating the facts – his place of birth, his schooling, and the number of children in his family. He writes that the most significant thing about him is the fact that he is applying for the job. He also says that he does not want to write an autobiography as part of his application.[19] Rath draws a fine line between himself and the organization.

Whyte misses the moral in the first scene of Wilson's book: telling the truth strikes a much stronger blow for individual dignity than beating the organization at its own game. Wilson's novel might still resonate with students today because all of them at some time will have to decide how truthful they have to be in a job interview or with an employer and how much of themselves they are willing to give to an organization. It is sometimes difficult to tell the truth when you want someone to like you. The fine line does not concern the number of hours or work one does. It is the boundary that people draw between their inner self and the parts of them needed to do their job. It is the line that allows a person to be both an individual and part of a group. In today's workplace, it isn't always easy to draw this line, especially when social media allows people to display aspects of their personal lives and thoughts to the world. Some people discover that what they want their friends and family to know about them is not what they want their employer or future employer to know.

The Race for the Worker's Soul

In the 1960s, the centralized bureaucratic organization of the fifties gave way to the sensitive approach to management. The National Training Labs developed sensitivity training and T-Groups to transform bossy managers into participative ones. After much crawling around on the floor together and getting in touch with their inner feelings, few managers were transformed. During the seventies and eighties, management fads designed to capture the souls of workers bombarded the workplace. Fueled by global competitive pressures, managers back then were ready to try anything to increase productivity and competitiveness. In 1981, William Ouchi's *Theory* Z and Richard Pascal's and Anthony Athos's *The Art of Japanese* Management were best sellers. The "new" idea from Japan was job enrichment and quality circles – after all, it worked for the Japanese. In 1982, the mystical Eastern touch of these two books gave way to Thomas J. Peters's and Robert H. Waterman's blatantly evangelical book In Search of Excellence. Peters and Waterman realized

[19] Sloan Wilson, *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit* (New York: Arbor House, 1955), 14.

outright that the role of a manager is to make meaning for employees and create excitement. They argued that excellent organizations do not produce the conformist described by Whyte. They assure us that "In the very same institutions in which culture is so dominant, the highest levels of true autonomy occur. The culture regulates rigorously the few variables that do count, and it provides meaning."[20] Nonetheless, in these organizations people are encouraged to "stick out, to innovate." If a strong culture provided meaning, it could reach to the very souls of employees, hence allowing for great freedom and creativity within the boundaries of the culture and the meanings provided by the culture. This kind of organization is designed to foster Mills's cheerful subordinates.

In the eighties and nineties, the word *leadership* began taking the place of the word *management* in business books. The semantic change is also a conceptual change from the idea of a manager as a boss who commanded and controlled the process of production to the leader who inspires people to work toward mutual goals. Joe Rost says that in the old industrial paradigm, leadership was nothing more than good management.[21] Empowerment is at least implied in most recent articulations of leadership in business books today. What is confusing about this literature is that it continues to be written for people who usually hold the position of manager. In ordinary discourse, people talk about managers who lead and managers who manage. The carefully crafted distinctions between leaders and managers that are made in the scholarly leadership literature are not always present in popular usage. What we do see in ordinary U.S. discourse is that leadership has positive connotations and is sometimes used as an honorific, whereas management is either neutral or slightly negative.

The management fads from the 1980s until today have appealed to business leaders (and those who aspire to be business leaders) because they make them feel powerful, inspiring, adventuresome, and lovable all at the same time. The lovable leader is an attractive image, especially given the lack of respect and trust for some authority figures in business and politics today. Lovable leaders are nice because they are democratic, and they do not openly exert power over others. Practicing lovable leadership requires some therapeutic fictions. CEOs of large corporations have spent fortunes on consultants and training programs. The goal of most of the programs has been to make work seem more enjoyable and participatory and to push power relationships between employees and management into the background. All of this is done in hope of creating a more competitive business. Sometimes these programs backfire. Consider the case of Pacific Bell.

In 1987, the California Public Utilities Commission asked Pacific Bell to stop its leadership-development program. The program intended to move away from the old AT&T culture, empower low-level managers and give them more responsibilities, cut

[20] Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., *In Search of Excellence* (New York: Warner Books, 1982), 105.

[21] Joseph C. Rost, *Leadership for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Praeger, 1991).

middle managers, and become more customer-focused. At Pacific Bell 23,000 of 67,000 employees took the two-day training.[22] Charles Krone created the leadership development program that came to be called "Kroning." This New Age program aimed at getting all employees to use the same language and think at all times about the six essentials of organizational health: expansion, freedom, identity, concentration, order, and interaction. The program was based vaguely on the Armenian mystic Gurdjieff's Law of Three, which teaches that there are no constraints that can't be reconciled.[23]

After a two-month investigation of this $40 million training program, the commission reported that employees complained of brainwashing. An employee survey turned up repeated descriptions of the program as Big Brother, thought control, and mind restructuring. Employees also claimed that the Krone program used obtuse language and unnecessary concepts that made some people feel stupid. The irony was that the investigation discovered that a large majority of employees expressed a love of and commitment to Pacific Bell and mistrust of its management.[24] A Meridian survey of 2000 Pacific Bell employees concluded that top managers at Bell "blame the employees for the lack of productivity and are trying to make them think better. However, the Pacific Bell workforce already knows how to think."[25]

In 1987, *California Business* surveyed 500 corporate owners and presidents and found that half their companies used some form of consciousness-raising.[26] These programs focused on the same themes espoused today: empowerment, leadership, and positive thinking. They are distinctive because they used such unorthodox training techniques as meditation, biofeedback, and hypnosis. For example, a company called Energy Unlimited escorted executives across hot coals as a means of empowering people. Today ropes courses that claim to teach leadership and team building are popular forms of training for business, government, and educational institutions. Although many of these programs now look silly to the outsider, they have serious followers among corporate managers. Their impact on other employees is unclear. We rarely hear about cases in which employees complain about a company motivational program. That's why the Krone's scandal is so interesting.

In 2012, U.S. businesses spent an estimated $170 billion on leadership training programs.[27] Employees tend to be a captive audience: Their success in the organization is contingent on buying into these programs. Motivational human potential courses often create a short-lived sense of euphoria among employees and/or a Hawthorne effect. They raise the expectation that employees will be enriched and empowered,

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[22] Telephony, June 22, 1987, 15.

[23] Annetta Miller and Pamela Abramson, "Corporate Mind Control," *Newsweek*, May 4, 1987.

[24] Ibid., 6.

[25] Sanford Bingham, *Management,* July 1987, 14.

[26] Venture, March 1987, 54.

[27] Mike Myatt, "The #1 Reason Leadership Development Fails," Forbes *Magazine*, December 12, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemyatt/2012/12/19/the-1-reason-leadership-development-fails/

however, after the dust settles, everything seems the same until the next initiative. Today leadership training continues to have the same problems that it had in the past. As one critic of leadership training programs notes, "My problem with training is it *presumes* the need for indoctrination on systems, processes and techniques. Moreover, training *assumes* that said systems, processes and techniques are the right way to do things."[28] No training program will have the same sustainable impact unless employers treat employees as autonomous human beings capable of making decisions about how they do their work. Empowerment and/or leadership development are about helping people think critically not conform to the template of a training program or organization.

Empowerment and Participation

Discussions about worker participation, including issues such as empowerment and the team approach, derived from two sources: industrial relations research and management research (largely based on organizational behavior). On the industrial relations side, discussion in the 1970s focused on workplace democracy. Admirable models of workplace democracy included democratic worker councils employed at the time in Yugoslavian industries. These councils allowed workers to play an active part in all facets of the business. Employees even elected their own managers. Other researchers in the sixties and seventies studied worker cooperatives in hopes of finding clues to constructing new forms of truly democratic organizations.[29] The workplace-democracy advocates wanted employees to have control of the organization as a whole and to discover new possibilities for organizing work.[30] Behind their thinking was the idea that participation was central to democracy, where citizens had a say in all significant institutions, including family, school, and work.[31] Worker participation fit Couto's model of psycho-political empowerment. However, back in the Cold War era, real democracy in the workplace was considered un-American.

Researchers on the management side focused on quality of work life, job enrichment, and motivation. They were interested in giving employees more discretion over the actual task that they performed, not over the organization itself. A major emphasis was on making the employee feel good about work. This approach, which

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Two good studies of cooperatives are Joyce Rothschild and Allen Whitt, *The Cooperative Workplace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Edward S. Greenberg, *Workplace Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[30] For example, see Martin Carnoy and Derek Shearer, *Economic Democracy*: *The Challenge of the 1980s* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, Inc., 1980); and Gerry Hunnius, G. David Garson, and John Case (Eds.), *Workers' Control* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

[31] See Carol Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

is usually emphasized in business schools, aimed toward therapeutic effectiveness and tended to fall into Couto's category of psycho-symbolic empowerment. One of the biggest problems with empowerment schemes is that the language used often raises unrealistic expectations about how much power and control employees actually gain over their work. They also fail to see any change in their relationship to other powerholders. When employees discover the limits of their participation, they are disappointed. Even employees who have a high level of expertise find initiatives that are feasible and beneficial to the organization overridden, by people who know less but have either positional or political power. It is also the case that employees may suggest changes on the production line, but not changes in their work hours. Many managers were ambivalent about giving away their own supervisory power.

The 1935 Labor Relations Act recognized the need to protect workers from bogus empowerment of participatory programs. Under it, quality circles and other similar participatory schemes are illegal unless employees have the right to choose their representatives and have a genuine voice in decisions. The act prohibited "sham unions" or in-house unions formed by employers attempting to keep out real unions. Because it is obvious to most people today that employers have to forge a cooperative partnership with employees to be competitive, the 1935 act may look like an atavism that ought to be eliminated. However, the law recognized that companies prefer cooperation and participation of their employees on their own terms. Most important, companies fear the loss of control that would come with unionization. In most businesses, empowering employees does not change the balance of power within the organization. Unions are still the only institution in history that ever addressed the asymmetry of power between employers and employees. Unions can be a strong form of empowerment because they give employees an independent voice over things like salaries, work hours, and work rules that terrifies most employers. Businesses have always feared the power of unions, and in the United States, they have been very successful at demonizing unions. Businesses have fairly and unfairly held unions responsible for their own failures and inability to be competitive in a global economy. In recent years, politicians have jumped on the bandwagon and blamed public service unions for the deterioration of K-12 education and budget deficits in state and local governments.

Management language in the 2000s is a continuation of terms that started in the 1960s. We have moved from the concept of *worker* involvement or participation to *empowerment* to the now over-used term leadership. Employees are now called upon to be leaders, but leadership like empowerment does not mean much without the power to actually do things such as make real choices and initiate changes on the job. The emphasis on power in all of these concepts gets at what most business leaders failed to deliver despite their claims over the past 30 years. What has become abundantly clear in research done on productivity is that workers do a better job when they have a say in the way they do their work, the redesign of their jobs, and the introduction of technology into the workplace. Research has also shown that employees work better when they see the meaning of their work or understand

impact of their work on others.[32] Yet, over the past century, some managers and management theorists seem constantly amazed by this, which tells us something about the respect they have for their employees.

At this point, some readers may be irritated by the cynical and unkind portrayal of management practices that most people consider a vast improvement over scientific management and traditional bureaucratic forms of work. Clearly there are sincere and committed business leaders all over the United States who really respect their employees and try to make their work more rewarding. I do not claim that all of the management theories and programs of the past 100 years or so have been designed to fool the U.S. worker, nor am I saying that all of the social scientists behind these theories and the consultants who develop these programs are evil manipulators. Yet I do ask the reader to consider the irony that despite the effort and resources put into empowerment programs, workplaces today are not much more democratic or participatory than they were 50 years ago. Not all empowerment and leadership initiatives are intended to manipulate people. Some leaders really do want to empower their followers. However, to do so they must be sincere and authentic.

Sincerity and Authenticity

In his book, *Sincerity and Authenticity*, Lionel Trilling notes that the public value of sincerity, like the concept of civility, emerged during the sixteenth century, a period of increasing social mobility in England and France. The art of acting with guile and expressing certain false emotions publicly became a tool for taking advantage of new social opportunities. Trilling says that sincerity was devalued when mobility and acting became accepted behaviors in a mobile society. People considered the sincere person stupid and unsophisticated. Audiences were no longer interested in seeing plays about "hypocrite-villains and conscious dissemblers."[33] It was more interesting to read or watch plays about self-deception. Authenticity replaced the notion of sincerity as a subject of dramatic interest. Hence, it is not surprising that the concept of authenticity would become prominent in the leadership literature.[34] This literature assumes that leaders who are "true to themselves" would be ethical

[32] Adam Grant, "Leading with Meaning," *Academy of Management Journal* 55, no. 2 (April 2012): 458–76.

[33] Lionel Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 13.

[34] B. J. Avolio and T. S. Wernsing, "Practicing Authentic Leadership." In *Positive Psychology: Exploring the Best in People*, edited by S. J. Lopez (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 147–65.

and effective. Most studies show that they tend to be effective, but authenticity is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for being an ethical leader."[35]

According to Trilling, we have deprecated the value of sincerity by treating it as such a common commodity in society and the market place. If this is true, then the really valuable emotional commodities are authenticity and "true" emotions. Thus, either people who serve customers will require even better acting skills, or training will have to dig even deeper into the employee to evoke the appropriate real emotions. If training programs could get at people's real feelings, find the hot buttons, employees would either no longer have to act, or they could engage in "deep acting." This may be the real reason for the use of intrusive motivational programs like the Krone program. It also lurks in the background of the ideology of strong cultures. Make the workplace your family and carry to it all the sense of caring and responsibility that you feel naturally for family members. Although this sounds sinister, it is true that most organizations want their employees to have a certain "genuine" feeling about their work, the people they work with, and the organization. At Pacific Bell, employees really cared and were concerned about the company. Perhaps one thing that we learn from the Krone's case is that attempts at engineering appropriate attitudes and emotions can actually undercut genuine feelings for a company. If a workplace is run honestly, people do care and are friendly; however, their emotions have to be free to be real. Nonetheless, the broader issues at stake remain the line between motivation and manipulation of emotions, and the claims that an organization can make on the inner self and emotions of an employee.

The principle of authenticity applies to organizations as well as individuals and leaders. Often motivational programs and leadership programs are just polite lies within a company. Employee involvement programs and redesigned jobs benefit employees by making their work more interesting. They intend to make employees feel empowered and feel that the organization cares about their development. Nonetheless, there is a difference between feeling empowered and really being empowered. One wonders if employees willingly buy into the fiction of empowerment because of their own need to believe that they have power and control. If so, symbolic empowerment works because employees are unauthentic.

Honesty and Security

The obvious difference between authentic and bogus empowerment rests on the honesty of the relationship between leaders and followers. Honesty entails a set of specific practical and moral obligations and is a necessary condition for empower-

[35] Joanne B. Ciulla, "Searching for Mandela: The Saint as a Sinner Who Keeps on Trying." In Authentic Leadership: Clashes, Convergences and *Coalescences*, edited by Donna Ladkin and Chellie Spiller (Northampton, CT: Edward Elgar, 2013), 152–75.

ment. In the beginning, I outlined three social values behind empowerment: individualism; freedom; and instrumentalism and economic efficiency. The fourth value, which encompasses the first three, I have called niceness. I characterized the value of niceness as a kind of self-interested social harmony, commercial friendliness, and therapeutic truth. All the values color the way people view the context of their work. To empower people, leaders must take into account the social and economic conditions under which they operate.

In some ways, employees today have more power. On the one hand, the use of and access to information technologies in the workplace give employees far more power than they had in the past. On the other hand, computerized control systems can impose even stricter discipline on workers and replace layers of management. Power shifts occur inside organizations not necessarily because one group intentionally gives up power, but because the demands of technology and economic efficiency require a new distribution of power. Why does this matter? It matters because empowerment requires good faith. It is a kind of giving. You do not tell people that you are giving them power that they have already gotten through structural and technological changes.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to empowerment today is job insecurity. The social contract that once said, if you do your job well, you can keep it no longer exists. In an era of high unemployment, employers have the upper hand, wages stagnate, and employees often ask for and expect little from employers when the chances of getting another job look bleak. The threat of not getting a good job strikes fear into the hearts of all workers because it reminds them of the fundamental way in which they are totally powerless over their lives, especially when business leaders claim that they are powerless to do anything but cut their workforces. It would seem difficult to empower people in organizations that do not at least attempt to find ways to keep their workers employed through good times and bad. The economic orthodoxy that says labor is *the* expendable variable and that cutting labor costs is the most rational way to save money, balance the budget, or be competitive is so entrenched in business that it sounds crazy to suggest otherwise. Nonetheless, workers who lack security also lack power. They need both to produce the creative and innovative products needed to be competitive in the world market. Although many companies try smoke and mirror leadership or empowerment programs, moral action is stronger and longer lasting than therapeutic intervention.

Empowerment as a Reciprocal Moral Agreement

When leaders really empower people, they give them the responsibility that comes with that power. But this does not mean that with less power, leaders have less responsibility. This point is often misunderstood. Perhaps one of the most ethically distinctive features of being a leader is that leaders are responsible for the actions of

their followers. For example, transformational leaders don't have less responsibility for their followers when they transform them; the followers have chosen to take on more. Couto offers a good example of a bogus empowerment relationship. Couto says he listened in amazement as a hospital administrator "told federal health-policy makers about her hospital's patient advocacy program that empowered low-income patients to find means to pay their hospital bills."[36] Is the administrator really giving people power, or is she simply unloading the hospital's moral responsibility on them? In the workplace, employees can only take full responsibility if they have the power and access to resources to influence outcomes. Empowerment programs that give employees responsibility without control are cruel and stressful. Real empowerment gives employees control over outcomes so that they can be responsible for their work.

When empowering employees, leaders must keep their promises. The best way to do this is to make promises that they can keep. When leaders empower employees, they need to be clear about the extent of that power and avoid the temptation of engaging in hyperbole about the democratic nature of the organization. An organization can always give employees more responsibility, but employees feel betrayed when they discover that they have been given less than the leadership's rhetoric implied. A leader who keeps his or her promises establishes the dependability necessary for trust. Leadership rests on two ideals that often conflict with each other – trust and power.[37] Trust has taken over from authority as the modern foundation of leadership. The moral concepts behind empowerment – responsibility, trust, respect, and loyalty – are reciprocal moral concepts; that is, they only exist if they are part of the relationship between followers and leaders. Like all the other moral principles that I have been examining in relationship to leadership and empowerment, they are related to truth and honesty. Honesty is one way to resolve the tension between power and trust. It is morally wrong to lie because lying shows lack of respect for the dignity of a person. This is why bogus empowerment is so devastating. Employees are made to feel foolish about falling for inflated claims and undelivered promises. Leaders lose credibility and respect because they have blatantly failed to respect their employees. Business leaders often overlook the reciprocal nature of these moral concepts, particularly the notion of loyalty or commitment. If leaders don't demonstrate in substantive ways that they are loyal and committed to their employees through good times and bad, they simply cannot expect employees to be loyal to them, and therapeutic interventions will be short-lived at best.

Lastly, if leaders are to establish a moral relationship with employees that allows for authentic empowerment, they need to think about constructively reapplying the traditional values behind empowerment. They must consider how to protect individualism even in team settings. Individualism has many flaws when it is selfish and

[36] Couto, 2.

[37] See Francis Sejersted, "Managers as Consultants and Manipulators: Reflections on the Suspension of Ethics," *Business Ethics Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (January 1996): 77.

uncaring, but there are some ethically important aspects to individualism, such as recognition and tolerance of difference and diversity.[38] Teamwork without tolerance of difference in opinion, gender, racial, or cultural background is unacceptable. Morally imaginative business leaders should challenge the dogma of instrumentalism and economic efficiency that sometimes mindlessly dominates all business decisions. It is difficult to say whether employees are more or less free on the job today than they were in the past. Although many are liberated from harsh physical toil and a dictatorial boss, others are caged in by competition, job insecurity, and peer pressure. Empowerment means more than discretion on the job. It also requires freedom from emotional manipulation, freedom to choose, and most importantly real viable choices.

To empower people authentically, business leaders have to be ready to overthrow some of the aspects of niceness. The truth is not always pleasant. It can disrupt the harmony of an organization and introduce conflict. When you really empower people, you don't just empower them to agree with you. Employees don't always feel good when they hear the truth and leaders don't like to deliver bad news. As a result of the therapeutic fictions that are part of niceness, managers aren't forthright in their assessment of employees' work and teachers aren't forthright about the quality of their students' work. Assessment inflation makes people feel good in the short run, but it does not build the self-esteem necessary for empowerment in the long run.

I close with the notion of authenticity. Leaders cannot empower people unless they have the moral courage to be honest and sincere in their intention to change the power relationship that they have with their followers. If leaders want to be authentic about empowering people, they must first be honest with themselves. Too many leaders are not authentic. They talk about empowerment and participation and even believe that they are participatory, but in practice they lead in autocratic ways. Employees are "empowered" to organize their work but when they do, management steps in and tells them how to do it their way.

James MacGregor Burns uses Franklin Roosevelt's decision to support the Wagner Act as an example of authentic empowerment. According to Burns, Roosevelt knew that giving people the right to organize into unions, gave a substantial amount of power to the people. He didn't necessarily like this fact; nevertheless, he supported the act.[39] Authentic empowerment requires leaders to know what they are giving away and how they are changing the relationship between themselves and their followers. This is the only way that they can commit to keeping their part of the empowerment relationship. It is difficult for leaders to give away their own power and even more difficult for them to take away power from others.

Leadership is a distinct kind of moral relationship between people. Power is a defining aspect of this relationship. Whenever there is a change in the distribution of power between leaders and followers, there is a change in the specific rights, respon-

[38] Taylor, 37.

[39] My thanks to James MacGregor Burns for this example and for his other helpful comments on the first formulation of this paper.

sibilities, and duties in the relationship. Both sides have to be honest when they make these changes and have to fully understand what they mean. Bogus empowerment attempts to give employees or followers power without changing the moral relationship between leaders and followers.

Empowerment changes the rights, responsibilities, and duties of leaders as well as followers. It is not something one does to be nice to gain favor with people. For decades business leaders have tried to harness the insights of psychology to make people feel empowered. These attempts have often failed and led to cynicism among employees because business leaders have ignored the moral commitments of empowerment. Without honesty, sincerity, and authenticity, empowerment is bogus, and it makes a mockery of one of America's most cherished values, the freedom to choose.

Chapter 13
The Moral Conditions of Work

Abstract and Background In 2000, I wrote *The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work.* The book explored the history of work and how people find meaning in it. Whether meaningful work has objective qualities and conditions that are always present when people experience it, or whether it is purely subjective, is an open question. I settled on the idea that meaningful work was in the eye of the beholder. We know it when we have it, because it has a way of lighting up our lives or making the time that we spend working good in a certain way. If this sounds fuzzy, it's because it is. Given the variety of people and what they find meaningful, I was not ready to proclaim what meaningful work is for everyone. There are, however, certain aspects of work that tend to make it meaningful, such jobs that help others or creative work.

Around 17 years after I wrote this book, I was invited to write a chapter for the *Oxford Handbook on Meaningful Work*. It was nice to revisit the topic, especially since there was more literature on work by philosophers than there was before 2000. The first thing I noticed about some of the philosophical discussions, was that the conditions for meaningful work were often the moral conditions of work, such as being treated with respect, having discretion over one's work, and being treated fairly. In this chapter, I separate the moral conditions of work, from the qualities and conditions of meaningful work. Being treated ethically at work is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for people to find meaning in their work, however, the moral conditions of work apply to everyone. I show how the moral conditions of work are the objective qualities that people use to evaluate meaningful work. They should not be confused with the subjective qualities and conditions of meaningful work that depend on individual talents, dispositions, and preferences.

Keywords Ethics and work · Meaningful work · Leisure · Freedom · Wages · Worthy work · Meaningful life · Intrinsic and instrumental value

Ciulla, Joanne B. "The Moral Conditions of Work," The Oxford Handbook on Meaningful Work," Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 23–35.

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Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_13

Introduction

> Neither Famine nor disaster ever haunt men who do true justice; but lightheartedly they tend the fields which are all their care. Hesiod, eighth century BC. (Hesiod 2008)

There is little that is self-evident about the concept of meaningful work. What is it? Is it something you get or something you find or make? How do you know when you have it? Does everyone want it? Does everyone need it? Does everyone have a right to it? Is it unethical to not have meaningful work? Moreover, who decides what it is? Is it something that rests in "the eye of the beholder"? Such questions drag us into a maze of philosophical speculation. Yet, wandering in this maze can be quite useful for understanding what separates meaningful work from ethical work. While some aspects of meaningful work are socially constructed and dependent on context, the values of a culture, and the values and preferences of individuals – the basic ethical conditions of work – are not. No matter who you are, where you are, or what kind of work you do, certain moral conditions apply.

In this chapter, I argue that by separating ethical work or the moral conditions of work from the concept of meaningful work, we avoid some of the problems with objective and subjective characterizations of it. By ethical work or the moral conditions of work, I am talking about such things as whether an employer respects the autonomy of employees, treats them fairly, pays a living wage, offers reasonable working hours, and does not engage in practices that cause physical or mental harm to employees. I want to show how the ethics of a workplace, while related to meaningful work, are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for meaningful work. They are, however, are important for being able to seek meaning in work and life.

The Meanings of Work

Let us begin by examining the meaning of work. The problem with the word "work" is that it can mean just about any activity and any product of an activity. It comes from the Old English noun *woerc* and verb *wyrcan*, which date back to the tenth century. A now obsolete definition of work characterizes it as "Action (of a person) in general; doings deeds conduct" (OED 1933: 285). *The Oxford English Dictionary* offers nine pages of definitions of work. Its first definition is only a bit more specific: "something that is or was done; what a person does or did; an act, deed, proceeding, business" (OED 1933). *The Random House Dictionary* weighs in with 54 definitions and starts with a more physical definition, "exertion or effort directed to produce or accomplish something; labor; toil" (Random House 1987: 2188–9), while *Webster's New Unabridged Dictionary* gives 45 definitions. Its first one portrays work with a teleological twist: "bodily or mental effort exerted to do or make something, purposeful activity; labor; toil" (Webster's 1983: 2107). These tallies of

definitions do not even include com pound words, such as workday, workbook, work bag. Since work refers to so many kinds of activities, determining what constitutes meaningful work can be daunting. Furthermore, the same activity can be work for one person and play for another. A group of children playing soccer is play, whereas a professional soccer team playing a match is work. Aristotle characterizes work as a necessary activity and leisure as a free activity. Work is an activity that has to be done, for a particular reason and often at a particular time and in a particular place. The necessity may also be internal to the person – "I must express myself through my art" – or external – "I have to be at work between 9 and 5."

Slavery represents the most extreme form of necessity. Free people work for a living; the slave works to stay alive. Aristotle says slavery makes people less than human because they are unable to exercise the capacities that make humans distinct from brute beasts, such as the ability to make choices, deliberate, and plan for the future (Aristotle 1984c: 1999). Slaves, he says, have no share in happiness because they have no control over their lives (Aristotle 1984c: 2032). Despite his chilling description of a slave, Aristotle notes that the most effective way to motivate slaves is to offer them their freedom as a prize sometime in the future (Aristotle 1984a: 2132). He says that once slaves gain their freedom, they recover their humanity, which includes their ability to choose and plan for the future. How many workers in the world today lack the ability to decide and deliberate at work? And among them, how many are engaged in employment that is so tenuous and pays so little that they lack the ability to plan for the future?

Aristotle also realized that personality affects how people approach life. He observed that some people have slavish personalities because they do not want to make their own choices (Aristotle 1984c). Henry Ford made a similar point when he said that some people are not cut out to do creative work (Yeoman 2014). This raises some of the same questions we find in the philosophic discussion of meaningful work. Is there meaningful work for people who simply want to be told what to do and get paid at the end of the week? What if some people simply neither want or need meaningful work? Are they misguided? Do they need to be set straight, or are there external factors that made them this way that need to be changed? Moreover, can such people lead meaningful lives?

The Meaning of Leisure

Leisure offers us another way to think about the nature of work. According to Aristotle, leisure consists of activities that are freely chosen and good in themselves and for no other purpose. Listening to music for pure enjoyment is one such pursuit. Aristotle believed that leisure was necessary for human happiness. He said we conduct business (or are "unleisurely") so that we can have leisure (Aristotle 1984b:

1861). Leisure brings out what is best and most distinctive about our humanity, such as our ability to think, feel, reflect, create, and learn. He said we need education to learn how to use our leisure and we need leisure to develop wisdom. Aristotle's ideal of leisure sounds a bit like meaningful work.

The word "school" is derived from the Greek word for leisure, *skolé*. The Latin word for leisure is *otium*. In both languages, the word for work is simply the negation of the word for leisure, *ascholia* and *negotium* or "not leisure" (Pieper 1952: 27). This is also true in contemporary Spanish where *negocio*, the word for business, means "no leisure." The Greek, Latin, and Spanish words compare work to leisure as if to say that leisure is the center of life. The English word "leisure" captures its association with freedom. It comes from the Latin term *licere*, which means "to be permitted." It is as if work is the center of life and leisure is when we are "permitted" to stop working and do what we want. As the British essayist G. K. Chesterton quipped, there are three parts to leisure. "The first is being allowed to do something. The second is being allowed to do anything and the third (and perhaps most rare and precious) is being allowed to do nothing" (Chesterton 1929: 130). Looking at language reveals how culture can determine where people look for meaningful things to do in life.

This takes us back to the original problem with the meaning of work. It refers to all types of activities, whether they are part of paid employment or free time. Sociologist Sebastian de Grazia notes that few people know how to use their leisure to do meaningful things because they need the structure of employment, education, or other factors (de Grazia 1962: 266). The other reason people today may not cultivate meaningful work in their free time is because they spend most of their waking hours working and lack the energy and perhaps the will to do meaningful work on their days off. Perhaps the inability of people to use their free time as Aristotelian leisure is why we look to work for meaning.

Freedom and Necessity

This discussion of work and leisure offers a way to narrow down the idea of meaningful work. The reason why it is such a complicated idea is because when most people write about it, they write about paid employment, which is an activity that is always tied to necessity in a way that leisure activities are not. Paid employment involves necessity, but it is also associated with three freedoms – freedom to work, freedom at work, and freedom from work (Ciulla 2000: 75). We may freely choose to work for a company, but in doing so, we do not always freely choose to do everything that is required of us – i.e. some days we may prefer to sleep late rather than show up on time. We also need to have the freedom to not work, something that the slave and sometimes even employees do not have because they fear getting fired.

The question here is whether the necessity of most work arrangements is a serious constraint on a person's freedom (such as not being able to sleep late), or simply

a characteristic of moral action, such as having a duty to show up on time. Christine Korsgaard characterizes the latter this way: "when we actually choose the particular actions demanded of us, we often manifestly do not want to do them. And yet we do them, all the same: the normativity of obligation is, among other things, a psychological force," which is what Kant calls necessitation (Korsgaard 2009: 3).

The nature of the job limits our freedom and autonomy, and the agreements that we make with employers create a moral obligation to live up to the terms of employment. Hence, the real challenge of characterizing meaningful work is not about work that we might freely do during our leisure, it is grappling with the constrained autonomy of paid work and how these constraints affect our ability to lead meaningful lives (see Brief and Nord 1990: 171–99). The question of meaningful paid work is important today, first, because we spend most of our lives working. Second, not everyone has the time and the ability to use their freedom to engage in the Aristotelian ideal of leisure. And third, people have different values, capacities, and live in different social contexts.

Objective and Subjective Meanings

The idea of work is easier to pin down than the idea of meaningful work. Meaning is internal or subjective – people differ on what they find meaningful. Yet it is also external or objective in that what goes on in the world shapes what we do and do not find meaningful. A subjectivist approach to meaning says that people determine meaningful conditions and that they have a favorable attitude toward wanting, getting, or setting a goal of achieving something (Metz 2001). Richard Taylor (1991) uses the example of Sisyphus to illustrate the subjectivity of meaningless and meaningful work. Sisyphus is condemned by the gods to spend his life pushing a large stone up a hill. The stone is so big that he never gets it to the top and it rolls back down. His punishment is meaningless work and a meaningless existence. The basic story of Sisyphus focuses on the nature of his task and the way that he experiences the task as punishment.

Taylor then offers two other variations on the story. Suppose the stones get to the top of the hill and then they are used to build a temple that will last for the ages. Then Sisyphus's labor has a purpose, but Taylor says purpose is not enough – building the pyramids did not make the lives of slaves meaningful. Taylor and others agree that you need more than purpose to make work meaningful (see also Kekes 1986: 81). Even with a purpose, there is still a problem with all of that rock pushing. Yet, sometimes understanding what your task means to others strengthens your sense of purpose and perhaps makes the work meaningful to you too.

Researchers have studied how purpose motivates workers. In a longitudinal field experiment, Adam Grant et al. studied callers in a fundraising organization. They had one group of callers meet with the grateful beneficiaries of the organization's work, while the control group simply read thank you letters from them. The group

that met with the beneficiaries spent 142% more time on the phone and raised 71% more money than the control group (Grant et al. 2007). Meeting the recipients and hearing their stories animated the purpose of the callers' work and influenced how they went about their work. Their relationship with the recipients made them see what their job meant to others, but it may or may not have made it meaningful to the callers.

We might also imagine a woman who is bored with her life, which she has dedicated to running a charity. She only continues with her work because she has nothing else to do. An admirer writes a book about her that extols her dedication and the good that she has done for society. The woman reads the book and discovers that other people think her work is meaningful, but it still does not make it meaningful to her (Ciulla 2000: 214). This raises the question: if meaningful work is objective, is it possible for someone to do meaningful or meaningless work and not know it? Some humanistic psychologists might say "yes," because their research has found that a "surprisingly high percentage of the population" are what they call existentially indifferent. They do not know, seek, or maybe even care about meaning. Psychologist Tatjana Schnell characterizes existential indifference as "a state of low meaningfulness that is not associated with a crisis of meaning" (Schnell 2010: 351). The mental health of these people is not worse than that of others and they do not report depression or anxiety. Explaining to existentially indifferent people that their work is meaningful still may not make it so for them.

Taylor's third and more interesting case asks us to imagine that the gods implant Sisyphus with an obsession for rolling stones up hills. Rock pushing becomes his sole desire. He finds it intrinsically good and he is now able to get what he wants out of life. Philosopher Susan Wolf argues that even if Sisyphus finds his work meaningful, the task is still pointless and hence it has no value because it does not "contribute to something bigger than oneself" (Wolf 2010). For Wolf, meaningful work is objective in the sense that it must have a purpose and a value. She says Sisyphus may be happy, but he is not doing meaningful work. Robert Nozick agrees that meaning is not strictly a personal matter. He believes that it depends on how well people connect with things outside themselves that are valuable. For Nozick there are "opportunity costs" to leading a valuable life, yet a valuable life leaves something behind (Nozick 1981: 596). So according to Nozick, the woman who spends her life doing charity leads a valuable life, even if she doesn't think so. Wolf might say that the woman does meaningful work even if she does not find her work meaningful.

Of course, if meaningful work were only objective, then we could say Sisyphus and the charity worker are simply wrong about their assessment of their work. While other people may influence what is meaningful to us, they certainly do not determine it. This is why I agree with Wolf and others that there are subjective and objective aspects to meaningful work, or as Wolf neatly puts it, meaningful activity "occurs when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness" (Wolf 1997: 224). In the above cases the subjective attraction does not meet the objective attraction. Whether people find their work meaningful depends on what they bring to the table and where their table sits in the world. It depends on personal values and

personal qualities such as personality, emotional makeup, education, imagination, curiosity, etc. When something is meaningful, we use our energy and resources to do what we think is important to us – actions that help us understand who we are (Wolf 1997: 212–13).

The Meaning of a Paycheck

Some people care more about the meaning of their paycheck and the life that it allows them to live than the meaning of the work that they do. This leads us to the question: does pay compensate for meaningless work? To answer this, consider yet another variation of the Sisyphus story. Suppose the gods pay Sisyphus to push the rock up the hill every day and Sisyphus uses the money to support his family. He is still not free, his work is still pointless, but his compensation has a point. This gets us much closer to what "meaningless work" means for many people. Women employed in a sweatshop may do the same task over and over again but the problem with sweatshops is not the meaning less work, it is the poor treatment of employees and wages that barely keep them and their families alive. These are problems with the moral conditions of work, they are not about meaningful work.

The instrumental value of a meaningless job raises the question of whether it is possible for someone to do meaningless work and use the pay from it to lead a meaningful life? Philosopher Ruth Yeoman argues that this kind of compensation argument fails (Yeoman 2014). She thinks that there are objective conditions for meaningful work and points to numerous studies that show how meaningless work deprives people of the opportunity to develop their capabilities, which can lead to a variety of social, physical, and mental harms. She says that meaningless work affects an employee's autonomy, their ability to exercise judgment, and it undermines their sense of self-efficacy in the world. Lastly, Yeoman draws on literature on the psychology of work and organizational studies to argue that meaningful work is important for our ability to experience well-being and engage in respectful and meaningful relationships with others. Yeoman says that meaningful work should provide people with dignity, autonomy, and freedom, and concludes that meaningful work is a fundamental human need. I agree with Yeoman that work that inflicts the harms that she outlines is wrong, but not because the work is meaningless but mainly because of the way these employees are treated on the job. While I agree that people find dignity, autonomy, and freedom in meaningful work, we can also imagine an employer who treats employees with dignity and gives them freedom and autonomy on a job that involves doing a mindless and repetitive task. You can have the moral aspects of Yeoman's meaningful work without actually engaging in interesting or meaningful work, and the reverse is also true.

Yeoman also points out that because of various social factors, there is an unfair distribution of meaningful work that affects the development of capabilities in people and diminishes their well-being. In a similar vein, Adina Schwartz argues that if "a just society respects all members as autonomous agents," then society should not

allow mind-numbing industrial labor that undercuts self-esteem, personal autonomy, and the ability of people to pursue good lives (Schwartz 1982: 635). Samuel Arnold also makes a social justice argument that it does not matter whether you are talking about white or blue-collar work; he believes that there can be permissible occupational equalities as long as workers can share in the goods of job "complexity, authority, and responsibility" (Arnold 2012). He focuses on changing what John Rawls calls the "powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility and authority in the workplace" (Arnold 2012: 95). This too gets at questions about power, justice, respect for persons, and the morality of the way that work is structured. Arnold believes that work can be rearranged so that employers eliminate division of labor that makes a job mindless, hierarchy that makes workers powerless, and provide autonomy over their work which gives them responsibility. By changing the moral conditions and power structures of organizations, Arnold thinks even boring jobs can be made better, but he also wants to make the work itself more complex or interesting.

The arguments against pay as compensation for meaningless work center on the concern that meaningless work diminishes the development of our capabilities and our ability to lead meaningful lives. While I agree that meaningful work can make life better, I am not ready to say that its absence keeps people from leading meaningful lives. In real terms, what people get paid for their work often has more of a positive impact on their lives than what they do on the job. It is interesting to note that Schwartz's paper, written in 1982, uses empirical studies from the late 1970s and early 1980s to support her arguments. Back then, there was still a large number of unionized industrial workers in America. It is ironic that in the twenty-first century, some of these former industrial workers long to go back to the "meaningless work" in those factories because they were paid better than the jobs that are available to them now and they were protected by unions. Many of these displaced industrial workers even voted for a president who unrealistically promised that they would get their old jobs back. With what they earned, twentieth-century American industrial workers were able to buy houses, send their children to college, and go on vacation. While their lives might have been better if they did not have to do mind-numbing work, these industrial workers did not appear to lead meaningless lives.

Writing in the later part of the twentieth century, psychologist Frederick Herzberg found that job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are not opposites, but separate things. Job satisfaction is a function of the content or the intrinsic value of the job that you do – this is related to meaningful work. Dissatisfaction with work is usually a function of external factors, which he called hygiene factors, such as inadequate pay, dirty or unsafe working conditions, and mean and disrespectful managers – this is related to the ethical conditions of work (Herzberg 1966). If you improved the hygiene factors of the workplace, offered better pay and benefits, a physically pleasing workplace, and understanding managers, workers would *not* be dissatisfied. Unions addressed these hygiene factors, which are the moral conditions of work such as safety, fair pay, work hours, and benefits. When managers abused employees, the unions stood up for them. While not morally perfect, unions mitigated the asymmetry of power between employers and employees.

The Moral Conditions of Work

The case of industrial workers in America and Hertzberg's distinction between the intrinsic value of the job and hygiene factors lead to what I think is the real problem with understanding meaningful work. If you set aside the factors related to job design such as complexity, creativity, and discretion over the tasks of work, most of the factors in the objective assessment of meaningful work are really about the moral conditions of work. They include everything from being treated fairly and with respect, to having personal autonomy on the job, to working in safe environments. When an employer exploits it employees and forces them to work 60 h a week, when managers harass employees and treat them like mindless children, and when employees have no say in how they do their job, they go home beaten and broken, not because their work is meaningless but because the conditions of their employment are mean (Arnold and Bowie 2003).

Yet, we still cannot underestimate the meaning of earning a wage and, more importantly, earning a living wage. Consider the immigrant who works two meaningless full-time jobs to build a better life for her children. If the two jobs yield a living wage, there is hope. The fact that one full-time job does not allow her to live is a far more serious problem than the nature of her job. The nineteenth-century designer William Morris said that work can be either a "lightening to life" or a "burden to life." The difference lies in the fact that in the first case there is hope, while in the second there is none. According to Morris, hope makes people want to work and it makes work worth doing. He says, "Worthy work carries with it the *hope* of pleasure in rest, the *hope* of pleasure in our using what it makes, and the *hope* of pleasure in our daily creative skill" (Morris 1985 [1885]: 21). We can translate this list as time off, or freedom from work, the ability to buy things, and freedom at work. Of the three, the last is about meaningful work while the first two are about the moral conditions of employment and wages. On Morris's account, the immigrant does not do worthy work, but she does it for a worthy reason.

The moral conditions of work make a job worthy of having a human being do it. The practical and/or moral value of a job make it worthwhile or worth spending time doing. Yet, as I have been arguing, while worthy and worthwhile work may facilitate or accompany meaningful work, they are not always necessary and they are never sufficient conditions for it (Ciulla 2012: 115–31). As Metz notes, "it is plausible to think that Van Gough's life was made more meaningful by posthumous recognition and appreciation, but that the later did not make his tormented life any more worthwhile" (Metz 2012: 446).

Moreover, some of the same harms of doing meaningless work are even worse for people who do not have the freedom to work because of the economy, the limitations of their education, or other factors. Sociologist William Julius Wilson observes that when work is scarce, people not only suffer from poverty, they "lose their feeling of connectedness to work in the formal economy; they no longer expect work to be a regular and regulating force in their lives" (Wilson 1996: 52). Wilson says when jobless people live in low-employment neighborhoods, they lose their percep-

tion of self-efficacy or their belief that they can take steps to achieve goals required in a certain situation (Wilson 1996: 75). So according to Wilson, work itself means more than just meeting material needs. It also satisfies various psychological and social needs such as discipline, connectedness, regularity, and self-efficacy. Hence, when we consider the idea of meaningful work, we should not ignore the meaning of working. Getting paid a living wage for work and working 40 h a week or less has significance in that it opens up a space for hope and maybe something more (Ciulla 2000).

The Moral and the Meaningful

I have been illustrating why many of the factors that philosophers discuss in regard to meaningful work are really about the ethical conditions of work. The ethical factors of meaningful work are objective and universal. It is always wrong to treat people unfairly and without respect, make them do things or work long hours that are dangerous to their physical and mental health, and place excessive constraints on their freedom and autonomy. This is true for workers who are employed to do interesting, valuable, and creative tasks and those who do mindlessly boring ones. Most theories of meaningful work are normative theories about the conditions of work in addition to subjective and objective assessments of the types and aspects of work that make it meaningful (see, for example, Roessler 2012).

The moral conditions under which people work have always had an impact on people's lives – from the forced labor of slaves, to the deskilling of labor during the industrial revolution, to today's on-demand and contract workers (Todolí-Signes 2017). Throughout history, employers have intentionally or unintentionally undercut, eliminated, or tried to manipulate meaningful work. As Karl Marx said, labor under capitalism alienates people from their work and their species essence (Marx 2005). Employers rarely design jobs so that they require the intelligence, creativity, and judgment of employees unless they are convinced that this will up productivity, lower costs, and/or increase profits. While some employers have the imagination to see beyond the narrow confines of efficiency into the ways that they can get profit by making the work interesting, this has not always been the case (Barley and Bechky 2017). Our technology created what used to be called "labor saving devices." The steam engine eliminated skilled weavers, computers and robotics and disruptive technologies have the potential to put out of work everyone from teachers and hospital caregivers to fast-food workers and taxi drivers (Veltman 2015). Jean-Jacques Rousseau said man fell from the golden age when he learned to use the labor of others (Rousseau 1968). Work is and always has been a struggle for employers to control workers and the work process and get the most amount of work out of the least number of people. Many of the moral problems with work come from this struggle. Employers seem to have been moving towards machines and robots ever since the time when slaves were referred to as "*instrumentum vocale*" or talking tools.

Conclusion: Meaningful Lives

Perfectionist accounts of meaningful work implicitly or explicitly include a vision of what it means to be human, the good life, well-being, and morality. Some perfections focus on human goods. They hold "that what is good for its own sake for a person is fixed independently of her attitudes and opinions toward it, that it constitutes an ideal way to live that an individual might attain to a greater or lesser extent, and that in principle cardinal interpersonal comparison of the amount of good that different individuals achieve for themselves over the course of their lives is possible" (Arneson 2000: 38). The problem with all forms of perfectionism comes down to two basic questions: Who says so? and What if I don't want to live this way? (Hepburn 1999). As academics who write on this topic, we have to keep in mind that not everyone wants a job like ours.

What I have been doing in this chapter is separating the moral conditions of work from the tasks of work, the subjectivity of the people who do them, and external assessments of meaningful work based on purpose and value. The reason why this is important is because the moral conditions of work are not subjective – they apply to all kinds of jobs whether they involve pushing rocks up hills or saving children's lives. The moral conditions of work determine whether people go home from work feeling like they have been treated fairly, in good health, and with their self-esteem, autonomy, and dignity intact. Earning a living wage and having time off to do other things with their lives are also moral conditions because they respect the right of people to do more than merely keep themselves alive. When the moral conditions of work are met, people are capable of engaging in the pursuit of meaning. Whether they pursue or find meaning inside or outside of work, is up to them.

Because of the subjectivity of meaningful work, the primary obligation of employers is to provide the moral conditions for employees to be capable of finding meaning in their work and/or outside of work in their lives. The question of what makes certain types of work meaningful is, in itself, partially an empirical and objective question about job design, purpose, what people and society value, and the types and aspects of work that they find meaningful. How and what we find meaningful is a philosophical and psychological question about value, purpose, and how we make sense of ourselves as we interact with and affect the world around us. When we find something meaningful, it lights up and enriches our lives (Ciulla 2000).

One of the questions that still needs to be explored is: What will meaningful work be like in a future where work is scarce and meaningful work is scarcer (Smith and Anderson 2014)? Imagine that technology becomes so advanced that robots and computers do almost everything and countries give their citizens a guaranteed basic income because it is no longer possible to give everyone a job (Van Parijs 2004). If that were to happen, what kinds of social and educational institutions would we need to help people develop the capacity to use their freedom from work to structure their lives and engage in activities that they find meaningful?

In his delightful book *The Grasshopper*, philosopher Bernard Suits imagines a utopia where people are treated well and no longer have to work. He argues that

without work, we would eventually end up inventing work games (Suits 1978). The carpenter would invent house-building games and the scientist would invent discovery games, even though there was no need to build houses and all scientific discoveries had already been made. Suits believes that in this utopia, work activities would become like games because people would freely choose to do them, for their own sake and not for some outside purpose. Would these intrinsically engaging activities be meaningful work or go beyond the goals of the game? For example, the game of golf has a goal not a purpose. The goal of golf is to win or do well by hitting balls into 18 little holes using the fewest number of shots. Suits's example reminds us that work, unlike games, is necessary in that it is done for some broader purpose. So, even though meaningful work is mostly subjective, we see that purpose is fundamental to the concept of work and by extension, it is a fundamental part of meaningful work as well. By separating out the moral conditions of work from meaningful work, we are better able to focus on the objective and subjective ways that people experience and evaluate purpose and meaning in their work.

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Part III
The Liberal Arts and the Humanities

Chapter 14
The Liberal Arts and Leadership: How to Design a School of Leadership Studies

Abstract and Background The greatest academic adventure of my life was working with a small group of colleagues to design a new kind of school in a university, from scratch. The Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond was the first undergraduate, degree-granting, liberal arts school of leadership studies in the world. The task was not easy because, at the time, leadership studies was still an arm of management studies. What excited me was that the school offered an opportunity to recast the liberal arts. I glibly called it 'liberal arts with a point' or with a focus on understanding leadership. Students could study, history, philosophy, anthropology, literature, etc. as a means for understanding leadership. Aristotle once said that the liberal arts taught people how to make good decisions in a free society. To my mind, the Jepson School took that idea one step farther. We designed it to teach students how to make good decisions and how to work with others to implement them.

This chapter is about developing the Jepson School, the challenges that my colleagues and I faced, and the mistakes that we made. Moreover, it is about what students need to learn to be good citizens and leaders. The Jepson School's development, and subsequent hiring of faculty from a variety of liberal arts disciplines, created a model for leadership education. Over the years, the faculty's research has expanded the field of leadership studies, to include work from disciplines that had not been represented in the leadership literature.

Keywords Leadership education · Liberal arts · Jepson School · Aristotle · Interdisciplinary · Curriculum · Leadership studies

Introduction

> Thus, some appear to seek in knowledge a couch for a searching spirit; others, a walk for a wandering mind; others, a tower of state; others, a fort, or commanding ground; and others, a shop for profit or sale …. (Francis Bacon 1605: 23)

Ciulla, Joanne B. "The Jepson School: Liberal Arts as Leadership Studies," eds. R Riggio and M. Harvey, *Research Companion to Leadership Studies: The Dialogue of the Disciplines*. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011, pp. 20–35.

J. B. Ciulla, *The Search for Ethics in Leadership, Business, and Beyond*,
Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_14

In 1991, I joined the faculty of the University of Richmond to help design the Jepson School of Leadership Studies. The easiest way to understand Jepson is as a liberal arts school with an explicit focus on the study of leadership. Our students take courses in history, philosophy, psychology, political science, and so on. These courses draw on the methodology and content of a discipline to understand leadership as a phenomenon and a practice. So as a school, we are multidisciplinary and some of our classes are interdisciplinary. By taking a liberal arts approach to leadership studies, the Jepson School is not doing anything new, but rather reapplying the original intent of liberal arts education, which was not to learn a craft or useful skill, but to acquire knowledge that is good in itself and to educate citizens to live and make choices in a free society (Jaeger 1986). Hence, the Jepson School is as much about the liberal arts as it is about leadership studies. In this chapter, I will briefly discuss the place of leadership studies in the liberal arts and then go on to describe the development of the Jepson School and how, from its inception to today, it grapples with the practical and philosophical challenges of being a liberal arts school of leadership studies.

People often think of a leadership school as some sort of training program. Yet when you think of it, the very idea of leadership *training* is an oxymoron. Training implies development of a skill in conformity to certain practices and procedures. Leadership would seem to be the opposite of this. While leadership requires certain skills, I am not so sure that leadership itself is a skill. If anything, leadership is more about initiative, perspective, imagination, morality, and the ability to think well and understand people and the world around us. Ideally, a liberal arts education provides the foundation for leadership and life in human society.

The Liberal Arts

In the ancient world, scholars considered the liberal arts to be those needed for free people to seek a good life (Artistotle 1984). For Aristotle, our real work in life is the work of being human. The ultimate end of life is happiness. Self-sufficiency and freedom from fear, material needs, and commitments allow us the liberty to develop ourselves as human beings. The word "school" comes from the Greek word for leisure "schole", which meant to stop and have quiet or peace (DeGrazia 1962). Education and war, not work, provide people with virtues such as temperance and discipline needed for free time, or the time away from working for the necessities of life. The liberal arts also free the mind so that it is not ruled by the passions, ignorance or prejudice. Aristotle believed that education for free time, not work, would teach people how to engage in activities that are good in themselves, because it is these activities that make humans unique from animals. In a similar vein, the Roman Cicero said that education should separate the truths needed for life's necessary cares · from knowledge that is pursued for its own sake. It is ironic that most stu-

dents today pursue a liberal arts education so they can get a job, when ideally it was meant to teach them how to use their freedom or discretionary time.

Aristotle believed that education should cultivate five virtues of thought: *technê*-craft or technical knowledge; *epistêmê* descriptive knowledge of the world; *sophia*-wisdom or thought about universal ideas; and *nous*the higher mind, soul or intellect. The fifth is *phronêsis,* or practical wisdom about how to act or bring about change or a particular end. It is also associated with prudence. Education should cultivate all of these virtues, but *phronêsis* is of particular importance for leadership. Aristotle writes:

> Practical wisdom is the only virtue peculiar to the ruler: it would seem that all other excellences must equally belong to ruler and subject. The excellence of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of a flute, while his master is like the flute player. (Aristotle 1984: 2027)

Both Plato and Aristotle started schools. They both understood the idea of educating young people to reason and see the world in different ways by exposing them to a variety of subjects. For example, Plato believed that everyone, especially rulers, needed to study geometry (see Ciulla 2004a; see also Ciulla 2004b). Aristotle suggests that at a minimum, students should study reading, writing, drawing, physical training and music (Aristotle 1984: 212128). From the Greek and subsequent Roman tradition, medieval scholars such as St Augustine depicted the liberal arts as resting on seven pillars. The imagery of the seven pillars came from Proverbs 9.1 in the Old Testament: "Wisdom has built her house; she has hewn out its seven pillars". The first three, or the *trivium,* are the verbal arts of logic, grammar and rhetoric. The second four, or the *quadrivium,* are mathematics, geometry, music and astronomy. These two divisions later evolved into what we call the arts and sciences.

If you read the mission statements of liberal arts schools, most of them say something about developing future leaders. So, you might wonder, if the liberal arts already educate people for leadership, then why do we need a leadership school or leadership programs? I think that there are several things to consider in answering this question. First, a liberal arts education does not magically produce leaders. Before college education was easily accessible to students from a wide variety of social and economic backgrounds and there were as many liberal arts colleges as there are today, most of the people who received a liberal arts education were from well-off families or members of the elite. It is not surprising that places like Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard and Yale produced leaders, because their students were often in line to take over the family business, or well positioned to go into politics, for example. Elite universities produced leaders in a large part because students came from elite families or well-connected families. Students who did not come from elite families learned from their classmates and made connections to elite networks while at school. In a sense, many of these students, by virtue of their lot in life, were born to take on leadership roles, whether they were good at them or not. The same was certainly true in Aristotle's time.

As higher education became democratized, universities enrolled students from all sorts of families. While students from wealthy, poor or modest means benefited from the liberal arts, the connection between liberal arts education and leadership may not have been as evident to people who had not grown up in families of influence or who were not surrounded by people from families of influence. As more people became better educated, there were also changes in the way that people ran businesses and government organizations. The command and control, centralized system of scientific management was geared towards an uneducated, industrial work force. By the mid-twentieth century, it began to give way to more decentralized ways of working in organizations, which resulted in more roles for leaders. This is one reason why, in the latter half of the twentieth century, writers such as James MacGregor Bums (1978), John W. Gardner (1989), and Warren Bennis (1989), wrote about the urgent need for more people who had the ability to take on leadership roles. All of these writers indicated that the higher educational system needed to offer something more than the traditional liberal arts.

Another reason for a leadership school or program is because liberal arts schools have changed. Students increasingly go to university to study business or get credentials for a job. One might argue that, in Aristotle's terms, universities are becoming more like centers for the servile arts (workers) than the liberal arts (free citizens). For instance, undergraduate students who major in business often take fewer courses in the liberal arts school than other students. They learn many useful things, but they may not get the full benefit of the liberal arts. They could miss out on what is perhaps the most important insight of the liberal arts tradition we can only understand what knowledge is useful if it is based on knowledge of the good. The good is not just what is good for the individual, but what is good for the individual in the context of some greater good that usually includes a good for society as well. Aquinas writes:

> In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason, the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. (Aquinas, 1947: Q.57 article 3, Reply Objection 2)

The courses that teach students about the good tend to be in the humanities. When parents or students regard universities as trade schools that prepare them for the job market, they seek only the instrumental goods of education, sometimes at the expense of learning things that are intrinsically good. By making liberal arts universities more like trade schools (what Aristotle would call teaching the servile arts), we may be educating students to be workers, but not leaders.

When we designed the Jepson School in 1991, distinguished researchers lamented the lack of progress in leadership studies, despite the growing number of studies and articles on the subject. After reading some of the leadership literature, I could see why they were concerned. Most of what was then called leadership studies came from researchers in psychology and management. Hardly any of the literature was from the humanities. The humanities help us understand the context and values that shape the relationship of leaders and followers and the phenomenon of leadership itself. Without the humanities, leadership studies is a little like watching

a movie without the sound. The research showed us things, but we could not hear what they meant. It is against this backdrop that my colleagues and I set out to design the Jepson School of Leadership Studies. Our task was to reinvent a liberal arts school around the study of leadership and to expand and enrich the field of leadership studies.

Designing the Jepson School

Let me start the story of the Jepson School at the beginning. The school was born in May 1987 when Alice and Robert S. Jepson gave the university of Richmond a $20 million challenge gift to develop a school for leadership education. The Jepson gift funded a school, not a center or a program. The Jepsons also seemed to know that if you want to build an institution, you need bricks. In 1992, they donated an additional $5 million to complete the building that houses the Jepson School. The story behind the founding of the school is important because it explains why the school was able to make an impact on leadership education and leadership studies. As a separate school housed in a building with its name on it, the Jepson School was built to last. It also started with three endowed chairs and funds for a full-time faculty, who would get tenure and promotions based on their teaching and scholarship in leadership studies. These elements provided a stable environment for innovation, curriculum development, and teaching that was conducive to cross-disciplinary cooperation and research.

Before the Jepson School was built and the faculty hired, a university committee had put together the basic plan for it. In the draft proposal, they articulated the mission of the school in the following way: "The primary task of the school is to provide a rigorous and disciplined education with a focus upon ethical and responsible leadership."[1] The committee then went on to describe the purpose of the school:

> The school's degree programs must be focused on producing in students the knowledge, experience, and abilities needed to be effective and constructive leaders in a variety of contexts. A solid foundation in the liberal arts and sciences, coupled with the study and preparation for leadership, holds the potential to prepare men and women who will approach leadership opportunities with a measure of skill, compassion, integrity, ability, and breadth of understanding that is sorely needed in our nation and world.

This statement was later translated into the mission of the school, which was to educate students *"for* leadership and *about* leadership."

In July 1991, I left The Wharton School for what I felt was one of the greatest opportunities in higher education designing a new kind of institution from the ground up. The University of Richmond had already hired the Dean, Howard Prince, and the Associate Dean, Stephanie Micas. James MacGregor Bums had also signed

[1] Draft 4: "Proposal for the Jepson School of Leadership Studies", University of Richmond Faculty Committee, 1989.

on as a Senior Fellow. I was the first tenure track faculty hired as an endowed chair in leadership and ethics (my graduate and undergraduate degrees are in philosophy). My three colleagues soon followed Richard Couto (political science), Karen Klenke (industrial psychology), and William Howe (education). The Dean was a behavioral psychologist and the Associate Dean's background was in women's studies. From July 1991 until the beginning of the spring semester of 1992, the faculty and two Deans developed all aspects of the school from admission procedures, to curriculum, to the introductory course.

This was an exciting but, at times, a very difficult process. It entailed seemingly endless conversations about what the school should look like. The first and most difficult stumbling block was unpacking what "for and about leadership" meant. As academics, the "about leadership" part was easy, but the "for leadership" part was not. Most of us did not think that the school should be doing leadership "training". My colleagues discussed what we wanted our students to be like when they graduated. In addition to leaving with a strong liberal arts education, we wanted them to be the sorts of people who took responsibility for the world around them. Not all of our students would be presidents or CEOs, but at a minimum they would be the good citizens the kind who, rather than complain about a pothole, would gather their neighbors together to do something about it. We hoped that the difference between our students and students in a regular liberal arts program would be that our students would not only feel responsible for the world around them, but they would have explicitly learned from the liberal arts how leaders influence and work with others. After this discussion, I captured our thoughts in the mission and philosophy statement. We stated the mission of the school this way: "The Jepson School develops people who understand the moral responsibilities of leadership and who are prepared to exercise leadership in service to society."[2] The "for and about leadership" was also tied to questions about how we selected our students. Were we supposed to be picking students based on leadership potential? (Our students apply to the Jepson School during their sophomore year at the university.) We did not want to be in the business of picking out who would be a leader. This was offensive to some of us on a few levels. First, because it seemed presumptuous and second, because both trait research and history show that there is no written-in-stone criteria for predicting who will be a leader. Even if there were, then such "born leaders" would, in theory, not need to take our program. The task of identifying future leaders is especially difficult, given how much students can change and mature in the last 2 years of college. Finally, the idea of selecting leaders based on their leadership potential precluded letting students in who were interested in studying leadership. In the end, we accepted students based on their grades and their essays about why they wanted to join the school. We decided that it would be best to have students with a variety of interests, backgrounds, and personalities in our classes. This scatter shot approach has served us well. To this day, I am often surprised by which of our graduates actually end up in significant leadership positions years after they graduate.

[2] Draft of the Jepson School Philosophy Statement from 3 September 1991.

In the end, we found some very acceptable solutions to the "for" question. Service learning, action research, speakers, and leaders in residence would provide students with hands-on and practical knowledge *for* leadership. We also pledged to experiment with pedagogy. Small interactive classes and the cohort effect created by having a selection process would allow us to create an active learning community in the school. Students would learn the skills and practical parts of leadership through doing things and interacting with leaders that we brought into the program. Today, one or more of these elements can be found in most leadership programs. The one simple reason why a liberal arts school of leadership studies may produce more leaders than a regular liberal arts program is because when students study a subject, they often want to practice it art students want to be artists, psychology students want to be psychologists, chemistry students want to be chemists, and so on. In the same vein, when students study leadership, they frequently become interested in taking on leadership roles. Over the years, our students have consistently held key leadership positions on campus, during some years they have held almost all of those positions. In part, this is the result of self-selection, but I do not think it accounts for all of it.

Creating the Curriculum

When it came time to develop the curriculum, there were some tensions because of the disciplines of the various faculty and Deans, but we were actually able to design the curriculum in 1 day. We first agreed to have an introductory course called The Foundations of Leadership Studies. Next, we formulated the core courses starting with critical thinking and ethics and leadership. We had an extended debate over history as a core course. I was the only person from the humanities in the group. I really thought a core course in history was essential. Instead, we ended up with what we later learned was a bad compromise – a course called The History and Theories of Leadership.

The discussion about critical thinking exemplified the challenge of a multidisciplinary program. I envisioned a course that focused on epistemology, informal logic, and philosophy of science as a means of developing critical reading, writing, listening, and argumentation skills. The social scientists wanted a research methods course. I thought that the study of knowledge itself would be a better all-purpose tool for our students. I was rightly outvoted on this. We then had to grapple with the question: which discipline's method should we teach? Our students would be taking courses and reading literature from a variety of disciplines. Critical Thinking was supposed to help our students critically read and discuss materials from all of the liberal arts. Again, we made an easy but problematic compromise and decided to have the course address research methods in all disciplines from psychology to literary theory. We ended up with a course called Critical Thinking and Methods of Inquiry. The fourth core course, Leading Groups, was not controversial.

The core curriculum consisted of Critical Thinking, History and Theories of Leadership, Leading Groups, and Ethics and Leadership, which later became Leadership Ethics. Experiential learning formed the last element of the core. Since a founding idea of the school was moral leadership, we wanted to make sure that ethics was not just a course in the curriculum, but a part of other courses and experiences in the school. Hence, we required all of our majors to engage in community service and take a Service Learning class. The course was mainly a forum for discussing students' on-site experiences. We later increased the number of credits for this class and created a regular academic course to go with Service Learning called Justice and Civil Society. In addition to this class, majors were required to do an internship. During the first 6 years of the school, all students were required to do a senior project. We later changed this requirement to a series of senior seminars and, since the ethics course touched on many aspects of the program, it became de facto the capstone course.

After formulating the core courses, we moved on to the electives. These were grounded in two broad variables in leadership studies the context of leadership and competencies of leadership (or things ·leaders need to know about). The context courses included community leadership, international leadership, political leadership, leadership in social movements, and leadership in formal organizations. The basic competency electives were also easy to identify: conflict resolution, decision-making, motivation, organizational communication, leading individuals, and leading change, to name a few. Today we have a very wide range of electives that still fall into these general categories such as: Leadership in Historical Contexts; Statesmanship; Leadership and Religious Values; Gender and Leadership; Leaders and Artists; Reason, Rhetoric and Leadership; Psychology of Good and Evil and so on. We have since abandoned the context and competency categories, but I still think they are helpful ways to think about a leadership curriculum. Any leadership program or comprehensive study of leadership needs to take a balanced look at what leaders know and do and the influence of the contexts in which they operate.

Designing the curriculum was a piece of cake compared with our effort to design the first Foundations of Leadership Studies course. Through years of teaching and research, established disciplines like psychology or philosophy have forged a general consensus about what students need to know in an intro course. This was not the case in leadership studies in general and definitely not the case for a liberal arts approach to the topic in 1991. There were some textbooks on leadership, such as Gary Yuki's *Leadership in Organizations* (1989), but they tended to offer a limited view of leadership studies that was mostly based on research in management and psychology. There was also a massive amount of literature in the popular press that was not really appropriate for this program.

Our first Foundations of Leadership Studies course was a disaster for all who taught it and took it. Out of what were sometimes heated debates, we put together 600 pages of readings and a syllabus that really did not hang together. Around mid-semester, our students called us to a meeting and demanded that something be done with the course because we were driving them crazy. Despite our failure to put together a very coherent course, we were rather pleased with the way that our stu-

dents intervened and offered constructive criticism. That was exactly the sort of behavior we hoped to see in them. Many of the students from that course stayed on and joined the first class of the Jepson School, which was formally inaugurated in the fall of 1992.

I think the biggest problem we had with that course is that none of us really knew what the foundations of leadership studies were, and I am still not sure that our faculty or colleagues in the field would agree on what they are today. As Thomas Kuhn (1970) notes, one indication that a field of study is mature is when there are standard textbooks in it. There are some good leadership textbooks out there today, but I do not think that they represent a consensus of what one should learn in an introduction to leadership studies course (for example, see Northouse 1997 and later edition, 2009). Three years after the first course, my colleague Tom Wren carved down and organized the 600 pages of reading from the original Foundations of Leadership Studies course into a reader called *The Leader's Companion* (1995). This helped reshape the course into something more manageable and it also offered the first model of a liberal arts leadership studies reader.

The Challenges of Implementing an Interdisciplinary Curriculum

It is rare that any program gets the curriculum right from the start, and we were no exception. Because we are a liberal arts school, we have a multidisciplinary faculty teaching a curriculum that consists of a number of interdisciplinary courses. This creates some unique challenges. It is one thing to devise a list of new courses and quite another to actually teach them and find faculty to teach them. For example, I taught Critical Thinking and Methods of Inquiry. As a philosopher, the critical thinking part was easy. There are plenty of good textbooks in this area – logic is still logic, and the same is true for epistemology and philosophy of science. All I did was insert examples and exercises that would apply to leadership. My problem was with research methods. I knew something about research methods in history, literature, philosophy, and the natural sciences but I did not know much about the social sciences. We had similar problems with History and Theories of Leadership. This course required knowledge in both history and the social sciences. Since we did not have enough faculty to team-teach these courses, the content of them was sometimes a bit lopsided. Depending on who taught it, students either got a strong dose of history or a strong dose of the social science theories of leader-ship. After teaching it for a while, some faculty managed to master both sides of the course.

Interdisciplinary courses raise a number of questions about the level of expertise needed in the various disciplines for a course to meet the same level of academic rigor as single-discipline courses. Professors sometimes make the mistake of trying to put too many things into an interdisciplinary course. This· allows them to skate with ease through material from a number of disciplines, but such courses run the

risk of fragmentation and failure to treat subjects with sufficient depth. Our Foundations of Leadership Studies course had a related problem. It was supposed to be a survey course, but our faculty did not like teaching things they did not know well or find interesting. They solved the problem of fragmentation and depth by teaching what they knew best. As a result of this, we eventually got rid of the Foundations of Leadership Studies Course by splitting it into two required courses – Leadership and the Social Sciences, and Leadership and the Humanities. This makes practical sense, but it raises the question of how knowledge of the humanities and social sciences complement, reinforce, and enrich our understanding of leadership. The old foundations course also served the function of teaching new faculty about the various areas of leadership research. One concern is that faculty who do not have a good sense of the whole field will be unable to tie what they do in their courses to the rest of the curriculum.

We later divided Critical Thinking and Methods of Inquiry into two courses: Critical Thinking, and Research Methods. Research Methods focuses on method in the social sciences. We still struggle with what to do about these two courses. We recently made them into two half-semester courses taught by different professors. Undergraduates in any program need to have a course that develops critical skills and skills that aid in the organized collection of information. The half semester of each short-changes both courses, but this may be adequate for an undergraduate program. In graduate education, however, an in-depth focus on method is fundamental for future research and a student's development as a teacher and scholar.

The ideal solution for interdisciplinary courses is to have them team-taught. This is a costly solution that few schools and departments can sustain over time. We have team-taught a number of courses at Jepson with faculty from other parts of the university. These courses have covered leadership in art, science, literature and economics. We funded several of these courses with a Keck Foundation Grant that Jepson, Claremont McKenna, and Loyola Marymount received in 2005. Team-teaching is a great way for faculty to learn new subject areas, but faculty need to teach a course more than once to develop it and refine their knowledge of a subject. Leadership courses require time to experiment, make mistakes, and refine the material. Some of us at the Jepson School published textbooks after we felt we had got a course right. For example, I published my book *The Ethics of Leadership* (Ciulla 2003) after getting the kinks out of my leadership ethics course and Gill Hickman published *Leading Organizations* (1998) based on her experience teaching Leadership in Formal Organizations.

Hiring and Developing Leadership Studies Faculty

Hiring faculty for a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary program is challenging. The Jepson School started out with four faculty members and hired two more the second year Tom Wren (history) and Gill Hickman (public administration). In the early years, our job advertisements were usually for people in leadership studies.

We received hundreds of applications from people with PhDs many of whom, were practitioners such as retired generals, consultants, business people, and a myriad of others who wanted to share their personal knowledge and leadership experiences with our students. We often invite such practitioners into our classes or to give talks, or to serve as our Leader in Residence. At this time, we do not have positions for "professors of practice". We soon discovered that the best way to advertise for a position in our school was to search for people who, first and foremost, had a strong disciplinary background in a liberal arts discipline.

One hallmark of a discipline is an implicit or explicit method of research. At this time, leadership studies is not a discipline – it is a field that includes many disciplines. We get a number of job applicants who have PhDs in leadership studies, but we have noticed that their research does not always rest on a solid foundation in one or more of the liberal arts. The danger of interdisciplinary graduate programs is that students can end up without a discipline. We then look at the candidates' research and background to see if they are able to connect what they know and have done to future teaching and research in leadership studies. Job candidates from specific disciplines can also present problems. While Ph.D. work in interdisciplinary programs sometimes lacks depth and rigor, single-discipline candidates are sometimes so narrowly focused that it is difficult to see how they could teach our courses or, for that matter, many courses in their own discipline. At this time, the disciplinary make-up of the Jepson School faculty consists of four philosophers, three psychologists, three historians, two economists and political scientists, and one from religion, literature, anthropology, public administration.

Drawing Boundaries and Staying Focused

As we have added faculty, we have added many new courses and research on leadership. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges of a leadership studies curriculum is finding a balance between what needs to be taught and what the available faculty can and will teach. You can make just about any subject into a leadership course. The difficulty is drawing the line between what is really about leadership and what is about something that has only a thin connection to leadership. This issue is conceptually difficult and as one might imagine, politically volatile. Yet, if a liberal arts approach to leadership studies is about anything and everything, then it is no longer a leadership program. It is the worst sort of interdisciplinary program – a collection of courses that lack a coherent connection to each other.

When we designed the curriculum, we were concerned about the danger of fragmentation so we decided that our courses should be carefully sequenced. By having students take courses in a certain order, we hoped to have the core courses build on each other. The course sequence also reinforced the cohort effect, which is very useful in a program where most classes are largely discussion, and group assignments are quite common. In addition to tight sequencing, we began to offer students the option of taking a leadership concentration. Before we started the school, the uni-

versity had stipulated that all of our students were required to have a minor or second major. They thought that a second major or minor would answer the "Leadership for what?" question. We soon discovered that a number of our students were taking two or sometimes three majors or minors on their own. Usually the major or minor complemented their work in leadership studies. We decided to get rid of the major or minor requirement and introduce leadership studies concentrations. Now, if students are interested in areas such as international leadership, law and leadership, political leadership, religious leadership, and so on, we help them put together a program of courses from Jepson and in other departments in the university. This allows them to follow their interests without having to cobble together several minors or another major. Students who take a concentration have a faculty supervisor and they write a thesis in their senior year.

Liberal Arts Postgraduate Programs

Ever since the day that The Jepson School opened its doors, we have received requests to give training programs for business, government and community groups. We turned down most of them because we were too busy teaching and doing our own research. During the first year, I was approached by the Virginia Foundation of Police Executives to develop a program for police chiefs and other senior officers from around the state. Since the mission of our school included the idea of service to society, I thought that we should do something for this important group of public servants, but only if that "something" was what we were already doing in our classes. I outlined a proposal that I thought the Virginia Foundation of Police Executives would reject. It was a miniature version of our undergraduate liberal arts program. This meant that participants would take everything from Critical Thinking to Leadership and Literature. The foundation liked the idea and so did the people who eventually attended the program. My colleagues did a wonderful job delivering short versions of their regular courses. The program ran as a Jepson program for over 10 years. The police executive program was a useful learning experience because the original plan for the Jepson School included the development of a master's degree program. We did indeed design one in 2002. I drafted the following description of the program:

The Jepson School's Executive Masters of Leadership Studies (MLS) is a selective and intellectually rigorous liberal arts leadership program for mid-career professionals. The MLS curriculum rests on three assumptions about leadership. The first and central assumption is that leaders must have a broad perspective on the world and the place of organization and work in it. There is no better vehicle for doing this than the liberal arts. Insights from areas such as history, anthropology, history, philosophy, and literature help participants expand their worldviews and gain new insights into their organizations and themselves. Second, leadership is about anticipating, analyzing and solving problems within complex systems.

Courses in this program focus on developing analytical ability and imagination to create viable strategies for creating, implementing and foreseeing change in organizations and society. The MLS program offers intensive work in logic, critical thinking, systems thinking, creativity and change. Third, perhaps the most difficult part of leadership is relationships with people. The people issues permeate all parts of this program, but are specifically addressed in sessions on ethics, groups, and organizations. These sessions are taught using literature from philosophy, religion, and the best social science on individual and group behavior.

We faced a number of practical challenges implementing this program, such as cost it would be quite expensive because we only wanted about 20 students in the class. The size of the potential pool of applicants in the Richmond metropolitan area was a concern because the university did not have a hotel facility, so most students would have to commute or make their own hotel arrangements. Staffing was problematic since some faculty did not want to teach in the program. In a small program, we also hoped for an interesting group of people with diverse backgrounds and experiences from both the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. Despite these challenges, we were able to get a pool of applicants for the first class and then we had a revelation. We had required all of our applicants to take the GREs (Graduate Record Exam). At the meeting to select our first class, we discovered that many of the applicants' scores were fairly low, except for one applicant who got an 800. Some of the lower scores were interesting people with years of experience who had been out of school for a long time. While we wanted these people in the program, we wondered if some of them could pass our courses. What would we do if they could not? This was designed as an academic master's degree program, analogous to one in a topic like history or psychology, so we did not want to lower our standards. We began to think about what failure of a course would mean to someone whose employer was paying for the program, or for someone who would be attending on a scholarship. Despite the fact that we were very clear about the program as a liberal arts program, I think that there was still the perception that it was a training program. At the selection meeting we made the difficult decision not to go forward with the program. In retrospect, I think it was the right choice. We had not sufficiently worked through the conceptual and practical challenges of such a program. Today the good graduate programs in leadership studies are not liberal arts programs. They tend to focus more on leadership practice and be grounded in the study of business, psychology, strategy, and so on.

This is not to say that liberal arts programs should not be done, but rather that it is often difficult to explain to employers the value added of taking impractical courses such as literature for leadership development. Having taught leadership seminars for a number of business and government groups over the years, I am not alone in noticing the powerful ways in which working adults translate lessons from areas such as philosophy and literature into practical applications regarding leadership and their work. For example, in the 1950s, executives at the Bell Telephone Company were concerned about how to develop leadership talent within the company. Many of the up-and-coming managers were good at their jobs but did not have

a college education. They believed that "A well trained man knows how to answer questions; an educated man knows what questions are worth asking."[3] The company sent promising managers through a 10-month liberal arts program at the University of Pennsylvania. There they took short courses on everything from James Joyce's *Ulysses* to the *Bhagavad Gita.* The company carried out a survey of the participants and found that they read more widely, were more curious about the world, and they tended to see more than one facet to any given argument after going through the program. In short, managers developed two very important leadership qualities. They had widened their perspective on the world and improved their critical thinking skills. The company considered the institute a success, except for one problem. The managers who participated in the program were more intellectually engaged and confident, but they were also less inclined to put the company's bottom line ahead of the interests of other stakeholders such as the community and their families. While the company wanted to develop competent, intellectually engaged leaders, they were not very comfortable with leaders who might put the interests of other stakeholders ahead of the company's bottom line. In short, these managers internalized the most important lessons of the liberal arts knowledge is only useful if it is for some greater good, and the ultimate end of knowledge is happiness and the good life. Perhaps this is the main reason why leadership studies should be a liberal and not a servile art.

Leadership Studies as the Liberal Arts

The liberal arts approach provides a foundation of knowledge needed for life. A liberal arts leadership studies program uses the study of leaders and leadership as a focal point for that foundation. The study of leadership will never be complete without the arts and the sciences. The humanities supply a rich foundation for understanding the context of leadership and they offer a gigantic repository of information about morality and human behavior that spans over time and across cultures. In an ideal field of leadership studies, social scientists would test the results of their research against what we know from subjects such as history, literature, philosophy and religion, and scholars from those fields would test their observations and interpretations against research carried out by social scientists in the laboratory and the field.

As I argued earlier, undergraduate students who choose to study leadership are probably more likely to want to be leaders than liberal arts students in general. Jepson School graduates rarely aspire to get graduate degrees in leadership studies. They move on to jobs in business, public service or non-profits, or they study law, medicine, public administration, education, religion, or some other academic discipline. In short, a liberal arts leadership studies degree is not something one takes to

[3] The description of this program is from Davis (2010).

prepare for graduate work in leadership studies or to be a leader. It serves as an intellectual and moral foundation for doing whatever it is that students choose to do or study in life. Nonetheless, by adding a leadership focus to the liberal arts, we hope that our students will be more inclined to take on the moral responsibilities of leadership and citizenship and know more about what it takes to do it well.

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Chapter 15
The Two Cultures: The Place of the Humanities in Leadership Studies

Abstract and Background In the last chapter, I expressed my affection for the study of leadership as a liberal art. This chapter is an ode to the study of leadership and the humanities. If I had spent all of my career teaching in a philosophy department, I probably wouldn't have written it. However, teaching in business schools and doing interdisciplinary research in leadership studies, compelled me to write this, because both areas are dominated by the social sciences. Another reason for this chapter is that I have watched with dismay, as the status of the humanities in the university has diminished over the years. Some consider the humanities impractical since they don't seem to prepare students for jobs when they graduate. Hence, most students in the U.S. want to study business, where, except for business ethics courses, the curriculum is usually devoid of the humanities. Over the years, I have participated in several projects to promote humanities research in leadership studies, including a special issue on leadership and the humanities in the *Leadership Quarterly* (see Ciulla JB. Leaders Q 19.4:393–395, 2008a) and a collection of original works on leadership by professors, of literature, art, design, music, philosophy, and political theory called *Leadership and the Humanities* (Ciulla JB (ed) Leadership and the humanities. In: Ciulla JB (ed) (3-volume set editor) Leadership at the crossroads, vol 3, Praeger, Westport, 2008b). In this chapter, I argue that the topic of leadership is a natural part of the humanities and that leadership scholars cannot fully understand leadership without building their research on the humanities as well as the social sciences.

Keywords Leadership studies · Humanities · Research methods · The two cultures · Hermeneutics · Ethical values · History · Interpretation · Kagan

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Ciulla Joanne B. Leadership as a Humanity adapted from: "You Can Run but You Cannot Hide from the Humanities." *What's Wrong with Leadership? Improving Leadership Research and Practice*. Ed. Ronald E. Riggio, New York: Routledge, (forthcoming, 2019).

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Introduction

> Humanity i love you because you are perpetually putting the secret of life in your pants and forgetting it's there and sitting down on it" (e.e. cummings 1966)

Leadership scholars tend to sit on the humanities. While few deny their relevance to leadership studies, most seem to ignore the humanities in their research or, when they do pay attention to them, treat them carelessly. Research on leadership still is mostly based in the social sciences, in part, because the majority of researchers hail from management studies. Yet, there is also an epistemic bias in our culture that regards the results of scientific research as more useful and closer to the truth than humanities-based research. In 1959, novelist and chemist C.P. Snow (2000) sounded the alarm over the gulf between the sciences and the humanities in his controversial Rede Lecture, "The Two Cultures." Snow argued that the growing communication and educational gap between two cultures of the sciences and the humanities was dangerous because it hindered leaders from solving important social problems and it left people poorly educated.

Today, we have the opposite problem. Leaders who are creating new things or solving social problems are sometimes well-versed in the sciences, technology, or the social sciences (business studies), but not in the humanities. Ignorance of the humanities can sometimes translate into ignorance about ethics, human values, behaviors, and relationships – all of which are fundamental to good leadership (by which I mean leadership that is competent and ethical) (Ciulla 1995). Similarly, without the humanities, leadership research offers descriptions and theories of leadership that are not always understood in the broader context of the history, values, and emotions that shape behavior and give it meaning. This paper compares and contrasts the research methods and knowledge that we get from the humanities with those of the social sciences. It argues that the humanities offer another, in some ways more fundamental, way of grounding research in leadership studies.

On Method

Quantitative social science research still dominates the leadership literature by the sheer number of articles and influence on the field. One reason is because most of the literature still comes from academics who work in business schools and some of their work is really management research with a more appealing name. Business school faculties consist of mostly social scientists and rarely of scholars with humanities backgrounds because the humanities are not considered useful or relevant for business. Like the debate that raged in Snow's time, there are those today who still regard the humanities as more of a luxury than part of what one needs to get a job or contribute to society. In some U.S. states, legislators periodically suggest that the state universities get rid of courses in the humanities because they do

not help students get jobs. A state university in Wisconsin got rid of several departments in the humanities to focus on business and technical courses. As one student commented: "What is a university without a history major?" (Smith 2019).

Some universities not only place less value on the subject matter of humanities courses, but also tend to regard the social sciences as epistemically superior to the humanities. By epistemically superior, I mean that they deem method and type of knowledge that social science research produces superior to the kind of knowledge that we get from the humanities. For instance, some consider a well-designed survey study or lab study of ethics and leadership that employs the best scientific research methods, to be more useful, precise, and justifiable than what we may learn from reading a novel, a history book, or a philosophical text. The perceived superiority of this knowledge comes from faith in the scientific method – a faith that rests on the principle, 'If you get the method right, your results are significant or true,' regardless of the topic under investigation.

This is a major tenet of positivism, which consists of the belief that the natural sciences should set the standard for all other studies. Positivism includes the assumptions that everything can be studied using scientific methods, and that all explanation is causal and consists of subsuming particular cases under hypotheses. Hence, we sometimes find the silly and inappropriate use of hypotheses and propositions to dress up journal articles, so that they appear to be "scientific." The tenets of positivism explain why many empirical papers in leadership studies spend more time explaining and justifying the methods used in the research, than they do actually exploring or analyzing a problem. As *Leadership* editor Dennis Tourish observes, leadership scholars tend to stick to "positivist methodologies and functionalist perspectives"; as a result, "the insights from this work seem increasingly trivial as method take precedence over substance" (2017, p. 3). Of course, the problem with quantitative social science research is that, despite the best scientific methodology and statistical methods for accounting for error, it is different from the natural sciences. Unlike predicting the behavior of a body in motion, predicting human behavior is less precise. Unlike gravity, human beings have free will and they don't always go where they are supposed to go.

The humanities do not have one method of research that promises: if you get the method right, you get true, relevant, or justifiable results. Yet, this does not mean that there is no such thing as research methods in the humanities – there are. They include historiography, literary theory, hermeneutics, and conceptual analysis. Like the methods used in the sciences, these methods offer a systematic way of approaching research. Unlike scientific method, the humanities do not claim to predict, but they can warn us of the problems that arise from sets of social, political, economic, and environmental conditions. In the last U.S. election, few scientific polls thought that Donald Trump would win. However, historical and biographical knowledge of the kinds of leaders that emerge when there is economic inequality and xenophobia would make the possibility of a Trump presidency less surprising.

The humanities offer powerful insights into what we feel and value, how we have behaved in the past, and how we might behave in the future. There is a sense in

which great art is historical, while at the same time transcendent of place and time. Exceptional works of art resonate with us because they capture a feeling or idea that is true, and perhaps always has been true. Picasso's 1937 painting Guernica depicted the destruction of the town of Guernica after the Nazis bombed it. However, the painting expressed something broader than that event – the banality and stupidity of leaders and the devastation of their wars. Thirty years later, Dumile Feni, a Xhosa artist from South Africa drew his "African Guernica," which used similar grotesque figures and scenes to capture the insanity and cruelty of apartheid (De Jager 1992).

The arts have a visual, moral, and emotional vocabulary. On a visceral level, they inform us about where certain types of leaders, under certain conditions, can take us. We see photographic Guernicas today of war zones such as Syria or the dire poverty and crime in some cities in Central America and other parts of the world. Similarly, operas often depict leaders, writ large, with all of their passions and flaws that lead them to fail (Gabriel 2017). In religion, the descriptions of God and gods, in religious texts from various cultures, tell us something about the qualities that the people who told the stories and wrote the texts, want in their ultimate leader.

In the leadership literature, it is more common to see humanities scholars making reference to social science literature than vice versa. Sometimes, social scientists try to do interdisciplinary work using the humanities, but they do it badly because they fail to appreciate that there are certain standards for how one uses and treats sources (more on this later). The scientific approach to leadership studies relies on method and often eschews critical interpretation of the cited literature; whereas, interpretation is the bread and butter of the humanities. For example, if you look at most journal articles in *The Leadership Quarterly*, or in other management journals, they have huge lists of references. As a reviewer, I find it astounding how many authors have clearly not read beyond the abstract or the titles of the articles they cite. They treat each study or assertion in an article, as if it is a point of truth upon which they can support their ideas. The problem with this is that a stack of citations is no substitute for a good argument. To make an argument, you have to critically discuss and interpret the meaning and significance of the studies cited – especially since few, if any, represent a finding that is broadly generalizable. The other problem with over-citation is that researchers hide behind them as a way of not taking responsibility for information or ideas in their paper. Also, for some researchers, citations are nothing more than name dropping.

I have been discussing the tension between the social sciences and the humanities, and some reasons why the gold standard in the leadership studies literature has come from the social sciences rather than the humanities. I do not intend to disparage the social sciences, but rather to explain why the leadership studies literature has been dominated by the scientific approach. Next, I will tease out some differences between the social sciences and the humanities, so that we can get a better picture of how, together, they can contribute to our knowledge leadership.

The Three Cultures

In his book *The Three Cultures*, psychologist Jerome Kagan (2009) revisits Snow's lecture and examines the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities today. He says that there are several factors that have affected the status of the humanities in universities. First, the humanities do not bring in large research grants because, as I have pointed out, they are not very "useful." Second, the media and the public have become persuaded that the sciences and social sciences provide answers to social problems. Lastly, Kegan notes how the attack of the postmodernists on the humanities shook the confidence of some humanities scholars and the over-all confidence in humanities research, which is not only inherently subjective, but according to some post-modernists, hopelessly biased by race, class, ethnicity, etc.

Despite the differences between the three cultures of research, Kagan tells us that they all consist of these components:

1. A set of unquestioned premises that create preferences for particular questions and equally particular answers
2. A favored collection of analytical tools for gathering evidence
3. A preferred set of concepts that are at the core of explanations (Kagan 2009, p. 3)

He then goes on to compare and contrast the three cultures on nine dimensions. For our purposes, I will slightly revise his table and only discuss the comparison between the social sciences and the humanities, to see where they differ and overlap (see Table 15.1). I will then discuss what this would mean in leadership studies.

As you can see, in many ways, the social sciences are quite close to the humanities in regard to dimension 1, which is their primary interests. Kagan says that the social sciences study human *behavior* and that the humanities study human *reactions*. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that in a sense, both study both. By *reactions*, he means causal connections, but they might also be considered reasons. Neither discipline alone is adequate for studying a complex human and social relationship such as leadership.

Explanation, Understanding, and Interpretation

The other two key elements of Kagan's description of primary interests are that the social sciences aim to *explain* and the humanities seek to *understand*. This distinction reflects the difference between causal and teleological accounts (Von Wright 1971). Causal accounts tell us *how* something happened, and teleological accounts tell us *why* something happened. A causal account is linear or systemic – i.e., looking at how an event or sets of events resulted in event X. A teleological explanation looks at why we have event X and what made such a thing as event X possible. German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey, in his work on hermeneutics (1996), said that history gives us understanding, only if we can derive insights from it that are generalizable to elements of the human condition.

Table 15.1 Comparison of two cultures

Dimension	Social sciences	Humanities
1. Primary interests	Prediction and explanation of human behaviours and psychological states	An understanding of human reactions to events and the meanings humans impose on experience as a function of culture, historical era, and life history
2. Primary sources of evidence and control of conditions	Behaviors, verbal statements, gathered under conditions in which contexts cannot always be controlled	Written texts and human behaviors gathered under conditions of minimal control
3. Primary vocabulary	Constructs referring to psychological features, states, and behaviors of individuals or groups, with an acceptance of the constraints that the context of observation imposes on generality	Concepts referring to human behavior and the events that provoke them with serious contextual restrictions on inferences
4. Influence of historical conditions	Modest	Serious
5. Ethical influence	Major	Major
6. Dependence on outside support	Moderately dependent	Relatively independent
7. Work conditions	Small collaborations and solitary	Solitary
8. Contribution to the national economy	Modest	Minimal
9. Criteria for beauty	Conclusions that support a broad theoretical view of human behavior	Semantically coherent arguments described in elegant prose

Source: Kagan (2009, pp. 4–5)

Hermeneutics is a method used in the humanities to understand texts. The ancient Greek rhetoricians developed it, and it was formalized in the Middle Ages. Medieval books contained what were called *accessus*, which were introductions or commentaries to a book and its author. They were sometimes anthologized as books of literary criticism and called *accessus ad auctores*. These books often stated the following questions as a means of interpreting the text (Quain 1945).

Who (is the author)?
What (is the subject matter of the text)?
Why (was the text written)?
How (was the text composed)?
When (was the text written or published)?
Where (was the text written or published)?
By which means (was the text written or published)?

While these questions may seem quaint, they are in effect, what most humanities scholars tend to do when they read a text. (Today, "who, what, why, when, where, and how" questions are often associated with journalism.) They do not simply take what the author writes at face value; instead, they use these questions to understand the text or a work of art. The method does not promise objectivity. It offers readers a way of interpreting the text in light of other works, and it gives an insight into the subjectivity of it. This allows scholars to explain the text in terms of what the author says and what it means, based on a variety of other types of information about the author, the context of the text, and the text itself.

Sometimes when leadership scholars attempt to use material from philosophy, history, or other areas of the humanities, they make the mistake of using the text as if it were a scientific study. They tell us what it says, but they fail to interpret what it means, or they use a text as an appeal to authority. Just because Plato, Foucault, or some other philosopher said something, does not mean that it is true or indisputable. In a sense, some researchers do not seem to understand, or fail to help their reader understand, the narrative of their work and the citations that support it. For example, some leadership scholars cite philosopher Martin Heidegger when they write about authentic leadership, yet they often don't specifically refer to what Heidegger says or where it is located in his book, *Being and Time* (1962). Others do not seem to have read enough of the text to notice that Heidegger does not really mean the same thing they do when he talks about "authenticity." For Heidegger, authenticity is a non-normative metaphysical concept about how people see themselves in relation to where they are in time; hence, the title of his book *Being in Time*. This is not the concept of authenticity behind relational transparency in authentic leadership theories (Walumbwa et al. 2008). It is worth noting that when you trace these citations back to the article on authentic leadership where Heidegger was first cited (Kernis and Goldman 2006), you see that the authors correctly explain what Heidegger said and use the citation as background information, not a support, for authentic leadership. The original article makes an admirable attempt to blend humanities and social science literature, even though the authors get a few small details wrong, such as consistently spelling René Descartes first name incorrectly and giving us a giggle when they refer to medieval philosophers as "middle-age philosophers" (Kernis and Goldman 2006, p. 287). As a matter of fact, with a little more reading, authentic leadership scholars would have discovered that their notion of authenticity comes closer to Jean Paul Sartre's. Sartre (2001) talks more about authenticity in relation to others and says the call of conscience is what makes a person authentic.

Of course, the problem of interpretation is exacerbated when authors fail to actually read the text and instead, cite what someone else has said about it. As we have seen, after numerous cites, the meaning of the reference can run amuck. The context gets lost and sometimes the argument behind the idea does too. As a result, such citations add a layer of subjectivity to what is already subjective about the interpretation of an article or study. Then, because leadership scholars cite each other, the result is that other articles on authentic leadership incorrectly cite Heidegger because their authors do not bother to read him either. Hence, when you cite a humanities

text, you must always go back to the original source and make sure that the source means what you or another author say it means. This principle applies to social sciences too. Perhaps one of the most annoying aspects of leadership literature is seeing an article cited when it is clear that the author citing it has not read it. Often an article is used in one paper because it was cited in another. The cycle of citation without going to the original source, continues until the content of the article is so distorted that it may be used support the opposite of what the author said. It's a pity that often the only people who notice this are the authors of those frequently cited but rarely read articles.

Lastly, even if scholars do their homework when they cite a text from areas like philosophy or literature, the use of in-text citations does not require them to give a page number, unless they use a direct quote. There was a time when humanities scholars cited page numbers or other text references in footnotes, even when they were not quoting a passage. Some philosophical texts contain numbers that are used for such citation. For example, the works of Plato have what are called *Stephanus pagination*, which is numbers and letters that tell the reader the exact spot in the text to which they may refer, regardless of the edition, translation, or language of the text.

Controlling Subjectivity

Kagan's second dimension concerns the sources of evidence and the degree of control that researchers have over the conditions of their research. Both the social sciences and the humanities study human nature, which is highly variable. The humanities scholars are not only comfortable with this variability, they sometimes celebrate it. Social scientists struggle because of the necessity to control the context and variables in their research. As explainers, they look for causal connections, or at least correlations. They must sometimes narrowly define their vocabulary to fit the context in which they are used. While works in the humanities have unlimited use of concepts, they are still required to use them consistently. It would be illogical to change the meaning of a term without explanation.

Kagan points out, in his third dimension, that the context of the vocabulary in both areas determines the inferences we can make from them. So, while the concepts used in the humanities are broad, the inferences that we can justifiably make from them are narrow. Whereas, the constructs in the social sciences are narrow, the inferences we can make from them are also quite narrow. For example, the results of a survey study about charismatic leadership in a company may be narrow, in that they apply to the people studied. The study might also open the door to being tested again, or modified, or replicated with other groups. The inferences one draws from the study of charismatic leaders in history could be useful in a different way, not because it has the potential to predict or be confirmed in subsequent studies, but because it has the potential to create hypotheses and constructs that could be used in designing empirical studies. In leadership studies, the theories are all too often grounded in other theories that are based on other limited empirical studies. It's like

stringing together a bunch of snapshots but never really getting the whole picture. This works well in the natural sciences, but when you are studying human relationships, the results gained in a lab or from a survey are still narrow and open to more limited generalizations than those in the natural sciences.

Context

In his fourth dimension, Kagan says that social conditions produced by history do not play a significant role in the social sciences. This may be why some, but certainly not all, leadership researchers ignore context. For example, contingency theories hold, what seems like the obvious position, that leader effectiveness is determined by a mixture of context and other factors (Fiedler 2008). The humanities offer leadership studies more than context. They offer layers of understanding about human nature and human values. This is especially important because leadership is socially constructed and, as I have argued, morally constructed. By "morally constructed," I mean that the very idea of a leader has built-in assumptions about someone who ought to have utilitarian intentions, duties to stakeholders, responsibility of a group or organization, and care for followers and relevant stakeholders (Ciulla 1995).

In a sense, the humanities offer a huge "data set of narratives" about human nature and human behavior. Mining what philosophy, history, religion, literature, and the arts have to say about leadership and then forming theories or scientifically testable hypotheses from them, adds a richness and depth to research in leadership studies that is rare in the current literature (Ciulla 2008a, b). The best example of this is James MacGregor Burns' book on transforming leadership, *Leadership* (1978). Burns' theory is built on observations from history, not on social science studies. Researchers such as Bernard Bass (1985) later took Burns' theory and used it to design constructs and testable hypotheses, which then became his theory of transformational leadership. Hence, at one point, Burns and Bass met at the fork in the road and then headed off in research different directions. The research that evolved from these two theories was different and between the two, Bass's became more popular among leadership scholars.

The humanities can be used help to formulate and also to test empirical constructs. For example, I did extensive archival research on Nelson Mandela and found that, contrary to descriptions of authors writing about authentic leadership, Mandela did not fit the model of an authentic leader (Ciulla 2013). The implications of my study raised new questions, which could be turned into testable hypotheses about how iconic leaders like Mandela differ from other types of leaders. Another important question in leadership studies concerns the relationship between a leader's public and private behavior. For this question, I studied U.S. presidents who committed adultery (Ciulla 2016). My study discovered several areas for potential empirical research on how the desire to keep something like adultery secret affects a leader's ethical behavior on the job. These kinds of studies may seem merely anecdotal.

Nonetheless, with sufficient evidence and a strong argument, they could be used to derive testable hypotheses. An ideal way of studying leadership might be to develop a hypothesis from one or more of the humanities, and then test it in a lab or survey study. Such research has the potential to make leadership research more relevant to real problems of leadership today because it has a grounding in real events in history.

Ethical Values

Kagan's fifth dimension concerns the degree to which ethical values are part of the questions asked and the inferences drawn in both types of research. He claims that ethics is a major part of the social sciences and the humanities. It is not clear if this claim is that ethics *should* be a major part of both or whether it actually *is*. After all, the idea of a value-free, and hence, more scientific, social science is still alive and kicking.

Despite the fact that unethical leaders and leadership were constantly in the news and that most leadership theories contain implicit or explicit moral assumptions, there was very little research on ethics and leadership prior to 2000 (Ciulla 1995). Michael Brown, Linda Treviño, and David Harrison's (2005) study of ethical leadership used a survey instrument to describe ethical leadership and analyze its antecedents and consequences. They began their research by interviewing people to find out what they thought the qualities of an ethical leader were. Then they developed a questionnaire, to see if respondents had the same perceptions about what constituted an ethical leader. Brown et al.'s questionnaire opened the door to new research because it facilitated the application of scientific method to the study of ethics. Since their study, researchers have published numerous articles using this construct or some variation of it. One reason this kind of empirical research on ethics is so attractive is because it does not require researchers to actually learn about ethics in philosophy, religion, or any of the other areas of the humanities. (In fairness, the study of Brown et al. was informed by some of the ethics literature.)

Kagan's Final Dimensions

In the sixth dimension, Kagan addresses some of the differences in funding that affect the status of the humanities and the social sciences that I discussed earlier. The seventh dimension describes how researchers in both areas work. Since humanities scholars tend to work alone, this is a problem for interdisciplinary research, since the easiest way of spanning the divide in leadership studies and other areas is through collaboration. Another problem with how the humanists and social scientists work is *where* they work: Most university departments are fortified silos, and there is often little interaction between academics in the humanities and the social sciences.

Kagan's eighth dimension looks at how the social sciences and humanities contribute to the national economy. Here, he seems to mimic the prevailing thought in society today. The humanities may not directly contribute to the economy (unless you factor in the arts, movies, tourism to historical sights, and such). They are not associated with making money, yet they are incredibly useful to the economy. Knowledge grounded in the humanities may deter unethical behavior that leads us to lose money, abuse technology, perpetuate social injustice, and destroy the environment. In other words, it might keep us from making the same stupid mistakes over and over again. In recent history, the unethical behavior of business leaders who operated without an awareness sense of history, human nature, and moral values have crashed the global economy. More attention to history, literature, art, especially in regard to how we understand leadership, may not solve social problems, but it certainly might help us avoid them. Another reason that the humanities are important is that they foster the critical skills and understanding of social values that are fundamental to the capacities that citizens need to maintain a healthy democracy. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1997) argues that the humanities cultivate three capacities: the ability to critically examine oneself; the ability to see oneself as a human being who is bound to all human beings; and narrative imagination, or the ability to understand the emotions and wishes of someone different from oneself. From a practical point of view, the humanities make civilized life possible, but the humanities give us what we need to make it worth living.

Lastly, Kagan compares the criteria that social scientists and humanists use to judge whether a body of research or work is done well, or as he says, is "elegant" or "beautiful." For the social scientist, beauty is fairly straightforward: It is the well-designed research that supports a broad theoretical view of human nature. Kagan is less clear on what humanists find beautiful. He says that they like arguments that are logically cogent and good writing. Yes, humanists admire good writing, but they aren't always good writers – i.e., it's sometimes downright painful to read works in areas like philosophy or literary theory. For social scientists, writing is usually straightforward, because it is a means of describing and analyzing their research. However, some socials scientists seem to delight in making up or using jargon, which is also off-putting to outsiders. For instance, one such word that is particularly annoying to philosophers who do ethics, is the use of the word "ethicality" instead of "ethics." Since the two words can be used interchangeably, it is not clear why we would need another word – unless perhaps, researchers think it makes them sound smarter. For social scientists, writing is how they describe their results and what they mean. For humanities scholars, writing is as important and, in some cases, more important than the research, because language and meaning are central to their work. Interdisciplinary work between the social sciences and humanities would be much easier if academics on both sides learned how to be kind to their readers by writing better.

Conclusion

The social sciences are about – or are supposed to be about – *real* things that happen in the world based on observation and data. Except for history, most of the humanities – the arts, literature, religion, and philosophy – are not about facts per se. They concern themselves with fictions – creations of imagination that are often drawn from human perceptions of reality. Even history is a contested terrain because it can be fictionalized or selectively told by the powerful or any group with an agenda. Yet, to some extent, leadership too is a creation of our imaginations – forged from human relationships that encompass the hopes, fears, dreams, passions, wants, and needs of our individual and collective experiences. A number of theories and experiments support the view that leadership is a perception, a romantic notion, and/or an implicit theory that people carry with them (Meindl et al. 1985). If this is true, why would the epistemic value of studying leadership in a novel, a painting, or a religious text be any less significant than an experiment done on undergraduates, or a survey given to people in a company? Whenever we study people, we aim at moving targets, whose behavior is formed by perceptions, beliefs, free will, and imagination. Leading and following are aspects of being human. The humanities study those things that make us human. Almost all elements of leadership are seen, heard, and discussed in the humanities, which is why we cannot understand leadership without them.

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Part IV
Leaders and Followers Today

Chapter 16
Leadership and the Power of Resentment/ *Ressentiment*

Abstract and Background I became interested in resentment in around 2011 when I was editing my friend, Ruth Capriles' book, *Leadership by Resentment*, for my New Horizons in Leadership Series. Capriles, a Venezuelan, wrote about how the Marxist Hugo Chavez used class resentment to invert values and polarize Venezuelans. I was amazed by the destructive power of this emotion. Years after Chavez died, resentment appeared to be one of the emotions driving the election of Donald Trump and other populist leaders in Western democracies, as well as a force behind pro-Brexit voters.

This chapter examines the resentment and the French version of it, *ressentiment*. It was not easy to write because I can't pretend to be objective about the ethics of President Donald Trump. I had to step back and try to gain a broader perspective and once again, history presented me with a place to stand. Fortunately, I did not have to travel back too far. Fredrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Max Scheler (1874–1928) supply frighteningly accurate accounts of resentment and the conditions that make leaders like Trump and his followers possible. Both philosophers write about the French notion of *ressentiment*, which means *re-sentiment* or re-feeling, and what happens when this emotion governs leaders and followers. Nietzsche's account of resentment as slave morality and the last man is well-known. Less known is Scheler's prescient book *Ressentiment* (1914), which was a revelation to me. He describes *ressentiment* as a type of "social comparison" that emerges when there is inequality in a democratic society. Sound familiar? Scheler tells us there are common men of ressentiment and arrivistes. An arriviste is an energetic man of resentment who often surfaces as a leader in this context. He describes the arriviste as a man who is obsessed with his ratings and comparison to others – an apt description of Trump and other politicians in this age of polls, ratings, and social media. Scheler also paints a clear and compelling picture of how *ressentiment* inverts values and motivates people to reject things that are beneficial to them and society. Resentment is a poisonous and tenacious emotion. Understanding it and the conditions under which it grows may help us find a way out of the bitter polarization that has plagued the US and other countries. To my mind, curing a society of *ressentiment* is one of the greatest leadership challenges.

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Introduction

> Alas! The time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. (Friedrich Nietzsche)[1]

The moral status of leaders and leadership is difficult to assess until you can observe current events from a yet-to-be-determined place in the arc of history. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote a hopeful but controversial book called, *The End of History, The Last Man*, in which he made the Hegelian argument that there was "a coherent and directional history of mankind that will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy."[2] Back then, it looked like Democracy, with its love of human rights and freedom, had become an almost unstoppable force for good in the world. It seemed difficult to imagine that if given a choice, people would not want to live in a liberal democracy or that anyone who lived in one would give it up. According to Freedom House, between 2005 and 2018, there has been a steady decline in freedom and democracy, most notably in countries that were designated as free countries.[3] The report specifically notes that democracy has been weakened in the United States under President Donald Trump because of his attacks on the judiciary, fact-based journalism, and the rule of law.

Meanwhile, over the years, leadership scholars have devised happy models of transformational, transforming, authentic, and servant leadership. These ideal types of leaders are ethical, inspirational, and responsible, albeit often paternalistic. They aren't necessarily democratic notions of leadership because, except for transforming leadership, the research behind these models is usually based on business leadership, which is often closer to dictatorships or oligarchies than democracies. More recently, some leadership scholars have rejected images of the heroic, lone, male leader and embraced more egalitarian and democratic models of shared or collaborative, leadership that is practiced by the full variety of people and peoples who comprise the human race. Then in 2016, along came President Donald Trump, Brexit, and several atavistic leaders, many of whom are not proponents of democracy, even though they were elected. In the first part of the twenty-first century, citizens in countries, such as the United States, England, Russia, Hungary, Venezuela,

[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1995), p. 17

[2] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 2006), p. xii–xiii.

[3] Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019 (accessed June 7, 2019).

and Turkey shake their heads in wonder as they watch misguided or dictatorial leaders and their supporters turn back the clock on freedom.

Understanding what made it possible for Americans to elect a person like Trump will occupy scholars of all stripes for years to come. In addition to Trump's admiration for dictators and his denigration of democratic institutions such as the press, Congress, and the judiciary, he is arguably the most openly unethical president in American history. By "openly," I mean his unethical behavior has either been revealed to the public or is on display in public daily. For example, he is a prolific and brazen liar whose untruths and egregious use of hyperbole are easily unmasked in public records, TV appearances, or contradictory tweets. What is most curious about Trump as a leader, is that his followers do not seem to care – he really might be able to get away with "shooting someone in the middle of 5th Avenue" (as he once said). One reason they do not care is that they value his peculiar form of authenticity over morality. In other words, it is more admirable for him to say what he thinks or do what he wants, than it is for him to tell the truth or behave civilly. Trump's followers are willing to give him a pass on personal immorality, such as his comments about grabbing women "by the pussy,"[4] even though they would not do that or condone such behavior in their children or partners.[5]

Trump is not the only openly unethical leader in office. The Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, won his election, despite requests by the police and prosecutors to indict him for bribery and breach of trust. Rather than denying the charges, Netanyahu flaunted them to his supporters, using an ancient Hebrew word, in his campaign slogan, "Davka Netanyahu!". "The word davka means doing or thinking something both in spite of and because of a given situation."[6] The slogan tells his base to vote for him regardless of the charges against him and in doing so, thumb your nose at the elites. Both Netanyahu and Trump justify their bad behavior by portraying themselves as victims of the media and others. As we will see, the false victimhood of such leaders helps develop and/or intensify the real or imagined grievances and resentment in their followers.

This paper only explores one aspect of why followers might enthusiastically support blatantly unethical and sometimes undemocratic leaders. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of analyzing Trump and his influence on supporters is that he has so little respect for the truth that his thoughts are frequently incoherent and illogical. Hence, the usual forms of reasoned analysis based on economic conditions, historical forces, immigration, a coherent ideology, etc., fall short when it comes to understanding him and his appeal. To make sense of why followers would support a

[4] Emerson Brooking and P.W. Singer, "How October 7th, 2016 Shaped the Course of American History," *Rolling Stone*, October 5, 2018, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/trump-access-hollywood-tape-733037/ (accessed June 7, 2019).

[5] See this video of Trump supporter endorsing Trump but rejecting him as a role model. https://vimeo.com/187878563 (accessed June 7, 2019).

[6] *The Economist*, "Thus Spoke Netanyahu: An Old Hebrew Word Says a Lot About Israeli Politics," February 7, 2019. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/02/09/an-odd-hebrew-word-says-a-lot-about-israeli-politics (accessed June 7, 2019).

leader who is not only personally unethical but who takes actions that are often against their interests and moral values requires examining emotion, not reason. In what follows, I explore one of those emotions, resentment, and why it is such an effective way for leaders to cultivate loyal followers. In particular, I will focus on the French concept of *ressentiment*, which has a slightly different meaning than the English word and does a better job of explaining the social context that lays the groundwork for leaders like Trump and his followers today. Whereas the English term tends to refer to individual emotion, the French term regards the emotion as both an individual and social phenomenon. We need to understand this emotion to learn how to move beyond it and heal the injuries that it inflicts on society.

I will begin by looking at the differences between the two concepts of resentment and *ressentiment* in the literature and how these emotions relate to justice, fairness, social status, nostalgia, and other emotions. Next, I explore the most harmful aspect of resentment, the social and moral bi-product of it that Nietzsche called the "inversion of values." This occurs when leaders convince followers to regard what was considered good by those whom they resent as bad, and vice versa. I then construct a picture of how leaders cultivate resentment and use the inversion of values to create loyal followers. The paper shows why the cultivation of *ressentiment* and its ability to invert values are powerful tools for leadership and destructive for society. Analyzing the various components of resentment offers us an insight into what society must address to overcome it.

Resentment

Resentment and *ressentiment* are both vicious tenacious emotions that cause social, personal, and moral damage. Scholars uniformly agree that resentment is a bitter feeling that comes from a real or perceived harm or slight that violates a person's sense of dignity. Adam Smith calls resentment a disagreeable and unsocial passion that occurs when people suffer pain or harm that they did not deserve.[7] Smith also sees it as a reasonable reaction to harm that needs to be tamed and controlled by an impartial system of justice and rules that regulate retribution. On the positive side, Smith says resentment keeps people from accepting injury without feeling the need for recourse. David Hume makes a similar point. He says that resentment can help protect a person's self-esteem when he or she is harmed.[8] However, Smith also acknowledges that while resentment may indicate a desire for justice, it is somewhat different from revenge. He says, "the object, which resentment is chiefly intent upon, is not so much to make our enemy feel pain in turn, as to make him conscious

[7] Adam Smith, *The theory of moral sentiments.* 1st edition 1759 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).

[8] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

that he feels it upon his past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner."[9]

There is a certain passive-aggressiveness to Smith's description. Smith's observation is perhaps one of the most telling aspects of resentment that will show up in other accounts. It is both the desire for an apology but also a desire to humiliate the transgressor by making her apologize. Apology usually requires humility, but the resenter wants more. She wants the object of her resentment to feel the humiliation that she feels. While the object of resentment may apologize, it is not clear that the resenter will be able to forgive, if, as the philosopher Joseph Butler notes, forgiveness requires the foreswearing of resentment.[10] He says that to get rid of resentment, the victim has to let go of her victimhood, which is challenging because resentment is about victimhood.

Like Smith and Hume, philosopher Peter Strawson thinks resentment is an emotion that can be used to hold people responsible for harm that is done to them. Strawson regards resentment as what he calls a "participant reactive attitude." He says, "participant reactive attitudes are integral to personal relationships. They express how we feel about the actions of others: such as how much we mind them, whether they matter, and our attitude towards the good or ill will or the indifference of the actor."[11] We use these feelings to attribute responsibility and then hold people responsible. We use reactive attitudes or feelings to justify behavior and speech that does not seem to make sense but feels a certain way. Feelings of resentment may be just as strong when people think they are being ignored or disregarded as they are when they are harmed. The fact that people can feel resentment when no harm has been done to them, opens the door to the kind of manufactured resentment that leaders cultivate to gain enthusiastic followers. Unlike social movements, where leaders inspire and empower genuinely oppressed people to fight for their rights, a leader who cultivates resentment creates followers who are impotent victims that depend on the leader to nourish their resentment and take revenge for them by destroying what the people they resent want and value.

In a somewhat similar vein to Strawson, Hannah Arendt portrays resentment as a way of responding to another person's subjectivity. She says resentment is, to use Edmund Husserl's term, an intersubjective or empathetic experience.[12] Arendt knows that such an experience may lead to terrible things such as anti-Semitism; however, as repugnant as resentment is, people must still relate to other human beings for it to exist. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt compares the Nazi Party's Brown Shirts (SA) with Hitler's Schutzstaffel (SS). She tells us, the SA had a deep resentment of the Jews and others whom they felt were superior to them, and

[9] Smith, Adam. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* pp. 94–97.

[10] Joseph Butler, *Joseph Butler: Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics,* edited by David McNaughton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[11] Peter F. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008).

[12] Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations,* translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 1969.

they delighted in having the power to torture them. She saw their resentment was "*a last remnant of humanly understandable feeling*.[13] When Hitler's SS took over the camps, the SS did not resent their charges or feel anything towards them. Their destruction of the Jews was cold and systematic. Arendt describes the camps as places where "perfectly normal men were trained to be full-fledged members of the SS."[14] For Arendt, the banality of evil is when there is a total absence of emotions such as resentment.

Another way to understand the moral implications of resentment is by comparing it with similar emotions like indignation. Philosopher Jean Hampton defines the relationship between the two this way: "indignation is the emotional protest against immoral treatment whose object is the defense of the value which this action violated, whereas resentment is an emotion whose object is the defiant reaffirmation of one's rank and value in the face of treatment, calling them into question in one's own mind."[15] Furthermore, she notes, indignation never feels good, whereas, resentment does. Resentment allows the victim to feel morally superior to the wrongdoer, who has attacked her self-worth. It serves as an attempt to restore self-worth. The fact that resentment is a negative emotion that feels good is one of the factors that makes it so useful to leaders. While resentment may be an emotional, moral, and social poison, it is also a delicious and addictive one. In this respect, it resembles the feeling of *schadenfreude*, when one takes pleasure in another's misfortune. Schadenfreude is more closely related to resentment than envy because resentment has a stronger affiliation with the desire to see the objects of resentment get what they deserve than envy.[16]

Nietzsche on *Ressentiment*

Nietzsche's discussion of *ressentiment* is the gold standard for how it is now discussed in philosophy and other areas such as psychology. The French term *ressentiment* comes from re-sentiment or to re-feel. As a mass emotion, it is not new. At the end of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche diagnosed *ressentiment* as a social and moral problem of modernity. He saw European society as lacking passion, complacent, apathetic, and mainly concerned with pursuing individual desires and interests. They no longer had to fight for freedom and equality, and they did not

[13] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1951), p. 459.

[14] Ibid 459.

[15] Jean Hampton and Jeffrie G. Murphy, *Forgiveness and Mercy* (Cambridge University Press, 198), pp. 59–60.

[16] N.T. Feather and Rebecca Sherman, "Envy, Resentment, Schadenfreude, and Sympathy: Reactions to Deserved and Undeserved Achievement and Subsequent Failure, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28. 7, July 2002: 953–961.

want or feel the need to strive for anything great. He called such a personal and social type of resentful person "the last man."[17]

Nietzsche describes *ressentiment* as a powerful albeit petty and life stultifying emotion. "Nothing burns one up faster than the effects of *ressentiment*."[18] Never one to worry about insulting people, Nietzsche identifies *ressentiment* a "slave morality." Nietzsche's slave is not someone who overcomes the master and then lives happily ever after as a free person. Nietzsche's slave is free but, she cannot let go of her victimhood. It is because she feels like a victim that she eschews generosity, kindness, and other values that most people think are morally good. The slave says "no" to the outside and the other, forever dwelling on the real or imagined aggression and pain that made her a victim. This "no" is a creative act that is projected outside the self on to an opposing world. It creates by destroying things that the victimizer values as good. *Ressentiment* looks backward and requires external stimuli and an enemy. According to Nietzsche, the man of *ressentiment* is not naïve or honest with himself – "His soul *squints*; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths, and back doors…"[19] In contrast to the man of *ressentiment*, what Nietzsche calls "the noble man" does not remember insults and "shakes off with a *single* shrug many vermin that eat deep into others."[20] Such a person looks forward, is open, generous, creates new and good things, and has the capacity to love his or her enemies. Yet, despite the noble person's merits, Nietzsche says that a race of resentful men is bound to be cleverer than any noble race, and the revolt of the slaves (as he describes them) will lead to a reign of "the last man," which will be one of mediocrity, corruption, and political nihilism.

Philosopher Robert C. Solomon offers this take on Nietzsche's characterization of *ressentiment*, calling it a devious villain of the passions:

> It rarely allows itself to be recognized as resentment but mocks the appearance and titles of virtually any other emotion. Puffing itself up with moral armament, it presents itself as indignation, jealousy, and anger. Refusing to acknowledge its marked sense of inferiority, it portrays itself as hatred, or even as scorn or contempt for its superiors. Finding itself threatened, it retreats to the punitive humility of guilt and remorse – but only until the danger passes. Sensing another's vulnerable trust and openness, resentment plays at love, using all the devices of tenderness and concern to gain control of the other and to use him or her as an instrument of its vengeance.[21]

In Solomon's and in Nietzsche's characterizations of *ressentiment* we see why the *ressentiment* can become a powerful tool for leaders and a dangerous social phenomenon. It is rooted in how people see themselves and their place in society.

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[17] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* 1995.

[18] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo,* in *Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 230.

[19] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals* in *Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 38.

[20] Ibid. 39.

[21] Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993), p. 290.

The Common Man and the Arriviste

Max Scheler brings into focus some of the important social as well as psychological aspects of *ressentiment* that are central to understanding how leaders use the emotion. He describes *ressentiment* as a "self-poisoning" and a re-feeling of negative emotions, impotence, and weakness.[22] This re-feeling is like a grievance that is so old that we have forgotten who it is against and why we have a claim against him or her.[23] Not only is ressentiment delicious, it's insatiable. For Scheler, resentment is a long-term emotion that stems from feelings of impotence and social comparison. He says it can be triggered by a real or perceived attack or injury. The feeling begins with a desire for revenge but then turns to rancor, envy, spite, a desire to detract, which ends with *ressentiment*. Scheler tells us that we would not have wide-spread *ressentiment* in a society where everyone was politically and socially equal, nor would we have it in a caste society, or one with sharply divided classes. According to Scheler, ressentiment is most likely in societies "where approximately equal rights (political and otherwise) or formal social equality, publicly recognized, go hand in hand with wide factual differences in power, property, and education."[24] He calls *ressentiment* a "psychological dynamite" that spreads with social and political inequality. So, for Scheler, nothing spurs *ressentiment* more than a society where people have a right to equality, but know they are not socially, economically, or political equals to others. This prescient observation captures the situation in some democracies today where there is a growing social and economic inequality.

Drawing on Nietzsche, Scheler compares the "noble man" with the "common man." The noble man has values that are prior to any social comparison; whereas the common man only has values through comparison with others. Scheler describes two types of common men, the weak variety or men of *ressentiment* and the energetic variety that he calls the arriviste, who is similar to Nietzsche's clever "last man." An arriviste is someone who is constantly trying to out-do others at any cost and "arrive" at the top. Scheler says, arrivistes are incapable of love, generosity, sacrifice, and forgiveness, and they are unable to admit that they are wrong and apologize. Their feelings of impotence make it difficult for them to have real friends and enjoy life. The arriviste is someone who "smirks" but doesn't smile in friendship.[25] Unfortunately, as Scheler observes, these "energetic" common men are the ones who are likely to become leaders. His description of the arriviste aptly describes Trump's obsessions with his TV ratings, crowd size, and winners and losers.

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[22] Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. Lewis B. Voser and William W. Holdheim (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007).

[23] Ruth Capriles, *Leadership by Resentment* (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2012).

[24] Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. Lewis B. Voser and William W. Holdheim (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007), p. 28.

[25] Manfred Fringes, "Introduction," Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. Lewis B. Voser and William W. Holdheim (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007) p. 16.

> The arriviste is not a man who energetically and potently pursues power, property, honor, and other values. The ultimate goal of the arriviste's aspirations is not to acquire a thing of value, but to be more highly esteemed than others. He merely uses the "thing" as an indifferent occasion for overcoming the oppressive feeling of inferiority, which results from his constant comparisons."[26]

So, for Scheler too, *ressentiment* in the arriviste and the common man is a psychological condition of impotence and a condition of social comparison. It is the constant social comparison, not necessarily class or economic status, that drives the arriviste's *ressentiment*.

The Inversion of Values

For Scheler, *ressentiment* is both the antecedent and consequence of social and moral mediocracy and decay. Moreover, because *ressentiment* combines feeling impotent with feeling inferior, it prevents the common man from acting. This creates a tension between wanting to act and not being able to act, making the common man a perfect follower for the arriviste. "To relieve the tension, the common man seeks a feeling of superiority or equality, and he attains his purpose by an illusory *devaluation* of the other man's qualities or by a specific "blindness" to these qualities."[27] However, the main achievement of *ressentiment* is that it negates the values that everyone would normally consider excellent. Hence, the common man can no longer want the things that he had desired and used to think were good. Scheler argues that these "value delusions" lead to what he and Nietzsche call the inversion of values.

Scheler uses Aesop's fable, "The Fox and the Grapes," to illustrate how *ressentiment* leads to the inversion of values. It goes like this: On a hot summer day, a fox notices some grapes growing over the branch of a tree and decides that they are just what he needs to quench his thirst. The fox leaps for the grapes many times, but he cannot reach them. He eventually gives up and walks away with his nose up in the air and says, "I am sure that they were sour." The moral of the fable is "It is easy to despise what you cannot get."[28] Notice that when the fox walks away, it is not an act of resignation because he cannot reach the grapes. Instead, the fox compensates for his inadequacy by denigrating the grapes as "sour grapes." In doing so, the fox, and Scheler's common man lower all values to the level of their abilities and desires. Because the fox can't get the grapes, he decides that they are not good, and he no longer wants them. Scheler says people who "slander" unobtainable values that oppress them, know that those values are good but treat them as if they do not exist in their experiences. Resignation is a healthier emotion because it accepts and acknowledges what a person cannot do. For example, Scheler points out that the

[26] Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, p. 32.

[27] Ibid. 34.

[28] Aesop, *Aesop's Fables*, retold by Joseph Jacobs, Volume XVII, Part 1, Harvard Classics (New York: P.F. Collier & Son), 1914, p. 24.

process of aging can only be positive and satisfactory if people freely resign themselves to their abilities and values that are appropriate to their stage of life. Resenting the young or the fact that you cannot do the things that you did when you were young, keeps one from having fond memories.

What Scheler calls "value blindness" accounts for why people are willing to follow leaders who support policies that could even lead to their death. Right after the 2016 election of Trump, my family went to a restaurant that we had not frequented in a while, in Central Pennsylvania (one of Trump's political strongholds). The owner of the restaurant was an Italian woman who immigrated to America with her parents when she was a teenager and still spoke with a heavy Italian accent. We asked the polite, "How are you?" question, and she told us that she had kidney problems and requires dialysis every week. Then, unprovoked, she went into a passionate speech about how much she loved her new president and how happy she was that he beat that "bitch," Hilary Clinton. She also told us she was glad that Trump was going to keep Mexican immigrants out of America. Besides the contradiction of an immigrant wanting to keep immigrants out, she was also supporting a president who had vowed to get rid of the Affordable Care Act or what is called Obama Care. As a small businesswoman, she was likely insured under this act. So, in voting for Trump, she was supporting someone who might get rid of the insurance that was keeping her alive. Nonetheless, since it was enacted and supported by Obama, Clinton, Democrats, and others that she and Trump resented, it was not good.

Value blindness, value delusions, the inversion of values, explain why followers of Trump do not seem to care as much about his lies as long as those lies denigrate or harm their objects of resentment. Hence, Trump does not have to serve his follower's interests as long as he feeds their feelings of resentment. Furthermore, when some people cannot navigate the daily flood of information and contradictory ideas, they often turn to leaders, social media, and sources they know and like to decide what is true or what they want to be true. Others are like the fox. When they cannot reach the truth, they walk away from it saying, 'everything is fake news or bullshit, so I don't want the truth.'

Nostalgia and Grievance

Another aspect of resentment and *ressentiment* is nostalgia for some real or imagined time in the past. Individuals or groups blame their diminished state on the loss of something that they had in the "good old days." For a person of *ressentiment*, the past is often idealized or historically incorrect. Some older white men in American long for the days when a man had a good job, supported his family, and was the head of the household. Nostalgia is an easy way for leaders to create *ressentiment* by playing on fears, prejudice, and conspiracies about who stole what they once had or is preventing them from getting it. As a narrative, it can be manipulated to achieve

a leader's goals.[29] Leaders use nostalgia to grow and sustain *ressentiment*. Promising a return to a golden age reassures people, especially in times of rapid social, economic, and technological change. In doing so, leaders dangle the hope of restoring individual and national self-esteem.

Nostalgia is a common theme of successful leaders, past and present, all over the world. It is one way of making people believe that they can take back control of their lives, even if it means inverting democratic values and subverting institutions that support those values, such as the judiciary and the free press. In the US, the values of clean air and water are inverted when the narrative is nostalgia for a time when coal miners had well-paid jobs and businesses did not have to concern themselves with the quality of air. That is what's behind Trump's campaign slogan, "make America great again." Brexiteer politicians tap into a longing to restore a dynamic global Britain that is akin to the old British Empire. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi promises a Hindu nationalist revival. China's President Xi Jinping wants to restore China to its golden age, President Vladimir Putin envisions a return of Russia to the powerful era of the Soviet Union, and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro's narrative harkens to the days when military dictators kept corruption under control. Uncertainty about the future and loss of the good old days seem to affect whole countries. According to a poll of 28 countries in 2017, over half of the respondents thought that living conditions would stagnate or get worse in the future. In Japan, 85% of the people thought their children would not be richer than they were.[30] In short, they do not see the present or the future as better than the past. This is a radical shift from modernity with its enthusiasm for continual progress.

When leaders use nostalgia, they tap into the emotion of grief and loss. Feelings of grief combined with distress and injustice, result in a grievance. Grievances may be real, manufactured, or exaggerated. Leaders that use *ressentiment* nurse grievances in their followers. Followers may use resentment as a kind of "psychic retreat" that gives people some peace and protection from things in the world that they find threatening.[31] Psychotherapist Paul Hogget observes, "I have been struck by how many of my patients seem unable to give up their suffering but cling to it, endlessly repeating the thoughts, feelings, and fantasies associated with it."[32] When leaders nurse grievances, they help to sustain a sense of injustice. While we may have an obligation to remember the past, forgetting keeps us from being "wounded monsters" who feel pain and desire revenge but are unable to do anything about either one.[33] That's why Nietzsche tells us that the noble person forgets about slights and

[29] Hamid Foroughi, Yiannis Gabriel, Marianna Fotaki, "Leadership in a Post-Truth Era," *Leadership*, 15.2: pp. 135–151.

[30] The Economist, "The Uses of Nostalgia," *The Economist*, December 22, 2018, p. 11.

[31] In psychoanalysis, the threatening thing that the patient retreats from is the analyst. See, John Steiner, *Psychic Retreats: Pathological Organizations in Psychotic, Neurotic and Borderline Patients* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).

[32] Paul Hoggett, *Ressentiment* and Grievance," *British Journal of Psychotherapy* 34.3 https://doi-org.newman.richmond.edu/10.1111/bjp.12365, accessed May 28, 2019.

[33] David Reiff, *In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 2016, p. 145.

insults and moves on. For both of Scheler's men of *ressentiment*, *ressentiment* is about remembering and holding on to their victimhood and grievances about the past and projecting them on individuals and groups in the present.

The Objects of Resentment or the Resented

Resentment is a circular process. Once leaders begin to cultivate resentment in their followers, they also start creating the object of resentment, who eventually think, feel, and act the way the resented imagine them. The resented begin to look down on the resentful as ignorant and immoral, and they sometimes say so in public. Hence, resentment can be both the cause and the result of polarization, whether it is between the democrats and republicans, anti and pro-Brexit contingents, the right and the left, the working class and the elites, or the populists and everyone else. In America, these lines are crystal clear. For example, in her book on resentment in rural Wisconsin, Katheryn J. Cramer describes when her husband pulled into a gas station, and the man at the next pump saw an Obama sticker on his Prius, (which is considered a liberal's car) and said, "I don't like people like you."[34] A liberal would probably think the same thing about someone in a pick-up truck that had a gun rack and a Trump sticker on it.

On a social level, historical conditions and leaders help determine the resenters and the resented. Some groups, such as immigrants, Jews, LGBTQ, and members of racial and ethnic minorities, are usually hated for what they are, not for what they do. They are only resented when they become part of a narrative about their role in some loss, grievance, or ideal past where, for example, everyone looked, talked, had sex, and prayed alike. Leaders can cultivate resentment in their followers by creating narratives about how others, such as immigrants, diminish, insult, threaten, or take resources from them.

Meanwhile, those on the left or the educated and professionals, while objects of ressentiment, are certainly not blameless victims. From a moral point of view, the picture is not as simple as Nietzsche's dichotomy between the common man and the noble man. As a matter of fact, Nietzsche's dripping condescension towards the common man illustrates a critical part of what makes *ressentiment* possible. An elite group that looks down on the common man and characterizes them, as Hilary Clinton did, as "a basket of deplorables,"[35] plays into the narrative of resentment. It does not matter if Clinton was referring to the racists, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic and Islamophobic supporters of Trump or that she later apologized. What mattered is that she gave voice to what many elites and liberals think about Trump

[34] Kathryn J. Cramer, *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker* (University of Chicago Press, 2016) p. 1.

[35] See her comments at, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/election-us-2016-37329812/clinton-half-of-trump-supporters-basket-of-deplorables (accessed June 7, 2019).

supporters. The fact that elites think they are dumb, immoral, and deplorable is the source of the common man's feelings of impotence, humiliation, and anger. Thus, leaders may socially construct the object of resentment from undercurrents that already exist. Through leaders' rhetoric and actions, they turn the objects of resentment into the monsters that inhabit the resentful person's imagination – the ones who tell them that they are stupid and do not matter.

Hannah Arendt observed that history is rife with examples of the strong and superior man who does not know how to enlist the help of others. She says, "His failure is frequently blamed upon the fatal inferiority of the many and the resentment every outstanding person inspires in those who are mediocre."[36] In other words, the elite's self-aggrandizing fantasy is that they failed because they were so awesome that the common man became jealous of them. It's a nice story, but untrue. When leaders and other members of well-educated elites discount or overlook the concerns of the common man, they lay the groundwork for resentment and their subsequent failure. As I pointed out earlier, Arendt thinks that treating people as if they are invisible or as objects is more inhuman than actually hating them.

Resentment today, certainly among Trump supporters, is mostly resentment of professionals, mainstream politicians, liberal journalists, the well-educated, and experts. Trump promises his working-class followers little to improve their lot. His anti-elite, anti-professionalism propaganda denigrates the object of their resentment, namely professionals, allowing them to take revenge on those who they believe oppress them. As philosopher Cory Wimberly writes, "The working class knows who administers their existence. They see it at work in the professionals who create and supervise their work environment; they are the same professionals who hire and fire them."[37] They also know the control professionals exert over them such as the "establishment" political parties, who have ignored them for a long time. By making elites and professionals the object of resentment, Trump easily jettisons science, facts, and experience. He inverts the value of experience by making his inexperience, and the inexperience of those around him, a virtue. This aspect of resentment is part of the reason why some mainstream politicians and political parties find themselves losing elections. Elites and professionals are the perfect foils for inverting values because the common man takes his revenge on them by rejecting whatever they think is good, even if they end up hurting the common man and the country. For example, according to the *Economist*, over 60% of Tory members are willing to inflict serious damage on the economy to achieve Brexit.[38]

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[36] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 128.

[37] Cory Wimberly, "Trump, Propaganda, and the Politics of *Ressentiment*, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* 32.1, 2018: 179–199, p. 191.

[38] The Economist, "The Global Crisis in Conservatism," July 6, 2019, p. 9.

Conclusion: Chaos and Hope

I have examined resentment as a part of an answer to the question raised at the beginning of the paper: "What makes it possible for people to elect a leader like Trump who is openly unethical, undemocratic, and does not act in the interests of his constituents?" While such leaders eventually leave office, their followers and the destruction they inflict on society remains. By describing the emotion of resentment and *ressentiment*, I do not offer a cure, only a description of what needs to be cured. A detailed analysis of how to solve the problem of a polarized society lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, some of the conditions that create the symptoms of resentment are well-known. Social comparison and negative self-esteem thrive in democratic societies where ballooning social and economic inequality contributes to the corruption of some leaders and the erosion of democratic institutions. So, as the social and economic distance between the top and everyone else grows, more people feel like impotent, invisible, victims. They are right to grieve the loss of a time when democracy guaranteed them equal opportunity, and its institutions created the necessary conditions for a level playing field.

Most people, including the resentful, want to be recognized and acknowledged as human beings who have dignity and are respected on an equal basis with others. The irony is that an arriviste leader like Trump does not give his followers what they need to attain these things. He has no plans for better education, job training, health care, or other initiatives that might alleviate inequality, restore self-esteem, and offer everyone the opportunity to pursue what is good in life. Instead, Trump's leadership by resentment only provides followers with food to feed their resentment. He does this through a relentless barrage of tweets, insults, erratic policy ideas, and rallies. In short, Trump offers his followers constant emotional stimulation so they can re-feel certain emotions. Herein lies the silver lining. When leaders stop feeding their followers' resentment, the feeling diminishes along with their enthusiasm for the leader. For instance, Trump was widely criticized for planning to give a speech during the Independence Day celebration in Washington, because politicians are not supposed to use that day for political purposes. Trump went ahead with the event and in response to criticism, gave a more presidential speech about uniting the country and American history.[39] His normally attentive and enthusiastic fans, while happy to be in the presence of the President, unsurprisingly paid little attention and showed

Less emotion than when he excoriates democrats, Hilary Clinton, and the fake news. As Trump well knows, he cannot act and talk like a traditional president without losing many of his followers. Removing the stimulants for resentment or the leaders who provide it may be the first step towards a cure for the emotion. The rest is up to leaders in all sectors of society to address inequality, the immigrant crisis,

[39] Maureen Dowd, "Yankee Doodle Donnie," *The New York Times,* June 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/opinion/sunday/maureen-dowd-trump-july-4th.html?searchResultPosition=10

etc., and destroy the conditions in which resentment can grow. What we do not know is the extent to which Trump, through the media and social media, would be able to sustain resentment when he is out of office – a fascinating question for future research.

As we see today, populist leaders, who are often both arrivistes and elites, tap in to the feelings of citizens who have been ignored by leaders, left behind by globalization, replaced by new technologies, diminished by the financial crisis, overwhelmed immigrants, and disheartened by gay rights and the breakdown of the patriarchal family. In the US and other countries, some of us believed, like Fukuyama, that the world was getting better, while the rest sat back, silently watching in dismay as the rest of the world seemed to move forward without them.

We are living in a time when those who are doing well have focused on pursuing their self-interests, ignored shared values, and taken democracy for granted. As Nietzsche predicted, when this happens, we end up with the "last man" and Scheler's arriviste leaders, who create polarization and chaos. Nietzsche thinks chaos is a good thing because it compels us to act. As his Zarathustra tells us: "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves."[40] Let's hope he is right on both counts and we can find ways to turn today's chaos into dancing stars.

[40] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, p. 17.

Chapter 17
Afterword

Keywords Business ethics · Philosophy · Leadership ethics · Leadership studies · *Business Ethics Quarterly* · *Journal of Business Ethics* · Followers · Post-heroic leadership

For the reader who has made it to the end of the book or perhaps wandered on to this page, I would like to offer a few closing reflections on my work in business ethics and leadership ethics. Pulling these papers together and seeing them next to each other was a curious experience because they have been published in disparate places over a long period of time. In contrast to business school scholars today, who are told that the only thing that counts is publishing in "top tier" journals, I have published promiscuously – never worrying about where my work landed. Many of the publications have appeared in obscure books and journals or the collections of friends or colleagues. I write when I have something to say and I am willing to say it to anyone, anywhere. This attitude accounts for the joy that I get from my work, and the gratitude I feel towards anyone willing to take the time to read it. I have always thought the most important obligation of writing is to be kind to the reader. This rule is especially significant in applied ethics, where scholars should write about things that matter to people in the real world and in ways that they can understand.

As I mentioned in the introduction, ever since I began working in the field of business ethics, my colleagues and I have been waging a battle to convince business schools that business ethics ought to be a fundamental part of business education, and should be taught by business ethics scholars. Ethics is certainly relevant to business because most business ethics courses and textbooks include timely case studies related to other parts of the curriculum, such as finance, marketing, etc. Those of us in business ethics often operate like "ambulance chasers," following the biggest scandals so we can write cases and articles about them. For example, when I started working in business ethics, the headlines were filled with high profile insider trading cases. Years later, the Enron case and then the financial crisis dominated the public discourse and academic literature. Today, the media is filled with stories

J. B. Ciulla, *The Search for Ethics in Leadership, Business, and Beyond*,
Issues in Business Ethics 50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38463-0_17

about topics such as data breaches, bitcoin, immigration, and global warming. When it comes to business ethics, there never seems to be a shortage of topics.

Courses and literature about business ethics also include theoretical work on subjects such as stakeholder and social contract theory, and normative literature on virtue ethics and other philosophical approaches to ethics and business. I have served on the editorial board of the *Business Ethics Quarterly* since its inception in 1991. In the early days of the journal, most of its articles were by philosophers and concerned foundational questions in business ethics. There was a fresh quality to them because everything was still pretty new. I was also on the editorial board and the book editor for the *Journal of Business Ethics*. Back then, it was more eclectic than the *Business Ethics Quarterly* and offered a mixed bag of some wonderful and not so wonderful articles. The field has come a long way since then. The literature from scholars in Europe and other parts of the world has also matured and made unique and significant contributions to the business ethics literature, which used to mainly come from the US. Business ethics has definitely progressed in terms of the quality of research. However, I am not so sure that it has improved in terms of producing new ideas and approaches to the subject. Perhaps this is because business ethics has entered what Thomas Kuhn called normal science, where we often hash over the details of established ideas or simply cover topics in the news.[1]

Institutional factors are also at play in shaping business ethics today and in the future. Who business schools hire to teach and do research on business ethics affects what gets written. In business schools that value where you publish more than what you publish, business ethics scholars are often at a disadvantage when it comes to hiring, tenure, and promotion. As a result of this, doctoral students get their PhDs in business disciplines like organizational behavior and then do research related to ethics. On the positive side, the influx of empirical work on ethics has enriched the field. On the negative side, if the number of philosophically trained scholars diminishes, business ethics research could become more like an arm of the management literature, which is dominated by empirical research. As I write this book, business ethics seems to have found the sweet spot that balances both kinds of research. Nonetheless, given the trends in the academy that I discussed in Chap. 15, I fear that philosophically sophisticated research in business ethics could fall by the wayside unless it is taken up by more philosophers in philosophy departments. Of course, this is also problematic because the discipline of philosophy has traditionally been less enthusiastic about business ethics than other areas of applied ethics, such as medical and legal ethics.

The philosophical side of business ethics matters for teaching as well as research. In a complex, fast-changing world, business schools have a difficult time keeping up with new technologies and ways of doing business in most of their courses. That is why we would better serve our students by having them enter the business world armed with timeless ideas about ethics and human values. Business students need

[1] Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

courses that allow them to reflect on their values, think critically about business, and gain an understanding of the role of business in society. These are useful and durable life skills that help them work with others, solve problems, develop perspective, and adapt to a changing environment. Unlike a large portion of the business school curriculum, what students learn in a good business ethics course usually cannot be conveyed in a corporate training program.

The issues related to research and teaching in leadership ethics are similar to those in business ethics. While philosophers shaped the early literature in business ethics, research on ethics in leadership mainly consisted of empirical studies that were mostly from business. In business ethics, we often learn more from the ethical failures of businesses than we do from companies that are moral exemplars. I think the same is true in leadership ethics. That is why I use the questions, "What makes it difficult for a leader to be ethical?" and "What are the ethical challenges that are distinctive to leaders and leadership?" to guide my research.

When I started in leadership studies, the popular literature or "airport books" on leadership were cheerful, hortatory tomes that celebrated leaders and often made readers feel like they too could be leaders. These books talked about leaders as ethical, inspirational, transformative, etc. I noticed that even the academic literature leaned towards models of ideal leadership types or studies of ethical leadership. Models and constructs of good leadership such as transforming, transformational, servant, authentic, and ethical leadership governed most of the leadership literature. They all tended to be 'the white man on a white horse' theories. Today, a growing body of leadership scholars reject these models because they are individualistic, Western, male, and heterosexual. So now, post-heroic leadership ideas of embedded, inclusive, shared, and collaborative leadership abound. These are aspirational theories about what leadership should be but not necessarily what it actually is.

While I wholeheartedly agree with the values and aspirations of post-heroic theories of leadership, I do not think that they address some of the most pressing problems with leaders and followers. I am not sure that changing the cast of characters or redistributing power necessarily yields more ethical and effective leaders. Both history and current events present more pressing research questions such as how destructive and unethical leaders are able to gain power and why people follow them. There has been some excellent work in this area, but we need more.[2]

When I began studying the ethics of leaders, I naïvely thought that when followers knew that a leader lied to them or behaved unethically, they would withdraw their support. After all, who would want to follow an unethical leader? I also assumed that at the most transactional level, followers would abandon a leader who failed to supply them with what they wanted and needed for their well-being. I was wrong again, because, as I discussed in Chap. 16 on resentment, the emotional needs of followers do not always align with their practical ones.

[2] The seminal work on why people follow destructive leaders is: Lipman-Blumen, Jean (2005). *The Allure of Toxic Leaders*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Looking back, I realize that I had fallen into the same trap of other leadership scholars. Whereas I criticized them for painting rosy pictures of leaders, I veered towards rosy pictures of followers. This made me wonder whether leadership scholars suffer from bouts of wishful thinking. The ethics of a good follower is not much different from the ethics of a good leader, so there is no reason to think that one would be better than the other in the leader/follower relationship.[3] Sometimes followers are personally more ethical than their leaders but unethical as followers. For example, ever since Aristotle, we have assumed that leaders would be moral (and immoral) role models. This is not always true. Followers sometimes endorse leaders who deviate from moral norms and say and do things that followers think are wrong and would never do themselves.[4] What I have learned is that the more you know about the moral relationship between leaders and followers, the more complicated it gets. This is why empirical studies alone are inadequate for understanding leadership or ethics. They offer snapshots of behavior but do not encompass the panoramic view of human nature that the humanities provide.

I have been fortunate to begin working in business ethics when it was young and be a pioneer in the field of leadership ethics. Watching both areas grow continues to be enormously gratifying. I am especially proud of the authors who have written books in my New Horizons in Leadership Studies[5]; the scholars who have contributed

[3] Kelly, Robert (1992). *The Power of Followership*. New York: Doubleday Currency.

[4] Edwin Hollander calls the behavior that allows leaders to deviate from norms "idiosyncrasy credits." See: Hollander, Edwin P. (2009). *Inclusive Leadership: The Essential Leader-Follower Relationship*. New York: Routledge.

[5] Ciulla, Joanne B. ed. New Horizons in Leadership Studies Series. Cheltenham, UK and Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Books in series:

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chapters to my edited and co-edited collections[6]; and those who have published articles in the special issues[7] that I have edited or co-edited. All of these people have contributed to growing the literature on leadership ethics and expanding the field of leadership studies.

Research in business ethics and leadership ethics continues to be an adventure for me because both areas affect our daily lives and are essential parts of the human condition. Business and leadership shape how groups and societies organize themselves and supply their members with what they need to live and flourish. The ethics of how people do these things matters, which is why I will continue on this path and encourage others to join me on my journey.

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33. Petersen, Verner C. 2002. *Beyond Rules in Society and Business.*
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